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An attempt is made to examine the importance of the Pacific region to the economy of Singapore, 
using several standard methodologies in the international economics literature. Singapore's trade with 
and investment flows from the 'region' have been increasing significantly, while its interaction with 
Europe has diminished. Hence, in light of these developments, it is useful to explore the links between 
Singapore and the Pacific region, especially with respect to ASEAN. 
The trade aspect of the thesis has been based on models developed by Balassa, who used them in an 
attempt to analyse the growth and development of the European Community. Firstly, in analysing tlte 
changing comparative advantage in the region, a measure of revealed comparative advantage is 
adopted, Balassa's export specialisation ratio (1965). Secondly, the changing pattern of trade in 
manufactured goods is examined in relation to changing country characteristics by the use of an 
econometric technique - ordinary least squares - (Balassa 1979). Then, using a measure of intra-
industry trade (Grube! and Lloyd 1975), the figures are examined for ASEAN along with a study of 
intra-industry trade by conm1odity group for Singapore. Balassa's method of estimating trade creation 
and trade diversion (1963), is used in order to test the effectiveness of economic cooperation in 
ASEAN. 
Singapore adopted an open strategy towards Foreign Direct Investment (FDI). The effects on 
Singapore can be conveniently reviewed under the standard industrial economics forn1at of structure, 
conduct and performance. Using Dunning's adaption of the 'industrial organisation approach' (1973), 
it is possible to show, by examining the statistical relationship between a number of structural 
variables and the sectoral distribution within the manufacturing industry (correlation technique -
bivariate normal distribution), that the ownership advantages of multinational corporations have 
assisted Singapore's economic restructuring towards higher allocative and technical efficiency; and 
that multinational corporations have adjusted to the changing locational advantages of Singapore's 
resource endowments rather more positively than national firms. 
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The work undertaken aims to investigate the nature of the economic development of the ASEAN 
com1tries. However, if one is to investigate ASEAN, it is above all necessary to analyse Singapore's 
position within this grouping. Singapore's dominant position at the commercial heart of ASEAN is 
manifested in two ways. The island carries a great deal of weight in the exchanges that takes place 
within ASEAN, but it also acts as a challllel for a considerable part of the flows between ASEAN and 
the rest of the world; it finds itself part of an intricate network of economic relations at once intra- and 
extra-regional. 
An attempt is made to exanline the importance of the Asia-Pacific region, particularly ASEAN, to the 
economy of Singapore. Singapore's trade linkages with the Asia-Pacific countries are rather extensive. 
They not only account for the bulk of Singapore's exports and imports but also contribute most 
significantly to the growth and expansion of its external trade. Using several standard methodologies 
in the international economics literature, an analysis of the relation between trade and development in 
Singapore is provided - decomposing Singapore's exports and imports by com1try and product, from 
the 1960s to the beginning of the 1990s. Particular emphasis is placed on the region's evolving pattern 
of trade in and production of manufactured goods, and the development of policies towards tl1e 
manufacturing sector, including industrial development tluough foreign investment. It is hoped that 
tllis approach will give further insights into t11e factors tllat have played an important role in 
Singapore-Pacific trade relations. 
Singapore has a very open and outward-looking economy. The share of international trade in the 
country's GNP is relatively high by developing country standards. Singapore's trade regime is liberal, 
with protection levels that pale in comparison witl1 most developing countries. Government 
intervention has played a pronlinent role. Therefore, tllis growing Pacific orientation in Singapore's 
trade relations may be seen essentially as a product of deliberate policy distortions rather than just a 
market phenomenon. Liberal trade policies, export -oriented industrialisation, and export 
diversification, have helped Singapore to become what it is today. This implies tl1at goverlllllent 
policies have apparently worked with, rather than against, t11e market forces, thereby expediting 
progress towards the internationalisation of the economy of Singapore. 
The preceding remarks are meant to pave the way for the analysis that is to follow. For, the approach 
adopted implies tllat changes in trade trends, shifts in the cmmtry's comparative advantage, and 
movements in its resource allocation cannot be considered in isolation without relating them to 
external factors. Thus, a change in the structure of Singaporean exports, for instance, may have to be 
related to industrial restructuring taking place elsewhere. 
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The interface between trade flows and investment linkages has helped strengthen the Singapore-
Pacific nexus. Industrial development in Singapore is closely related to structural changes and 
industrial adjustments taking place in the industrial countries and the other NICs, especially those in 
the Asia-Pacific region. Some activities which have been edged out or phased out in the process of 
industrial restmcturing in these countries have migrated to Singapore through foreign direct 
investment cluumels. 
The process of rapid growth in output and intra-regional trade and investment in Asia is sometimes 
referred to as a 'virtuous circle' of economic development. Foreign capital inflows have combined with 
a favourable policy environment, industrialisation and trade expansion to achieve a sustained 
acceleration in economic growth. The efficient use of resources, increased trade and rapid growth 
have, in turn, stimulated an increase in the flow of intra-regional foreign investment. This process is 
gradually helping to internalise Asian growth and to reduce Asia's vulnerability to external shocks, 
although the latter factors are and will continue to wield significant influence on Asian economic 
performance. Foreign investment activities, in turn, have helped open up additional conduits for trade 
flows between the home and the host countries. As a result, the complementarity of the Singapore 
economy to the rest of the Pacific has grown even stronger, as manifested by the increased intra-
industry trade flows between Singapore and its major sources of foreign direct investment in the 
Asia-Pacific region. 
Singapore has benefited immensely from its strategic geographic location by taking advantage of 
opportunities arising from the dynamics of the Asia-Pacific region. Major stmctural changes have 
taken place in the industrial countries of the Asia-Pacific region since the 1970s, especially in Japan, 
partly prompted originally by the rapidly rising energy and raw material prices. The successful export 
thmst of Singapore has provided incentives for the rest of ASEAN to emulate it. Singapore did not 
lose the opportunity to profit from the international migration of industries forced by 'product cycles' 
(Vernon 1979). 
As a response to the changing economic environment and domestic comparative advantage, the Asian 
countries have undergone significant stmctural change and readjustment. They are now in the process 
of finding their own niches in the production of goods and services for the world market. Therefore, 
changing comparative advantage will have to be dealt with in order to determine whether or not the 
case of Singapore accords well with the predictions of trade theory. This is done by identifYing 
changes in a measure of revealed comparative advantage (RCA), the export specialisation ratio 
(Balassa 1965), for a number of cmmtries in the Asia-Pacific region. 
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There is evidence to show that intra-industry trade flows between Singapore and the ASEAN 
countries, and for that matter, between Singapore and the developed countries of the region, are 
increasing, as will be seen in chapter three, and that industrial linkages between Singapore and the 
Pacific are growing stronger, as will be seen in chapter five. It is important to note, that the 
relationship between Singapore and the rest of the Pacific, especially the developed cmmtries and 
ASEAN, is largely one of complementarity rather than competition, given the differences in their 
resource endowments. 
One of the most important trends in trade, especially trade in manufactured goods, has been the 
growth of intra-industry trade (liT). This has been defined as the simultaneous export and import of 
products belonging to the same industry (Grubel and Lloyd 1975). Since the introduction of the 
concept of intra-industry trade (Ba1assa 1966), a vast literature has developed on the subject. Efforts at 
the measurement of the extent of intra-industry specialisation (its relative importance within a 
country's total trade), have been followed by research on the theory of intra-industry trade and its 
delenninants. Thus the changing pattern of trade in manufactured goods can be examined by the use 
of econometric techniques. One teclmique, as used by Balassa, analyses the detenninants of intra-
industry trade in terms of country characteristics affecting this trade. The results are interpreted in 
terms of changes in the extent, and in the determinants of intra-industry specialisation as countries 
reach higher income levels in the process of economic development. 
Using the Grubel and Lloyd measure of intra-industry trade, the figures can be exatnined for the 
ASEAN region along with a study of intra-industry trade by commodity group for the economy of 
Singapore, to identify the growth sectors within the economy. The study should show that over time 
there has been a tendency for the ASEAN countries to move away from inter-industry trade. 
Furthermore, the commodity composition, in the case of Singapore, is of interest not only for the 
information it reveals about Singapore's trade patterns, but also because it gives some indication of 
how the development policies have changed over time. 
The formation of the European Community represents one of the major economic events of the post 
war era. This so called 'economic community' encouraged the view that economic integration could be 
used as a means of developing trade, especially intra-regional, sustaining growth and thus becoming 
of interest for developing countries. The importance of ASEAN cooperation must be examined in 
order to detennine whether this group of countries has had a favourable effect on economic growth. 
This is done by analysing the trade effects of ASEAN integration using a test of trade creation and 
trade diversion (Balassa 1963), investigating the pattern of imports prior to and after the point of 
integration. The method is based on the assumption that income elasticities of import demand would 
have remained unchanged in the absence of integration, ie. that the establishment of ASEAN was the 
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only major measure influence on changes in the pattern of imports as between the pre-integration and 
the post-integration periods. 
The role of foreign capital in economic growth is controversial. Neither the theoretical arguments nor 
empirical evidence is clear-cut or conclusive. In the early 1960s a group of economists had argued that 
foreign capital inflows invariably had a favourable effect on economic efficiency and growth. 
(Rosenstein-Rodan, 1961). In the early 1970s the assumptions and findings of this group were 
challenged by the 'displacement theorists' who argued that foreign capital could be immiserising. 
(Areskoug, 1973). Recent developments and experiences in Asian developing com1tries have 
warranted a further consideration of this issue. 
There appears to exist a close link between trade in manufactures and foreign investment activities in 
the economy of Singapore. This seems to be the case especially with regards to intra-industry trade 
flows, for intra-firm sales apparently constitute the bulk of such flows. Thus, an important explanation 
of Singapore's trade phenomenon lies in tl1e pattern of foreign investment in the country. Foreign 
direct investment, especially from tl1e Asia-Pacific com1tries, has facilitated the structural 
transformation of industry in Singapore and ASEAN, by injecting not only capital but also 
teclmology, as will be seen in chapters five and six. The significant demonstration effect of all this on 
the rest of the economy is discernible even tl10ugh it is hard to quantify. 
In Singapore, foreign direct investment and multinational corporations have played a major role in tl1e 
development of the economy. However, in order to test the extent the operations of MNCs have 
affected economic structure or changes in economic structure in Singapore, the thesis will draw on 
the theory of foreign direct investment. First, in the 1960s and 1970s, a number of Western-based 
economists approached the study of overseas investment through micro-economic analysis of the 
multinational finn (Kindleberger, 1969; Caves, 1971; Hymer, 1976; Horst, 1978). Second, beginning 
in the late 1970s, a m111lber of Japanese economists used a macro-economic perspective based on 
comparative advantage to analyse the special nature of Japanese overseas investment (Kojima, 1973; 
1978). Both approaches focused heavily on the supply side - eitl1er the internal dynamic of the 
multinational firm, or the comparative advantage of the investor cmmtry. 
Singapore adopted an open strategy towards Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) with the objective of 
taking advantage of foreign investment for the necessary restructuring of the economy of a small open 
state. Singapore relied on inward FDI in order to create the conditions for its own future outward FDI. 
The objective of tllis study is to analyse various aspects of foreign investment which were carried out 
by examining the statistical relationsllip between a number of structural variables and the sectoral 
distribution within tl1e manufacturing industry. Using Dmming's adaption of the 'industrial 
organisation approach' (1973), it is possible to show that the ownership advantages of multinational 
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corporations have assisted Singapore's economic restructuring towards higher allocative and technical 
efficiency; and that multinational corporations have adjusted to changing locational advantages of 
Singapore's resource endowments rather more positively than national firms. 
The authorities in Singapore took advantage of foreign investment in restructuring Singapore's 
manufacturing sector and overall development from a low wage and low productivity economy to a 
relatively high wage and high added value economy. The authorities did not hesitate to abandon 
whole low wage sectors of the economy to outward FDI of their own, in order to allow for higher 
added value productions at home. Thereby the govemment made use of certain political 
authoritarianism and of wage controls. But it did not regulate specifically inward or outward FDI, but 
rather the macroeconomic environment. This is a almost unique precedent in the developing world. 
It is realised that the results will be limited as the question of restructuring ought to be answered on a 
world-wide scale, as the larger multinational corporations consider the world as their potential 
operating ground. The statistics on inward foreign direct investment in Singapore allow the testing of 
several hypotheses. The description of the development of Singapore's economy and its development 
strategy provides the background against which these hypotheses conceming determinants and effects 
of foreign direct investment in Singapore can be evaluated. 
Intervention has been widespread by govemments in the region. While less protectionist than the third 
world as a whole, few accepted westem free trade principles. Many have used import controls to 
protect strategic sectors. At one time or another state-owned industries have played an important role 
in many of the economies, including South Korea, Taiwan, Indonesia, Singapore and Thailand. Many 
have not hesitated to direct the supply of credit to particular sectors. 
Govemment intervention has always played a dominant role in the successful development of 
Singapore. Upon independence Singapore was not a low income country by today's standards; it had a 
well trained civil service, a well developed infrastructure and port, an excellent location and, above 
all, no large agricultural sector to support. The merit of the govemment's pragmatic policies is that it 
has exploited these initial conditions to the full. It used interventionist policies and market signals to 
accelerate economic growth while at the same time satisfYing basic needs and providing a high level 
of public services. 
It is claimed that development would be fastest when the govemment concentrated on two jobs: 
maintaining macroeconomic stability through conservative fiscal<md monetary policies; and investing 
in people through public education, training and healthcare programmes. Beyond this, developing 
countries should rely on market forces. They should create as competitive as possible a regime in 
industry, commerce and financial sector. They should also eliminate all barriers to trade and foreign 
investment. Development will be rapid, provided countries find a way of: accumulating capital 
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readily; allocating resources efficiently; and catching up technologically. However, there is no 
presrunption that any of these functions should be reserved exclusively for the private sector. The 
Asian economies appear to have used a mixture of market incentives and state intervention in each of 
these areas. 
Economists have failed to give a clear answer to the question of growth in East Asia (Leipziger and 
Thomas 1994). Instead the issue has been a battleground for two competing and contradictory, schools 
of t110ught. The first - the neoclassical school - argues that East Asia succeeded because it did certain 
basic things right: low inflation, a stable framework of law, lots of domestic and international 
competition, relatively undistorted prices and plenty of education. The other - t11e revisionist school -
emphasises state intervention. East Asia succeeded, say tl1e revisionists, precisely because of the 
'distortions' that governments deliberately introduced: if otl1er countries, rich or poor, want to grow as 
quickly, they should stop praising market forces and put t11eir bureaucrats in charge (The Economist, 
Oct 2nd-8th 1993). 
Over the last tllirty years the ASEAN countries have experienced successful economic development. It 
is remarkable, that over tllis period, almost all the Asian developing economies have deliberately 
moved away from policies of extensive state control of the economy and inward-looking 
industrialisation toward market and export-oriented policies. Few would have forecast in 1960 that 
not only Hong Kong, Korea, Singapore and Taiwan, but also Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines and 
Thailand, almost all the coru1tries of Soutl1 Asia and China and Vietnam, would make liberalisation of 
trade, deregulation of industry and increasing autonomy for state enterprises major objectives of 
national economic policy since t11e 1980s. 
The motive behind these policy reforms has been tlte realisation that inward-looking industrial 
development for a protected domestic market was building up relatively inefficient, internationally 
uncompetitive industries and, more generally, tltat excessive state regulation of industry inllibited 
industrial development and economic growth. An ingredient in almost all the reforms has been the 
belief that greater reliance on market forces, international competition and the price mechanism 
would make for a more dynamic economy and more efficient allocation of resources. 
It goes without saying that tltis economic ntiracle needs to be understood. Much of tlle tltird world, 
especially the countries of sub-Saharan Africa, remains desperately poor. If the secrets of East Asia's 
success could be discovered and applied in other developing countries, an enormous advance in 
human well-being would be within reach. Nor should t11e lessons be confined to the world's poor 
countries. For years the big Western economies have been growing far more slowly tl1an East Asia. 
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The world economy enjoyed moderate growth in the closing years of the 1980s, but the auspicious 
picture was not uniform. The industrial com1tries saw favourable developments in growth, trade, and 
investment. The growth in trade flows with the accompanying expansion in foreign investment has 
been, according to Beeman and Frank (1988), a manifestation of the increasing integration of the 
world economy. This trend towards globalisation has been attributed to two factors. One is 
technological: the explosive advances in the speed and effectiveness of international communication 
and transportation and the concomitant shrinkage in their real costs. The other is economic: the 
reduction or dismantlement of national barriers to the international movement of goods, services, 
technology, and capital. Outside of Japan and Gennany, the main beneficiaries of this tighter world 
nexus have been tl1e Asian NICs. 
The remarkable growth in the region only partly reflects market-oriented policies. Singapore, 
Malaysia, Thailand and, to some degree, Taiwan, have welcomed foreign investment. Early 
developers such as Japan and Sout11 Korea used otl1er devices, such as licences letting t11em copy 
foreign Leclmology. But unli.l{e many other developing com1tries none tried to rely on home grown 
technology. All of these countries have intervened selectively to promote particular industries, with 
varying intensity and success. The process of trying to shift industrial output towards high value 
added sectors is described by enthusiasts as "getting prices wrong in order to create dynamic 
comparative advantage". 
' One of the biggest challenges for economists today is understanding the extraordinary success of East 
Asia. The region has nearly quadrupled per capita incomes in the past quarter of a century - a record 
unparalleled in econmnic history. On present trends it may begin to overtake much of the 
industrialised west early in the 21st century. The region has done far better than conventional theories 
predict, even allowing for such quantifiable pluses as macroeconomic stability, high rates of 
investment and a focus on exports.' (M. Prowse: Financial Times. April 26th 1993). 
The Asian example poses a dilemma for bodies such as the lMF and tl1e World Bank, especially in 
former communist countries. Does it still make sense to advocate a form of 'shock therapy' - the 
doctrine tlmt deregulating and privatising everything as fast as possible is the optimum policy? Or 
should they recommend East Asia's slower, more interventionist path to economic maturity? It all 
depends on whether East Asia's deviations from orthodoxy can be replicated. 
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The problem of economic growth in the short and medium tem1s is related to the long-tem1 problem 
of economic development, which involves economic transformation along a continuum from reliance 
simply on primary production for export to the establislunent of sophisticated, integrated industrial 
sectors. Current and future rates of growth in these economies are therefore closely related to their 
ability to make investments in productive capacity and infrastructure. However, as the developing 
countries have a relative lack of technical know-how and domestic capital goods industries, such 
investments in tum typically require a high proportion of imported goods and services, in particular 
capital goods from the developed countries. These imports can be financed basically in two ways: out 
of current export earnings and reserves of foreign exchange and through external borrowing or 
foreign investment. 
A basic assumption of the post-war orthodoxy regarding trade and development in the contemporary 
world economy has been the implicit belief that the industrialisation of developing countries depended 
upon, and could proceed only on the basis of, development of exports for the markets of the industrial 
countries. In this context, trade among developing countries, although recognised as having a place 
within regional integration schemes intended to create larger 'internal' markets, was thought to be 
both impractical and irrelevant. Impractical because, given the fact that their exports were largely 
primary commodities and, in accordance with the 'factors-proportion' model, only labour intensive 
manufactures were thought possible, there did not seem to be much scope for significant trade 
expansion amongst them; and irrelevant because, after all, a developing country needed the 'hard-
currency' of industrialised countries in order to meet payments for capital equipment and technology, 
as well as interest payments on borrowings from the industrialised countries (Giersch, 1974). So long 
as growth in tile industrialised countries was high and developing countries had few manufactured 
products to export to developed countries, the arguments of tile orU1odoxy seemed to hold. However, 
with the slowing down of growth in the economies of the industrialised countries and the growing 
volume of exportable products of the developing countries, the various arguments and assmnptions of 
the orthodoxy began to be called into question (Lewis, 1980). 
For one thing, slower growth has put severe strains on the economies of developed countries and 
rising imports from developing countries have threatened the survival of certain of their high-
employment industries. These difficulties have brought into sharp relief the limits imposed by the 
absorptive capacity of the industrial country markets. Even if it were politically feasible for the present 
industrialised countries to implement structural adjustment measures of the kind usually advocated in 
order to absorb a larger volume of imports from the developing countries, it is doubtful whether they 
could adjust fast enough, bearing in mind the burden of continuous economic and social dislocations 
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and associated adjustment costs. Finding sufficient avenues into which to adjust so as to maintain 
acceptable levels of employment on a continuing basis. Moreover, if all of the developing countries 
attempted to expand their manufacturing capacity based on exports to the developed countries, sooner 
or later, owing to a limited demand in relation to supply, a secular decline in their combined export 
earnings from manufactures, similar to that experienced in the case of primary commodities, would be 
the likely result (Lewis 1980). 
Analytical issues 
In regard to the subject of trade among developing cotmtries two basic questions may be asked. Is tiris 
trade important, quantitatively? And does it matter, qualitatively? 
The first question is descriptive or 'positive'. Related questions arc: how big is this trade as a 
proportion of the total trade of developing countries; and has its relative importance shown any 
tendency to increase over time and are recent trends likely to continue into the future? Tlris begs 
another question: what explains the past growth of trade among the developing cmmtries, on both the 
demand and the supply sides? For example, on ti1e demand side, what has been the role of income 
growth and relative price differences (ie shifting comparative advantage)? And on the supply side, 
what has been the role of output and industrial growth, which reflect an increasing capacity to supply 
a range of goods? Are ti1e explanatory factors mainly structural or non-market? Which countries so far 
have been the key ones in the growing network of trade among developing countries? And do these 
countries possess a common economic profile? 
The second question - does trade matter? - is 'nonnative'. That is, what are the likely impacts of the 
expansion of tiris trade on the world economy and, more immediately, on the prospects for 
accelerating the economic growth and industrial development of the developing countries? Is there 
sometiring qualitatively different about this trade, for the countries involved in it, as compared witi1 
other trade flows? Aside from differing potentials for trade expansion in various directions, the 
directions of a country's exports could matter if, to put it simply, they are product-specific and 
products in turn are production process- and/or factor specific. In principle, under assumptions of 
competitive market conditions and full infonnation, no structural problem on the import side should 
arise. However, in practice, lack of infonnation and imperfect market conditions could lead to 
outcomes, from the point of view of a country's imports, which are direction-wise 'structurally' sub-
optimal in a welfare sense. 
This raises several empirical questions in the context of developing countries' trade. Do the 
developing countiies in general export to each other products which are different, in tem1s of 
production processes and factor contents, from those they export to ti1e developed countries? If so, 
what benefits static and dynamic, flow from trade in different directions, given the relative sizes of 
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trade flows and potentials for expansion in each direction? To fully gauge these benefits it might be 
necessary to know who are the agents involved in a country's exports - whether they are 
predominantly domestic or foreign firms? Finally, one might also be interested in the kinds of policies 
and instruments which would be feasible and efficient for facilitating and promoting the expansion of 
trade among developing countries. 
The study of Singapore's experience in ASEAN by no means claims to provide answers to all the 
foregoing questions. However, it is hoped that it will contribute to the understanding of some of these 
issues. The remaining part of this chapter aims to provide an overview of the ASEAN economies, 
highlighting the salient features, trade flows and linkages. An m1derstanding of these trends and traits 
and the underlying factors enables a better appreciation and interpretation of the empirical results. 
Since it is natural for those who are interested in trade among developing countries, whether for 
analytical or for policy reasons, to turn to standard theories of trade for guidance, chapter two presents 
the theory of international trade and deals with structural change in the Asia-Pacific region by 
investigating changing comparative advantage. Against tllis backgrmmd, chapter three draws togetl1er 
the main insights from tl1eory regarding the underlying deternlinants of the pattern of trade among 
developing countries, especially in temlS of intra-industry trade in Singapore. Chapter four tl1en 
examines the importance of ASEAN cooperation, using a test of trade creation and trade diversion. 
The role of foreign capital in economic growth is controversial, thus, chapter five provides a review of 
existing theoretical approaches to overseas investment looking at both Singapore and ASEAN. 
Chapter six presents an analysis of foreign investment by examining the statistical relationship 
between a number of structural variables and tl1e sectoral distribution witllin the manufacturing 
industry. Chapter seven deals with the role Singapore and ASEAN have played in the regional 
environment, looking at regional integration agreements and examining a number of possible 
prospects. Finally, in chapter eight, the findings and the major conclusions are sununarised. 
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An Overview of Singapore and ASEAN 
1 The ultimate objective of development must be to bring about a sustained improvement in the well 
being of the individual and bestow benefits on all. If undue privileges, extremes of wealth and social 
injustices persist, then development fails in the essential purpose. 1 
UN General Assembly Resolution 2626 (XXV) 24 October 1970. 
The five member countries of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) have recently 
received increased international notice for their relatively strong economic growth perfonnance and 
for their assertion of a collective approach to a range of foreign economic policy issues. ASEAN was 
established in 1967 when Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Thailand and Singapore came 
toget11er in a loose association, mainly out of concerns for political security in Southeast Asia, (Brunei 
is the six member, but has been excluded from the present study as it did not join untill984). 
ASEAN born in 1967 in the shadow of the Vietnam War, shows signs of becoming an important and 
permanent regional organisation. After almost a decade of doldrums it was galvanised into renewed 
vigour in 1976 by the security problems which the reunification of Vietnam seemed to present to its 
member countries. The impetus to the formation of ASEAN, and to its recent renaissance, has been 
political and strategic. Since 1967, ASEAN1S development can usefully divided into three phases. The 
first phase spans the 1967-75 period ; the second from 1975 to 1979 ; and the third from 1979 
onwards. In each of these phases ASEAN was responding primarily to developments in the 
international arena. 
Phase I (1967-75) 
The first eight years of ASEAN1s existence was a period in which little of tangible value was achieved. 
Scarcely a year after the signing of the Bangkok Declaration, the Sabah dispute between Malaysia and 
the Philippines had resurfaced, and for an eight month period the activities of the Association were 
effectively suspended. The dispute was felt to be so serious that tl1e establishment of a rival 
organisation was even mooted. At the end of 1968, relations were strained still further when two 
Indonesian marines who had been found guilty of sabotage and murder during the 1 Konfrontasi 1 were 
hanged in Singapore. 
In view of impediments such as these, it is not surprising that the cause of Southeast Asian 
regionalism appeared to be in limbo. Admittedly some progress was made - a number of committees 
dealing, for example, with food and agriculture, communications, tourism and commerce and industry 
were set up - but there was virtually no concrete progress in regional economic or political 
cooperation. But this underestimates the significance of the first phase of ASEAN1s existence. 
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The first undistinguished and undramatic phase of ASEAN's development was a period in which the 
member countries grew together. The habit of consultation became inculcated, greater mutual trust 
was developed, their world views became more harmonious, and an ASEAN identity began to evolve. 
These achievements are loose and ill-defined, and possibly as a result are underplayed, but without 
such a period the organisation might well have found the stresses of working together too great. This 
has certainly been the case with many other attempts at regional cooperation in the developing world. 
It is noteworthy that the nature of the Bangkok Declaration - open-ended and without specific 
objectives - helped in this regard, as it set no targets and placed the organisation under little pressure 
to produce results. 
Phase l!I (1975-79) 
In 1975 the USA finally withdrew from South Vietnam and the government in Saigon fell to the 
victorious forces of the communist North. This was quickly followed by the fall of anti-conununist 
govenunents in Cambodia and Laos. For ASEAN, these changes in the geopolitics of the region 
marked the begitming of a period of great uncertainty. For although in public ASEAN appeared happy 
that the conflict in Indochina had finally come to an end, and messages of goodwill and good relations 
were transmitted to the Vietnamese govenunent, there is no doubt that as a group its members were 
deeply worried. Vietnam had the largest and most powerful army in the region, and there was little 
sign that its leaders were favourably disposed towards the market economy, Western-oriented 
com1tries of ASEAN. 
The conununist victories in Indochina encouraged, possibly even forced, the members of ASEAN to 
strive to cooperate more closely. In spite of differing assessments of the Vietnamese threat, each of the 
member nations felt that it was imperative that a united response be made. This cuhninated in the Bali 
Sununit of February 1976, a watershed in ASEAN's development. ASEAN ostensibly still remained 
an economic and socio-cultural association, not a political one. In addition to its move on security, the 
sununit laid the foundations for intensified economic cooperation. This took the fom1 of pledges to 
supply one another with basic commodities (particularly oil and rice), to build 'ASEAN Industrial 
Projects' in each country, and to exchange preferential tariffs. The important point, however, is that 
these agreements would not have been accomplished so quickly had it not been for the changes in 
Indochina. External political developments, albeit with serious ramifications, had the effect of 
galvanising a comatose ASEAN into action. As if to emphasise that the association now meant 
business, an ASEAN Secretarait was established shortly after the Summit had ended. 
Phase m (1979 onwards) 
In 1979, a second development in Indochina again forced ASEAN to reappraise itself. On Christmas 
Day 1978, Vietnamese forces invaded Can1bodia. By January 1979 they ousted Kluner Rouge and 
installed a puppet regime under Heng Samrin. ASEAN, and in particular the front line state, Thailand 
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was appalled. The presence in Cambodia of more than two hm1dred thousand battle hardened 
Vietnamese soldiers put Thailand on the edge of a conflict that threatened the integrity of ASEAN. 
There were real fears that Vietnam, which had signed a defence treaty with the Soviet Union and 
joined COMECON, might invade the Kingdom of Thailand. ASEAN became, in effect, an informal 
security grouping, and the polarisation of the region, which had been in the offing since 1975, was 
finally finnly established. 
ASEAN reacted swiftly and decisively. An ad hoc meeting of its foreign tninisters was convened a 
week after Pol Pot had been driven from Phnom Penh, and a statement deploring the invasion and 
calling for an immediate withdrawal was released. This response might seem unremarkable, but it is 
important to realise that ever since 1975 ASEAN had gone out of its way not to provoke Vietnam. The 
increasing numbers of Vietnamese boat people arriving in ASEAN waters in 1978, for example, had 
elicited only a weak response. The invasion of Cambodia changed the state of affairs. ASEAN became 
increasingly critical of Vietnam, political and security cooperation (formerly a taboo subject) was 
openly discussed, and the Association managed to organise a highly effective response to the invasion. 
Once again, an external threat had acted as a catalyst for greater cooperation. However tltis brief 
history of ASEAN since its formation in 1967 tells us little about the substance of regional political 
and economic cooperation. 
Today, other dimensions are arguably more important than political security, especially the ASEAN 
economic arrangements to promote intra-bloc cooperation in investment and trade. The ASEAN 
schemes to coordinate investment projects, which were established mainly with a view to attempting 
to increase the complementarity of economic stmctures in t11e ASEAN countries, have proven 
particularly unsuccessful, mainly because of the opposition of national interests concerned for the 
profitability of their local investments. 
The ASEAN system of preferential trading arrangements (PTA), established in 196 7, sought to 
expand intra-ASEAN trade through the extension of reduced tariff and nontariff barriers to goods 
produced in member countries. Only negligible increases in intra-bloc trade, however, have been 
achieved because of persistent (and even increasing) reliance on administered protection in many 
ASEAN cmmtries and, more fundamentally, because of the opposition of many of the same vested 
interests that have prevented the success of the coordinated ASEAN investment programs. 
Concerned for increasing bilateralism in the trade relations of the major industrial countries and the 
uncertainty of a successful outcome of the Uruguay Round, the ASEAN heads of state signed an 
agreement to establish the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) in January 1992. Under the new trading 
arrangement, which began in 1994, each ASEAN country will seek to reduce the level of its tariffs on 
imports of manufactures, including capital goods and processed agricultural products, to a minimun1 
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range of 0-5% by the year 2008. Also, the plan calls explicitly for the simultaneous elimination of 
nontariff barriers to intra-ASEAN trade in manufactures. Notably, liberalisation of intra-bloc trade in 
primary commodities is excluded from the plan, raising some important uncertainties about the 
implications of the new free trading area for agriculture and natural resource-based sectors in the 
ASEAN countries (DeRosa, 1994). 
§ounces of data 
Trade statistics in Singapore come fTom three sources, namely, the national accounts, balance of 
payments, and data on exports and imports published by tl1e Singapore Trade Development Board 
(STDB). The basis of compilation differs across these three sources. In tl1e national accom1ts, tl1ere are 
no separate figures for exports and imports as they are given on a net basis. Furthermore, tl1e data in 
the national accounts are for the computation of gross domestic product while those from the balance 
of payments are intended for t11e gross national product. The net factor income component is difficult 
to measure within such a balance of payments structure. 
Data from tl1e STDB pertain only to merchandise trade with exports on a free on board (fob) basis and 
imports on a cost, insurance and freight (cit) basis. Trade with Indonesia is excluded. For commodity 
trade, use has been made of information from the STDB whereas figures for trade in services are 
found in balance of payments accounts. In addition to published Singapore trade statistics from tl1e 
sources mentioned, data from the United Nations, tl1e World Bank and the International Monetary 
Fm1d were also used where appropriate, for Singapore and the other countries included in tl1e 
analysis. 
The structure of the Singaporean economy has evolved from being a mere entrepot economy thriving 
on colonial trade and locational advantages to one that is modern and diversified. Entrepot trade had 
contributed from 15% to 18% of gross domestic product (GDP) in the 1960s with a peak of 18.4% 
even in 1970, before tapering off to 16.8% in 1973 (Yearbook of Statistics, 1973/4). In later years for 
which statistics on the entrepot sector were no longer available, the contribution of commerce, which 
best approximates it, remained high. 
Enterepot trade was tl1e essential feature of Singapore's successful economic development during tl1e 
colonial period. Up tilll960-65, 40% of its external commerce was still tied to Malaya and Indonesia, 
processing industry was still embryonic, and 70% of employment and 75% of revenue depended on 
the tertiary sector - linked either to the commercial and financial activities of the entrepot or to tl1e 
British naval and air base which guaranteed its security. 
While remaining statistically important, tl1e entrepot fimction declined throughout the 1960s and 
1970s and, besides, underwent some radical changes. Because of its entrepot trade, Singapore's 
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imports are registered either as re-exports pure and simple, or as being destined for re-exportation 
almost immediately. With such a definition, it should be possible to evaluate this kind of interchange; 
however a series of problems makes this exercise less straightfonvard than it seems. First, imports 
destined for the entrepot do not always correspond, in either volume or value, with the expected re-
exports; and it was only in 1976 that Singapore's official statistics began to include re-exports as a 
separate category among exports as a whole, whereas imports in transit only were not singled out at 
all (Law, 1975). Secondly, there is a moveable boundary between 'domestic exports' and 're-exports'. 
The latter can include simple re-eA'])Orts, ingenious repacking of goods, incomplete assembly of parts, 
and 'paper transactions'. To this should be added a vague classification of certain kinds of transaction, 
such as the distinction belween 'manufactured goods' and 'miscellaneous goods' (Chua and Morgan, 
1972). 
As well as these difficulties, the official figures show that re-exports, which in 1960 accounted for 
43% of Singapore's eAiemal trade (and 93.7% of total exports), subsequently took a dive - to 24% 
(and 61%) in 1970 and 16.4% (and 35.1%) in 1990, (see table 1.1). 
Table 1.1 
Singapore's re-export trade, by country (1970=90) 
1970 1980 1990 
Country Total Re- % Total Re- % Total Rc- % 
Exports exports Exports exports Exports exports 
SE Asia 1,661 963 33 9,571 5,122 36 13,245 7,105 34 
A SEAN 1,210 879 30 9,205 4,268 30 12,699 6,803 32 
NE Asia 709 361 13 8,588 1,905 13 13,505 4,188 20 
Japan 362 145 5 3,338 418 3 5,449 1,300 6 
Hong Kong 194 71 2 3,196 525 4 3,815 1,274 6 
N America 584 369 13 5,555 1,337 9 15,179 2,589 12 
USA 527 380 13 5,272 1,245 9 14,695 2,455 11 
WEurope 904 628 22 5,899 1,691 12 8,113 2,751 13 
EC 740 525 18 5,081 1,337 9 7,353 2,461 12 
WAsia 104 67 2 2,476 968 7 1,933 917 4 
Saudi Arabia 12 825 341 2 579 276 1 
S Asia 81 45 2 2,393 825 6 2,618 1,427 7 
Oceania 227 106 4 3,252 405 3 2,525 700 3 
Australia 160 1,671 298 2 1,650 1,328 2 
Africa 137 68 2 1,916 984 7 
Latin America 85 72 2 602 560 4 428 297 1 
E Europe 233 203 7 1,241 447 3 613 359 2 
TOTAL (World) 4,756 2,882 100 41,493 14,244 100 60,268 21,194 100 
Source : Singapore Trade Statistics. Department of Statistics. 
All the same, such results show that this type of business is far from defunct: sixty warehousing 
companies still practise it, and numerous studies by consultants have estimated that to obtain a true 
picture, one should add 10-15% to the foregoing figures (Industrial Market Research Ltd, 1978). 
Furthermore, since 1983-85 the growth of Singapore's external trade has depended partly on a revival 
in re-ex']Jorts offood products, primary products, energy and manufactured goods (see table 1.2). 
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Table lo2 
Singapo~e's e~te~nal trade by product, 
as a percentage of total trade (1980 & 90) 
1980 11990 
Commodity Import Export Re- Import Expmt Re-
export export 
Food 59 41 28 59 41 30 
Beverages, tobacco 64 36 13 34 66 56 
Primary products 42 58 44 43 57 50 
Energy 55 45 1 56 44 20 
Oils, fats 48 52 33 50 50 12 
Chemicals 65 35 20 52 48 18 
Manufactured goods 68 32 19 68 32 23 
Infrastructural and transport 58 42 17 51 49 16 
equipment 
Various manufactured items 53 47 12 52 48 16 
Unclassified products & 18 82 11 24 76 17 
transactions 
Source : Singapore Trade Statistics. Department of Statistics. 
Singapore's intermediation takes a number fo fonns. In petrochemicals, for example, value added is a 
mere 12%: crude petroleum is imported from the Middle East, Malaysia and Indonesia, processed and 
then exported to countries such as Indonesia, Hong Kong, Australia, Japan and Malaysia. 
Significantly Singapore only uses 13% of the output of its petrolemn products industry and most 
exports are destined for intermediate use elsewhere. In industrial, electrical and electronic machinery 
the value added is rather higher, but otherwise the process is the same. Parts are imported into 
Singapore or produced locally (by MNCs); processed/utilised; and the final output is largely exported 
overseas (most demand in Singapore is, in fact, intermediate). A similar analysis applies to most other 
industries, showing tl1e importance of entrepot trade, and indicates that MNCs are encouraged to 
produce locally because oflow import duties (see Mirza, 1988). 
While the traditional entrepot activities have not completely disappeared, Singapore has modernised 
and diversified into manufacturing-while maintaining and enhancing its trading role and developing 
modern services such as banking. There has also been constant upgrading and diversification witlrin 
each of those three main activities. Entrepot trade now includes more industrial commodities and 
countertrade. The manufacturing sector has restructured along lines of high technology, skill-
intensive and service-related production. Similarly, the service sector has diversified into financial 
and business, transport and communications and tourist activities. 
Although entrepot trade has played an important role in the growth and development of tl1e economy 
of Singapore, the statistics on re-exports have not been used in any of the empirical studies in the 
thesis due to the inaccuracy of this data over the period the study covers, especially from 1967 to 
1985. 
25 
Measures of growth and development 
Whether growth and development are judged in purely economic tenus or by a combination of 
economic and welfare criteria, the East Asian <md the ASEAN cmmtries have established a clear lead 
over other developing countries. Despite the world wide recession of the early 1980s, Singapore is 
now catching up with the high income industrial com1tries and several other East Asian market 
economies are poised to do so. The economic perfom1ance of Thailand has been particularly striking 
for it was an10ng the very low income countries of the world in the 1950s. Even the Philippines, a 
poor performer among this group of countries, has a better than average record among developing 
countries. 
The ASEAN countries range in population size from city states to middle-sized countries and have 
widely divergent resource endowments and economic histories, but they have faced the same 
international environment as other com1tries. Table 1.3 on the physical size of ASEAN countries 
shows that Indonesia had the largest population while Singapore had the smallest population. The 
Philippines and Thailand have comparable population figures. Singapore, however, enjoyed the 
highest GNP ofUS$14,210 compared to US$610 in Indonesia in 1991. By World Bank's criteria, they 
are, respectively, a high-income (OECD level) and a low-income com1try. The highest rate of GDP 
growth over the period 1980-91 was, however, experienced by Thailand at 7.9%, followed by 
Singapore at 6.6%. The rate of inflation is highest in the Philippines. 
Country 
Indonesia 
Malaysia 
Philippines 
Singapore 
Thailand 
Table 1.3 
Population, GNP per capita, GDP and inflation 
of ASEAN countries 
Population GNP per capita GDP Inflation 
millions 1991 Dollars 1991 Growth rate 1980-91% 1980-91% 
1965-90% 
181.3 610 4.5 5.6 8.5 
18.2 2,520 4.4 5.7 1.7 
62.9 730 1.3 1.1 14.6 
2.8 14,210 6.5 6.6 1.9 
57.2 1,570 4.4 7.9 3.7 
Source: World Bank, World Development Report 1993. 
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Table 1.4 shows the contribution of the main sectors to GDP. The decline in the primary sector and 
the increasing shares of manufacturing and new services, as in transport and communications and 
finance and business services, are salient features of the economy since the 1980s. 
Table 1.4 
Percentage contribution to GDP by industry (Singapore), 
selected years (current market prices) 
1960 1970 1980 1990 
Agriculture 3.5 2.3 1.3 0.4 
Quarrying 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.2 
Manufacturing 11.4 20.0 29.1 26.1 
Utilities 2.3 2.6 2.2 2.3 
Construction 3.4 6.8 6.4 4.8 
Services 76.4 66.8 64.6 70.1 
-Commerce 32.3 27.1 21.7 15.7 
- Transport & communications 13.3 10.6 14.0 12.7 
- Finance & business 13.8 16.2 19.6 29.1 
-Others 17.2 12.0 9.2 11.6 
Source : Economic Develo:gment Board Yearbook, Singa:gore (various years). 
The success of the ASEAN economies lies in the fact that 'unshackling exports' (that most of the East 
Asian countries had themselves at first shackled) has been the key. However, it is also clear that 
successful performance needs several policy strands. Political stability and the mle of law are 
essential. Economic policies apparently distorted prices less than was the case in most other 
developing countries; macroeconomic management was relatively successful, all economic sectors, 
particularly agriculture, were developed, and public investment in social and physical infrastmctural 
facilities was productive. Where these economic conditions did not prevail, as in the Philippines, the 
economy faltered. Governments thus provided the environment for growth; but private enterprise, 
despite risk and tmcertainty, made the investments necessary, and through exposure to international 
competition, became efficient and profitable. There seems little doubt that if other developing 
countries had followed similar economic policies t11ey would also have grown more rapidly and would 
thus have been able to alleviate the poverty of their low income groups as well as avoiding high 
national indebtedness. 
ASEAN includes one state, Singapore, that has adopted a tl1oroughly open and outward-looking 
approach to foreign economic relations. It includes three states, Malaysia, the Philippines and 
Thailand, which display ambivalence between outward-looking and inward-looking approaches to 
trade policy. The fifth state, Indonesia, remains strongly protectionist. 
All five economies have extensive economic links witl1 a wide range of OECD countries. During and 
immediately after the colonial era, the foreign economic relations of the Philippines had been focused 
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almost entirely on U1e United States, and those of other ASEAN countries strongly on Europe. But by 
the seventies, there had been considerable diversification of extemal economic links, and Japan was 
the largest trading partner of all five countries. 
As Myint (1983, p26-27) observes in the context of widely divergent gro\\1h rates within Asia 'The 
truth of tl1e matter is that the currently available theoretical e>..--planations do not seem able to provide a 
convincing account of the wide difference in U1e gro\\rth rates between the mainly outward-looking 
Southeast Asian countries and the mainly inward-looking South Asian countries'. 
It is e>..iremely difficult to measure comparative levels of development. The statistical methods 
available may be thought fairly reliable for obtaining acceptable measures of rates of growtl1 of living 
standards and of ordinal rankings as to whether one country is more developed than another, but they 
exhibit great deficiencies when used as cardinal measures of by how much or how many times one 
country is more developed than any other. It is recognised that, in the end, no lmiversally acceptable, 
value free indicator of overall performance is attainable (Herrick and Kindleberger, 1983 ). 
The fundamental cause of t11e measurement difficulty lies witl1 the definition of development. Many of 
the criteria or objectives by which development is to be judged are qualitative ones. Such criteria as 
the standard of living, health levels, the educational level, and the extent of grass-roots participation 
in govemment are all qualitative ones which cannot be measured directly. They have to be measured 
indirectly using indicators which are directly measurable quantities. For example, the number of 
people per trained doctor, infant mortality rates, or the average life expectancy; and for standard of 
living one might use such indicators as average national income per person, the proportion of families 
with piped water to their living quarters, the proportion of households supplied with electricity, and so 
on. 
Since the concept of development only acquires substance through a process of measurement, it is 
important to examine briefly some of the development indicators used in the present study, and some 
of the criticisms levelled at them:-
11 Measurements, when they are well formulated and accurately performed, allow us to evaluate 
progress toward tl1e society's development goals. The spirit of t11e age insists on systematic empirical 
measurement, rather than rational introspection or casual impressionism. 11 
(Herrick and Kindleberger, 1983) 
Measurement of gross national product 
Intemational standards and conventions now have found world wide acceptance in the calculation of 
national income and in the gathering of census statistics on population and its composition. 
International comparisons reveal the difficulty in closing quickly the widening gap that separates the 
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incomes of different countries. Per capita incomes are used as development indicators despite their 
sensitivity to the presence of very high incomes. Social indicators are suggested as possible 
alternatives, both because of their directness, and thus presumed accuracy, and because they are less 
sensitive to extremes in the income distribution. Therefore, it is worth discussing a few problems of 
the measurement of GNP and its suitability as a measure for development (Singer and Ansari, 1978). 
The mere existence of all of the measurements of GNP and GDP is cause for concern. First, the 
measurements must conceptually be analogous to the phenomena measured. A second cause for 
concern is associated with methodological difficulties in the measurements themselves. The value of 
the output of homeworkers' services produced and consumed in the home is not counted as part of a 
country's aggregate output under national income accounting conventions. Yet clearly in societies 
with low levels of specialisation, households are more self sufficient. Accordingly, a greater 
proportion of economic functions are performed in homes in low-income countries than are performed 
in homes in richer countries. National income is thus tmderstated in the former, relative to the latter. 
Tlris has been highlighted in the work of Usher (1980), who studied the econonric development of the 
Thai economy. 
A third area of concern is the reliability of statistics. At least three basic sources of inaccuracy exist: 
difficulties in measuring physical quantities or enun1erating events, problems of valuation, and 
possible bias resulting from an incentive to misstate. All of these problems are present to some degree 
in the statistics of any nation but seem relatively more severe in poor countries. Cross-checks can 
sometimes be made in assessing the reliability of a particular set of statistics, the more difficult is the 
task of policy analysis and decision making. 
A country's econonric size and power is sometimes measured by the size of its total income or output, 
regardless of the number of workers necessary to produce it or the nmnber of citizens who will 
consume it. Per capita income, on the other hand, takes into account changes in population size that 
may accompany the increasing output, and it can provide some infommtion about both the efficiency 
of production and the success in reaching a country's econonric goals. The biggest drawback of 
income per capita is its nature as an aritlunetic average. As an average, it does not give any direct 
information about the distribution of income and therefore about the econonric welfare of the people. 
While it is wise to maintain a healthy scepticism about the use of statistics on average incomes, one 
should be aware that the accuracy of different measures varies. Figures on population size, the 
denonrinator in per capita income, are by no means accurate for the poorest com1tries, particularly 
those whose first censuses came after their post-war independence from official colmrial status. 
Uncertainties of 20% or more, involving tens of millions of people in some cases, have been cited. 
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Population figures are, however, more accurate than those of the labour force or hours worked. 
Estimates of the labour force, and especially of women working in agticulture, are subject to wide 
margins of error. Data on hours of work are even worse, particularly in agriculture, petty conunerce, 
and many services where statistics hardly exist at all. As a result, labour inputs are measured only in 
the most imperfect way. The uncritical acceptance of labour force measurements obviously can cause 
policy miscalculations of a sort that poor countries can ill afford. 
When making international comparisons the probletns of measurement multiply. The average growth 
rate of GDP for Singapore from 1980-91 was 6.6%. These figures are deceptive for the purpose of 
international comparison. Singapore, firstly, is a city state, and its GDP is thus bound to be much 
higher, owing to its small geographical size and the large volume of entrepot trade. Secondly, a large 
part of the GDP is not indigenous in character. It belongs to tl1e multinational corporations that invest 
in Singapore. For the purpose of reflecting international welfare, a figure of two thirds of the given 
Singapore GDP, would be more realistic, not just with respect to its present position but also, if not 
much more so, in the future. 
If the monetary authorities of a country do not permit free convertibility of their domestic currency 
into foreign exchange, then it is hard to choose an exchange rate that approptiately expresses a 
country's output in terms, say, of dollars. Even where currency exchanges are unrestricted, conversion 
of income data between currencies is biased because the internationally traded goods and services may 
not be representative of price and value relationships among the country's total goods and services 
(Gilbert and Kravis, 1954). 
Most poor countries have overvalued exchange rates. This means simply that if the national income 
data are converted, stated in units of tl1eir local currency, into dollars using official exchange rates as 
tl1e conversion factor, tl1e dollar amounts will be overstated. Substituting 'free market' (black market) 
exchange rates for official rates does not escape tl1e problem. The black market is usually small 
relative to the overall size of a country's foreign-exchange flows. The black market rate thus would not 
be equal to an equilibrium rate generated by an unrestricted market. If anything, the local currency 
may be undervalued in the black market, leading to opposite interpretations about tl1e dollar 
equivalent of local incomes. Finally, in tl10se countries using multiple exchange rates, the choice of a 
single rate or of some weighted average is likely to be arbitrary at best. 
Singapore and Malaysia, consistent with their liberal trade regimes, have adopted the system of 
managed floating exchange rates. Indonesia and the Philippines have also been floating their 
currencies witll periodic govermnent interventions. Thailand has adopted a system of exchange 
control, although the Thai baht has been tied to the US dollar since 1981. The only country in which a 
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significant black market for foreign exchange exists - indicative of disequilibrium foreign exchange 
pricing - is the Philippines. 
Once an appropriate exchange rate has been chosen, the conversion into a common standard can be 
made. But research made it clear that when national output is internationally compared, item by item, 
using a common price level, a different relation emerges than when the national product in local 
currency and at local prices is converted at the going exchange rate. The International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) has at last faced up to this problem. Previously, the IMF used to convert local cunency GDP's 
into dollars at market exchange rates. Now it has decided to use purchasing-power parities (PPP), 
which take account of international differences in prices. ' The result is a sharp jun1p in developing 
countries' share of world output, to 34% from 18% on the old method. The share of Eastern Europe 
and the former Soviet Union has edged up from 9% to 11%. By contrast, the share of industrial 
economies has dropped from 73% to 54%. Perhaps the proof that the previous figures were flawed is 
that they suggested that Asia's weight in world output had fallen from 7.9% in 1985 to 7.2% in 1990, 
although it was by far the fastest growing region. This was owing to a sharp decline in some Asian 
countries' exchange rates against the dollar.' (The Economist May 15th- 21st 1993). 
Many developing countries have e:\."}Jerienced rapid rates of growth of GDP, yet it is increasingly 
obvious that this has often brought little, if any benefit, to the substmtial minority, or perhaps even 
the majority, of the population of these countries. Economists, planners and international agencies 
have expressed concern over the fact that perhaps one third (the World Bank's estimate) of the 
population of developing countries have received no net benefit from growtl1. In some comttries, the 
proportion of the population excluded from receiving the benefits of growth will be even higher and, 
in certain cases, large sections of the population may have sunk into even greater poverty as a result of 
the specific processes of change taking place within these societies. 
If the prices of traded goods were equal everywhere, then wages in each country would depend on the 
productivity of its traded-goods industries. Countries with low productivity would have low wages. In 
these countries, producers of non-traded goods would also tend to get lower wages than their 
counterparts in more productive economies. However, productivity differs less from country to com1try 
for non-traded goods than for tradeables. So developing cmmtries tend to have cheaper services. Also, 
third world governments often keep housing and energy artificially cheap. Converting these countries' 
GDPs with market exchange rates therefore systematically understates their real output. 
The UN's International Comparison Program (ICP) is the most ambitious effort to revalue developing 
countries' output at international prices. It attempts to estimate PPPs every five years on the basis of a 
detailed comparison of prices in each country. The IMF has used the ICP estimates for its new 
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weightings for all countries except China, where the Fund used its own more modest estimate, 
thinking the ICPs unrealistically high (The Economist May 15th- 21st 1993). 
Although most economists agree that PPPs give a more accurate measure of the relative size of 
economies than market exchange rates, this still leaves a problem: the original local-currency figmes 
may themselves be unreliable. For example, poor-country governments may have an incentive to 
report GDP as low as possible to qualify for soft loans from international financial institutions, or to 
get favourable trade treatment. It is also likely that poor countries have bigger 'informal' economies 
than do rich ones. 
Taking all this into account, some developing countries may be even higher up the world GDP league. 
The industrial economies' share of world output may already have dropped below half. Therefore, as 
GDP and GNP figures will be used throughout this study, along with other indicators, the results 
should be interpreted with caution and taken to be indicative of general trends rather than exact 
magnitudes. 
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Trade Structure and Growth 
The ASEAN economies have experienced significant stmctural changes in the last thirty years. There 
has been a continuous and substantial relative decline in agriculture, accompanied by a large increase 
in industry. The sectoral contribution to GDP in 1991 is shown in Table 1.5. Singapore has always 
had a higher dependence on manufacturing and services than the other ASEAN countries, as they 
were all able to build on their agricultural-base. Now all the members of ASEAN are largely industrial 
based, with Singapore leading the way in the service sector. 
Table 1.5 
Sectoral share to GDP, 1991 (in percent) 
Country Agriculture Industry (Manufacturing) Services 
Indonesia 19 41 21 40 
Malaysia na na na na 
Philippines 21 34 26 45 
Singapore 0 39 29 61 
Thailand 12 39 27 49 
Source: World Bank, World Development Report 1993. 
All the ASEAN countries enjoyed higher rates of growth for exports than for imports in the period 
1980-91, with the highest rate of export growth enjoyed by Thailand as shown in Table 1.6. In terms 
of energy as a percentage of merchandise exports the Philippines had the highest figure of 20% 
closely followed by Singapore, which had a figme of 16% in 1991 because of its oil refineries and 
petrochemical plants. Indonesia and Singapore had the most favourable tem1s of trade in 1991 ( 1987 
= 100). 
Table 1.6 
Terms of trade, energy imports, and growth of trade 
Country Average ammal growth(%) Energy import as Tenus of trade 
1980-91 % of merch<mdise (1987 = 100) 
Export Import export 1991 1991 
Indonesia 4.5 2.6 8.0 101 
Malaysia 10.9 7.2 5.0 93 
Philippines 3.3 3.0 20.0 91 
Singapore 8.9 7.2 16.0 101 
Thailand 14.4 11.1 12.0 91 
Source: World Bank, World Development Report 1993. 
Table 1.7 shows the stmcture of merchandise imports and exports in the ASEAN countries in 1990. 
Imports of machinery <md transport equipment dominate in all the ASEAN countries. The largest 
export item from Indonesia was fuel and minerals while from Malaysia it was other primary 
commodities (especially rubber and tin). The largest export item for both the Philippines and Thailand 
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was other manufacturing. As an oil refiner rather than a producer, Singapore had an oil share of 17%. 
Reflecting its entrepot status, other primary exports formed 8% of total exports while machinery and 
equipment and other manufactures together constituted about 74% of Singapore's exports. 
Table lo7 
Percentage share of merchandise imports and exports 
in 1991 
Imports 
C01mtry 
Indonesia 
Malaysia 
Philippines 
Singapore 
Thailand 
Exports 
Country 
Indonesia 
Malaysia 
Philippines 
Singapore 
Thailand 
Food 
5 
6 
7 
6 
5 
Fuels 
43 
17 
9 
18 
2 
Fuels 
9 
4 
15 
14 
9 
Other primary 
16 
22 
20 
8 
32 
Other primary 
9 
5 
7 
4 
8 
Machinery 
equipment 
2 
38 
14 
48 
22 
Source: World Bank, World Development Report 1993. 
Machinery & Other 
transport manufacturing 
equipment 
45 32 
55 30 
26 46 
44 32 
39 38 
Other (Te:-.iile) 
manufacturing 
99 14 
23 6 
57 9 
26 5 
45 17 
Table 1.8 shows that only Singapore ettioyed a current account surplus in 1991. Singapore also had 
the highest gross international reserves in terms of months of imports, closely followed by Thailand. 
All the ASEAN countries were dependent on private capital inflows. Only Singapore had a negligible 
amount of official development assistance and external debt. 
Table loS 
Balance of payments, capital, aid flows 
and international reserves 
Current Gross Private capital Official Total external 
account international flow Development debt 
balance after reserves in Assistance 
official months of 
transactions imports 
(US$m) 1991 (mths) 1991 (US$m) 1990 (US$m) 1991 (US$m) 1991 
Indonesia -4,080 3.3 153 1,854 66.4 
Malaysia -4,530 3.2 649* 289 47.6 
Philippines -1,034 3.3 262 1,051 70.2 
Singapore 4,208 5.4 1066* 8 
Thailand -7,564 4.8 74 722 39.0 
* indicates data for 1988 
Source: World Bank, World Development Report 1993. 
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As could be expected, five cmmtries with such different economic structures and approaches to trade 
policy have sought very different benefits from regional cooperation. This contributed to the cautious 
pace of progress. Singapore, with its worldwide trading links and interests, could have much to lose 
from any major diversion of trade towards less competitive neighbours. But, as a small island state in 
a region that has had the potential for great political tension, Singapore has an important strategic 
interest in close and constructive relations among the ASEAN partners. At the other extreme, 
Indonesia has felt that its own industrial growth requires the preservation of its domestic market for 
its own production, and has been reluctant to grant open access to producers in other ASEAN 
countries. Malaysia, the Philippines and Thailand have tended to be more willing to contemplate costs 
of trade diversion than Singapore, and less jealous about preserving the whole of their local markets 
for domestic production than Indonesia, but have nevertheless each been very careful in the 
calculation of national advantage. By contrast, there has been much greater awareness of convergence 
of interest an1ong the five countries on common problems that have emerged in economic relations 
with the rest of the world : commodity market stabilisation issues; access to the markets of OECD 
countries; and bilateral relations with Japan, the EC, the United States and Australia. 
Table 1.9 shows the composition of intra-ASEAN trade for 1970, 1980 and 1986, at 1980 prices, for 
some historical perspectives. This data set was provided by the Institute of Developing Economies 
(Tokyo) through the Asian and Pacific Development Centre. First, for intra-ASEAN trade in three 
main commodities, namely, primary, oil and manufacturing, the dominance of primary commodities 
dropped from 65.2% in 1970 to 22.4% in 1986. Trade in oil also declined while manufacturing saw a 
rapid rise from 13.3% in 1970 to 49.2% in 1986. Except for 1970, total ASEAN exports exceeded 
total ASEAN imports. Total intra-ASEAN trade figures as a percentage of total ASEAN imports and 
exports, respectively, were 17.1% and 16.4% in 1986, both of which were increases over the figures in 
1970, reflecting more intra-ASEAN trade. 
Table 1.9 
Composition of intra=ASEAN trade (1980 prices) 
1970 1980 1986 
(US$m) % (US$m) % (US$m) % 
(1) Primary commodity 489 65.2 3478 31.3 2361 22.4 
(2) Oil 161 21.5 3856 34.7 2991 28.4 
(3) Manufacturing 100 13.3 3778 34.0 5175 49.2 
(4) Total intra-ASEAN trade 750 100.0 11112 100.0 10527 100.0 
(5) Total ASEAN imports 7329 63317 61627 
(6) Total ASEAN exports 6066 66517 64026 
(7) (4) as percent of (5) 10.2 17.5 17.1 
(8) (4) as percent of(6) 12.4 16.7 16.4 
Source :Institute ofDeveloging Economies (Tokyo) 
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Table 1.10 shows a breakdown of the import and export contributions of member countries to total 
ASEAN imports and e"-'POrts. The most noticeable feature in table 1.10 is Singapore's dominance in 
intra-ASEAN trade. Its share of ASEAN imports grew from 33.91% in 1970 to 50.82% in 1990 
while its export share rose from 25.61% to 46.74%. Both Indonesia and Malaysia are also important 
in intra-ASEAN trade, followed by Thailand and the Philippines. In the case of the Philippines, its 
share of both ASEAN imports and exports have declined over the period 1970-90. Thailand's exports 
have increased while its imports have fallen over the period. Indonesia's share of ASEAN exports was 
higher in the early 1980s probably because of oil, while the same was not observed for Malaysia. 
Table 1.10 
Percentage distribution of intra~ASEAN trade 
Indonesia Malaysia Philippines Singapore Thailand A SEAN 
Imports 
1970 12.29 19.30 16.69 33.91 17.81 100.00 
1975 20.31 15.01 16.07 34.65 13.96 100.00 
1980 17.11 16.95 13.10 37.91 14.93 100.00 
1985 16.17 19.32 8.58 41.37 14.56 100.00 
1990 8.42 19.76 5.44 50.82 15.56 100.00 
Exports 
1970 17.39 27.83 17.48 25.61 11.69 100.00 
1975 34.12 18.48 11.02 25.83 10.55 100.00 
1980 32.94 19.45 8.70 29.13 9.78 100.00 
1985 27.15 22.36 6.76 33.33 10.40 100.00 
1990 11.57 28.62 2.71 46.74 10.36 100.00 
Source: Calculated from data in IMF Direction of Trade Statistics (various years). 
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Table 1.11 shows the direction of intra-ASEAN trade. Over the period 1970-90, both intra-ASEAN 
imports and exports increased, the former from 10.26% to 13.05% with a peak of 19.19% in 1985, the 
latter from 12.28% to 13.92% with peaks in 1980 and 1985. Imports of ASEAN from Japan, the US 
and the EC declined between 1976 and 1985 but picked up after 1986, more so for Japan than the 
other two. Exports to Japan increased up to 1980 before falling in 1985 and 1990 while exports to the 
US rose throughout the period. In contrast, ASEAN exports to the EC fell consistently throughout 
1970-85. In 1990, the largest share of ASEAN imports came from Japan (22.25%) while t11e US 
constituted the largest market for ASEAN exports (22.18%), followed very closely by Japan (20.48%). 
In 1990, ASEAN imports from the EC and ASEAN exports to the EC were quite balanced at 14.57% 
and 14.76%, respectively. By 1990, the EC had caught up with the US in terms of supplying imports 
toASEAN. 
Table 1.11 
Direction of ASEAN trade (in percent) 
1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 
Imports 
A SEAN 10.26 9.58 17.55 19.19 13.05 
Japan 25.05 25.36 20.37 17.43 22.25 
us 14.84 14.27 13.71 12.03 13.29 
EC 17.14 13.89 11.58 11.56 14.57 
ROW 32.71 36.91 36.79 39.79 36.84 
Total 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 
Exports 
A SEAN 12.28 10.81 16.70 17.79 13.92 
Japan 22.72 27.07 26.80 23.88 20.48 
us 17.74 19.86 16.98 20.31 22.18 
EC 16.69 13.84 13.38 11.38 14.76 
ROW 30.57 28.42 26.14 26.64 28.66 
Total 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 
Source : Calculated from data in IMF Direction of Trade Statistics (various years). 
Table 1.12 shows ASEAN's exports and imports as percentages of world totals. For exports, ASEAN's 
share in world el'.'JlOrts rose from 1.9% to 3.9% while its import share also grew from 2.3% to 3.7%. 
Clearly, the Southeast Asian region, together with the rest of Asia-Pacific, experienced relatively 
robust rates of growth throughout the 1980s. Growth in the ASEAN region (which is resource 
abundant except for Singapore) had been export-led. With rapid development, ASEAN's import 
growth also provided a strong impulse for world trade and the world economy as a whole. 
The years up to and including 1990 had been exceptional for trade in most Asian-Pacific countries. 
Starting with the larger sphere, the growth of intra-Asian trade had been particularly strong, 
especially during the period 1987-90. Trade among eleven major Asian countries (five ASEAN 
countries, Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, China and India) grew by 31.9% compared with 
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the 29% growtl1 in 1987. This amOtmt of intra-Asian trade exceeded Asia's exports to North America 
1990. It implied a lessening in the traditional dependence on the US economy and improved regional 
prospects. In 1988, 37.0% of Asia's ex'}Jorts were absorbed by the region while 43.0% of its imports 
came from outside. 
Table 1.12 
Shares of ASEAN°S exports and imports in world totals 
A SEAN Japan us EC ROW Total 
Imports 
1970 2.32 5.12 12.51 35.03 45.02 100.00 
1975 2.69 5.79 10.74 33.22 47.57 100.00 
1980 3.18 6.22 12.06 35.04 43.50 100.00 
1985 3.28 5.76 16.72 30.68 43.56 100.00 
1990 3.70 6.70 16.76 36.26 36.58 100.00 
Exports 
1970 1.94 6.18 13.62 35.86 42.40 100.00 
1975 2.38 6.39 12.16 34.15 44.91 100.00 
1980 3.34 6.50 10.68 33.23 46.26 100.00 
1985 3.54 9.08 11.01 31.78 44.59 100.00 
1990 3.91 10.08 12.01 39.98 34.02 100.00 
Source: Calculated from data in IMF Direction of Trade Statistics (various years). 
Japan is clearly the factor behind these trade growth trends, accounting for 56.0% of total trade, or 
US$228.2 billion. Excluding Japan, intra-Asian trade in 1990 was only US$100.4 billion. ASEAN 
countries were similarly dependent on the Japanese factor. Thailand was among the Asian com1tries 
which experienced the sharpest increases in exports to Japan in 1990, as these rose by 51% while 
imports from Japan increased by 73.0% in 1990. Imports from Japan by Malaysia and Singapore also 
grew in excess of30% in 1990. 
Apart from Japan, exports from other Asian NICs to Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines and 
Thailand also registered a strong increase of 40.9% in 1990. Exports from these ASEAN countries to 
the Asian NICs grew by 42.9%. In particular, Singapore's exports to Indonesia as recorded in 
Indonesia's trade statistics and to Thailand enjoyed strong growth in 1990. 
Excluding Brunei, intra-ASEAN trade in 1990 grew by 33.5% to US$18.3 billion. As usual Singapore 
dominated total intra-ASEAN trade; its exclusion gave a growth of only 11. 7%, to US$2.3 billion. For 
Singapore, trade with Malaysia accomlted for over one-half of the total. This reached US$9.3 billion 
and grew by 27.0%. 
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Table 1.13 provides a detailed bilateral trade pattem for 1986 and 1988. In 1986, Japan was the 
largest market for exports from Indonesia and Malaysia, accounting for 30.8% and 23.3% of their 
exports respectively. For the other three ASEAN countries, the US market was the most important 
country for both 1986 and 1988. For Malaysia in 1988, Japan lost its top importer spot as its 
percentage of Malaysian exports fell to 15.4%, possibly owing to oil exports, and was overtaken by the 
US with a share of 17.3%. The importance of the US and Japan to Singapore's e"rports seemed to 
remain quite stable, just as the US was to the Philippines. For Thai expmts, the US market led Japan 
by only 4.0%. For all the ASEAN countries, Asia excluding Taiwan has become an important export 
outlet, especially for Malaysia and Thailand. 
Country 
Indonesia 
Malaysia 
Philippines 
Singapore 
Thailand 
Table 1.13 
Direction of ASEAN exports to major 
1986 
us Japan Europe Asia* us Japan 
16.1 30.8 5.8 14.5 na na 
16.4 23.3 14.9 35.1 17.3 15.4 
35.8 17.9 19.1 16.9 35.7 20.1 
23.4 8.6 11.7 38.4 23.8 8.6 
18.1 14.2 23.1 27.3 19.5 15.5 
*Excludes Taiwan. 
Source: IMF, Direction of Trade Statistics. 
markets 
].988 
Europe Asia* 
na na 
14.6 40.4 
18.3 16.9 
14.2 38.6 
22.0 36.9 
The main factors favouring trade growth within the Asian and ASEAN region include the need to 
diversi:f:Y trade away from traditional but protectionist trade partners like the US and Europe. Japan 
and other Asian countries, while equally suffering from the brunt of protectionism, appear to have 
taken up the diversified trade from the ASEAN countries. Its doors are nonetheless urged to be more 
open. 
Growth in domestic demand in the ASEAN economies themselves also propels larger import needs. 
Commodity prices have perfom1ed fairly well in the last few years, boosting mral income and demand 
in primary producing countries. In Singapore and other manufacturing-oriented ASEAN members, 
steady foreign capital inflows require further imports to satisfy investment and consumption needs. 
For Malaysia and Thailand in particular, they are enjoying the relocation of relatively lower-end 
manufacturing activities from East Asia as well as the rapid growth symptoms as near-NICs. 
Thailand, for instance, has benefited from large inflows of Japanese, Korean and Taiwanese 
investment. Apart fTom cost conditions, exchange rate depreciation has also pushed some lower-end 
consumer industries out of the Asian NICs. Indonesia and the Philippines have also become recipients 
of relocated industries even from Singapore. These ASEAN cmmtries are in the right stage themselves 
to take over these lower-end industries. 
Such industrial relocation induces greater intra-regional trade. In other words, East Asia is expected 
to figure more prominently in ASEAN trade as these investment and trade flows mature. Not only 
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would there be goods flowing back to these investing countries, their products from the ASEAN 
countries would be likely to find access to countries which still offer benefits under the Generalised 
System of Preferences (GSP) schemes. Thus, while the Asian NICs have lost their GSP privileges to 
the US, they can tap these in ASEAN countries like Malaysia. 
Economic deregulation in many ASEAN countries such as Malaysia and Indonesia and other Asian 
countries including China have also helped to stimulate inter- and intra-ASEAN trade. The region is 
also benefiting from the effects of liberalisation policies pressured by the US on com1tries such as 
Japan, Taiwan and South Korea which have been accused of mlfair trade practices. 
Another factor favouring greater intra-regional trade is exchange rate realignments. In particular, the 
currencies of Japan and the NICs except that of Hong Kong have appreciated against the US dollar in 
the last three to four years. Those of the Southeast Asian countries have moved in the opposite 
direction. A faster rate of increase in exports from Southeast Asian countries to Japan and the NICs 
has thus resulted. 
Balance of payments considerations have also affected intra-regional trade flows. Countries with trade 
and current account surpluses, such as Japan, South Korea and Taiwan, as well as those with deficits 
in the ASEAN economies except Singapore, have been trying to adjust accordingly. Current trends in 
economic cooperation among the ASEAN cmmtries and the efforts from the Asia Pacific Economic 
Cooperation foTUlll (APEC) have also placed sharper focus and emphasis on intra-regional trade. 
Industrialisation 
Industrialisation is essential for economic growth in most countries. Whatever economic indices are 
selected - from the more general such as growth rates to the more specific such as value-added in 
manufacturing or numbers employed in manufacturing industry - it seems that, at the regional level 
there has been a more rapid growth in industrialisation than in other regions of the developing world 
which are conventionally considered to be in the forefront of industrialisation. 
These developments have led many theorists to reject previous explanations of industrialisation based 
on perspectives such as growth or dependency, or on models of import substituting industrialisation. 
Most would now conclude that, after a post-war period in which the major focus was the domestic 
market, export-orientated strategies have played a crucial role in the recent industrialisation of 
Southeast Asian economies (Chia, 1984). 
The level of industrialisation varies considerably among the ASEAN cmmtries. Differences among the 
ASEAN countries may be attributed to differences in domestic market size, resource endowments, 
historical factors and the general level of economic development. Singapore, with a small domestic 
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market, sparse natural resources and a long tradition of entrepot trade has become the most 
industrialised, while Indonesia, with a vast domestic market, rich natural resource endowment and a 
historically strong primary trade specialisation, is the least industrialised among the five founding 
member countries of ASEAN. Actually, it is the Philippines which has the longest history of 
industrialisation as it began to industrialise seriously from the early 1950s, with Singapore, Malaysia 
and Thailand lagging behind by almost a decade, and Indonesia by nearly two decades. It is no 
accident that all these countries followed the familiar path of import substitution before they began to 
adopt export orientation in their manufacturing (Ariff and Hill, 1985). 
The switch from import substitution to export oriented industrialisation in the ASEAN region has by 
no means been easy or smooth. Again, there have been considerable intra-regional variations in 
industrial experience during the transition. The ASEAN countries began to adopt export oriented 
industrialisation strategies begimring with Singapore in the nrid 1960s, followed by Malaysia, the 
Philippines and Thailand in the late 1960s and by Indonesia in the early 1980s. 
In the developing countries, wages are on average one tenth of those in the industrialised countries. 
Transport costs have been greatly reduced in recent years. Manufacturing industries such as 
electronics have been scaled down to a series of clearly demarcated stages, many of which are 
elementary and easily movable from one location to another. 
Debates currently centre on whether or not export-orientated industrial strategies have generated a 
basis for self sustaining industrialisation in tl1e econonries of tl1e region, and whetl1er or not they can 
lead to significant improvements in the standard ofliving (Clria, 1980, 1984). 
Indices pointing to regional trends in growth and industrialisation should be treated with some 
caution. As aggregates they conceal marked disparities, since much of the increase in industrialisation 
levels is concentrated in Singapore, and to a lesser extent in Malaysia and Thailand. Other states 
such as the Plrilippines and Indonesia are perfornring at relatively lower levels. It should be recalled 
that there are several economies Vietnam, Laos, Burma and Kampuchea - whose industrialisation, 
although at much lower levels, remains directed primarily towards agriculture, and whose 
development strategies place much greater emphasis on labour intensive production as a means for 
creating a viable national econonric base. 
When it is argued that the East Asian countries succeeded because of exogenous circumstances, what 
is usually implied is either that they got a headstart on industrialisation, and/or that they were lucky to 
possess certain critical, non-reproducible assets or resources in greater proportion tl1an otl1er 
countries. There are few key issues: first, whether these resources were indeed more abundant in 
ASEAN; and second, whether tl1eir abundance is in fact given exogenously. 
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There was a time when being well endowed with natural resources was considered a distinct 
advantage. That was before the mineral poor, land-scarce East Asian NICs outperformed everyone, 
including the oil-exporting cow1tries. There are, however, some reasons why a lack of natural 
resources, in particular land, might be interpreted as an advantage. For example in the case of 
Singapore. 'Singapore holds the richest asset for success in the post industrial world - the asset of 
having nothing: no long standing heavy industry to deaden its itch for change: no rich raw material 
resources, like North Sea Oil, to provide a treacherous cushion. Singapore's only exports that spring 
from its natural resources are goldfish and orchids.' (Large, 1985) 
It might be thought that having a relatively small mining or agricultural sector would ease the 
potential for political resistance to industrialisation. Productivity growth in agriculture tends to be 
lower than in other sectors, so that the smaller the agricultural sector the easier it is presumably to 
achieve high growth rates. While that logic might seem adequate to deal with the record of Hong 
Kong and Singapore, it fails altogether for any of the other East Asian countries. 
Not all external resource flows to developing countries are determined exogenously. The ability to 
attract private direct investment and to borrow in international financial markets and, to a lesser 
extent, from official multilateral lending agencies depends to some degree on growth and export 
prospects. Foreign aid is a different matter, it tends to be allocated to countries more on the basis of 
humanitarian, political and strategic considerations. That fact by itself casts doubt on whether foreign 
aid should necessarily be considered a positive exogenous factor for economic growth. 
That aid is not a necessary condition for growth is w1derscored by the experience of some other East 
Asian countries. Hong Kong did not receive much aid, but did get undisclosed amounts of mainland 
and overseas Chinese capital in the 1950s; Singapore borrowed heavily in the early 1960s from the 
World Bank and the Asian Development Bank, but on relatively hard terms. In both cases it was 
presumably their ability to make good use of the resources that counted more than anything else. 
Human resources must be measured in tenus of both quantity and quality. All of the ASEAN 
countries, apart from Malaysia and the outer islands of Indonesia, are densely populated. At the 
outset of industrialisation, all had or were soon to have more labour than they could employ. In this 
regard, they were no different from many other developing countries today. What distinguishes the 
ASEAN cotmtries, in particular Singapore, is the quality of its labour force. Diligence, loyalty, hard 
work and a strong appreciation of education are virtues which appear to be more abundant in ASEAN 
and the East Asian NICs than elsewhere. Since these countries have common historical roots, the 
explanation has been found in culture. 
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Some have suggested that part of the explanation of the success of the East Asian countries' relative 
success is that they simply got a headstart. The facts, however, do not bear this out. All, with the 
exception of Thailand, were under colonial rule until the end of the Second World War. Both Taiwan 
and the Republic of Korea are sometimes regarded as having had a more favourable colonial 
e":perience, in terms of economic progress, than other countries, though Singapore and Malaysia were 
undoubtedly the richest at the end of the war. Whatever advantages Taiwan and the Republic of 
Korea might have had were largely destroyed by war. Indeed, all the East Asian countries began the 
1950s still suffering the effects of war. In this respect, their circumstances were less advantageous 
than those of many other developing countiies (Page, J. 1994). 
The role of the government 
In East Asia governments have played an important and active role in development. This has taken 
place in many forms varying from country to country, the importance of which can be seen in the 
example of Singapore. There is no escaping the fact that governments have been deeply involved in 
the economics of all of the East Asian countries. In addition to serving minimal fwtctions, including 
the provision of necessary infi·astmcture, governments have intervened in three broad areas: Firstly, 
they have been actively engaged in managing the system of industrial incentives (Chia 1984); 
secondly, they have claimed exclusive responsibility for maintaining macroeconomic stability; thirdly, 
they have established some public enterprises apart from utilities to produce what are essentially 
private goods (McCawley, 1979; Soehoed, 1967). 
There has been very little systematic analysis of government regulation in developing economies. 
There is, of course, an extensive literature on development plamling, but tllis has been concerned 
mainly with the objectives of development and the techniques of planning. For example, the two 
standard texts, Lewis (1966) and Tinbergen (1967), barely discuss the econonlics of regulation 
although Lewis observes that 'licensing is one of the obstacles to development in poorer countries ... In 
most poor countries licensing means inordinate delays, and inexplicable decisions' (Lewis 1966, 
p266). In the field of industrial policy there has been considerable discussion of the effect of 
government intervention in the pricing of factor inputs and in fiscal incentives on industrial efficiency 
and technology choice. With tl1e exception of Little, Scitovsky and Scott (1970), there is little else on 
tl1e subject. Government regulation in developing economies remains an under-researched topic (Ariff 
and Hill, 1985). 
For one thing, regulation - like protection - affects manufacturing perfonmmce and export growth: 
directly, as regulation affects the international trade sector, and indirectly, through its effect on 
industrial efficiency and international competitiveness. For another, tl1e nature and exient of 
regulation varies enormously witllin ASEAN. The most impOitant difference concerns not tl1e amount 
of regulation but rather the type of such intervention. Singapore and Indonesia constitute extreme 
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cases. Both governments intervene e.x.1ensively in the economy. But in Singapore, which has a small 
and relatively efficient bureaucracy, intervention generally enhances the operation of market forces. 
By contrast, regulation in Indonesia generally impedes the operation of market forces and reduces 
efficiency (Lim, 1983). 
Without the macroeconomic stability that the East Asian countries enjoyed, in varying degrees, it is 
unlikely that their success, not only in achieving rapid growth and export expansion, but also in 
improving income distribution and other measures of 'quality of life', would have been anywhere near 
as great (Page, J. 1994). The area of government involvement most difficult to evaluate is the 
management of the system of incentives which guide private economic activity. It is certain that 
government manipulation of incentives can be extremely effective (Wong and Kalirajan, 1984). Every 
major shift in industrial policy in the East Asian countries was followed by a significant change in 
economic performance. Particularly impressive have been the responses of manufacturers to the 
removal of impediments to exporting, although there is nothing unique about this. 
There remains the question, however, whether govenm1ents' main contribution to economic success in 
the East Asian countries was not principally in removing the obstacles to growth which they 
themselves put there in the first place. Taking everything at face value, tltis would seem to be largely 
the case. Under import substitution they generally stagnated; removing the obstacles to exporting, they 
generally flourished. Backsliding towards protectionism, as in the Republic of Korea in the 1970s, led 
to decline. 
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((::Jm~ptew 2 
1Reve21ied Comp21Ir3ltive Adv3lll1lt3lge 
In the last three decades the ASEAN economies have been among the most rapidly growing in the 
world. With a few exceptions, manufacturing has been the region's leading growth sector. The 
ASEAN manufacturing sector is of interest not only because of the pace of industrialisation but also 
because in each country manufacturing has undergone a major transfornmtion. One element of this 
process is the increase in manufactured exports. Another is the profound change in the stmcture of 
manufacturing, involving the transition from simple consumer goods and resource-based processing 
activities towards more sophisticated industrial structures. 
It is widely recognised that the comparative advantage of a cow1try is by no means static in a dynamic 
world. It is subject to changes such as shifts in resource and factor endowments, technology and 
demand. Experience has shown that it is not unusual for a country to lose its comparative advantage 
in certain lines of production over time or to develop a competitive advantage in an entirely new set of 
products (Porter 1989). In industrial countries, several industries have exhibited distinct product 
cycles which have resulted in the international relocation of the labour-intensive and standardised 
production phases. 
In theory, comparative advantage is essentially related to pre-trade relative prices, whereas in 
empirical research one has to improvise with post-trade data (Hillman, 1980). Tllis difficulty was 
largely responsible for the emergence of the concept of 'revealed comparative advantage' (RCA) in 
empirical research. The concept of 'revealed' comparative advantage, introduced by Balassa (1965) 
pertains to the relative trade performances of individual countries in particular commodities. On the 
assumption that the commodity pattern of trade reflects inter-cmmtry differences in relative costs as 
well as in non-price factors, this is ass1U11ed to 'reveal' the comparative advantage of the trading 
countries. A number of indicators of RCA are available in the literature, but for the present study, one 
of the more popular measures has been chosen, the export specialisation ratio. The export 
specialisation ratio provides an insight into the sllifting pattern of comparative advantage or 
disadvantage in manufacturing of a number of countries allowing an exanlination of the extent to 
which changes in the manufacturing sector conform to the theoretical predictions. This is preceded by 
a brief review of the relevant literature on international trade and changing comparative advantage. 
Needless to say, international shifts in comparative advantage constitute so complex a phenomenon 
that no single explanation is adequate. There are so many forces at work that no simple two-factor 
model would suffice. These include the role of factor movements, human capital, natural resources, 
infrastructures, technology transfers and reversals and research and development. In this chapter, an 
attempt is made to detect shifts in comparative advantage in the Pacific region, \vith special reference 
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to Singapore's manufactures. The examination of structural change will aim to determine what light 
the theory of changing comparative advantage has shed on the process of structural change, and how 
well the observed changes conform to the theoretical expectations. 
To sununarise the approach, a three-stage transformation process is envisaged. In the early stages of 
industrialisation, the manufacturing sector consists predominantly of simple processing and resource-
based activities. As capital accumulation - both human and physical - proceeds, a range of non-
resource-based activities emerge, initially consisting mainly of those which are unskilled labour-
intensive, but subsequently of products which are more capital and technology-intensive. 
Despite some similarities in the general reorientation of industrial policies, the ASEAN countries' 
industrial sectors are quite dissimilar in many other respects. For one thing they are at different stages 
of industrialisation. At one extreme is Singapore, a high wage NIC. At the other extreme is Indonesia, 
a low wage economy with, until fairly recently, one of the least developed industrial sectors for its size 
in the world. In between are the other three countries, which are commonly labelled 'near NICs'. 
Singapore, the most advanced member of ASEAN, has found it increasingly difficult to maintain its 
comparative advantage in labour-intensive exports and since tl1e late 1970s has been actively pursuing 
a policy of industrial restructuring directed at shifting the manufacturing sector towards more skill-
intensive activities. While tl1e next-tier ASEAN NICs continue to rely heavily on unskilled labour-
intensive exports, they are aware that this phase of growt11 will be of limited duration. Anticipating 
tl1e erosion of tl1eir comparative advantage by other low-wage developing countries, these com1tries 
have also adopted programmes of upgrading labour force skills which it is hoped will facilitate tlle 
transition to specialisation in more skill-intensive activities. 
There are two main difficulties associated with empirical investigation of the nature and consequences 
of changing comparative advantage. The first is to develop appropriate measures of changing factor 
endowment, tl1e underlying causes of changing comparative advantage. The second is to develop a 
suitable schema for disaggregating production and trade flows, and to verify tl1e impact of these 
changes on the structure of production and trade. From tl1e data presented in chapter one it can be 
seen that the ASEAN economies are neither resource-rich nor resource-poor in the Asia-Pacific 
region. The best endowed countries in ASEAN are Malaysia and Indonesia, while the Philippines has 
tl1e poorest endowment. But even the well endowed countries do not have a resource base as rich as 
Australia and tl1e United States; similarly, even the poor Philippine endowment is superior to that of 
Japan and Korea. 
A word on data limitations is important at the outset. Unlike international trade flows, which are 
fairly well documented and easily measured, tl1e reliability of industrial production, employment and 
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value-added statistics of some ASEAN cmmtries is questionable. Satisfactory time series data, on 
which an 1malysis of structural change must rely, are particularly difficult to obtain. There are 
considerable variations in the coverage of industries and firms, and the level of disaggregation 
between cow1tries and over time. In the absence of appropriate data on production costs in the 
manufacturing industries of individual countries, it may be proposed to rely on prevailing theories of 
international specialisation for detennining the pattern of comparative advantage. Among these 
doctrines, the Heckscher-Ohlin theory and the classical theory of comparative advantage can claim 
our attention. 
lLiteratull"e 
Models of international trade serve as vehicles for discussing the sources of international comparative 
advantage and the consequent effects that govermnent interventions may have. The sources of 
comparative advantage are: differences in technology; differences in factor supplies; economies of 
scale; differences in tastes; and barriers to entry. 
The myth of positive economics would make us expect to find in the literature some decisive empirical 
tests that have led the profession to discard one or more of these models. In fact, only two empirical 
findings seem to have had a major impact on the way that economists think. The first was Leontief's 
(1953) discovery that US imports were more capital intensive than US exports. This was widely 
regarded to be a great blow against the Heckscher-Ohlin model. The second major empirical finding 
was the extensive amollilt of 'intra-industry' trade catalogued by Grubel and Lloyd (1975), which will 
be discussed in the next chapter. The extent of intra-industry trade is also regarded as a blow against 
the generality of the Heckscher-Ohlin model and is at least partly responsible for the large theoretical 
literature on models with increasing returns to scale and product differentiation. Other than these two 
results, beliefs about the sources of international comparative advantage have not been greatly affected 
by any observations (Greenaway and Winters, 1994). 
The theory of international trade is fow1ded on the principle of comparative advantage. As Ricardo in 
1817 first explained it, for a nation to gain from trade all that is necessary is that its relative cost of 
producing various goods differ from tl1e relative cost of producing the same goods in other countries. 
No matter whetl1er a country is absolutely more (or less) efficient in producing all goods, it will gain 
from trade, exporting those goods whose relative cost is low. Since virtually every country in the 
world has a comparative advantage in sometlling, and hence a comparative disadvantage in something 
else, every country in the world should gain from trade, rat11er than going it alone and remaining an 
autarky (Ricardo, 1871). 
One of t11e most celebrated attempts at testing tlle Ricardian tlleory was undertaken by MacDougall 
(1951), who in noting tl1at before World War Two 'American weekly wages in manufacturing were 
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roughly double the British', concluded that the US ought to have had a comparative advantage in 
industries where output per worker was more than twice the British. An examination of 193 7 trade 
data disclosed that, in general, the US industries in question upheld a larger share of the world export 
market than did its UK competitors. On the strength of these results MacDougall considered the 
Ricardian theory to be validated, especially since his figures revealed that where US labour 
productivities were less than double those of the British, UK exports exceeded American ones by very 
large margins. While not questioning the accuracy of MacDougall's observations, it is not clear that 
the inference he draws is consonant with the theory's essence. The theory is usually formulated in 
terms of bilateral trade, where one country exports to the other, goods in which its labour force is 
comparatively more efficient. While no allowance is made for the same goods to be exported 
simultaneously by both countries, MacDougall's approach is cast in terms of comparative expmt 
market shares sustained in third party economies. This is supposedly justified on the grounds that in 
the review period, trade between the US and the UK was severely restricted because of inordinately 
high tariffs. Although there appears to be no theoretically sound bias for such a procedure, it has been 
accepted by many as 'a valid translation of the classical comparative costs model into a multi-country 
setting' (Caves, 1967). MacDougall recognised that, theoretically, if either the US or the UK 'had any 
comparative advantage, however small, she would get the whole export market' (MacDougall, 19 51). 
That in practice, both had at least some share, even if labour productivity ratios diverged from relative 
wage ratios, is accounted for by the existence of imperfect markets, non-homogeneous products and 
transport costs. None the less MacDougall felt reassured that the labour theory was indeed confinned 
since there was a clear 'tendency for each country to get a larger share of the market the greater its 
comparative advantage'. 
Economists generally regard the Heckscher-Ohlin model to be superior to the Ricardian model. The 
first and by far the most influential study of the Heckscher-Ohlin model was done by Leontief (1953) 
who found that a given bmtdle of US exports in 1947 was apparently produced with a smaller input of 
capital per man than an equivalent bundle of competitive imported substitutes. As the US was 
generally believed to be capital abundant compared to the rest of tlte world, tllis finding contradicted 
theoretical expectations from tlte simple factor proportions theory. 
This generated two main responses. On the one hand, there were those who, eager to verify Leontiefs 
claims, conducted sinlilar tests on the other country's data (Stapler and Roskamp, 1961; Wahl, 1961; 
Bharadwaj, 1962; Roskan1p, 1963). On tlte other hand, there were those who attempted to 'explain' 
the paradox by turning on the alleged invalidity of specific Heckscher-Ohlin assmnptions (Lancaster, 
1957; Minhas, 1963; Travis, 1964; Keesing, 1965, 1966; Kenen, 1965; Vernon, 1966; Hirsch, 1967; 
Baldwin, 1971; Metcalf and Steedman, 1972). It was out of this second group that tlte 'new' theories 
of trade emerged in the mid -1960s as extensions of the factor proportions theory. 
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The new theories of trade, suggested resolutions of the Leontief paradox, fall into three broad 
categories. Each originates from a relaxation of specific Heckscher-Ohlin assumptions and can be 
denominated respectively as the skill level hypothesis, the technological gap hypothesis and the scale 
economy hypothesis. 
The explanation offered by Leontief (1953) is that an average US worker was three times as effective 
in production as his foreign counterpart. Though this figure of three times greater efficiency has been 
fOtmd to be exaggerated (Kreinin, 1965), subsequent evidence (Leontief, 1965; Keesing, 1966, 1968) 
has shown that, across industries, US exports are indeed more skilled labour intensive in production 
than their import competing counterparts (Kravis, 1956; Waehrer, 1968). These empirical analyses 
suggest that an additional factor - labour skill or human capital - as well as physical capital and raw 
labour is a significant determinant of the pattern of US trade. 
As well as the labour skill approach, the human capital resolution of the paradox (Kenen, 1965) has 
sho\vn that including the physical and human capital inputs to production can give empirical results 
which are consistent with the predictions of the Heckscher-Ohlin theory. Tllis has been criticised on 
both theoretical and empirical grounds. First, the notion that wage differences between skill levels are 
exclusively due to differences in human capital is not entirely valid. Though Waehrer (1968) found a 
significant correlation between wage payments and skill inputs these may be due, in part at least, to 
such socio-econonlic factors as labour productivity differences and labour market imperfections. 
Secondly, Baldwin (1971) suggests that it is theoretically inappropriate to aggregate the human and 
physical capital elements. Finally the different labour skills are unlikely to be perfectly substitutable 
though this is assun1ed by the human capital approach. 
The technological gap hypotltesis is based on tlte premise tlmt, contrary to the Heckscher-Ohlin 
assltlllption of identical technology, lags and leads in product innovation between trading countries 
may explain the observed pattern of trade in manufactured products (Posner, 1961; Vernon, 1966; 
Hirsch, 1967). Indeed, empirical evidence based on American trade data and industry characteristics 
have established that a significant positive relationship exists between the technology intensity of the 
production process and competitive export performance in foreign markets (Gruber, 1967; Keesing, 
1968; Weiser and Jay, 1972). 
The scale economy thesis suggests t11at, contrary to tlte Heckscher-Ohlin assumption of constant 
returns to scale, economies of large scale production figure in the production technologies of a wide 
variety of manufactured goods (Linder, 1961). Large countries have a relative advantage over smaller 
ones in foreign trade in products whose outputs are subject to increasing returns. Empirical 
verifications of the scale theory by Keesing (1968) and Weiser and Jay (1972) have shown that there 
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is a strong positive correlation between US competitive export perfonnance and the average size of its 
industries. 
The Heckscher-Ohlin model has often been studied empirically with cross-commodity comparisons 
implicitly based on the assumption that the export perfonnance 'should' depend on the characteristics 
of the industry. Simple correlations were rather common early in the literature, but these gave way to 
multiple correlations in the 1970s. 
For example Keesing (1966) reports some simple correlations of export performance (US 
ex-ports)/(group of 14 countries' exports). The results of the study are suggestive of human capital 
abundance in the US because the largest positive correlations occur at the highest skill levels and 
because the unskilled labour share is actually negatively correlated with export performance. 
The basic Heckscher-Ohlin model has been extended in a variety of directions. One of these is the 
synthesis by Kruger (1977) and Garnaut and Anderson (1980) which, drawing on the model 
developed by Jones (1971), have incorporated natural resources into lhe model. The inclusion of 
natural resources is particularly relevant to the ASEAN countries, given that most have a moderately 
rich resource endowment. In this formulation a two-good model is proposed, consisting of 
manufactures and natural resources. There are three factors of production: capital, which is specific to 
the production of manufactures; natural resources, which are specific to natural resource based goods; 
and labour which is required for both. 
In the early stages of development, when the capital stock is small, the wage rate is detennined largely 
by the ratio of natural resources to labour, that is, the lower the ratio the lower the marginal 
productivity of labour. At this stage, the country will export natural resource based goods and import 
manufactures. As capital accumulation proceeds, labour is attracted into the newly developing 
manufacturing sector, and the com1try gradually shifts from being a net exporter of natural resource 
based goods to a net exporter of manufactures. According to this formulation, the speed at which 
labour is reallocated to manufacturing, and the 'cross-over point' - at which manufactured exports 
exceed those of natural resource based goods - will be determined by the initial per capita endowment 
of natural resources: the greater the endowment, the greater the capital accumulation and the higher 
the wage necessary to achieve the cross-over, and the longer the period of specialisation in the 
production and export of natural resource based goods. 
Conventional trade theory stresses the differences in factor endowments between countries and 
differences in the factor proportions required for producing different goods as the basis for 
comparative advantage. Countries are differently endowed by nature witl1 tl1e various factors of 
production (land, labour and capital) required for production. This means that, in the absence of trade, 
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the relative prices of these factors will differ between countries. Land will be relatively cheap in 
countries well endowed with land, labour will be relatively cheap in countries well endowed with 
labour and capital relatively cheap in countries well endowed with capital. By implication, this 
assumes that factor markets are perfectly competitive. At the same time, different factor proportions 
are required for the production of different goods. Some productive processes are highly labour 
intensive, others capital intensive, others land intensive. Thus, it follows that a country will find a 
comparative advantage in those goods which use the relatively abundant factor of production 
relatively intensively. In other words, relative labour abundant developing cotmtries are predicted by 
the theory to have a comparative advantage in relatively labour-intensive goods, while relatively 
capital abundant developed countries find a comparative advantage in capital-intensive goods. The 
theory can be extended to allow for many factors of production and many countries without losing 
much of its generality. 
Trade theory has traditionally identified the relative factor endowments of land, labour and capital as 
the primary determinants of the composition of trade. Recognising the growing importance of 
manufactures in world trade, most theories since the 1970s have emphasised criteria such as 
economies of scale, skill intensities, and technical innovation, (Hufbauer 1970). These various 
theories on the determinants of comparative costs and the commodity composition of trade contain 
certain implications regarding which developing countries are likely to have a comparative advantage 
in exporting manufactures. Some of the country characteristics, which various trade theories have 
stated are favourable to increasing manufactured exports, are discussed below. 
Domestic market size 
The underlying theory of tl1e market size hypothesis is that economies of scale give a com1try a 
comparative advantage in exporting manufactured goods ·with increasing returns to scale. Linder 
( 1967) took this arguement to the e:..'treme, stating tl1at a country cannot successfully export 
manufactures without a large domestic market. Keesing (1967) has provided empirical support for the 
market size hypothesis. 
The market size hypothesis of the study is not that a large domestic is a precondition for successful 
performance in exporting manufactured goods. Besides constituting a pessimistic forecast since most 
developing countries have small domestic markets, a precondition hypothesis would contradict the 
evidence that some small com1tries have provided by increasing significantly their manufactured 
exports such as Singapore and Hong Kong. Indeed, manufactured exports are in a way even more 
important for small countries, since foreign trade is a means by which they can effectively increase the 
size of their markets and obtain the important scale and competitive benefits. 
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There are several ways in which small countries can overcome their size handicap in exporting 
manufactures. One solution is to concentrate on manufactured goods with constant returns to scale. A 
good example which has yielded substantial returns in recent years for some developing countries is 
the assembly and processing operations subcontracted from multinational corporations. The major 
subcontracting developing countries in Asia for the United States are Taiwan, Hong Kong, Singapore, 
Korea and the Philippines. Most of the these countries have small domestic markets. The main 
determinants of comparative advantage in international subcontracting, low labour costs and 
proximity to a large market, do not discriminate in favour of large countries. 
A policy recommendation emanating from tltis ntight be to encourage small cow1tries to consider 
regional integration. This appears to have been the case for Singapore as it has, over t11e years, 
attempted to convince its partners of t11e need to elaborate effective regional economic cooperation. 
Through regional integration countries can increase t11e size of their 'domestic markets' and be more 
capable of exporting manufactured goods wltich exhibit economies of scale. Unfortunately, efforts at 
regional integration have not been very successful, making impossible an empirical confonnation of 
tltis policy recommendation. It must also be remembered that a large domestic market is not a 
precondition for increasing manufactured e::~.:ports, however, and indeed may in some cases encourage 
policies wltich discrintinate against exports. 
Level of economic development 
The higher the level of economic development of a country, ot11er things being equal, the greater 
should be its capability of producing manufactured products that are competitive on the world market. 
The degree of industrialisation, technology, efficient infrastructure, and levels of skills and 
organisation combine to give a more developed country a comparative advantage in producing 
products with the quality and economy necessary to be competitive in world trade. 
Just as with the market size factor, however, a high level of economic development is not a 
precondition for success in exporting manufactures. The relationsltip between level of economic 
development and manufactured export performance is not categorically positive. In their study of the 
pattern of export growth in developing countries, Chenery and Hughes (1972) have shown that the 
first stages in ex"}Jorting manufactures is generally in products intensive in low-skilled labour and 
simple technology. Later stages normally exhibit increased sophistication in manufactured goods. 
This is the pattern that the ASEAN countries have attempted to follow. 
The tmderlying assumption which has been called into question is tlmt there is a common worldwide 
stock of technical knowledge to which all countries have equal access. Even if technology is ultimately 
diffused around the world, it takes time for this to happen. Therefore, countries which are better able 
to generate new technologies gain a comparative advantage, albeit a temporary one, in producing new 
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goods which use newly minted technology, what are often called 'high-tech' goods. Over time as new 
products become standardised for mass consumption, their production may shift from the country 
which created them to other countries with lower production costs. Singapore was able to take 
advantage of this situation through a number of subcontracting arrangements and investment from 
foreign owned MNCs. As costs began to rise production has shifted down the line, first to Malaysia 
and Thailand, then to Indonesia and the Philippines. Tlris pattern is consistent with Vernon's 'product 
cycle hypothesis' (Vernon, 1979). That products have a life cycle and that countries specialise at 
different stages in the product life cycle has been offered as an alternative to the Heckscher-Ohlin 
hypothesis. However, the product cycle theory fails as a separate theory of trade because it begs the 
question of why some countries are better able than others to create new products and new 
technologies. If the reason is that if some countries have more skilled labour and scientific resources 
to devote to research and development, then the product cycle theory comes close to being nothing 
other than an extended version of the Heckscher-Ohlin proposition. 
N:tturaR resource endowment 
There are several ways in which a developing country's endowment of natural resources can affect its 
performance in exporting manufactures. This section proposes that the donrinant effect of a large 
endowment of natural resources is to discourage manufactured eA'}JOrts. Following directly from the 
Heckscher-Ohlin factor endowment theory of comparative advantage, it is expected that a comttry rich 
in natural resources will tend to specialise in producing primary products or goods intensive in 
primary factors, as has occurred to a large extent in Indonesia and Malaysia. On the ot11er hand, a 
country poor in natural resources, such as Singapore, is expected to specialise in manufactured 
products. The assumption of no country-specific resources clearly does not apply to natural resources 
winch are distributed very unevenly around the world. Obviously, if a country does not have certain 
natural resources, it will import them regardless of the capital or labour intensiveness of their 
extraction, this has been a characteristic of a number fo Asian econonries, most notably Japan, Hong 
Kong and Singapore .. 
The fact that a country is poor in natural resources does not, however, by itself confer a comparative 
advantage in manufactures. Since the country is poor in natural resources, it must concentrate its 
efforts on manufactures if it wishes to export. Comparative advantage is not a static phenomenon and 
dependent only on given endown1ents. A country can develop a comparative advantage in 
manufactures by working to develop certain factors which can be changed over the short and medium 
run (Little, 1979). 
A lack of natural resources does not necessarily mean that a country will never be a successful 
exporter of manufactures. To the extent that industrialisation and diversification are synonymous witl1 
economic development, this assertion would imply that countries rich in natural resources are thereby 
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handicapped in their efforts to develop their economies. The experience of some of the developed 
countries obviously refutes this asse11ion. 
When discussing only the developing countries, however, it is valid to apply the Heckscher-Ohlin 
theory to the extent that cmmtries are expected to depend at least, in the first stages of development, 
on their abundant natural resources for export. When a com1try rich in natural resources reaches a 
certain level of development, it might begin to industrialise and depend more on manufactured 
exports if it wishes to progress further. 
Abundance of natural resources can, in fact, provide a basis for the expansion of manufactured exports 
in developing countries through the further processing of the locally produced raw materials. For a 
variety of reasons, this avenue for increasing manufactured exports has not been extensively used in 
developing countries. The processing industries, particularly the extractive industries, often require 
large capital investments and a skilled labour force. In addition, the escalation of tariffs by stages of 
production in developed countries discriminates against the processing for e:-..."}Jort of locally produced 
raw materials in developing countries. Even if the developing countries offsel the Lariff obslacle 
through export subsidies to their processing industries, they still risk (and have, in fact, experienced) 
retaliation in the fonn of countervailing duties by the developed countries. 
An hypothesis of this study is that the above obstacles have proved to be effective constraints on the 
ability of developing countries to process successfully for export locally produced raw materials, thus 
reenforcing the prediction of the Heckscher-Ohlin theory that countries rich in natural resources will 
not be successful exporters of manufactures. In the case of ASEAN, Singapore is the most successful 
exporter of manufactures and has a poor resource endowment. However, the remaining four countries 
are resource rich and, to varying degrees, have become successful exporters of manufactures. To say 
that the Heckscher-Ohlin theory predicts that countries rich in natural resources will not be successful 
exporters is inaccurate, it is just that some countries, such as Indonesia, are slower at developing their 
exports breaking away from the reliance on their natural resources. 
Labour skills 
Several empirical studies have shown that differences in labour skills play a major role in determining 
comparative advantage and trade patterns. Cmmtries well-endowed with skilled labour will have a 
comparative advantage in skill-intensive goods, and countries with a scarcity of skilled labour will 
tend to produce goods intensive in unskilled labour. The empirical tests for the labour skills 
hypothesis have shown that trade patterns can be explained when industries are ranked according to 
their relative skill intensities. In order to measure the different skill intensities of industries, Kenen 
(1965), Kravis (1971), used differences in average wage rates as proxies. Keesing (1979) used the 
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actual share requirements of skilled labour man years by industry. Baldwin's (1981) variable for 
skilled intensity measured the differences in the education of labour in various industries. 
It seems reasonable to assume that developing countries as a whole should have a comparative 
advantage in products intensive in the use of unskilled labour. The product cycle theory of Vernon 
provides a theory in support of this proposition (Vernon, 1979). 
Since most developing countries have more than enough unskilled labour, this particular resource 
should not be very helpful in explaining relative performance in exporting manufactures. It would be 
a mistake, however, to categorise the labour forces of all developing countries under the same label of 
unskilled, implying no cross-country differences. There are significant degrees of differences in the 
quality of labour existing in the various developing countries, and there are even sizeable pools of 
skilled labour in some of these countries. For example, some of the East Asian countries, notably the 
NICs, undoubtedly owe significant parts of their successful manufactured export performance to the 
relatively high quality of their labour forces. 
Empirical support has been presented for the argument that labour skills are a major determinant of 
the direction and composition of trade. Based on a factor endowment theory of trade, the hypothesis is 
that a cmmtry with a skilled labour force will have a comparative advantage in manufactured goods 
whose production is intensive in skilled labour. 
This study hypothesises that a skilled labour force should be positively related to manufactured export 
performance in developing countries. Skilled labour enables a country to produce a greater variety of 
products with the quality necessary to be competitive on the world market. Countries such as 
Singapore, Hong Kong, Korea and Taiwan are able to achieve levels of diversification in their 
manufactured exports which are not possible for countries lacking in skilled labour. For example, 
there are some developing countries lacking in skilled labour which have been able to achieve 
reasonably high levels of manufactured exports, but these exports are heavily concentrated in a 
product like textiles with unfavourable growth prospects. It is desirable to have a wide base of export 
products both for reasons of stability and because the growth prospects for textiles and clothing 
exports are not nearly as bright as they were in the 1960s. These two product categories certainly 
cannot provide the road to success in manufactured exports for many more countries. 
Although the theory is wanting in many respects, it has not lost its intellectual appeal. The principal 
of comparative advantage makes considerable sense to those concerned with allocative efficiency, 
although what constitutes comparative advantage and what contributes to it are subject to debate. 
None the less, the factor endowment hypothesis exhibits considerable robustness with respect to both 
inter-industry and intra-industry trade. (Ethier, 1982) 
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In theory, comparative advantage is essentially related to pre-trade relative prices, whereas in 
empirical research one has to improvise with post-trade data. This difficulty was largely responsible 
for the emergence of the concept of 'revealed comparative advantage' (RCA) in empirical research. 
The concept of 'revealed' comparative advantage, introduced by Balassa ( 1965) pertains to the relative 
trade performances of individual countries in particular commodities. On the assumption that the 
commodity pattern of trade reflects inter-country differences in relative costs as well as in non-price 
factors, this is assumed to 'reveal' the comparative advantage of the trading countries. 
For one thing, comparative advantage would be expected to detennine the structure of exports 
(Liesner, 1958); for another, under the assumption of uniformity in tastes and a uniform incidence of 
duties in every industry within each country, export-import ratios would reflect relative advantages. 
Thus, while the heterogeneity of statistical commodity groups allows for exports and imports within 
the same category, the greater is a cmmtry's advantage in producing the commodities in question, the 
higher the ratio of the f.o.b. value of exports to that of imports is likely to be. 
The assumption of the unifonnity of tastes and uniform incidence of duties is not fulfilled in the real 
world, however. Rather, imports will be affected by intercountry differences in the degree of 
protection. Moreover, in the case of intern1ediate products, export-import ratios are influenced by 
demand for purposes of further transformation in producing for export. To take accmmt of these 
influences, separate consideration has to be given to the special circumstances relating to individual 
products, which fact reduces the generality of the comparisons. 
On the other hand, as long as all exporters are subject to the same tariff, data on relative export 
performance are not distorted by differences in the degree of tariff protection. Correspondingly, in 
evaluating 'revealed' comparative advantage, greater weight is given to export performance than to 
export-import ratios. In doing so it avoids the lengthy discussion of protection policies, although it is 
recognised that patterns of both export and import specialisation are of considerable importance as 
indicators of comparative advantage in a world in which there are many commodities and intra-
industry trade. 
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Export Specialisation Ratio~ 
A Measure of Revealed Comparative Advantage 
International shifts in comparative advantage constitute so complex a phenomenon that no single 
explanation is adequate. The interaction between the detern1inants of comparative advantage is such 
that the concept of comparative advantage itself is increasingly looked upon as a dynamic one. There 
are so many more forces at work than was originally envisaged in the simple two-factor model. These 
include the role of factor movements, human capital, research and development, natural resources, 
and technology transfers and reversals (Kennen, 1970; Keesing, 1966; Wells, 1972; Vernon, 1970). 
In an attempt to detect shifts in the comparative advantage of ASEAN manufactured exports, no 
single satisfactory measure is readily available. For, in theory, comparative advantage is essentially 
related to pre-trade relative prices, whereas in empirical research one has to improvise with post-trade 
data (Hillman, 1980). It is mainly this difficulty which led to the notion of 'Revealed Comparative 
Advantage' (RCA) in empirical research (Balassa, 1965), assuming of course that the relative costs as 
well as differences in non-price factors are reflected in the pattern of commodity trade. 
A number of indicators of Revealed Comparative Advantage are available in the literature. However, 
the most commonly used are the net exports/total trade ratio, the export performance ratio and the 
export specialisation ratio. A rough insight into a country's shifting pattern of comparative advantage 
or disadvantage in manufacturing may be gleaned from changes in the ratio of net e"1Jorts to total 
trade. 
Net export/total trade ratio 
NXij = (Xij - Mij) I (Xij + Mij) 
where:-
Xij = country i's export of product j 
Mij = country i's import of product j 
Changes in the ratio of net exports (exports minus imports) to total trade (exports plus imports) at a 
fairly disaggregated level can provide rough insights into a country's shifting pattern of comparative 
advantage. This measure NXij expresses net exports of commodity j as a ratio of total trade in 
commodity j, for country i (see formula above). This measure yields negative figures in the case of net 
imports, and the ratios can theoretically range between -1 (where a product is imported but not 
exported) to + 1 (where a product is exported but not imported). Although the positive sign thereby 
indicates that the country exports the good it does not necessarily indicate revealed comparative 
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advantage; nor does a negative sign necessarily suggest revealed comparative disadvantage. However, 
an increase in the ratio may be taken as a likely indication of some strengthening of 'revealed' 
comparative advantage. The net export/total trade ratio has also been expressed in percentage terms, 
with the values ranging between -100 and +100 (multiplying the formula by 100). UNIDO (1982) 
provides an empirical application of such a model. A word of caution, however, is in order in 
interpreting the net export ratios. The ratios are affected by the level of aggregation. Even at the two-
digit level, the ratios can conceal a lot of interesting variations and deviations. In addition, the ability 
of this measure to 'reveal' the shifts in the country's comparative advantage pattern is affected by the 
stmcture of protection in the e:\.'}JOrt markets (which distorts exports) and at home (which distorts 
imports). Where domestic market protection is substantial, the ratio may indicate little about changes 
in 'real' comparative advantage. These caveats notwithstanding, the net export ratios do serve as a 
useful tool of analysis, especially when used in conjunction with other RCA indicators. 
The next two measures to be considered - the export performance ratio and the export specialisation 
ratio - have an intuitive appeal as an RCA measure, especially since they obviate the need for import 
data. However, they are not free from policy distortions, since exports are also influenced by policy 
interventions by both importing and exporting countries. Nonetheless, the danger of such distortions 
appears to be much less than that for the net export/total trade ratio, as government interventions 
generally distort a country's import-mix more than its export-mix. 
The first of these two measures is the 'export perforn1ance ratio'. This measure EPij expresses the 
share of country i's export of product j in total world exports of product j, as a ratio to the share of 
country i's total exports of manufactures in the world total exports of manufactures. 
Export performance ratio 
EPij = (Xij I Xwj) I (Xim I Xwm) 
where:-
Xij = country i's export of product j 
X \\j = world exports of product j 
Xim =country i's total manufactured exports 
Xwm = world total exports of manufactures 
In interpreting the data for the export perfonuance ratio (see formula above), it needs to be 
emphasised that the ratio, in effect, standardises for a country's share of world manufactures. Thus, for 
example, low figures for one country are not attributable to that country's small aggregate 
manufactured exports, but rather to the export performance of the particular product. An export 
perfonuance ratio of unity would imply 'nonnal' export perfonnance of product j relative to the size of 
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country i as an exporter, while a ratio of two would suggest that the product j's share in country i's 
exports is twice the corresponding share, and so on. Although the ratio in theory can range from zero 
to infinity, large nmnbers beyond two digits are uncommon. AB this measure does not require import 
data, unlike the net export ratio, the results are less distorted by policy interventions. An export 
performance ratio exceeding mlity is usually taken as an indication of comparative advantage, while 
an increase in the ratio supposedly suggests a strengthetling of the comparative advantage so revealed. 
Wllile ASEAN exports have increased rapidly, so too have exports of the same products from many 
other developing countries. 
The second more conunonly used measure of RCA - the one used in the present study - is the ex'Port 
specialisation ratio (see formula below) which was introduced by Balassa (1965). This measure (ESij) 
is based on the ratio of the share of a commodity in the total merchandise exports of a country to the 
commodity's share in world merchandise exports. 
Export specialisation ratio 
ESij = (Xij I Xi) I (Xwj I Xw) 
where:-
Xij =country i's export ofproductj 
Xi = country i's total merchandise exports 
Xwj =world exports ofproductj 
Xw = world total merchandise exports 
The ex'Port specialisation ratio is in effect simply a more general measure than the export performance 
ratio, the difference being that the ratios are presented with respect to total merchandise exports rather 
than to manufactured ex'Ports. It is an indication of the extent of conunodity specialisation in a 
country's exports relative to that of other exporting countries. However, this ratio like the ex'Port 
performance ratio, must be used cautiously as an RCA measure (Bowen 1983). RCA indices need to 
be interpreted with caution, since they represent 'proxies' and portray 'ex-post' situations. An export 
specialisation ratio of umty would imply 'normal' export specialisation of product j relative to the size 
of country i as an exporter, since the amom1t of product j country i exports is equivalent to the amount 
of product j the world as a whole exports. Although the ratio in theory can range from zero to infinity, 
large numbers beyond two digits are uncommon. Any value above one implies the greater importance 
of product j in country i's exports compared to the world average (a concentration or specialisation in 
a particular product). An export specialisation ratio of more than tmity is usually taken as an 
indication of comparative advantage as a country i must have some sort of advantage in order to be 
able to produce more of product j than would nonnally be expected. In addition an increase in the 
ratio over time supposedly suggests a strengthening of the comparative advantage. 
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An index of less than one implies that country i's export of a particular product j in relation to its total 
exports is less than 'normal' (ie less than the world exports of product j in relation to world total 
merchandise exports). An index that is increasing, but is still less than one however, suggests a 
strengthening of the comparative advantage so revealed as a country begins to develop an advantage, 
enabling it to produce more of a particular product. Over time the country in question may gain a 
comparative advantage in producing the product as indicated by a ratio of greater than one. Similarly, 
any index that decreases over time implies that the country is beginning to lose its comparative 
advantage in producing a particular product. Eventually the index will fall below one as other 
countries begin to gain a comparative advantage in the production of the product. 
The inquiry has been limited to manufactured goods, partly because these provide the lion's share in 
trade among countries, and partly because a large number of primary products are subject to subsidies, 
quotas, and special arrangements, so that the ensuing trade pattern can hardly reflect comparative 
advantage. Manufactured goods have been defined to include the products classified in commodity 
categories five to eight of the Standard International Trade Classification, the exception being 
unwrought metals which - following the customs of international organisations - are regarded as 
primary products. 
In order to test the theory of changing comparative advantage it is necessary to develop a broadly 
consistent commodity classification. The minimum requirement is resource-intensive and labour-
intensive goods; technology-intensive goods should also be identified separately. It is necessary, 
further, to devise a universal ranking of industries, which can be applied consistently to each of the 
ASEAN countries. 
The usual procedure is to rank industries according to the production characteristics in the United 
States, on the assumption that the United States economy is relatively undistorted, and that its 
manufacturing data are the most comprehensive and reliable. The most frequent objection to this 
procedure is that the ranking of production characteristics may differ between developed and 
developing countries. However, limited evidence suggests the rankings are largely invariant to tl1e 
level of economic development, that is, t11at the phenomenon of 'factor intensity reversals' is of limited 
importance. The most widely used classification, first developed systematically by Lary (1968), is a 
ranking based on United States per capita value added within manufacturing. A major limitation of 
this classification is that it fails to identify resource-based goods,which are important both in our 
theoretical formulation and in a number of the ASEAN countries. Another classification developed 
subsequently by Krause (1982) is essentially a modification of t11e Lary-type classification, 
categorising commodities into four broad groups according to the dominant factor input: natural 
resource, unskilled labour, teclmology and human capital. In the Krause classification, labour 
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intensity is measured on the basis of the US data relating to per capita value-added, while teclmology 
intensity is gauged using the US research and development expenditure data. A further modification 
by Tyers and Philips (1984) splits resource goods into agriculture and mineral resource-intensive 
goods. Krause's SITC classification is reproduced, with some modification at the 3-digitlevel. 
Several points need to be made regarding this classification. First, what is an internationally mobile 
factor input- and therefore excluded from the classification- is to some extent arbitrary. For example, 
the movement of physical capital is severely restricted by some countries, although its exclusion in the 
case of the ASEAN countries may be justified on the grounds that these countries have fairly open 
capital markets. It may also be argued that resources and technology are fTeely traded and that their 
production is not location specific. However, there are often substantial economies in at least early-
stage processing on-site, and for some perishable agricultural commodities such processing is 
essential. The same may be said for teclmology-intensive goods, in the sense that the international 
relocation of production facilities requires basic technical competence in the host country. 
There is also the question of the definition of manufacturing. The conventional national accmmts 
definition for the purposes of production is !SIC 3, whereas in the case of trade it is SITC 5-8 (less 
68). Neither definition is clearly superior, and yet there are substantial differences in coverage. It 
would be possible in theory to adopt a common definition. But this raises a maze of methodological 
problems, compounded by the difficulty of a satisfactory and workable SITC-ISIC concordance. 
The model used appropriately, redefines capital to include both physical and human capital (Johnson, 
1968), it is conceptually desirable to distinguish between the two types of capital. Empirical support 
for this proposition has been provided by Balassa (1979), who found that human capital was a 
significant determinant of export specialisation in half of a sample of 36 developing countries. 
Secondly, it is necessary to distinguish those products whose development and production is 
particularly technology intensive. A large body of literature, developed by Hufbauer (1970) and others, 
and incorporating the product life cycle theory, asserts that research and development expenditure (or 
some suitable alternative measure of technology) is an important determinant of the pattern of trade 
flows. 
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Hence the classifications used in this study are :-
N am ran resoUJrce intensive 
SITC 61, 63, 661-3, 667, 671. 
ill nskilledl llabour intensive 
SITC 65, 664-666, 81, 82, 83, 84, 85, 89 except 896 and 897. 
IBlumalll capital intensive 
SITC 55, 62, 64, 69, 775, 78, 79, 885, 896, 897. 
'fecllmology intensive 
SITC 54, 56, 57, 58, 59, 752, 759, 76, 77 except 775, 88 except 885, 87. 
lPhyska! capital intensive 
SITC 51, 52, 67, 68, 71, 72, 73, 74, 751. 
Although the classification is generally transferable across cmmtries, there are some activities whose 
production characteristics differ sharply between countries. Such differences are marked especially 
between developed and developing countries, exacerbated by the phenomenon of factor intensity 
reversals. Thus, what is classified as an unskilled labour-intensive activity in one country may well be 
technology-intensive in another (see Lary, 1968; Krause, 1982). 
The model predicts first, a resource-based processing stage; secondly, a period of sustained growth in 
unskilled labour-intensive manufactures; and thirdly, the emergence of a more sophisticated industrial 
structure encompassing more skill and capital-intensive activities. Abstracting from policy 
interventions, the two key variables which explain the dynamics of the model are relative resource 
endowment and the rate of capital accumulation. 
On a priori expectations regarding trends in the composition of ASEAN manufacturing exports, one 
would expect the most rapid change to have occurred in Singapore. The two key variables are resource 
endowment and growth in per capita income. Singapore is exceptional on both grounds, having the 
poorest resource endowment and the most rapid growth in ASEAN. At the other extreme is Indonesia, 
which grew slowly in the 1960s and has a relatively good resource endowment. Malaysia, also, is well 
endowed with resources - which would be expected to inhibit the rapid movement of inputs out of this 
sector - but its growth has been rapid. The Philippines, which has the poorest endowment of the 'other 
four' and, should also have exhibited a significant transformation, although less rapid than Singapore. 
Thailand, in addition, is in an intermediate position. 
A wide range of policy interventions are likely to affect the predictive power of the model. 
Govenunent intervention or, more generally, 'resistances', defined by Drysdale and Gamaut (1982) as 
"any factors which prevent or retard the immediate international movement of conunodities in 
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response to price differentials", will substantially distort the pattern of production and trade. Apart 
from considerable inter-industry variations in the strncture of protection, some countries appear to 
discriminate against activities in which they appear to have a strong comparative advantage. Trading 
partners' (principally developed countries) protection also has an impact on trade and production 
composition. Consequently, while the composition of exports, being less distorted by domestic policy 
interventions, should provide a better indication of changing comparative advantage, it does not 
entirely escape the effects of these policy distortions. Moreover, domestic govenunent policy 
frequently has an important effect on the export perfonnance of particular products. 
The theory will be difficult to test for production in the case of a small industrial sector characterised 
by significant production of 'home goods', substantial state ownership, and sizeable tariff and other 
trade barriers. By contrast, a larger economy, and one characterised by closer domestic and 
international economic integration, should provide a more reliable test for theory. Exports should also 
provide a better test of the model, although again small volumes may easily be 'swamped' by factors 
not easily e.x:plained in comparative advantage terms (for example, irregular exports of state 
enterprises, or intra-firm transactions). Only in the case of significant volumes of production and 
trade would it be reasonable to attempt empirical verification of the model. 
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Structural Adjustment and Changing Comparative Advantage 
Table 2ol 
Revealed Comparative Advantage 
N aturai resource intensive 
Year Japan Hong Korea Singapore Thailand Malaysia Indonesia Philippines 
Kong 
1970 0.27 0.45 0.60 1.71 2.34 2.15 2.33 2.31 
1980 0.15 0.31 0.40 1.13 2.11 2.11 2.66 1.75 
1990 0.09 0.32 0.24 1.05 2.20 1.71 2.46 1.31 
Unskilled! labour intensive 
Year Japan Hong Korea Singapore Thailand Malaysia Indonesia Philippines 
Kong 
1970 2.60 6.90 5.62 0.96 0.23 0.18 0.12 
1980 1.13 6.23 5.33 0.92 1.66 0.46 0.10 1.27 
1990 0.60 4.51 3.88 0.81 2.23 0.67 0.73 1.38 
:Human capital intensive 
Year Japan Hong Korea Singapore Thailand Malaysia Indonesia Philippines 
Kong 
1970 1.83 0.51 0.22 0.34 0.05 0.10 0.02 0.01 
1980 2.56 1.25 0.99 0.61 0.16 0.13 0.07 
1990 1.24 1.44 0.93 0.79 0.41 0.19 0.10 0.24 
Technology intensive 
Year Japan Hong Korea Singapore Thailand Malaysia Indonesia Philippines 
Kong 
1970 2.50 1.61 0.60 0.62 0.07 0.05 
1980 2.10 1.59 1.51 1.93 0.49 1.01 0.04 0.12 
1990 2.11 1.64 1.85 2.50 0.61 1.74 0.05 0.44 
Physical capital intensive 
Year Japan Hong Korea Singapore Thailand Malaysia Indonesia Philippines 
Kong 
1970 1.32 0.11 1.14 0.23 0.53 0.89 0.03 0.05 
1980 1.75 0.25 0.69 0.55 0.72 0.70 0.15 0.27 
1990 1.55 0.56 0.54 1.38 1.35 1.67 1.82 1.26 
Source: Calculated from data in IMF Direction of Trade Statistics- count!Y curren9J (various years}. 
Export specialisation ratios for the five ASEAN countries, Japan, Hong Kong and Korea are presented 
in table 2.1, calculated using the fommla on page 59. From table 2.1 it can be seen that the more 
advanced nations, namely Japan and the NICs are beginning to lose their comparative advantage in 
the category unskilled labour intensive as all the ratios show a noticeable decline. The four remaining 
ASEAN countries show an increase as they move in to 'fill' the gap with the ratios for Thailand and 
the Philippines rising to over one by 1990, indicating a comparative advantage in this particular 
category. All of the ASEAN countries have moved out of the first phase of specialisation in natural 
resource based manufactured exports - Singapore was never really in this phase owing to its poor 
resource endowment. The shift away from resource intensive manufactures is to be expected, although 
64 
there has been a slight resurgence of this group since 1980, owing mainly to the governments' 
promotion of certain industries. Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia and the Philippines have all entered 
the second phase, but are showing signs of progressing to the third stage. Singapore, the most 
industrialised economy in the ASEAN region, is already in stage three but is being closely followed by 
Malaysia and Thailand. 
The ASEAN-4 also show an increase in the share of human capital intensive and technology intensive 
manufactures although the values are not particularly large, less than unity for all countries except for 
Malaysia in the case of technology intensive manufactures, but the fact that they are increasing 
suggests a strengthening of the comparative advantage. The remaining countries' share fluctuates 
throughout the period in both categories. Only Singapore shows a steady increase in the share of 
human capital intensive and technology intensive manufactures, reflecting its more advanced 
industrial sector. 
Singapore and the other ASEAN countries also show an increase in the share of physical capital 
intensive manufactures, all above unity, with Indonesia registering the most significant increase 
which implies that they have a comparative advantage in this category. Hong Kong shows an increase, 
although not to the extent of the ASEAN countries, as the ratio only rises from 0.11 to 0.56. Japan 
shows a decline since 1980, although the ratio is still above unity in 1990 (1.55), and South Korea 
shows a decline throughout the period from 1.14 to 0.54. The slow down in the growth or the decline 
of the share of manufactures indicates a loss in comparative advantage as other countries begin to 
compete and fill the niche in the market. 
The Philippine pattern bears some resemblance to that of Indonesia, and for similar reasons. Resource 
based activities have declined, as would be expected. However, the rise in the human-capital intensive 
group is due to the very high protection conferred on a number of activities, notably electric 
machinery, in both the Philippines and Indonesia. This probably explains much of these industries 
growth as domestic production of human capital-intensive products received considerable 
encouragement in the 1970s. Thus the more inward-looking economies, Indonesia and the 
Philippines, do not accord very closely to the model's predictions, precisely because of the effects of 
government intervention. 
The results of the other three more outward looking ASEAN economies is a good deal more 
encouraging. In Thailand the resource based category has generally declined, albeit around a 
fluctuating trend. At the same time, the unskilled labour-intensive product group has increased its 
share rapidly from 0.23 to 2.23, higher than all the other ASEAN countries. The share of technology. 
and human capital-intensive products has remained fairly modest although an increase has occurred 
indicating a strengthening of comparative advantage in both categories. Trends in the composition of 
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Malaysian manufacturing production also conform to the model's predictions. The share of resource-
intensive manufactures has declined from 2.15 to 1.71, with a rise in unskilled labour-intensive 
manufactured exports from 0.18 to 0.67, and more recently an increase in technology-intensive 
exports to 1. 7 4 by 1990. Trends in Singapore accord best with the tl1eoretical predictions. In the early 
1960s, resource and human capital-intensive activities were particularly impmtant, reflecting the 
nature of its economic relations with, and its factor endowments relative to, its ASEAN neighbours. 
The importance of unskilled labour-intensive activities grew strongly, especially in the late 1960s, 
until rising real wages resulted in their sharp absolute and relative decline beginning in the late 
1970s. As in the case of manufactured e""1Jorts, Singapore began to move into the fuird phase of 
Balassa's 'stages' approach in the late 1970s, as technology and human capital-intensive products 
became increasingly important. 
Rapid structural changes taking place in developed countries in ilie wake of the changing patterns of 
international division of labour have contributed significm1tly to the intra-regional movement of 
capital in tl1e Pacific Basin (Yamazawa,l980). 
Japan lost its comparative advantage in labour-intensive manufactures in ilie late 1960s, but managed 
to maintain its competitive lead in technology-intensive manufactures. The NICs enjoy strong 
comparative advantage in unskilled labour-intensive manufactures and have also gained new 
competitive strengtlts in human capital-intensive manufactures. 
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Table 2.2 shows Revealed Comparative Advantage (RCA) changes by major industrial groups in 
Japan, the NICs and ASEAN, from 1970-90. 
Table 2o2 
RCA changes in Japanu the NICs and ASEAN (1970=90) 
Year JAPAN NICs A SEAN 
Total textiles 1970 1.30 3.25 2.11 
1990 0.41 4.22 4.00 
Synthetic fibres 1970 2.01 0.14 0.12 
1990 1.68 3.75 1.56 
Textile yarn and thread 1970 1.37 1.50 0.27 
1990 0.84 2.69 1.35 
Clothing 1970 0.93 10.00 2.02 
1990 0.11 3.97 3.12 
Electronic home appliances 1970 4.80 1.22 0.75 
1990 1.10 2.43 4.98 
Electronic parts & components 1970 1.00 1.39 1.66 
1990 3.54 2.43 4.64 
Electronic industrial machinery 1970 1.00 1.00 0.94 
1990 2.09 2.05 1.96 
Iron and steel - primary 1970 2.50 0.33 0.26 
1990 1.70 0.80 1.00 
Iron and steel - secondary 1970 1.00 0.86 0.47 
1990 0.76 2.64 1.73 
Jf.AJPAN 
N:U:Cs : South Korea, Hong Kong, Singapore 
ASEAN : Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia, Philippines 
Source : Calculated from data in lMF Direction of Trade Statistics- cmmtry currency (various years). 
The data shows that by the end of the 1970s Japan no longer had a comparative advantage in textiles, 
textile yarn and thread, or clothing. It had been losing its comparative advantage in these industries 
compared to the NICs and ASEAN (Yamazawa,l980). In synthetic and regenerated fibres Japan is 
still leading the ASEAN countries (1.68 and 1.56 respectively) but has been overtaken by the NICs 
with a ratio of3.75. In electrical and electronic home appliances, Japan's lead has rapidly been eroded 
by the ASEAN countries and the NICs. With the ASEAN countries recording a ratio of 4.98 by 1990, 
higher than both the NICs and Japan (2.43 and 1.10 respectively). In electrical and electronic parts 
and components, Japan still enjoys a comparative advantage in world markets, but in the key 
subsector of semi-conductor assembly the ASEAN countries have an advantage against Japan, and the 
NICs restmctured to shift from assembly to design and fabrication work. In industrial electrical and 
electronic machinery Japan enjoyed a rising comparative advantage (1 to 2.09) but the NICs and 
ASEAN are catching up (1 to 2.05 and 0.94 to 1.96 respectively). In most heavy-industry subsectors, 
Japan led the NICs and ASEAN by a large margin, but both groups overtook Japan in iron and steel 
secondary products and finished products, the NICs in the 1970s and ASEAN in the early 1980s. 
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The continuing structural change provided an important stimulus for the NICs exports, initially as a 
major potential competitor began to withdraw from the market, and subsequently as a new export 
market emerged. The more advanced Northeast Asian NICs and Singapore were better placed to take 
advantage ofthe transformation of the Japanese economy, although there was some spill-over effect to 
the other ASEAN countries. 
A similar transformation has occurred in the NICs, as they began rapidly to lose their comparative 
advantage in labour-intensive manufactures. Just as the NICs benefited from changes in the Japanese 
economy, so the ASEAN economies are well placed to expand t11eir manufactured exports, including 
eventually to t11ese same countries. There are, of course, many other 'near NICs' outside ASEAN. But 
the four ASEAN countries enjoy the advantage of geographical proximity and close commercial 
contact. 
Of course, the realisation of this potential for future Western Pacific trade growth depends on the 
Northeast Asian countries continuing to be prepared to accept major stmctural adjustments. 
Continued adjustment in Northeast Asia depends as well on these countries having access to 
e:-.:panding worldwide markets for more sophisticated manufactures. The prospects on this issue 
appear favourable since markets for more capital-intensive commodities, and especially for t11e 
products of Japanese advanced technology, are probably less vulnerable to protection in the advanced 
industrial countries than markets for less complex labour-intensive manufactures. 
In a dynamic situation, the pattem of comparative advantage is constantly changing. While some 
industries 'migrate' from the more advanced industrial countries to the industrialising ones in t11e 
region, as the former move up the ladder, in what has been characterised as tl1e 'flying geese pattem' 
in the Japanese international economics literature (Akamatsu 1962). Hitotsubashi University has 
taught for many decades the doctrine of the 'flying geese pattem', but it has been written into t11e 
intemationalliterature only recently. Its importance to latecomers in industrial development has been 
mentioned explicitly by Hong (1975) and Balassa (1977). The pattem envisages a group of countries 
in the region flying together in layers, signifying the different stages of economic development 
achieved in different countries. Countries in tl1e higher layer will pass on t11eir outdated industries to 
the next layer of countries because of changing comparative advantage over time. The leader of the 
flying geese is of course Japan which is followed by the Asian NICs, (Singapore, Hong Kong, Taiwan 
and Sout11 Korea). Next come the ASEAN countries, of which Malaysia and Thailand fly closer to t11e 
NICs than the Philippines and Indonesia. This pattem of development suggests that cmmtries in t11e 
region will engage in different stages of industrial development. Even for countries in the same stage 
of development, specialisation is nonl13lly possible for t11e achievement of complementarity. 
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It is well known that Japan attained extraordinarily high rates of growth initially through strong 
specialisation in the export of labour-intensive manufactures on to world markets. A few years later 
the NICs travelled down a similar path. Japan is sometimes thought of as the 'first generation', and the 
NICs the 'second generation' of rapidly-industrialising East Asian countries. The successful growth of 
Japan facilitated the emergence of this 'second generation', through the reduction in competition in 
worldwide markets for labour-intensive manufactures, through the opening up of opport1mities for 
export to Japan itself and through Japan providing a major new source of direct investment and 
finance. 
The changing composition of trade is associated with the introduction of more sophisticated 
technology. The experience of the NICs in the importation, adaptation and spread of new technology 
will be invaluable to the Asian developing economies as they strive to capture export markets vacated 
by the NICs. Undoubtedly, the NICs have played a major role in placing Asia at the forefront of the 
development process. However, the prospects for sustaining this position and for providing the growth 
momentum \vithin Asia \vill require increasing econmnic cooperation between the Asian econmnies. 
It is sometimes argued that the latecomer developing countries have lost their chance to specialise 
strongly in the export of manufactures, because world market opportunities have come to be more 
monopolised by others. It is also said that Japan and the NICs achieved their phenomenal industrial 
growth in an era of strong worldwide growth and trade liberalisation and that similar success is not 
possible for new com1tries. The idea that markets for labour-intensive manufactured goods have 
become overcrowded and that there is no room for newcomers is a plausible one. The alternative view 
is that the very success of established exporters of these commodities weakens their comparative 
advantage in labour-intensive manufactures, so that they move on in stages to specialise in 
increasingly complex manufactures. The idea that there are stages of comparative advantage falls 
readily out of dynamic comparative cost theory. 
The record of the NICs, and Singapore in particular, was instmctive for the ASEAN com1tries in two 
respects. First, it effectively demolished the arguments of the 'export pessilnism' school, prevalent in 
the 1950s and 1960s, regarding the feasibility and desirability of rapid export-led growth. Secondly, 
the very success of the NICs resulted in rising real wages and pushed their comparative advantage 
increasingly towards more capital and skill-intensive activities. The lesson for ASEAN was clear. Just 
as the NICs became the 'second generation' exporters of labour intensive manufactures in the 1960s, 
occupying the position vacated by Japan, so ASEAN could become the third generation exporters, as 
rapid structural change altered the NICs' competitive position. 
The second factor was the conducive international trading environment, which coincided with the 
reappraisal in most of the ASEAN countries. Structural changes in the industrialised com1tries 
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facilitated the relocation of many industries to developing cmmtries. The Japanese economy, in 
particular, underwent major stmctural changes during the 1970s in the face of the rapidly increasing 
energy and raw material prices, slower growth, sharp appreciation of the yen and the successful export 
thmst of the NICs (Yamazawa, 1981). 
Foreign direct investment has been a third factor facilitating the structural transfonnation of ASEAN 
industry. However, there does appear to be a significant difference in the pattern of investment from 
the US and Japan, the two major investors in ASEAN. In particular, Japanese investment - globally 
more heavily concentrated in developing cmmtries - has tended to locate in resource-based and labour-
intensive manufacturing activities in ASEAN (Sekiguchi and Krause, 1980). Differences in the 
pattern and motivation of Japanese and US investors have led Kojima to develop his well known 
thesis regarding the alleged superiority of 'Japanese-style' investment, on the grounds that it is 'trade-
creating', and more likely to locate in industries consistent with the host cmmtry's comparative 
advantage (Kojima, 1977). While containing many useful insights into the process and nature of 
Japanese foreign investment, Kojima's thesis has been effectively challenged on both empirical and 
welfare grounds (Arndt, 1974; Sekiguchi and Krause, 1980). 
The involvement of MNCs in ASEAN manufactured exports is probably more extensive that that of 
direct investment in production. Tllis is an area where systematic data collection and research are very 
linlited. Foreign investment in the trade sector of ASEAN is extensive (von Kirchbach, 1983), but not 
all of this investment relates to international trade, and in any case it excludes the most important 
group, that of international trading houses. 
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The results given in Table 2.3 show tl1e export specialisation ratio for selected commodities in 
Singapore, calculated using tlle formula given on page 59 at tl1e tllree digit SITC commodity level. 
Table 2.3 
Export Specialisation Ratio Singapore 
SITC Commodity 1970 1974 1978 1982 1986 1990 
553 Perfume, cosmetics l.l7 0.57 0.47 0.59 0.65 0.67 
554 Soaps, cleaning preparations 1.67 0.81 0.57 1.00 1.00 1.53 
562 Fertilisers O.R7 0.95 0.85 1.34 0.36 0.34 
598 Chemicals nes 0.36 0.29 0.26 0.72 1.20 1.37 
621 Materials of rubber 0.55 0.30 0.22 0.53 0.45 0.36 
628 Rubber articles nes 0.61 0.58 0.68 0.94 0.79 0.71 
634 Veneers, plywood 2.64 3.60 3.76 4.04 3.28 3.00 
635 Wood manufactures 0.22 0.51 0.26 0.83 0.38 0.81 
641 Paper and paperboard 0.34 0.21 0.16 0.17 0.30 0.29 
651 Textile yam 0.23 0.64 0.47 0.36 0.37 0.44 
652 Cotton fabrics woven 2.38 1.79 1.29 0.91 0.67 0.67 
653 Woven man made fibres 0.96 1.01 1.18 1.40 1.40 1.28 
661 Lime, cement, building prod. 0.72 0.59 0.64 0.72 0.26 0.21 
664 Glass 0.20 0.29 0.30 0.44 0.33 0.30 
666 Pottery 1.60 0.20 0.08 0.17 0.18 0.33 
672 Iron and steel 0.04 0.13 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.01 
678 I+S tubes, pipes etc 0.22 0.35 0.69 0.92 0.69 0.68 
692 Metal tanks, boxes etc 3.64 1.73 0.57 0.86 0.69 0.83 
696 Cutlery 0.25 0.49 0.63 0.73 0.50 0.38 
712 Steam engines, turbines 0.23 0.13 0.38 0.53 
714 Engines and motors 0.49 0.60 0.27 0.27 
723 Civil eng equip 1.39 1.50 1.24 1.35 
724 Textile, leatller mach 0.15 0.26 0.23 0.27 0.26 0.47 
751 Office machines 0.59 2.04 1.18 2.05 1.13 1.57 
764 Telecommunications equip 0.48 1.96 0.19 1.18 1.43 2.70 
771 Electrical power machinery 0.50 1.10 2.16 2.44 
775 Household type equip 0.28 0.07 0.71 1.40 1.55 1.28 
842 Mens outwear non knit 1.29 0.92 0.90 0.83 
843 Womens outwear non knit 1.25 l.l9 1.07 0.93 
851 Footwear 0.51 0.40 0.26 0.23 0.13 0.18 
871 Optical instruments 0.17 0.14 0.50 1.22 
885 Watches and clocks 0.82 1.03 1.53 1.34 1.02 0.95 
892 Printed matter 0.98 1.25 0.87 0.76 0.93 1.09 
893 Articles of plastic 0.25 0.45 0.33 0.91 0.75 0.70 
894 Toys, sporting goods 0.43 0.70 0.87 1.16 1.28 1.35 
895 Office supplies 0.50 0.63 0.33 0.99 1.55 2.00 
896 Works of art etc 0.25 0.14 0.14 0.06 0.20 0.06 
897 Gold, silverware, jewellery 0.33 0.27 0.25 0.60 0.70 1.03 
Source : Calculated from data -
Research and Statistics Unit of the EDB (Singa~ore dollars}, Singa~ore. 
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Resource based manufactures do not play a significant role in the case of Singapore, probably because 
Singapore has few natural resources to exploit and other developing countries will wish to reap their 
own rewards. The only outstanding result of products among the resource based manufactures is 
(SITC 634) veneers, plywood, with iron and steel tubes and pipes (SITC 678) showing an increase to 
1982 (2.64 to 4.04 and 0.22 to 0.92), which has since fallen slightly, then levelled out at around 0.7 in 
both cases. Thus it can be clearly seen that Singapore's lack of resources does restrict its development 
in this area. 
In the labour intensive category, textiles are an important group. The more capital intensive stage of 
textile production such as yarn and thread (SITC 651), has recorded a lower ratio, while the more 
labour intensive process, woven cotton fabric (SITC 652), has a much larger ratio, although this ratio 
has declined from 2.38 in 1970 to 0.67 by 1990 as Singapore began to lose its comparative advantage 
in this particular category. Similar trends can also be identified for other textile products - Mens 
outwear non knit (SITC 842) and Womens outwear non knit (SITC 843). Toys and sporting goods 
(SITC 894) have assumed greater importance over the years with ratios increasing from 1970 to 1990, 
and since 1982 the ratios have been greater than one indicating a comparative advantage. Among 
what may be labelled teclmology intensive, electrical power machinery (SITC 771) and 
telecommtmications equipment (SITC 764) have quite large revealed comparative advantage ratios 
(2.44 and 2.70 respectively), which appears to be the direction Singapore is taking. 
As recently as 1980, t11ere was no such thing as a Singaporean computer components industry. Today 
tl1e island republic is the world's largest manufacturer of computer disk drives, accounting for more 
than half of world production, and a big supplier of a wide range of other computer peripherals, 
semiconductors and electronics equipment. In the early 1970s, the textile industry accounted for some 
17% of manufacturing equipment in Singapore. Now the figure is well below 10% and declining as 
the economy continues to lose its comparative advantage in a number of the textile categories, as 
highlighted by the falling RCA ratios in table 2.3. 
These are two examples of the e""traordinary swirl of change that continues to invigorate the 
Singaporean economy. They help to illustrate how a country with no natural resources, a minuscule 
land area and a static indigenous workforce has managed to carve out its position as a leading 
competitive player in a number of international industries, from consumer electronics to oil refining 
and petrochemicals. 
"The Austrian economist Joseph Schumpeter would have recognised what is happening. Writing in 
the first half of this century, he called it "creative destruction" -the process of unremitting innovation 
and renewal in an economy affected by the free play of market forces. In Singapore's case, the market 
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is the world, and it has exposed itself to - and benefited from - the full force of international 
competition by maintaining a stance towards foreign investment as open and unrestrictive as you will 
find anywhere". (Financial Times March 29th 1993) 
Singapore is uniquely unsentimental about preserving industries which have lost their competitive 
edge: the timber business, for example, once a local mainstay, is now virtually extinct, while textile 
manufacturing on the island has moved inexorably to the high-value end of the market while spinning 
off low-cost operations as it began to lose its comparative advantage to Malaysia and other 
neighbouring countries. Their place has been taken by productive, teclmology-driven industries such 
as consumer electronics, telecommwrications equipment and precision engineering. 
The last twenty years provide countless examples of this shift - as always, under the guiding hand of 
government bodies such as t11e Economic Development Board (ED B). Having established itself as an 
oil refining and bWlkering centre, Singapore moved into bulk petro chernicals and is now assiduously 
developing higher-value products such as speciality chemicals and pharmaceuticals. 
The trick consists not just in attracting new investors: more importantly, it involves encouraging 
heavy investment by those already installed. Singapore has remained especially alert to global changes 
in the consumer electronics industry. It is now positioning itself as an important production base for 
digital compact cassette players and notebook computers. 
This constant drive for higher value-added makes sense given Singapore's severe physical and 
demographic constraints. It is also getting more urgent all the time in view of the intensifYing 
competition for investment among low wage Asian econonries, which are themselves gradually 
following Singapore "up the value chain". To understand why, compare labour and land costs in 
Singapore with those elsewhere in the region. The starting wage for a production worker in Singapore 
is S$630 a month; in Penang, Malaysia, it is S$264 a month; and in Vietnam it is S$80 a month. In 
Singapore, a square metre of industrial land costs ten times what it does in Penang and thirty times 
what it does in Vietnam (Singapore Economic Development Board, Yearbook 1990/91). 
Unable to compete on wages, land or on the size of its domestic market, Singapore has quite 
deliberately priced itself out of the business of low-cost manufacturing; partly for political reasons, 
t11e govermnent will not prop up labour-intensive industries by allowing companies to import more 
foreign workers. Instead it has been forced to develop altemative attractions to retain the loyalty of its 
multinational partners. The Singapore experience accords well with tl1e theory of changing 
comparative advantage. Indeed, because of its more advanced industrial structure and poorer resource 
endowment, it has progressed further along the 'stages' approach forwarded by Balassa. The share 
(RCA) of unskilled labour intensive manufactures began to decrease about the mid 1970s, when rising 
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real wages and hwnan capital intensive manufactures began to erode the economy's comparative 
advantage in these products. Correspondingly, the share of technology and human capital intensive 
manufactures began to increase gradually. As would be expected, the share of these two groups in 
Singapore's manufactured exports is by far the highest in ASEAN, even allowing for the absence of 
resource based exports. 
The share of physical capital intensive manufactures also increased, but not at the same rate as the 
other ASEAN countries. Care should, of course, be taken when using tiris as a measure in tile RCA 
analysis, as some econonrists believe it is no longer an important detenninant of a country's 
comparative advantage, especially where liberal foreign investment policies are pursued, as in the 
ASEAN countries. 
A recent analysis (1988) by the United Nations Industrial Development Organisation (UNIDO) has 
provided some interesting insights into the shifting pattern of dynanric comparative advantage. 
According to this study, the fhstest growing industries are: 
paper and paper products (ISIC 341) 
industrial chenricals (ISIC 351) 
other chetnical products (lSIC 352) 
plastic products (ISIC 356) 
non-electrical machinery (ISIC 382) 
professional goods 
electrical machinery 
'other' manufactures 
(ISIC 385) 
(ISIC 386) 
(ISIC 390) 
Industry branches in which developing countries as a whole grew more than twice as fast as developed 
countries during tile period 1980-85 include tile following: 
food products (ISIC 311) 
beverages (ISIC 313) 
tobacco (ISIC 314) 
textiles (ISIC 321) 
footwear (ISIC 324) 
wearing apparel (ISIC 322) 
wood products (ISIC 331) 
glass and glass products (lSIC 362) 
pottery and china (ISIC 361) 
industrial chenricals (ISIC 351) 
petroleum refineries (ISIC 353) 
iron and steel (ISIC 371) 
non-ferrous metals (ISIC 372) 
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Industries which are declining in developed countries and rapidly expanding in East and South East 
Asian developing countries include: 
food manufacturing 
tobacco 
textiles 
rubber products 
non-ferrous metals 
(ISIC 311) 
(ISIC 314) 
(ISIC 321) 
(ISIC 355) 
(ISIC 372) 
metal products (ISIC 381) 
'other' manufactures (ISIC 390) 
It appears that Singapore has potential or actual comparative advantage in many of these products. 
Much would, of course, depend on Singapore's factor endowments and the factor intensity of the 
products in question. Much would also depend on how Singapore's factor endowments compare with 
those of its major trading partners. There is considerable diversity within the Asia-Pacific region for 
Singapore to complement its production with that of others. 
The results reported in table 2.3 confinn the earlier notions regarding the revealed comparative 
advantage of the Singaporean manufactured exports. It appears that Singapore has an overwhelmingly 
high revealed comparative advantage in technology-intensive manufactures. It is interesting to 
observe an improvement in human capital-intensive manufactures, which is not surprising in view of 
the policy emphasis on the upgrading of labour skills since the 'second industrial revolution'. Another 
pertinent observation is that the revealed comparative advantage index for unskilled labour-intensive 
products has been declining. It is clear that Singapore is specialising in the export of products in 
which it has an overwhelming comparative advantage. 
Summary 
All the ASEAN countries have shown extraordinarily rapid rates of economic growth, industrial 
growth and the expansion of manufactured exports. From the analysis of Singapore, the 
transformation of the industrial sector can be seen: from production of resource-based processing 
activities and of simple consumer goods towards a more sophisticated industrial structure, and from 
the production primarily for the domestic market towards increasingly export oriented activities. The 
importance of 'policy' can also be seen to have played a role, both facilitating the industrial 
transfonnation and in detennining the extent to which Singapore is able to reap the benefits of 
changing comparative advantage. 
The traditional Heckscher-Ohlin model can be used to ex'Jllain why certain countries, such as 
Singapore have a comparative advantage in the provision of services connected with entrepot and re-
export trade. Singapore lies along major sea routes, near great populated areas and has natural 
harbour facilities with an abundant supply of labour required for the provision ofthese services. 
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The RCA analysis suggests that, broadly speaking, e>..']Jort growth has been in accord with the regions 
changing factor endowments. Singapore is a rapidly growing and industrially advanced country with a 
very poor resource endowment. The last few years have witnessed a major transfonnation in the 
stmcture of industrial production and exports. It has shed its labour intensive industries as its 
comparative disadvantage in these activities has developed. Increasingly its industrial stmcture has 
evolved towards more skill and capital intensive activities. Its ex.1remely open economy and the nature 
of the govenunent intervention have facilitated the industrial upgrading process. 
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Clbunptew J 
1rnna:lle §ped.~Ri§anbimn 
This chapter will examine the trade specialisation undertaken by the ASEAN countries, with 
reference to economic cooperation among the member states. Firstly, an attempt will be made to 
explain intercountry differences in the extent of intra-industry trade in manufactured goods by 
reference to country characteristics affecting such trade. Secondly, the intra-industry trade for 
Singapore will be examined by selected commodity groups. This will be followed, in the next chapter, 
by an investigation of ASEAN in tem1s of economic cooperation, using a test of trade creation and 
trade diversion. 
One of the most important trends in post-war trade, especially trade in manufactured goods, has been 
the growth of intra-industry trade. This has been defined as the simultaneous export and import of 
products belonging to the same industry. 
Much of what is written in the international economics textbooks is still couched in terms of inter-
industry specialisation. Models are constructed in which each country specialises in a particular 
industry or activity in which it enjoys a comparative advantage. In such models, the opening up of 
trade between any two countries or the removal of barriers to trade leads to each country concentrating 
on particular activities. This implies a contraction of certain other industries as resources shift into the 
e:\."Panding industry. Such inter-industry specialisation results in a relocation of economic activity. 
Altl10ugh inter-industry specialisation does still take place, tltis has not been the form wltich 
specialisation between cmmtries has largely taken over the post war period. Individual countries have 
not concentrated on whole industries or activities. Rather, they have undertaken a much narrower type 
of specialisation. This has involved specialisation in the production of particular products or groups of 
products witltin a given industry. Such specialisation is known as intra-industry specialisation. With 
tltis type of specialisation there is no wholesale contraction or disappearance of certain industries from 
particular com1tries following the ope1ling up of trade. 
Altl10ugh much trade in primary commodities still takes place in the fom1 of inter-industry 
specialisation, a growing proportion of trade in manufactured goods has involved intra-industry 
specialisation. Where intra-industry specialisation follows the lowering of trade barriers, international 
specialisation may give rise to fewer adjustment problems. There need be no wholesale disappearance 
of single industries from particular countries. Hence there will be less of a need to redeploy resources 
(especially labour) in otl1er industries. One can expect less resistance to trade barriers. On the other 
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hand, the gains from such specialisation will not be the same as those which result from conventional 
inter-industry specialisation. 
In recent years the healthy atmosphere that has pervaded the international economic system has been 
tainted by the revival of protectionist attitudes. Tltis has been brought about by the trade friction 
between the US, the EC and Japan. There is a growing fear that the drift towards globalisation will be 
replaced by an extreme form of regionalism which is characterised by 'the formation of blocs, 
fragmentation of the trading system, and a relapse to the disastrous conditions of the thirties'. The 
uncertainty spawned by the instability of the world financial system has also contributed to a 
reassessment of globalist policies (Global Strategies Conference, 1990). 
The political factors outlined, have likewise played a crucial role. With tl1e deterioration of the US 
economy and t11e consequent erosion of its leadership, and the collapse of the old order in Eastern 
Europe, t11ere is a strong possibility that a multi-polar world will evolve out of the shadows of the 
Cold War. There has been speculation that the three major economic zones will be formed, namely : 
an integrated European community, possibly incorporating Eastern Europe with a united Germany at 
its helm ; the free trade zone in Nortll America ; and t11e last bloc consisting of Asian nations mostly 
in the West Pacific rim with Japan as the focal point. How the Asian-Pacific zone will progress, 
however, is far less clear tl1an the oilier two, owing to botll tlle dynatnism and diversity of t11e 
individual countries involved. 
The relationship among these tlrree regional groups need not be confrontational. Given tlle degree of 
integration the world has achieved, tlle extreme form of regionalism described is not feasible. What is 
more conceivable is a type of 'open regionalism' wltich roughly translates to 'a way for a group of 
countries that share some common features to more efficiently face t11e present economic challenges 
by gathering their forces'. (Brender 1989). 1n this sense, regionalism could prove to be a complement 
to a multilateral trading system ratller than a substitute. Lorenz (1989) also points out tllat tlle idea of 
regionalism has some affinity with tlle one promoted previously of constructing an international 
economic order or re-integrating tlle world economy from the bottom upwards and not the reverse. 
Under these circumstances, it is neitl1er appropriate nor possible for the member countries of t11e 
Association of Sout11 East Asian Nations (ASEAN) to outline their future prospects purely from a 
domestic point of view. While ASEAN has been effective as a political organisation, 'regional 
economic cooperation has been more a recipient of platitudes'. The swift pace of change makes it 
progressively more important for tlle countries of the region to share a common understanding of tl1eir 
independent economic relations and mutual interests. In the context of tlle accomplishments of 
ASEAN, tltis requires a review and restructuring ofpast efforts at economic cooperation in view oftlle 
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present global metamorphosis. These include the ASEAN Preferential Trading Arrangement, the 
ASEAN Industrial Scheme, and various harmonisation policies. 
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Models and Literature 
Jl])efinitnon and measurement 
Intra-industry trade is defined as the simultaneous export and import of products belonging to the 
same industry. Inter-industry trade is the exchange of products which belong to different industries. 
Inter-industry specialisation involves a country specialising in a whole industry or activity. Inter-
industry specialisation leads to inter-industry trade and intra-industry specialisation will lead to intra-
industry trade. However it is possible for intra-industry trade to take place between any two countries 
without either country tmdergoing intra-industry specialisation. Therefore not all the increase in intra-
industry trade of recent decades need be caused by intra-industry specialisation. 
It is apparent that, because of the difficulty in agreeing on a precise definition of an industry, the 
concept of intra-industry trade suffers from a degree of ambivalence. It may prove difficult in practice 
to decide how to clarifY different products and, therefore, how to distinguish between inter- and intra-
industry trade. Some kinds of trade may assun1e the form of a hybrid of inter- and intra-industry trade 
(Dunning and Norman 1985). Systems of international trade classification are often based more on 
statistical convenience than any set of economic criteria. For these reasons it is generally not possible 
to measure accurately the extent of intra-industry trade. 
The first measure of the extent of intra-industry trade was proposed by Balassa in 1966. He proposed 
that it be measured by the extent to which exports of a given good are offset by imports of an 
equivalent good. Algebraically, if Xi is the value ofthe exports of commodity i by a country, and Mi is 
the value of the 'matching' imports then the Balassa index is:-
Ai= IXi-Mil 
(Xi+ Mi) 
If there is no intra-industry trade then either there are no exports (Xi= 0) or no imports (Mi = 0), and 
so Ai = 1. If there is 'perfectly matching' intra-industry trade then Xi= Mi and Ai = 0. 
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The Balassa index has not found much favour. Most studies use the Grube! and Lloyd index. Grubel 
and Lloyd (1975) measured intra-industry trade as the percentage of a country's total trade (exports 
plus imports) in the products of a given industry which was matched or balanced, that is ex"]Jorts 
equals imports. For an individual product group of industry i, the fonnula is:-
ITT = c Xi + Mi ) - 1 Xi - Mi 1 
(Xi+ Mi) 
Where Xi and Mi stand, respectively, for the exports and imports of product group i. The straight 
brackets around Xi-Mi denote that the sign of the trade balance is ignored. If all trade was balanced, 
the measure would be equal to 1. If all trade was one way, the measure would be equal to zero. Thus 
the closer the measure is to 1, the greater the importance of intra-industry trade. 
The Grubel and Lloyd index has taken precedence over the Balassa index because the values taken by 
the former are intuitively more appealing. The Grubel and Lloyd index has a value of zero when there 
is no intra-industry trade (either Xi or Mi zero) and a value of one when there is 'perfectly matching' 
intra-industry trade; that is, it is positively related to the level of intra-industry trade. The Balassa 
index, on the other hand, is positively related to the level of inter-industry trade. For the purpose of 
the current study the Grubel and Lloyd measure will be used throughout (see Sodersten and Reed, 
1994). 
One of the greatest problems involved in accurately measuring the extent and importance of intra-
industry trade is the aggregation problem. It has been argued that intra-industry trade is largely a 
statistical phenomenon because it is owing to a large number of different products being treated as 
belonging to the san1e industry. At least, it is argued, the true extent of intra-industry trade has been 
exaggerated. Even if we reject this argument, it has to be conceded that accurate measurement of 
intra-industry trade is, in practice, quite difficult. 
Trade data are published according to a specified form of classification. The most commonly used is 
the Standard International Trade Classification (SITC). Products are grouped together at several 
different levels of aggregation. Thus it is possible to choose the level of aggregation which is 
considered most appropriate. Most empirical intra-industry trade studies have been based on two- or 
three-digit SITC data, and, in practice, there has been no great difference between estimates 
calculated at tl1ese two aggregation levels. The three-digit level of the SITC is thought to be the most 
accurate as product groups defined at this level of aggregation are generally thought to accord as 
closely as possible to an economic definition of an industry. However, it is sometimes argued that, 
even at this level of aggregation, intra-industry trade is overestimated. Products are often grouped 
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together which fail to meet the criteria generally used in the definition of an industry. Economists may 
disagree about how serious is such aggregation bias, but none would deny that some element of 
aggregation bias exists. 
There are a number of ways of testing for the degree of aggregation bias. One obvious approach is to 
calculate intra-industry trade at a higher level of disaggregation, for example to use four- or even 
five-digit product groups. It is extremely time consuming to carry out a comprehensive study of a 
country's level of intra-industry trade using highly disaggregated data of this kind. The number of 
product groups involved will be very large and the amount of calculation very great. Moreover, 
product groups defined at the fourth- or fifth-digit level of SITC may not be economically meaningful. 
Products with the same factor intensities may appear in different product groups. 
Greenaway and Milner calculated the average level of intra-industry trade for the United Kingdom at 
the third-, fourth-, and fifth-digit levels of SITC. The average level of intra-industry trade was fmmd 
to fall from 56% to 47% to 46.5% as the level of aggregation fell from the third- to the fourth- to the 
fifth-digit level. (Greenaway and Milner 1986). 
Literature 
Recent writings on the potential of trade among developing countries have sometimes noted the 
possibility of benefit from trade in 'competitive' products among the more advanced developing 
countries. In particular, it is argued that since these countries are on the whole similar in industrial 
endowments and hence have comparative advantage in similar products (generally standardised, 
labour-intensive goods, but perhaps also capital goods), trade among them might involve trade in 
similar but slightly differentiated products, or what is commonly labelled as 'intra-industry trade' 
(liT). It is well known that among industrial countries with similar factor endowments, a large 
proportion of trade is such two way trade, rather than trade in clearly distinct 'complementary goods' 
of different factor intensities. While there has been some debate on the literature available as to 
whether the large amount of intra-industry trade among industrial countries is something other tl1an 
Heckscher-Ohlin trade, or whether it is a statistical artifact, the broad consensus appears to be that, as 
Corden (1980) suggests: "less weight should be given to factor proportions theory .... [and] it is 
desirable that there be developed a rigourous general equilibrium model with economies of scale 
possibly embodying some dynamic elements and allowing for more than two products". The statistical 
fact of a large amount of intra-industry trade has led to some theorising on such trade flows, for 
example, Lancaster (1980) and Krugman (1980), emphasising economies of scale and product 
diversity in monopolistic competition. 
The objective of this work is to explain intercountry differences in the extent of intra-industry trade in 
manufactured goods by reference to country characteristics affecting such trade. The subject matter 
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chosen for the investigation is a neglected area as most contributions have examined the effects of 
commodity characteristics on intra-industry specialisation. Exceptions are Loertscher and Wolter 
(1980), Havrylyshyn and Civan (1983), and Clair, Gaussens and Phan (1984). But these papers 
covered only developed country trade, the exception being the Havrylyshyn and Civan paper which 
included the trade of both developed and developing cotmtries. Studies of centrally planned economies 
have also been undertaken by Pelzman (1978), and Drabek and Greenaway (1984). 
The empirical work of Grubel and Lloyd (1975), though not the first application of the concept of 
intra-industry trade, is perhaps the most extensive of these and became the focus of discussion about 
the implications of these results for trade theory. Grube! and Lloyd inferred from the fact of high 
levels of intra-industry trade of industrial countries (50% to 60% for manufactured goods in 1967) 
that at best half of trade flows could be explained by the conventional factor-endowments model. The 
remainder, being two-way trade in similar conunodities with presumably similar factor characteristics 
could not be attributed to differing factor endowments. While some writers expressed doubt that intra-
industry trade was in fact trade in conunodities with similar factor characteristics [Finger (1975), 
Lipsey (1976) and Finger and De Roosa ( 1979) in particular], most trade theorists have agreed that 
there is some truth in the Grubel and Lloyd contention, and several authors have attempted to develop 
a theoretical explanation for trade in similar goods: Lancaster (1980), Krugman (1980), Caves (1980). 
The dissenting views consist of saying that within a 3-digit SITC category 'overlapping trade' can still 
be Heckscher-Ohlin trade because there is as much if not more variation in factor characteristics 
within these industry groups as among them. In effect, this suggests that the high liT values may only 
be a statistical artifact resulting from inadequate disaggregation to capture true industries with unique 
capital-labour ratios. 
One may encounter this criticism first on a conceptual level. While some liT would disappear if one 
defined industries in more disaggregated statistics, some two-way trade in different statistically 
defined categories may be in goods with the same capital intensity, and in principle therefore non 
Heckscher-Ohlin trade. After all, the fundamental point of factor endowment theory pertains neither 
to arbitarily defined categories of statisticians, nor to specific end-use characteristics of products, but 
rather to the factor characteristics of goods. Second, calculations of liT using more disaggregated 
data, while they diminish its value, by no means make it small enough to ignore. Thus (Gray, 1979) 
finds that disaggregation does not cause the liT phenomena to disappear. Finally, one should consider 
that even as far back as 1967, industrial countries had quite similar factor endowments. It should be 
no great surprise that a theory explaining trade on the basis of factor endowment differences is not 
applicable to a large portion of trade among industrial countries. 
Tltis is not to say that the theory of Heckscher-Ohlin is to be ignored, for the critics of intra-industry 
trade are right to some degree. There is a statistical problem, and an overstatement of the extent of 
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such trade. Furthermore, whatever the explanations of intra-industry trade, its values are what matter, 
for intra-industry trade is not a theory but an observation. And when such explanations are considered 
they consist of elements that have either always been a part of the trade theorists' perception - scale 
economies, tastes - or of elements which may add to factor endowment but do not contradict it -
differentiated products and monopolistic competition. 
Even if the factor endowment theory has become less important in explaining trade among similarly 
endowed industrial countries, it surely remains important in determining the pattern of trade between 
developing and industrial countries. As to trade among developed countries, their similar factor 
endowments should lead one to expect a greater amount of intra-industry trade than in trade with 
developing countries. However, the overall level of intra-industry trade for developing countries may 
be lower than for industrial countries because production of highly differentiated goods is not very 
important in such economies. 
lP'revious results 
A variety of hypotheses have been put forward as to the effects of country characteristics on intra-
industry trade. Consideration will be given to general country characteristics, including the level of 
economic development, the size of domestic markets, distance and the existence of common borders. 
The investigation will further cover the participation in integration schemes. 
The higher the level of a country's per capita income, the greater the demand for variety. As per capita 
income rises, so consumers demand more variety. The demand for variety leads to an increase in the 
degree of product differentiation. This promotes intra-industry trade and reduces inter-industry trade 
as a component of total trade. 
The more equal the level of per capita income of any two countries, the greater the amount of intra-
industry trade that will take place between them. Level of per capita income is known to exert a strong 
influence on the pattern of demand. It follows that the pattern of demand will be similar in countries 
with a similar level of per capita income. Therefore it is likely that products initially developed to 
meet local tastes will sell best in other cmmtries with a similar per capita income. Cultural similarity 
and close geographical proximity will further enhance such trade. Much of this trade will take the 
form of intra-industry trade (Linder 1961). Strong empirical support exists for this hypothesis. Thus 
Balassa found that inequality of per capita income had a significant negative effect on the United 
States' level of intra-industry trade with different trading partners (Balassa 1986). 
The higher the stage of development of a country, the greater the importance of manufacturing 
industry in national output. Since intra-industry trade is higher in manufacturing products, the 
country's level of intra-industry trade will be higher. Obviously there is a close relationship between a 
country's stage of economic development and its level of per capita income, so these two factors will 
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work together to influence the level of a country's intra-industry trade. However, it is possible for a 
com1try to have a high per capita income yet be at quite a low stage of development. lf so, the level of 
its intra-industry trade will also be quite low despite having a high per capita income. Empirically, it 
is impossible to measure separately the influence of per capita income and stage of development on 
the level of a country's per capita income. 
When any two countries are at different stages of economic development, inter-industry trade is likely 
to be relatively more important than intra-industry trade (Helpman 1981). This is because the stage of 
development affects the ratio of capital to labour. Differences in factor endowments promote inter-
industry not intra-industry specialisation. The level of intra-industry trade is lower for trade between 
developed and developing countries than between developed and other developed countries. However, 
one can expect that, as developing countries industrialise and accumulate more capital, more of their 
trade with developed countries will assume the form of intra-industry trade. 
There are grounds for believing that the level of intra-industry trade will be higher in larger com1tries. 
What is important is not the geographical size of a country but the size of its gross domestic product 
(Dixit and Norman 1980). Countries with a large GDP offer producers a wide market within which to 
sell. This is important for differentiated products produced m1der conditions of increasing returns to 
scale. It is less important for standardised goods where unit costs rise with output. Thus, large 
countries will tend to be relatively more competitive in differentiated goods, small countries in 
standardised goods. However, it does not follow that all small cmmtries will have low intra-industry 
trade ratios and all large countries high intra-industry trade ratios. 
The next question concerns the introduction of transportation costs. In models of intra-industry trade, 
such as that of Krugman ( 1980), transportation costs will reduce the volume of such trade. The greater 
the geographical distance separating any two countries, the smaller will be the level of intra-industry 
trade taking place between them. Intra-industry trade is greatest between countries which either share 
a common border or are in close geographical proximity. Of course, large geographical distances and 
the consequent high transport costs reduce trade in general, whether it be inter-industry or intra-
industry trade. The literature does not provide us with the presumption that intra-industry trade will 
be affected relatively more or less than inter-industry trade. Such a presumption may be established if 
information flows are taken into accmmt. There is less need to provide information on the 
characteristics of standardised (non-differentiated) products such as copper metal, steel ingots, and 
caustic soda, which have uniform specifications across the world; hence their trade is determined by 
relative costs, giving rise to inter-industry specialisation. However, there is need for information on 
the characteristics of differentiated products such as machinery, transport equipment, and consumer 
goods, which are subject to intra-industry trade. At the same time, it can be assumed that the 
availability of information decreases, and its costs increase, with distance. The existence of common 
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borders will also contribute to information flows. Furthermore, as Grube! and Lloyd suggested, in 
countries sharing a common border, intra-industry trade may occur 'in products which are 
functionally homogeneous but differentiated by location' (1975). 
High levels of intra-industry trade exist between countries which are part of a regional trading zone, 
such as a free-trade area, customs union, or conunon market. Balassa has shown that the 
establishment of the EC led to intra-industry and not inter-industry specialisation. He calculated 
'representative ratios of trade balances' for each of the six, a fall in the ratio indicating increased intra-
industry specialisation. The level of intra-industry trade increased in all six countries. Other studies of 
integration include Grubel and Lloyd (1975), Kreinin (1979), and Ezran and Laird (1984). 
Regional economic integration between countries appears to be one factor promoting intra-industry 
trade. This will be the case whenever the countries in question have similar per capita incomes, are at 
a similar stage of development, and situated close to each other, and share a similar culture. If, 
however, these factors are missing, it is equally possible that regional integration may lead to inter-
industry specialisation. 
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Theoretical Explanations for Intra=Industry Trade 
On the face of it, intra-industry trade appears to be something quite distinct from trade based on 
comparative advantage since it appears to be motivated by similarities rather than differences among 
countries. One of the main reasons why economists have been interested in the growth of intra-
industry trade is that, on the whole, it contradicts the predictions of conventional trade theory. 
According to conventional trade theory, each country will specialise in those products in which it 
enjoys a comparative advantage. It will exchange those products for others in which other cmmtries 
possess a comparative advantage. Conventional trade theory stresses (1) differences in factor 
endowments between countries and (2) differences in the factor proportions required for producing 
goods as the basis for comparative advantage. 
Traditional theory argues that trade occurs largely in response to differences among countries in 
production capabilities. The possible exception to tllis is intra-industry trade which occurs 
predominantly among the developed countries and in any case may be more an aggregation 
phenomenon than a fundamental contradiction of the traditional trade theory. The implications of 
trade theory for intra-Asian trade are obvious- where sufficient differences in production capabilities 
exist among tl1e Asian countries, intemational trade is likely to arise, provided that there are no 
significant barriers to these flows, such as high transportation costs or policies restricting trade. 
The Heckscher-Ohlin theory may be modified to make it more realistic. For example, instead of just 
three factors of production - land, labour and capital - these categories may be subdivided into 
narrower groups, for example skilled and unskilled labour, physical and human capital , agricultural 
and non-agriculturalland, and so on. Technology may be incorporated as another factor of production 
to ensure that a further important detemlinant of trade is included. Thus some countries well endowed 
witl1 scientists and engineers may enjoy a comparative advantage in knowledge intensive science 
based industries. However, even with these modifications, the Heckscher-Ohlin t11eory leaves a lot of 
actual trade unexplained. Some pattems of trade fail to accord with t11e predictions of tl1e Heckscher-
Ohlin theory. Many of the industrialised and newly industrialising countries possess broadly similar 
factor endowments. Moreover, most of this trade has taken tl1e fonn of intra-industry trade. Yet the 
Heckscher-Ohlin theory largely, but not wholly, predicts inter-industry trade. 
Trade in functionally-identical commodities 
Functionally-identical commodities are cmmnodities which have perfect substitutability in use. They 
are perfect substitutes for each other. Anot11er way of puting this is to say that they have a positive 
cross elasticity of demand. Consun1ers have no reason to prefer one to the ot11er. Conventional trade 
theories, such as the Heckscher-Ohlin tl1eory, generally make such assumptions about commodities. 
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Although normally trade in such products will take the fom1 of inter-industry trade, intra-industry 
trade can take place. 
The problem of aggregation bias has already been discussed. It is possible that products may be 
grouped together which are not close substitutes in production, that is they are not produced using the 
same factor proportions or input requirements. As such, they belong to different industries. Therefore, 
what appears to be intra-industry trade is in fact inter-industry trade. It may well be caused by 
differing factor intensities and relative factor prices in accordance with the Heckscher-Ohlin theory. 
Cross-border trade can occur in products which are 'weight-gaining'. This means products whose 
weight, in relation to the unit value of the product, increases with the degree of manufacturing. 
Examples might be bricks, cement, glass bottles, and so on. This necessitates locating production as 
near as possible to the market. Because of the costs of transporting such products, it will not be 
profitable for producers to transport the product long distances. The existence of tariffs and other 
trade barriers may serve to reduce such trade. In this case, the removal of such restrictions will lead to 
a flourishing of such trade. It is believed that some of the intra-industry trade in iron and steel 
products following the establishment of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) in 1952 
may have been of this type (Adler 1970). 
Some goods are only available at certain times of the year. Fresh fruit and vegetables come into this 
category. It may be that during these times ofthe year such products are imported from abroad, while, 
at other times of the year, some of the locally grown produce is exported. In this event intra-industry 
trade results. 
Some products are produced jointly. In some cases the proportions in which tl1ey are produced crumot 
be varied. Apparently, this is quite common in the chemical industries. Unless local demand combines 
these products in the same proportions, tlle result will be excess supply of some products and excess 
demand for others. The result may be tllat tlle country in question will both export certain products 
and import oilier products. The result will be intra-industry trade. 
Entrepot trade refers to tlle importation of a finished product for packaging, labelling, warehousing, 
and so on, before being re-exported to tl1e final market. Such trade is very important for certain 
countries, such as Singapore. Singapore is well situated witl1 suitable ports and other facilities for 
such trade. Over the years, Singapore has acquired a great deal of experience and acumen in 
conducting such trade. Much of this trade will show up in trade statistics as intra-industry trade. 
Cross hauling by multinational corporations refers to the practice of multinationals relocating the 
processing or final assembly stages of manufacturing at sites based in developing countries. 
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Processing or final assembly takes place at these factories using components, parts, and other semi-
finished goods imported from the parent company of the multinational or one of its subsidiaries in one 
of the industrialised countries. When finished, the product is then exported back to the developed 
country before being sold to the final consumer. This practice has become increasingly popular in 
recent decades, especially in the electronics and textile/clothing industries. In some cases it has been 
encouraged by special tariff provisions in the industrialised countries, which treat imports of such 
products more leniently than otl1er equivalent imports. Such trade more closely resembles the inter-
industry trade of the Heckscher-Ohlin theory. It is based on relative factor intensities, specifically the 
comparative advantage which developing countries possess in labour-intensive activities. Thus, such 
trade should be regarded as inter-industry rather t11an intra-industry, altl10ugh it may appear as intra-
industry trade. This is because trade statistics often group together components, parts, semi-finished 
goods, and finished goods. For some purposes this is appropriate. Since, however, such trade 
conforms more closely witl1 conventional Heckscher-Ohlin predictions, it might be preferable to treat 
it as inter-industry. Some economists differ over tllis point and chose to treat this as a special type of 
intra-industry trade. Sometimes, the term 'vertical intra-industry trade' is used to distinguish tllis from 
the more common horizontal intra-industry trade. 
Thus, intra-industry trade is possible in functionally-identical conunodities. It follows that tl1e 
Heckscher-Ohlin theory is not wholly incompatible with intra-industry trade. However, none of the 
above cases could properly be described as examples of intra-industry specialisation. They illustrate 
how it is possible to have intra-industry trade (or what shows up as intra-industry trade) without intra-
industry specialisation. Statistically, tl1ere is no way of saying how important such types of intra-
industry trade are. However, it does seem unlikely that t11ey can e:-..1Jlain much more than a small 
proportion of intra-industry trade. 
Trade in dift'erentiated commodities 
Most intra-industry trade takes place in conunodities wllich are differentiated. It is this wllich leads to 
intra-industry specialisation. Differentiated conunodities are like conunodities which are close, but not 
perfect, substitutes for each ot11er. They have high cross elasticity of demand. Where products are 
differentiated, a basis exists for intra-industry trade, although the existence of product differentiation 
does not amount to a sufficient condition for intra-industry trade. Alongside the existence of product 
differentiation, t11ere must exist some element of increasing returns in production, or decreasing 
average costs, wllich causes producers to specialise. If average cost were constant or rose as 
production increased, producers would seek to supply consun1ers witl1 all available varieties of a given 
commodity. They do not do so because the production of each variety involves incurring substantial 
fixed production costs. A large output is needed over which to spread these costs. Yet no one producer 
can acllieve tllis output if all producers seek to produce the full range of varieties. So each producer 
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specialises. Product differentiation can take a number of different fom1s. Three broad types of 
differentiation are identified below :-
Horizontal differentiation occurs where commodities share certain 'core' attributes but combine these 
in different proportions. Consumers have diverse preferences for the different varieties available. Such 
differentiation is very common in industries such as the tobacco industry (different brands of 
cigarettes) or the detergents industry (different brands of soap powder) etc. Indeed, to varying degrees, 
horizontal differentiation is present in most industries. Nevertheless, in certain industries it is the 
predominant type of differentiation. Such differentiation partly reflects consumer demand for more 
variety and choice with rising per capita incomes. It may also be the result of competition with each 
producer seeking to increase their market share by differentiating their product from their rivals. This 
is the case in monopolistic competition. Equally, product differentiation may be the result of attempts 
by producers to erect barriers to deter potential new entrants to the industry. 
Vertical differentiation occurs where products differ in quality from one another. For example, a Rolls 
Royce is known to be a superior quality car to an Austin Metro. Such quality differentiation is 
extremely conunon in the motor car industry. Firms compete by making quality improvements to their 
various model ranges. It is common in many other consumer goods industries - for example watches, 
musical equipment, personal computers, typewriters, and so on. The essence of vertical differentiation 
is that consumers are able to rank the different varieties in some kind of order according to the quality 
of the product. 
Teclmological differentiation refers to the kind of differentiation which results from technological 
change, specifically, the development of new products. Product im1ovation is very conunon in certain 
industries. One exan1ple is the pharmaceutical industry. New drugs to treat particular illnesses or 
conditions are constantly being brought onto the market by drugs producers. The electronics industry 
is another example of an industry where the rate of product illllovation has been extremely rapid in 
recent years. 
Altl10ugh intra-industry specialisation may occur witl1 all three kinds of product differentiation, each 
case may be slightly different. It has been suggested tl1at technological differentiation is more likely to 
lead to inter-industry specialisation consistent with the Heckscher-Ohlin model of trade. The 
Heckscher-Ohlin model may be adapted to incorporate teclmological change. Technology may be 
treated as an additional factor of production. This would lead to the prediction tl1at cmmtries well 
endowed with technological knowledge (those with large numbers of scientists and engineers) will 
produce the greatest number of new products. Therefore tl1ey will enjoy a comparative advantage in 
the 'newest', most technologically advanced, science based industries. This is inter-industry and not 
intra-industry specialisation. 
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Technological differentiation may give rise to intra-industry specialisation, where a cmmtry develops 
an innovative capability in a certain range or type of product. The existence of increasing returns to 
scale in science based industries would appear to be another factor leading to intra-industry 
specialisation. Such industries are typified by high levels of research and development (R&D) 
expenditure relative to tumover. These expenditures have to be incurred before a product is actually 
produced and sold. They are recuperated in later years to the extent that the new product is a success 
and sells well. However, even a successful new product is likely to have quite a short life. For 
example, in the pharmaceuticals industry, new patented products normally have market lives of only 
six to ten years. This is a comparatively short time in which to recuperate the amounts spent on R&D 
and eam a decent retum on these expenditures. An innovating firm must therefore sell as much as 
possible and for the highest price that the market will bear. These conditions lead to the expectation 
that, in many science based industries, intra-industry specialisation will in fact be quite great. By 
specialising on a small range of products, producers can spread their fixed R&D costs over a large 
output and recuperate these costs more quickly. 
At the other end of the spectrum is the case of horizontal differentiation. One of the causes of such 
differentiation is the existence of diversity of consumer tastes. Different consumers have different 
preferences for products. They differ in their preference for the actual type of 'attribute mix'. It has 
been suggested that tastes differ between countries. The result is the emergence of what may be called 
'national varieties' of a particular product. However, where there exists a strong local demand for a 
particular variety, exports may follow. The existence of diversity of preferences even within individual 
countries means that a potential demand always exists for the exporter of a 'national variety'. The 
result is intra-industry trade. At the same time the existence of increasing returns means that it is not 
possible for each producer to produce all the varieties demanded by the consumer. Intra-industry 
specialisation results. 
Industries characterised by such horizontal differentiation are not, in general, research intensive. 
There is little product innovation or product improvement. Rather, the emphasis is upon altering the 
appearance, packaging, style, etc of the product to cater for diversity of consumer preference and to 
increase market share. Advertising costs and sales promotion expenditures will constitute high fixed 
costs such that a large output may be needed to recuperate these costs. This would favour intra-
industry specialisation. Foreign direct investment is often quite important in such industries. Firms 
may initially seek to tap an overseas market through exports. Once, however, sales have reached a 
certain level, the firm may prefer to produce abroad. In this case it will have the advantage of being 
close to the consumer and better able to adapt its product to the particular preferences of consumers in 
the foreign market. Foreign production also enables the firm to minimize transport costs and get 
round any tariff or non-tariff barriers to imports. The relatively simple nature of the product in 
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question may also mean that fixed production costs are small. Geographically dispersed production 
will therefore not be too profitable. In this case intra-industry trade may be quite low. 
Finally, there is the case of vertical differentiation. In this case consumers rank different varieties by 
quality. Each country e.x]lorts products of a certain quality while importing products of a different 
quality. For example, a country may export large automobiles with heavy fuel consun1ption while 
importing small economy type models. Once again the existence of increasing returns to scale can 
explain intra-industry specialisation. As with technological differentiation, levels of R&D expenditure 
are likely to be quite large relative to turnover, but not as large as in industries where product 
iimovation is more common. Since the emphasis is on quality improvements rather than product 
innovation, the 'development' aspect of R&D is likely to be more important than the 'research' aspect. 
However, the occurrence of high levels of R&D expenditure means that unit costs will fall with 
output. Intra-industry specialisation will therefore be beneficial. 
It has been suggested that the case of trade in vertically differentiated goods fits ill with the 
Heckscher-Ohlin theory of trade (Falvey 1981 ). The argument is that the production of higher quality 
goods is more capital intensive than the production of lower quality goods. Then capital abundant 
countries will export the higher quality ranges and labour abundant countries the lower quality 
ranges. This conforms with the predictions of the Heckscher-Ohlin theory. Alternatively, one could 
say that higher quality goods require larger inputs of skilled labour and lower quality goods larger 
inputs of unskilled labour. This also conforms with a modified version of the Heckscher-Ohlin theory. 
If this is true, it is the case that the Heckscher-Ohlin theory can explain more kinds of intra-industry 
trade than it may first seem. On the other hand, it ignores the influence of the demand side 
determinants of trade. 
Demand for high quality alternatives is likely to be greater in countries with a high per capita income. 
In this case, the lower per capita income countries will export the lower quality ranges. Another 
possibility is that demand patterns vary with the distribution of income. Demand for higher quality 
alternatives will be greater in countries with a more uneven or skewed distribution of income. In both 
cases the existence of strong local demand for high quality substitutes may lead a comltry to specialise 
in these goods. However, the existence of economies scale means that it is not profitable for all 
producers in the com1try concerned to produce all the quality ranges. To satisfy demand at the lower 
end of the income scale, lower quality manufactmes are imported. 
Some of the literature on intra-mdustry trade has attached more importance to market structure than 
product differentiation. Specifically, the growth of oligopolistic markets in the industrialised countries 
is seen as the primary cause of increased intra-industry trade. It is important to see the linkage 
between market structure and trade involved. The essence of oligopoly is that the market is 
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concentrated in the hands of a few firms each of which controls a significant share of the market. It 
involves e"''treme uncertainty for each producer because, in determining his price output policy, he has 
to take account of the likely reaction of his rivals. Because of tllis uncertainty, firms may avoid overt 
price competition which reduces the joint profits of all producers. Instead, firms may seek to increase 
their market share by methods other than price competition. This will include product differentiation. 
At the same time, the oligopolistic nature of markets may force firms to seek expansion overseas. 
Individual firms may be reluctant to upset the equilibrimn existing in the domestic market. Yet the 
only way of increasing domestic sales further may be by entering into more fierce competition with 
rivals. The international expansion of the firm may be a means of overconling this dilelll1lla. The firm 
seeks to increase sales by e"'iending its influence to foreign markets. Tanlir Agmon has suggested tlmt 
intra-industry trade is one stage in this process of international expansion. Firms first seek to expand 
internationally through exports. Later, tltis gives rise to overseas production (Agmon, 1979). 
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Economic Integration and Intra=Industry Trade 
Interest in the measurement and explanation of intra-industry trade can be dated from attempts to 
explore (ex post) the trade effects of economic integration in Westem Europe. Early studies (such as 
Balassa 1966 and Grube! 1967) reported evidence which suggested a direct association between the 
fonnation of the EEC and the growth of intra-industry exchange. Subsequently studies have 
investigated whether similar links apparently hold for less developed countries (Willmore 1972, 
Balassa 1979) and even centrally planned economies (Pelzman 1978). 
Drawing on the evidence provided by several studies, Greenaway (1989) concludes that there is a 
causal link between these two phenomena and that this has been corroborated for both developed and 
developing countries. The same author points out, however, that the theoretical analysis of the 
underlying mechanisms is still unsatisfactory and that tl1eir empirical relevance is strongly related to 
country specific assumptions. In other words, intra-industry trade may be stimulated by economic 
integration, but this effect is mediated by factors such as preference diversity and overlapping 
demand, decreasing costs in production and intra-fim1 trade, oligopolistic competition and product 
differentiation. 
Economic integration and intra-industry trade have also been described as two phenomena, which are 
generated by other basic forces. These forces need be identified and the ways tl1ey shape actual trade 
flows and/or influence the formation of trade blocs explained, but there is no obvious link between the 
two issues. In earlier studies, argU1llents in support of this hypothesis were usually based on empirical 
tests rather than theoretical reasoning (Pomfret, 1979; Caves, 1981). At present, the analytical 
separation of intra-industry trade and economic integration is a fact as can be seen in the large 
number of studies which altematively concentrate on one or another of the two issues, disregarding 
the link. 
A third logical altemative - that growing intra-industry trade as an independent phenomenon can 
provide a motive for economic integration - has usually been ignored in the literature. This 
presumably depends on the difficulties in finding some rationale for this hypothesis within the 
framework of trade theory. The notion that the objective of increasing intra-industry trade can push 
integration forward, however, makes sense when translated into tl1e real world of trade negotiations 
and conflicts. 
It is not difficult to explain why little work exists by way of systematic theoretical analysis of links 
between intra-industry trade and economic integration. Traditional (Vinerian) customs union theory, 
with its stress on three-country, two-commodity and two factor models, cannot easily accommodate 
preference diversity, multiple products and imperfect competition. Either and Hom (1984) 
demonstrate the difficulties of incorporating such market imperfections into customs union theory. 
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However, despite the absence of a clearly articulated and widely accepted theoretical point of 
reference, it is possible to establish a number of possible causal com1ections between economic 
integration and intra-industry trade. 
1I'rade Riberallisatnon 
One of the most distinctive features of an integration arrangement is the liberalisation of tariff barriers 
among the integrating economies and (in the case of a customs union) the erection of a common 
external tariff against 'outside' countries. One could argue that trade liberalisation is likely to promote 
intra-industry trade on the grounds that liberalisation promotes trade expansion in general. Whilst it 
seems reasonable to suppose that discriminatory trade liberalisation is likely to promote intra-
community trade expansion (whether this be of a trade creating or trade diverting type), there are no a 
priori reasons why trade liberalisation per se should stimulate the growth of intra- as opposed to inter-
industry trade. 
Drabek and Greenaway ( 1984) argue that intra-union tariff liberalisation will give a greater stimulus 
to intra-industry trade than multilateral tariff liberalisation will, if the integrating economies have 
similar patterns of demand and production. The existence of similar, and therefore competitive as 
opposed to complementary, production structures is a necessary condition for intra- as opposed to 
inter-industry specialisation. (The common external tariff may also exclude lower cost producers 
outside the union). Similarity of demand conditions, ie taste overlap, is then an incentive to horizontal 
differentiation and specialisation within industries in order to reap the benefits of large scale 
production. To the extent that there are dynamic benefits from integration that result in rising per 
capita incomes then the demand for variety and the scope for intra-industry trade can be expected to 
rise. This expected positive association between economic integration and intra-industry trade may be 
reinforced by any liberalisation of capital flows concomitant on integration, which encourages vertical 
specialisation by, for instance, multinational corporations. 
In order to find reasons why economic integration may stimulate intra-industry exchange to a greater 
degree than inter-industry exchange, one needs to focus more closely on features of the pre-union 
market structures. 
Preference diversity and overlapping demands 
Theoretical analysis suggests that the distribution and intensity of preferences has an important 
bearing on the potential for intra-industry trade. Other things being equal, the more evenly 
preferences are distributed across a given product spectrum, the greater the potential for intra-industry 
exchange. Moreover, it is not only the horizontal product spectrum (ie diverse preferences for 
alternative combinations of a given set of attributes) which is relevant, but also the vertical spectrum 
(ie diverse preferences for alternative quality gradings). In addition, as Lancaster (1980) and 
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Greenaway (1982) demonstrate, the extent of any taste overlap between potential trading partners is 
relevant. Other things being equal, the greater the overlap of preferences, the greater the potential 
scope for intra-industry trade. Thus, if the pre-integration economies have similar preference 
stmctures, and produce similar, but differentiated, commodities, a greater stimulus will be given to 
intra-industry exchange than would be the case with multilateralliberalisation. If it is predominantly 
countries with similar factor endowments, similar per capita incomes and similar demand stmctures 
which form customs unions, this will be an important basis for intra-industry exchange. Many 
analysts would agree that this has been particularly relevant in the case of the EC. 
Factor movements md intm-firm trade 
Liberalisation of capital flows tends to be a concomitant of economic integration. The conventional 
wisdom on the relationship between factor movements and trade in goods is that they are substitutes 
rather than complements. This proposition, however, derives from the stmcture of the Heckscher-
Ohlin model, and in particular the assumption that initial factor endowments differ (since this leads to 
complementarity in production stmctures). Markusen (1983) argues that this may be a result which is 
peculiar to the Heckscher-Ohlin model, and as such may be the exception rather than the mle. It is 
argued that, in many circumstances, factor movements and intra-firm trade may be complementary. 
For example, Agmon (1979) argues that where intra-industry trade is concerned, it is likely that factor 
movements and trade will be complementary. The vehicle of transfer turns out to be the multinational 
corporation which engages in foreign direct investment in order to specialise in different varieties in 
different countries. Foreign direct investment followed by intra-industry trade allows the firm to 
exploit the rents associated with firm specific advantages, as well as providing a means for 
reconnaissance of foreign markets. In tum, the latter facilitates new product development and further 
expansion. 
Tllis horizontal specialisation is not the only mechanism whereby foreign direct investment leads to 
intra-firm trade which is then recorded as intra-industry trade. Vertical specialisation may also be a 
contributory factor. In other words, firms may 'peel off parts of the production process in order to take 
advantage of the opportunities offered by further division of labour in a larger market. Some 
commentators have argued that this is in fact the principal explanation of recorded intra-industry 
trade (Pomfret 1986). It need not necessarily result in intra-finn trade; this depends on whether the 
requisite ownership-location-intemalisation preconditions exist. It is probable, however, that for a 
given set of ownership-location-intemalisation advantages the probability of foreign direct investment 
occurring which results in intra-firm trade is higher in a common market than a non-integrated 
market since tl1is facilitates the movement of capital within tl1e integrated market. Thus there are 
sound a priori reasons for expecting tlle potential for intra-firm trade, which may be recorded as intra-
industry trade, to be greater in an integrated market than in a non-integrated market. 
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Intra=Industry Specialisation 
This section investigates the detenninants of intra-industry trade in manufactured goods based on the 
work of Balassa who used a cross country fTamework by taking the trade of individual countries with 
the rest of the world as the unit of observation. Its objective was to explain intercountry differences in 
the extent of intra-industry trade in manufactured goods by reference to the country characteristics 
affecting such trade. 
It is hypothesised that the extent of intra industry trade across countries will be:-
1 : Positively correlated with per capita incomes, representing the extent of demand for differentiated 
products. 
2 : Positively correlated with com1try size, indicating the possibilities for increasing the variety of 
differentiated products manufactured under economies of scale. 
3 : Negatively correlated with average distance from the country's trading partners, representing the 
availability and the cost of information necessary for trading differentiated products. 
4 : Positively correlated with the existence of common borders with trading partners, indicating the 
possibilities for intra-industry trade in response to locational advantages. 
5 : Positively correlated with the participation in regional integration schemes, indicating the 
possibilities of intra-industry trade in the framework of regional integration schemes. 
The investigation was limited to manufactured goods where product differentiation predominates, 
with the exclusion of natural resource products whose trade is much influenced by the availability of 
such resources in individual com1tries. The commodity classification scheme utilised has been 
established on the basis of the Standard Industrial Trade Classification, with four-digit SITC 
categories merged in cases when the economic characteristics of the products in question were judged 
to be very similar. 
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The investigation covered twenty six countries for the year 1990 (table 3.1). The index of intra-
industry trade for a particular country (liT) - the dependent variable - has been derived using the 
formula shown and defined earlier (page 81). A number of country characteristics have been presented 
as independent variables in order to determine the extent of intra-industry trade across countries: The 
level of development has been defined as Gross Domestic Product per capita, (GDP/population). 
Market size has been represented by the Gross National Product (GNP)- (GNP has been expressed in 
US dollars, using purchasing power parities as conversion ratio). While the domestic consumption of 
manufactured goods would have been a more appropriate measure of the size of domestic market for 
these products, the necessary data are not available for several cowttries and are subject to 
considerable error for others. At the same time, from available information it appears that the 
consumption of manufactured goods and the Gross National Product are highly correlated. 
Table 3.1 
Intra=industry trade indices by country, 1990 
Developed ][ndustrial Economies Newly ][ndustrialised Developing 
Countries Economies 
Country ll'JI' Country ][]['][' Country []['][' Country ][]['][' 
Japan 26.0 United Kingdom 81.0 Singapore 66.9 Malaysia 32.4 
United States 59.4 France 80.3 Hong Kong 40.8 Thailand 17.3 
Canada 66.9 Gem1any 62.7 Korea 34.9 Indonesia 16.1 
Australia 25.3 Belgium 79.2 Mexico 31.9 Philippines 15.0 
New Zealand 25.9 Netherlands 74.2 Brasil 37.8 China 15.3 
Italy 59.0 India 37.4 
Industrial Economies 56.4 NICs 41.6 Developing 19.22 
Economies 
Source : Computation of World Bank and IMF trade data. 
Geographical distance has been introduced in the form of a variable for proximity. This was measured 
by taking the average distance in miles between the principal trading partners of each country in 
question (using an international air mile classification- 'ABC World Airways Guide'). 
The border trade variable has been given a value of 1 for countries that have a common border with at 
least one trading partner covered by the investigation. Dummy variables were also introduced for 
membership in the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN), as well as for Singapore that 
has considerable entrepot trade involving intra-industry specialisation. 
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Empirical results : Balassa 
Table 3.2 shows the results obtained in the Balassa study by ordinary least squares. The investigation 
covered thirty eight countries for a single year, 1979. 
Estimates 
Constant 
Proximity 
Border dummy 
Per capita GNP 
GNP 
Trade orientation 
Singapore dummy 
R-squared 
Standard deviation 
Number 
Table 3o2 
0 Balassa (1979) 0 
of intra=industry trade for exporting 
manufactured products 
(t=values in parentheses) 
Ordinary least squares 
0.176 (5.26) 
0.141 ( 5.72) 
0.098 ( 2.90) 
0.061 ( 4.10) 
0.054 ( 4.84) 
0.128 ( 4.52 ) 
0.333 ( 3.95) 
0.8977 
0.067 
38 
Source: B. Balassa European Economic Review (1986) 27-42. 
In using ordinary least squares Balassa found that the regression coefficients of income per head, the 
gross national product, the trade orientation variable (defined in terms of deviations of actual from 
hypothetical values of per capita exports), the proximity variable, and the Singapore dummy were all 
statistically significant at the 1% level while the border dummy was significant at least at the 5% 
level. The coefficient of determination is 0. 90. 
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Table 3.3 shows the results obtained from the current study using ordinary least squares. 
Table 3.3 
Estimates of intra=industry trade fox exporting 
manufactured products 
Onllnnary least sqi!Bares Ordiillary least sqi!Bares 
Coefficient Standard T-value Coefficient Standard T-value 
error error 
Constant 0.4116 0.1021 4.03 0.4114 0.0996 4.13 
Per capita GNP 0.0148 0.0031 4.84 0.0146 0.0028 5.13 
GNP 0.00027 0.00028 0.96 0.00026 0.00027 0.97 
Proximity -0.0432 0.0196 -2.21 -0.0423 0.0185 -2.28 
Border dummy 0.0518 0.0698 0.74 0.0561 0.0641 0.87 
Singapore dummy 0.3106 0.1819 1.71 0.3273 0.1532 2.13 
ASEAN dummy 0.0171 0.0935 0.18 
Adjusted R-squared 0.7681 0.7677 
Standard deviation 0.0675 0.0675 
Standard error 0.0844 0.0845 
F(6, 19) I F(5, 20) 10.486 13.215 
Mean of dependent 0.4888 0.4888 
Number 26 26 
Diagnostics 
Serial Correlation F(l, 18) 0.876 F(1, 19) 1.046 
Functional Form F(l, 18) 0.001 F{l, 19) 0.006 
Normality Chi-sq 1.1984 Chi-sq 1.099 
Heteroscedasticity F{l, 24) 4.02 F{l, 24) 3.906 
Data 1990 
.Diagnostic tests 
Diagnostic tests, or mis-specification tests, are designed to test the adequacy of the specification of a 
regression equation. Before any regression model is deemed acceptable it is subjected to a battery of 
diagnostic tests, and any reported regression will be the outcome of some iterative process in which an 
initial model has first been estimated and has been modified in some regard as a result of the outcome 
of diagnostic tests. The tests are conducted with a null hypothesis which states that the regression is 
well-specified but do not have well-defined altemative hypotheses; hence if any diagnostic test results 
in a significant statistic the unambiguous conclusion is that the regression model is, in some way, mis-
specified, but the direction of the mis-specification is not indicated. 
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If the model is to be modified in consequence of a significant diagnostic test it is advisable that any 
modification is made in the light of relevant economic theory, rather than as a mechanical reaction. 
The diagnostic statistics included in the ordinary least squares regression are for testing the following 
hypotheses:-
Residual serial correlation 
Functional form mis-specification 
Normality of residuals 
Heteroscedasticity 
For each of these hypotheses two statistics are computed: a Lagrange Multiplier (LM), or score 
statistic, and an F statistic. The LM statistic is asymptotically distributed as a chi-square (CHI-SQ) 
variate (see Godfrey, 1988). The F statistic also known in the literature as 'LM F' or 'modified LM' 
statistic is taken approximately to have the F distribution (see Harvey, 1981). The LM and the F 
statistic have the same distribution asymptotically. But, on the basis of Monte Carlo results, Kivet 
(1986) has shown that in small samples, such as the one in the present study (N=26), the F version is 
generally preferable to the LM version. 
Serial Correlation: The assumption that errors corresponding to different observations are 
uncorrelated is important in (both time-series and) cross-section studies. When the error terms from 
different observations are correlated, we say that the error process is serially correlated or 
autocorrelated. As a general rule, the presence of serial correlation will not affect the unbiasedness or 
consistency of the OLS regression estimators, but it does affect their efficiency. In the case of positive 
serial correlation this loss of efficiency will be masked by the fact that the estimates of the standard 
errors obtained from the least squares regression will be smaller than the true standard errors. In other 
words, the regression estimators will be unbiased, but the standard error of the regression will be 
biased downward. This will lead to the conclusion that the parameter estimates are more precise than 
they actually are. There will be a tendency to reject the null hypothesis when, in fact, it should not be 
rejected (Godfrey, 1988). Therefore:-
Ho = the disturbances are serially uncorrelated 
Ha = the disturbances are autocorrelated 
The critical value ofF at the 5% level is:-
F(l, 18) = 4.41 
F(l, 19) = 4.38 
Since the calculated F statistics of 0.876 and 1.046 (from table 3.3) are both less than the critical 
values (4.41 and 4.38 respectively), we accept the null hypothesis at the 5% level of significance. 
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!Fumctionan 1form mis-!ipccification: The general linear model is assumed to be linear in the 
regressors, and if the assmnption of linearity is false then any estimation of the model restricted by 
this assumption will lead to false inferences. The simplest test of the assumption of a linear functional 
form is that due to Ramsey (1969, 1970). It is to be noted that economic theory rarely indicates a 
specific functional form of the relationship, and the assumption of linearity is an acknowledged 
approximation. In the absence of an obvious alternative hypothesis to that of linearity, the Regression 
Equation Specification Error Test (RESET) can be used. Linearity is therefore rejected if the 
computed F statistic lies in the right-hand tail of the relevant F distribution. 
H0 = model is linear (appropriate functional form has been chosen) 
If the RESET test rejects the hypothesis of linearity it should be noted that no precise alternative 
functional form has been utilised as an alternative hypothesis (nor, indeed, has any precise alternative 
hypothesis been stated), and so the investigator is merely alerted to the presence of a problem but is 
not necessarily alerted to the direction in which a better specification lies. Moreover, a significant 
RESET statistic is nol necessarily an indicator of a rnis-specified fi.mctional form; for example, if 
there is a structural break in the relationship this too can give rise to a significant RESET F statistic. 
The critical value ofF at the 5% level is:-
F(l, 18) = 4.41 
F(1, 19) = 4.38 
Since the calculated F statistics of 0.001 and 1.006 (from table 3.3) are both less than the critical 
values (4.41 and 4.38 respectively), we accept the null hypothesis at the 5% level of significance. 
Normality: The most popular test of nonnality in regression analysis is the Jarque-Bera test (Jarque 
and Bera, 1980). In small samples the normality of the OLS estimator is assured if the errors are 
normally distributed; in large samples resource may be made to asymptotic theory to demonstrate this 
result, under a wider class of assumptions about the error. However, a test of the nonnality of the 
error, via a test of the fitted residuals, can provide evidence not only of a possible non-normal 
distribution, but also of the presence of outliers. 
H0 = nonnality 
Ha = non normal distribution of the errors 
In this instance tl1e F statistic is not reported therefore we must make use of tl1e LM version. Since the 
statistics of 1.19 and 1.09 are both less than the critical value (15.4 - Chi-square test), we accept the 
null hypothesis at the 5% level of significance. 
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lBieteroscedasticity: When Heteroscedasticity is present, OLS estimation places more weight on the 
observations which have a large error variances than on those with small error variances. The implicit 
weighting of OLS occurs because the smn of squared residuals associated with large variance over 
terms is likely to be substantially greater than the sum of squared residuals associated with low 
variance errors. The regression line will be adjusted to minimise the total sum of squared residuals, 
and this can best be accomplished by guaranteeing a very good fit in the large-variance portion of the 
data. Because of this implicit weighting, OLS parameter estimates are unbiased and consistent, but 
they are not efficient; ie the variances of the estimated parameters are not the minimmn variances. In 
addition, the estimated variances of the estimated parameters will be biased estimators of the true 
variance of the estimated parameters (Goldfeld and Quandt, 1965). 
H0 = Homoscedasticity 
Ha = Heteroscedasticity 
The critical value ofF at the 5% level is:-
F(l, 24) = 4.26 
Since the calculated F statistics of 4.02 and 3.91 (from table 3.3) are both less than the critical value 
(4.26), we accept the null hypothesis at the 5% level of significance. 
The first set of results reported in table 3.3 includes six explanatory variables. Per capita income is 
expected to have a strong positive effect on liT, since as per capita income rises, so consumers 
demand more variety. The demand for variety leads to an increase in the degree of product 
differentiation which promotes liT and reduces inter-industry trade as a component of total trade. As 
expected the per capita income coefficient is positive and statistically significant at the I% level. 
There are grounds for believing that the larger a country is the greater the effect on liT. What is 
important is not geographical size of a cmmtry but the size of its GNP. Countries with a large GNP 
offer producers a wide market within which to sell. Therefore the second variable, GNP, is expected to 
have a strong positive effect on liT. The GNP coefficient is positive but insignificant at even the 10% 
level. 
A variable of proximity was included. Distance between countries is expected to have a strong 
negative effect on liT. Of course, large geographical distances and the consequent high transport costs 
reduce trade in general, whether it be inter-industry or intra-industry trade. As expected the proximity 
coefficient is negative and statistically significant at the 5% level. 
The fourth variable, a border dummy is expected to have a positive effect on liT, as the existence of 
common borders, besides lowering transport costs contribute to information flows. The border dummy 
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is positive but was not significantly different from zero. Dummy variables have also been introduced 
for membership in ASEAN and for Singapore. The ASEAN dummy variable is expected to have a 
strong positive effect on liT, as regional economic integration between countries appears to be one 
factor promoting liT. However the variable was found to be insignificant at even the 10% level. The 
dummy variable for Singapore was introduced as it has considerable entrepot trade involving intra-
industry specialisation. Therefore, the Singapore entrepot variable is expected to have a strong 
positive effect on liT. As expected the Singapore dummy is positive and statistically significant at the 
5%level. 
While the results are generally good (three significant t-values and an adjusted R-squared of 0. 76. The 
standard error of 0.0844 is best interpreted in relation to the mean value of the dependent variable, in 
this case 0. 48 9. The standard error is approximately 17% of the dependent variable mean. 
The second set of results reported in table 3.3 include five explanatory variables as the ASEAN 
dummy has been dropped. Regional economic integration between member countries appears to be 
one factor promoting liT. The ASEAN dummy variable has been dropped as it may involve a mis-
specification picking up the statistical impact of other variables (multicollinearity). The idea of 
regional integratio11 agreements implies that the countries in question will have similar per capita 
incomes, are at a similar stage of development, situated close to each other, and share a similar 
culture. Similar results were also observed for the EC in the work of Balassa (Balassa, 1986). 
Dropping the ASEAN dummy variable causes the adjusted R-squared to fall from 0.7681 to 0.7677, 
only a slight fall. However, the fact tltat tlte standard error of the equation has decreased slightly is 
indicative of a gain in predictive power. 
The adjusted R-squared of 0.76 allows us to conclude that the independent variables help to explain 
over three quarters of the variation in the level of intra-industry trade (liT) for the sample of 26 
cmmtries. The F statistic allows us to test tlte null hypothesis of no relationship between the 
independent variables and liT. To do so, we use a table of the F distribution to determine tl1e critical 
value associated with a 5% level of significance and six and nineteen degrees of freedom in tl1e 
numerator and denominator, respectively (five and twenty in tlte second set of results). The six 
degrees of freedom are used because tl1e model includes six explanatory variables, while the nineteen 
degrees of freedom result from the fact tltat tltere are 26 observations and seven parameters to be 
estimated. 
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In this case the critical value ofF at the 5% level is:-
F(6, 19) = 2.63 
F(5, 20) = 2.71 
Since the calculated F statistics of 10.49 and 13.22 are both greater than the critical value, we reject 
the null hypothesis at the 5% level of significance. 
Building on the results presented in table 3.3 a number of transformations were performed in order to 
improve the statistical significance of the variables and the explanatory power of the regression 
equations. 
The poor performance of the market size variable (GNP) is explained by its introduction in 
untransformed form. As shown in table 3 .4, this variable improves statistically if expressed in 
logarithmic terms, which compresses the extreme observations and reduces the variability of GNP that 
is quite large compared to the variability of the index of intra-industry trade. The ASEAN variable has 
been omitted and the per capita income, GNP and proximity variables are all presented in logarithmic 
form. All the statistical results are reported in table 3 .4. 
The index of intra-industry trade defined below:-
liT = < Xi + Mi ) - 1 Xi - Mi I 
(Xi+ Mi) 
takes values between 0 and 1. There is no guarantee, however, that the predicted values of the 
regression equation will fall within this range. Such an outcome is ensured if a logistic function is 
chosen:-
IITj =1/ ( 1 +exp-B 'Xj) 
where Xj is the vector of the explanatory variables. 
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Table 3.4 
Alternative Estimates of Intra=Industry Trade 
(Regression Coefficientsv OLS) 
Constant 
Per capita GNP 
GNP 
Proximity 
Border dummy 
Singapore dummy 
Adjusted R-squared 
Standard deviation 
Standard error 
F(5, 20) 
Mean of dependent 
Nmuber 
Jl))iagnostics 
Serial Correlation 
Functional Form 
Normality 
Heteroscedasticity 
Data 1990 
Ordinary Beast squares lLogistic fumctiollll : I())JL§ 
Coefficient Standard T -value Coefficient Standard T -value 
0.2809 
0.1016 
0.0201 
-0.0652 
0.0386 
0.2517 
0.8838 
0.0675 
0.1020 
30.407 
0.4888 
26 
F(l, 19) 
F(l, 19) 
Chi-sq 
F(1, 24) 
error 
0.084 
0.017 
O.Dl8 
0.030 
0.048 
0.112 
0.047 
0.940 
1.0937 
3.153 
3.34 
5.77 
1.11 
-2.20 
0.79 
2.24 
0.2199 
0.0241 
0.0071 
-0.0373 
0.0067 
0.0833 
0.8692 
0.0610 
0.0328 
26.581 
0.2585 
26 
F(1, 19) 
F(1, 19) 
Chi-sq 
F(1, 24) 
error 
0.027 
0.005 
0.005 
0.009 
0.015 
0.036 
0.348 
3.555 
1.2479 
0.220 
8.14 
4.27 
1.43 
-3.93 
0.43 
2.31 
Diagnostic tests were also performed to test the adequacy of the specification of the regression 
equations reported in table 3.4. In all cases the null hypotheses were accepted implying that the 
regression equations have in fact been well specified. 
Estimation by ordinary least-squares and utilising a logistic function give similar results in terms of 
the statistical significance of the variables and the explanatory power of the regression equations. The 
regression equations explain over 85% of the variance of the index of intra-industry trade in both 
cases and, with one exception, the statistical significance of the regression coefficients is also similar 
in the two studies. The regression coefficient for proximity improves from being significant at the 5% 
level in the OLS study, to being significant at the 1% level. The coefficients of income per head and 
the Singapore (entrepot) dummy variable both remain significant at the 1% level and the 5% level 
respectively. However, the GNP coefficient and the border dmnmy variables remain insignificant even 
at the 10% level, although the results have improved. 
The coefficient of determination is 0.90 using ordinary least-squares and 0.87 using the logit 
procedure with ordinary least-squares. While differences in the estimation procedures do not allow a 
comparison of the adjusted R-squareds, the residual standard deviations are directly comparable. They 
are 0.067 and 0.061, almost identical in t11e two cases. 
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The results presented in the present study are not directly comparable to those obtained by other 
authors who also analysed the determinants of intra-industry trade among developed and developing 
countries. Tllis is hardly surprising since the selection of a different set of countries will give rise to 
different results, as will using different commodity categories and applying different methods. 
Loertscher and Wolter (1980) used bilateral trade flows rather than each country's overall trade as 
observations. While this pernlitted testing for intercountry differences in per capita incomes and in 
market size, the coefficient of determination was only 0.15 and the results are marred by reason of the 
fact that the authors failed to weight the dependent variable. Weighted least-squares estimation was 
correctly used by Bergstrand (1983), but tllis investigation covered only SITC 7 and the coefficient of 
determination was not reported. Clair, Gaussens and Phan (1984) employed ordinary least-squares in 
an equation pertaining to the intra-industry trade of the developed countries in SITC 5 and 7, with the 
coefficient of determination ranging between 0.66 and 0. 74 in the reported estimates. 
The work in tllis section has set out to explain intercountry differences in the extent of intra-industry 
trade in manufactured goods by reference to hypotheses derived from contributions to the theory of 
intra-industry trade. Apart from the effects of economic integration on intra-industry specialisation, 
all the hypotheses put forward have been confirmed by the results and the explanatory power of the 
regression is high. The extent of intra-industry specialisation increases with the level of economic 
development and the size of domestic markets. The existence of trading partners with common 
borders and geographical proximity also contribute to intra-industry trade and its role as an entrepot 
increases the extent of such trade in Singapore. 
In providing evidence on tlte determinants of intra-industry trade the findings of the current study 
support the work carried out by Balassa and complement t11e relevant theoretical literature. As noted 
by Balassa nearly thirty years ago, tlte existence of intra-industry trade has important policy 
implications (Balassa 1966). Tllis is because the cost of adjustment associated with reductions in trade 
barriers will be much less in cases when this involves increased intra-industry specialisation than in 
cases when resources are reallocated among industries. 
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Intra=Industry Trade In ASEAN 
Prior to export-oriented industrialisation, ASEAN's exports comprised almost entirely primary 
products, while imports consisted mostly of manufactures, resulting in a large volume of inter-
industry trade flows. The increasing share of manufactures in the total exports of ASEAN com1tries 
since the 1970s has given rise to the possibilities of increasing intra-industry trade flows. 
The phenomenon of intra-industry trade is explained by several factors. In the first place, the presence 
of transport, storage and selling costs can result in international trade in functionally homogeneous 
goods. Transport costs give rise to border trade especially where geographic regions are more closely 
integrated to other countries than to other regions within their own country. Singapore's entrepot trade 
is another example within this category, in the case of ASEAN. A second explanation for intra-
industry trade is the existence of economies of scale, which may give rise to vertical intra-industry 
specialisation among countries and hence generate international trade of inputs, and intermediate and 
final products, within the same industly. A third factor is intra-industly trade emerging through 
product cycles and international subcontracting arrangements. In the case of the ASEAN 
manufacturing industries, governments have tended to promote domestic vertical integration of many 
activities (eg in the automotive and appliance industries). Consequently, the second and third 
explanations are unlikely to have generated substantially increased intra-industry trade within 
ASEAN. Export processing zones, however, are likely to have induced considerable extra-regional 
intra-industry trade, especially of the third variety. 
Table 3.5 shows the indices for each of ASEAN's major trading partners during the periods 1967-75 
and 1976-84 in percentage tenus, calculated at the three-digit SITC level, excluding petroleum. (see 
page 81 for Grubel and Lloyd formula on liT). These two periods were chosen as they represent 
similar stages of the business cycle, whilst also giving an indication of differences in the years before 
and after the 1976 Bali Summit. It can be seen that the indices for each of the ASEAN countries were 
high and increasing except in the case of Indonesia, probably owing to the omission of petrolemn 
products. Intra-industry trade is of the greatest importance for ASEAN trade with the US and the 
Northeast Asian NICs (Hong Kong, Taiwan and South Korea). The indices concerning trade with the 
EC rose rapidly. However, what is surprising is that the indices remained small in the case of Japan, 
although they too did rise rapidly but from a much smaller base. The third explanation for intra-
industry trade mentioned is likely to account for these figures. The US and Japan invest considerable 
ammmts in export-oriented manufacturing in ASEAN, as do the NICs in some of the ASEAN 
countries but not on such a large scale. 
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Table 3.5 
Intra=Industry Trade Indices for ASEAN Manufactures 
by Major Trading Partner 
in percentage terms (1967=75, 1976=84) 
EC USA Japan Australia N E Asian Other World 
NICs A SEAN 
Singapore 
1967-75 15.2 23.3 2.8 49.7 35.2 43.5 50.1 
1976-84 37.1 44.6 11.4 40.3 47.3 49.8 65.7 
Malaysia 
1967-75 5.3 3.5 1.7 9.1 9.8 43.1 16.8 
1976-84 23.7 58.3 8.1 28.6 28.4 71.7 38.2 
Thailand 
1967-75 4.8 6.5 3.7 7.9 12.1 25.2 9.6 
1976-84 11.9 25.3 7.2 19.2 36.3 30.4 32.5 
Indonesia 
1967-75 4.1 0.3 0.3 0.5 0.4 6.1 2.5 
1976-84 3.2 1.8 1.4 3.9 8.1 26.3 7.9 
Philippines 
1967-75 1.1 5.3 2.7 0.9 10.9 11.1 5.8 
1976-84 20.8 46.1 29.4 17.5 37.4 20.5 42.3 
A SEAN 
1967-75 6.1 7.8 2.24 13.6 13.7 25.8 16.9 
1976-84 19.3 35.2 11.5 21.9 31.5 39.7 37.3 
Source: Calculated from data in United Nations Yearbook oflnternational Trade Statistics 1992. 
The importance of intra-industry with extra-regional trading partners varies considerably among the 
ASEAN countries. As would be expected, Singapore generally has the highest index, especially since 
it is the most export-oriented of the five countries. Singapore's entrepot trade is also the most 
extensive in the region, although tllis factor is more important in explaining intra-regional trade. 
Indonesia is at the other end of the spectrum. Of t11e three tnain explanatory factors of intra-industry 
trade, only the first is likely to be of some importance for Indonesia, and only in tl1e context of intra-
regional trade. It is therefore not surprising tlmt intra-industry trade assumes some significance only 
in the case of Indonesia's trade with the other ASEAN countries. The indices for the other tluee 
countries also rose quite sharply, especially in the case of the EC and t11e US. Here again, export-
oriented foreign investments are likely to have been a tnajor factor. 
To check the emerging hypothesis that close proxinlity in terms of geographic and economic (and 
probably socio-political) distance is a major factor in the intensity of intra-industry trade, trade 
between the ASEAN countries is exanlined. From table 3.5 it appears t11at, on t11e whole, the intra-
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industry trade ratio is the highest in trade among the ASEAN countries compared to that between the 
ASEAN countries and other trading partners. 
Intra-regional intra-industry trade is especially significant for Singapore, and is also important for the 
Philippines. Nevertheless, compared to the first period (1967-75), its significance in the second period 
(1976-84) relative to intra-industry trade with the world declined somewhat. This suggests that the 
second and third explanations for intra-industry trade, which would tend to encourage trade with 
cmmtries beyond the ASEAN region, have been more important in the second period than the first 
explanation, which tends to account for much of the intra-regional trade. 
Economic cooperation amongst the ASEAN countries may account for part of the increase in the 
indices, but the development of larger economies and more sophisticated industrial stmctures were 
undoubtedly the more important factors. It is interesting that Malaysia had the highest index rather 
than Singapore, the region's centre for entrepot trade. The fact that the definition of manufactures 
used excludes petroleum and otl1er primary commodities undoubtedly accounts for this finding. 
Nevertheless, the high figure for Malaysia is not altogether surprising in view of the fact that it shares 
a common border with three of the other ASEAN cmmtries (all but the Philippines). Care should of 
course be taken in interpreting these figures, even at the three-digit level, since some of the intra-
industry trade flows are very small. But the general direction of the trends is quite unambiguous. 
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Intra=Industry Trade In Singapore 
Table 3.6 
Intra=Industry Trade indices for Singapore 
(in percentage terms) 
SITC Commodity 1970 1974 1978 1982 1986 1990 
553 Perfume, cosmetics 44.51 35.42 41.49 48.36 52.13 56.71 
554 Soaps, cleaning preparations 89.31 64.52 75.63 77.84 84.61 94.24 
562 Fertilisers 64.60 71.79 87.69 90.03 93.80 99.59 
598 Chemicals nes 35.70 41.60 46.18 53.69 92.25 89.57 
621 Materials of rubber 30.25 33.24 38.96 48.13 56.33 52.70 
628 Rubber articles nes 83.58 68.16 76.30 78.14 77.47 69.66 
634 Veneers, plywood 58.74 47.08 49.97 61.01 57.80 69.89 
635 Wood manufactures 51.25 86.31 85.26 70.65 85.79 60.59 
641 Paper and paperboard 21.26 31.40 32.65 36.93 57.96 58.68 
651 Textile yarn 27.39 75.28 88.18 88.32 84.89 95.71 
652 Cotton fabrics woven 48.30 68.87 68.05 63.32 51.24 50.76 
653 Woven man made fibres 27.16 33.81 55.62 56.75 64.51 72.96 
661 Lime, cement, building prod. 31.81 20.97 44.51 41.76 21.51 32.20 
664 Glass 33.88 31.86 46.19 49.71 39.88 41.19 
666 Pottery 88.34 13.05 20.71 24.39 28.78 49.41 
672 Iron and steel 11.49 50.64 26.41 6.53 7.08 4.84 
678 I+S tubes, pipes etc 31.43 22.02 70.25 58.31 72.46 57.74 
692 Metal tanks, boxes etc 91.75 66.84 83.25 83.33 90.62 77.34 
696 Cutlery 23.41 39.96 45.45 64.63 58.69 71.04 
712 Steam engines, turbines 10.70 20.21 38.63 86.90 
714 Engines and motors 83.82 69.68 36.77 30.76 
723 Civil eng equip 65.17 79.62 93.62 85.80 
724 Textile, leather mach 26.02 47.08 63.65 81.42 84.69 85.35 
751 Office machines 90.09 54.29 65.88 71.93 90.67 74.74 
764 Telecommunications equip 49.36 45.01 52.37 78.48 89.07 94.55 
771 Electrical power machinery 37.39 56.84 69.26 74.23 
775 Household type equip 37.55 79.84 98.19 69.82 77.23 75.81 
842 Mens outwear non knit 53.69 70.47 63.42 63.47 
843 Womens outwear non knit 43.57 58.08 81.66 73.72 
851 Footwear 77.08 98.40 84.27 49.08 36.14 55.90 
871 Optical instruments 45.22 46.73 83.86 97.29 
885 Watches and clocks 28.19 32.85 66.05 59.46 60.59 57.90 
892 Printed matter 78.04 88.98 94.88 96.07 97.29 87.35 
893 Articles of plastic 54.64 60.68 66.30 93.44 84.48 86.08 
894 Toys, sporting goods 42.87 60.11 85.27 89.01 95.25 80.70 
895 Office supplies 22.66 26.62 30.09 44.80 75.12 90.84 
896 Works of art etc 68.10 68.25 75.67 52.46 82.15 95.38 
897 Gold, silverware, jewellery 29.30 26.45 62.75 86.65 63.58 54.50 
Source : Calculated from data -
Research and Statistics Unit of the EDB (singanore dollars}, Singa,gore. 
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Care should, of course, be taken in interpreting the intra-industry trade indices even at the three digit 
level, since large indices are not inconsistent with small trade volumes. However the uptrend in intra-
industry trade is not at all surprising, given Singapore's export-oriented industrialisation in which 
direct foreign investment plays a crucial role. 
The intra-industry trade indices for Singapore's manufactures (calculated at the three digit SITC level) 
are given in Table 3.6 in percentage terms (see page 81 for Grubel and Lloyd formula on liT). Most 
indices increased during the 1970s and the very high indices for several commodities deserve a brief 
comment. Fertilisers (562), and chemicals (598) respectively have both shown a growing tendency 
towards intra-industry trade. For example, fertilisers increased from 64% in 1970 to 99% in 1990. 
Chemicals increased from 35% in 1970 to 89% in 1990 with its peak of 92% occurring in 1986. 
Industrial growth in the late 1960s early 1970s was concentrated mainly in labour-intensive industries 
such as textiles, food, paper and wood products. Paper and Paperboard ( 641) shows an increase from 
21% in 1970 to 58% in 1990 indicating a switch from inter-industry to a growing tendency towards 
intra-industry trade. Pottery (666) shows a similar trend apart from the fact that in 1970 a measure 
was recorded (probably due to entrepot trade) before Singapore commenced production of its own 
where upon values rose from 13% in 1974 to 49% by 1990. Steam engines, turbines (712) also 
increases from 10% in 1978 to 86% in 1990. This strategy of labour-intensive manufacturing, 
especially but not exclusively for export continued from 1966-73, by which time full employment and 
emerging domestic labour shortages had led to plans for industrial upgrading into less labour-
intensive activities. 
Since the mid 1970s manufacturing growth has been concentrated in higher value added industries, 
namely petroleum refining, electrical and electronic machinery, shipbuilding and oil rig construction, 
metal engineering and precision equipment, and chemicals. Except for petroleum chemicals, these 
industries employ large numbers of unskilled workers, but they have all been upgrading themselves in 
response to labour shortages and competitive pressures. Telecommunications Equipment (764) and 
office supplies (895) have both shown a dramatic increase. Telecommunications Equipment rose from 
49% in 1970 to 94% in 1990 (with a dip in 1974 to 45%). Office supplies rose from 22% in 1970 to 
90% in 1990. Other categories show similar patterns, textile yam (651) increased from 27% in 1970, 
to 95% in 1990. Woven man made fibres fabric (653) rose from 27% in 1970 to 72% in 1990. 
Household type equipment (775) has increased from 37% in 1970 to 75% in 1990 with its peak 
occurring in 1978 of 98% after which point the figures barely fell below 70% indicating intra-industry 
trade. The same can be said for the commodity metal tanks, boxes etc. (692) for which the lowest 
figure recorded was 66% in 1974. All these trends show a tendency towards intra-industry trade away 
from inter-industry trade. Numerous other commodities shown also follow similar trends, though not 
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all at the same rate as those mentioned, whilst others show the reverse trend. Iron and steel (672) 
which fell from 55% in 1974 to 4% in 1990. 
The onset of the severe 1974-75 world recession, which particularly affected labour-intensive export 
industries, delayed the intended restmcturing of the economy. It may also account for anomalies in the 
data for the period 1974 as seen for products such as telecommunications (764) and metal tanks, 
boxes etc. (692). No new industrial policies were introduced during the market-led post recession 
recovery from 1976-78 until 1979 when the government introduced 'the second industrial revolution'. 
Singapore has lost its comparative advantage in resource-intensive manufactures (since Indonesia and 
Malaysia have developed their own capabilities in these areas). This may help to explain distortions in 
the data through the years as Singapore looses out in some resource and labour-intensive commodity 
categories. Singapore has not lost out altogether as it has gained a comparative advantage in 
teclmology-intensive activities. 
A useful classification of grouping products (in intra-industry trade) consist of dividing all goods by 
production characteristics and end-use characteristics. (Havrylyshyn and Wolf, 1983). First, a 
distinction is made between capital-intensive and resource-intensive goods. Second, a mutually 
exclusive distinction is made between intermediate, investment and consumption goods. The 
allocation of SITC 3-digit categories into these groupings is shown (Table 3.7). 
Commodity group 
Intermediate goods 
Labour-intensive 
Capital-intensive 
Capital goods 
Labour-intensive 
Capital-intensive 
Consumer durables 
Labour-intensive 
Capital-intensive 
Consumer non-durables 
Labour-intensive 
Capital-intensive 
Table 3.7 
Commodity Groups 
SITC groups 
5(excl515) 621 641 662 663 664 693 694 
661 691 692 698 812 
695 712 714 718 719 731 733 861 
711 722 723 726 729 732 734 735 
667 697 864 891 897 
724 725 892 893 896 
665 666 696 892 893 894 899 
553 554 895 
Source : UN Broad Economic Categories 
113 
Table 3.8 
Intra=industry trade among Asian countries 
by type of good 1990 
Country Capital Labour Intermediate Investment 
intensive intensive goods goods 
Singapore 66.69 58.43 50.55 72.76 
Indonesia 43.89 42.94 43.22 59.11 
Malaysia 46.83 56.05 65.80 56.50 
Philippines 27.29 34.67 50.20 29.50 
Thailand 29.15 56.25 67.11 44.50 
Hong Kong 72.85 60.71 59.27 72.92 
Korea 50.46 43.33 50.45 44.69 
AvASEAN 42.77 49.67 55.38 52.47 
AvNICs 63.33 54.16 53.42 63.45 
Source : Calculated from data in United Nations Yearbook oflntemational Trade Statistics 1992. 
Table 3.8 which shows the values of intra-industry trade by these groupings and country. In the case 
of the ASEAN countries only Singapore and Indonesia have liT values in capital intensive goods 
greater than those for the labour-intensive goods, with the latter only just falling into this category. 
The three remaining countries show the reverse. There is greater intra-industry trade in goods that are 
capital-intensive in production, compared to those that are labour-intensive and also there is greater 
intra-industry trade in goods used for investment as these categories have a much greater tendency to 
be two-way trade or trade in 'similar' products, than is the case for labour-intensive goods, or 
intermediate goods and consumer goods. When looking at the average values for ASEAN it can be 
seen that Singapore's position is outweighed by the rest, ie the liT in capital-intensive goods is lower 
than in labour-intensive goods (42.77% v 49.67%). Also investment goods have a lower liT index 
52.47% than do intermediate goods 55.38%. 
However, when looking at the figures for Singapore a different picture can be seen. liT in labour-
intensive goods is considerably lower than in capital-intensive goods (58.43% v 66.69%). Investment 
goods have a much higher liT index (72.76%) than do intennediate goods (50.55%). This trend is 
also followed by the NICs. One should expect liT to be higher in trade for industrial countries 
(56.35%), than for developing countries as a whole (19.22%), and between the two the NICs (41.61 %) 
-(see table 3.1, page 98). It is also certainly true that the developing countries do more intra-industry 
trading with each other than with the developed industrial economies. This is especially true when 
considering the values for the ASEAN countries: liT among them is high while liT in their total trade 
with the world is relatively low (see table 3.5, page 109, for liT statistics 1967-75 and 1976-84). 
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The specific products which have t11e highest levels of liT in Singapore are : 
554 Soaps, Cleaning Preparations 94.24% 
562 Fertilisers 99.59% 
598 Chemicals nes 89.57% 
651 Textile Yam 95.71% 
712 Steam Engines, Turbines 86.90% 
723 Civil Eng Equip 85.80% 
724 Textile Leatl1er Mach 85.35% 
764 Teleconununications Equip 94.55% 
871 Optical Instruments 97.29% 
895 Office Supplies 90.84% 
896 Works Of Art etc 95.38% 
Most of the products listed above are in tlle capital intensive category. On tlle whole, products witl1 a 
high measure of liT are more 'sophisticated' goods in some sense of that word. This is because 
Singapore has had to adopt new teclmologies because of changing comparative advantage. The share 
of unskilled labour-intensive manufactures began to decrease about tlle mid 1970s, when rising real 
wages and human capital development began to erode tl1e economy's comparative advantage in tllese 
commodities. Correspondingly, tlle share of technology and human capital-intensive manufactures 
began to increase gradually. 
The indices for extra-regional and intra-regional trading partners are not presented here, but some 
observations are pertinent, in terms of tlle level and trends of intra-industry trade. In the case of extra-
regional trade, most indices have increased since the 1970s. Very high indices for several products 
deserve brief comment. A number of high, or increasing, indices are for products whose production 
tends to be concentrated in export processing zones. Most notable are electrical power machinery 
(771), telecommw1ication equipment (724) and certain textile products (651). In fact, intemational 
subcontracting arrangements would appear to be tlle key factor in explaining variations in the indices 
among industries. The t11eory of intra-industry trade suggests tllat tlle products which are significant 
in extra-regional intra-industry trade will not necessarily be as important in intra-regional trade. This 
contention is broadly supported by tlle data, witl1 tlle notable exception of SITC 771 - electrical power 
machinery. The more important products tend to be resource based processing activities, in whose 
trade Singapore figures prominently. These include rubber products (621) and paper products (641). 
Of tlle trade that the ASEAN countries do with each other a sizeable part (about 40% in tl1e second 
period, 1976-84) is in tlle form of intra-industry trade or 'competitive' trade. This is lower tllan for 
trade among industrial countries, but tllat is not surprising as it has been shown elsewhere t11at intra-
industry trade varies witl1 the degree of development. These findings are broadly in conformity witll 
theory: unlike inter-industry trade which depends basically on tlle pattem of factor endowments, as 
stipulated by tlle Heckscher-Ohlin model. This is not surprising tllat Singapore, tlle most advanced of 
all t11e ASEAN countries, accounts for the bulk of ASEAN's intra-industry trade witll tlle developed 
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countries. Nor is it surprising to find that intra-industry trade indices among the ASEAN countries are 
higher than those with third cmmtries, but for a few exceptions. The increased intra-ASEAN intra-
industry flows may partly be due to official interventions such as the Preferential Trading 
Arrangements (PTA). Their intra-industry trade with each other is higher than with the rest of the 
world, and the trade diversion in the integration schemes probably accounts for this. But given the 
costs of trade diversion, the higher intra-industry trade in ASEAN may not be beneficial. Ce1tainly the 
fact that intra-ASEAN intra-industry trade indices have increased significantly since the 1970s is 
indicative of growing intra-industry specialisation in the region. 
It appears that countries such as Singapore, which have relatively more open trade regimes also have 
higher levels of intra-industry trade. On theoretical grounds, it can be said that expansion in trade -
inter- or intra-industry alike - as a response to a general liberalisation would yield increased efficiency 
and mutual benefits with a greater certainty compared to the case with trade created by specific 
measures (Balassa, 1966,; Dixon, 1978; and Lloyd, 1979). The implications of this for the developing 
countries are obvious. 
On the other hand, it is incumbent on the developed countries to eliminate the escalation in protection 
at higher levels in the processing chain (Helleiner, 1979). This is an imperative if there is any truth in 
the argument that the costs of adjustment to intra-industry trade are significantly lower (see 
UNCTAD, 1980). Also, the developed cmmtries have to bring to a halt the tendency to make 
increased use of - indeed to start removing - non-tariff barriers. To a large extent these are 
discriminatory, and frustrate tl1e developing countries in their efforts to diversify their manufactured 
exports (UNCTAD, 1984). 
Widening the scope of existing general measures to promote North-South trade is also an issue which 
involves intra-industry trade. Notable in tltis context are improving the conditions and enlarging the 
scope of the generalised system of preferences (GSP), and a greater use of value-added tariff 
provisions, such as those that exist in tl1e EC or under tl1e provisions of United States tariff items. 
As the findings in tltis chapter indicate, there is a great potential in intra-industry trade between 
developing com1tries. The determining factor in tllis will certainly be the further industrialisation of 
developing countries. Since most developing countries are geographically apart, the emergence of tl1e 
new NICs - such as the ASEAN-4 - help to fill in the gaps, a chain reaction with respect to intra-
industry trade is most likely. At the same time, in addition to general measures increasing tl1e 
openness of their economies, there are a number of specific policy areas which can contribute to 
South-Soutl1 trade in general, and intra-industry trade in particular: greater economic cooperation 
among developing countries, in particular regional integration schemes, and probably a general 
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preferential treatment scheme - such as that envisaged in the global system of trade preferences 
(GSTP) - would be the main items. 
Without the cooperation of the other member states of ASEAN, it is doubtful whether the growth of 
the Singapore economy would have been as prolific. The fact that Singapore was at a higher level of 
development in the integrated region implies that with a head start in industrialisation it was able to 
strengthen its position and increase its lead as a result of integration. 
It can, of course, be argued that the trade e:-.]lansion induced by special arrangements between 
developing countries can have distortive effects and may not yield net benefits. However, such 
arrangements deserve consideration for at least three reasons. First, there are market imperfections 
such as 'traditional' transport, marketing and finance channels which, to say the least, do not favour 
South-South trade. Secondly, returns to scale and minimun1 optimal scale requirements are of much 
greater importance in the developing countries due to smallness of their markets - especially in some 
manufacturing products (Erzan, 1983). Hence there is a substantially greater scope of exploiting 
returns to scale through, for example, regional integration schemes, than is the case with developed 
countries. Thirdly, most developing countries, for economic and non-economic reasons, desire to 
reduce their dependence on a small number of suppliers of what they consider to be critical or 
strategic products. They also believe that they have to keep up with the new technologies in at least 
some fields. Hence, the costs of import substitution would be significantly reduced by economic 
cooperation among tl1e developing countries which, as consequence, would lead to increased intra-
industry trade. 
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Clln~ ]plt~Ir 4 
lR.~gnmn~lln§~ltHoiDl of liiDlt~IriDl~1bimn~D Tir~dle 
This chapter aims to assess the effect of the regional integration of the ASEAN economies on trade 
and welfare. The first part of the chapter focuses on pointing out how history, geography and even 
non-preferential trade policies can effect the geographic distribution of a country or region's trade. A 
simple method for disaggregating the change in the geographic distribution of a region's trade into 
component parts is provided. In the process indexes of intensity and propensity to trade intra- or 
extra-regionally are defined. The traditional intensity index overcomes several problems associated 
with using Lrade shares as indicators of trade bias. It is defined in the case of extra-regional trade as 
(roughly) the share of a region's trade with the rest of the world relative to the rest of the world's share 
of global trade. But even this indicator ignores the possibility that the region may be trading more or 
less with the rest of the world because of extemal trade policy changes. 
The work then draws on a number of theoretical and empirical literatures for various regional 
integration arrangements, so that an investigation of the ASEAN countries may be undertaken. The 
importance of ASEAN cooperation must be examined in order to determine whether this group of 
countries has had a favourable effect on economic growth. The ex-ante and ex-post approach is one of 
the most popular approaches in measuring the effects of integration. It permits the evaluation of the 
integration framework by comparing an integration 'parameter' before and after integration. This is 
done by analysing the trade effects of A SEAN integration using Ba1assa's (1963) test of trade creation 
and trade diversion. 
Balassa's quantitative approach in measuring integration was first based on his work on the 
integration effect of the EEC. Other authors of integration like Lamfalussy (1963), Verdoon and 
Schlochtern (1964), Kreinin (1972), Trunmn (1974) and Donges (1979) also adopted quite similar 
criteria in estimating the trade creation and trade diversion effects. Tnunan and the EFf A Secretariat, 
for instance, applied the same tool in measuring the trade effect of EFfA, while Donges (1979) 
provided the model for the possibility of Spain's accension into the EEC. However, in the latter case, 
estimation was undertaken using the price elasticities of each commodity group and also the tariff 
level on intra-imports according to the preferential trading agreement provisions of each commodity. 
In the developing world, the work of Patterson (1980) in assessing the CACM integration via a 
similar approach should not be forgotten. Despite its limitations the Balassian approach is an 
important and popular approach in assessing integration. It is a simple yardstick in guaging 
integration through trade effects. The results of the current study are reported in the second half of the 
chapter. 
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Global economic integration through extra-regional trade has, of course, been going on for centuries 
(Tracy, 1991). But with the rapid decline in the cost of ocean transport in the later nineteenth century, 
as iron and then steel replaced wood in ship construction and steam substituted for sails, 
intercontinental trade became much less costly (North, 1958). That, in the presence of strong 
imperial-colonial ties, often stronger trade complementarities between European and less-
industrialised countries than among European comttries, and intennittent animosities among 
European countries, ensured that for a hundred or so years from 1830 there was faster growth in inter-
rather than intra-continental trade. Moreover, this extra-regional trade bias was reinforced by imperial 
preference policies that were strengthened in the early 1930s. It was only after the post World War 
reconstruction period that those preferences began to be dismantled - only to be replaced by regional 
preferences first in Europe and then in North America. Simultaneously, the volume of intra-industry 
trade among high-income industrial economies in sophisticated merchandise has become more 
important over time than those economies' inter-sectoral trade with exporters of primary products. 
About half of Asia's trade is intra-regional at present, as was the case in the inter-war period. But in 
tlte tllird quarter of Lhe century it was barely 40%. To wtderstand why requires first exanlining Japan's 
international trade. That trade was very heavily focused on its neighbours in the inter-war period: as 
much as two-thirds of Japanese trade was then with oilier Asian economies. However, following the 
collapse of the Japanese empire in the mid-1940s and the decline of barriers to Japan's trade with 
other industrial economies between the 1950s and 1970s, tlle share of its trade witl1 otlter Asian 
economies dropped to half the inter-war level. (See table 4.1). 
Table 4.1 
Intra=regional trade share ( % ) 
1928 1938 1948 1958 1968 
Western Europe 51 49 43 53 63 
Nortll America 25 23 29 32 37 
Asia 46 52 39 41 37 
Japan 63 68 60 36 32 
Australasia 16 16 14 25 31 
Developing Asia 47 55 44 47 45 
TOTAL WORLD 39 37 33 40 47 
Western Europe includes Yugoslavia and Turkey 
Nortll America refers to Canada and the United States 
Australasia refers to Australia and New Zealand 
Developing Asia excludes Japan - incorporates NICs and ASEAN countries. 
Source: Calculated from data in:-
United Nations Yearbook oflntemational Trade Statistics (various years). 
The World Banks World Tables (various years). 
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1979 1990 
66 72 
30 31 
41 48 
31 35 
49 51 
48 56 
46 52 
History, Geography and Regional Integration 
Both history and geography, in addition to government policies, play fundamental roles in shaping the 
pattern of world trade. Through influencing the size of nations, history also influences the share of 
GDP traded intemationally, because large economies tend to trade a smaller proportion of their GDP 
(Perkins and Syrquin, 1989). Historical events also influence national factor endowment ratios and 
thereby comparative advantages, and hence the commodity composition of countries' international 
trade. 
Geography influences all four determinants of the pattem of an economy's intemational trade (its 
GDP, share of GDP traded, conunodity composition of trade, and relative transaction costs of doing 
business with different cmmtries). The output and real income of a nation can be affected directly by 
proximity to a more affluent economy, as shown so dramatically in the 1980s by the reductions in 
trade barriers between southeast China and Hong Kong. Also a nation's trade-to-GDP ratio is smaller 
the lower the cost of transacting business domestically compared with intemationally, and this is 
deternlined by transport and communication costs. These costs vary across trading partners as well 
and change over time. They thereby influence the direction of a country's trade not only directly but 
also indirectly through altering its inter-sectoral and intra-industry commodity composition 
(Krugman,1991). 
Govemment policies also alter the determinants of the pattern of international trade (Clarida and 
Findlay, 1992). Even a uniform intemational trade tax for all commodities is inherently 
discrinlinatory, in at least two respects. First, it discrinlinates between domestic and intemational 
trades and so is likely to lower botl1 GDP (especially for small countries) and the nation's intemational 
trade-to-GDP ratio below t11eir free trade levels. And second, it alters domestic producer incentives 
among tradeable industries because a given change in good prices translates to differential changes in 
value-added, especially when the value-added share of output varies by industry and elasticities of 
substitution in production and conswnption differ across commodities. In t11e usual case in which a 
govemment's trade taxes (and ot11er policies) do differ across industries, these differences add to t11e 
distortions to domestic production and so lower GDP furtl1er. Also such differences tend to reduce 
trade more for t110se trading partners whose trade witl1 the taxing country is concentrated in the goods 
taxed most. Moreover, these changes to goods trade will be accentuated if tl1e country's trade policy 
allows international factor flows. Thus even if a country's policies were to contain no overtly 
discriminatory or preferential trade arrangements, they nonetheless would have an impact on the 
geographic distribution of the country's trade. 
For all tl1ese reasons the share of intra-regional trade in a region's total trade is a very inadequate 
indicator of preferential policy-induced regional trade bias. But there are two ot11er reasons as well, 
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based simply on arithmetic, as to why the intra-regional trade share can be misleading. They have to 
do with the definition of a 'region'. One is that the share is affected by the number of countries in a 
region. To overcome this problem, one might be tempted to suggest defining regions to include a 
similar number of countries. But that raises a second and realtered problem, namely, that the value of 
total trade matters. The problems can be avoided, and determinants of the share of one country's trade 
that goes to another cmmtry or country group can be identified formally, by making use of measures of 
trade intensities. 
'JI'rade intensities 
Iij is the index of intensity of country i's export trade with country (or country group) j: 
where 
* = multiplied by 
Iij = xij I mj 
= xij I ( qj * rj) 
xij =the share of country i's exports going to country j. 
rnj = the share of country j in world imports. 
qj =the share of country j in world GDP. 
rj = the 'relative openness' of country j, defined as j's import-to-GDP ratio divided by the world's 
import-to-GDP ratio. 
This index (and its counterpart for import trade) has the property that if trade is not geographically 
biased in the sense that the share of i's trade going to j equals j's importance in world trade, then it 
will have a value of unity for allj. (Drysdale and Gamaut, 1982). 
The share of developing Asian economies' trade within Asia fell a little with the collapse of the 
Japanese empire in the 1940s, but increased again over the post-war years as the region's share of 
world trade grew. Throughout the period their intra-regional trade intensity has remained high (Table 
4.2), reflecting not only relative proximity in terms of distance and culture but also strong 
complementarity with the more advanced economies of the region, especially Japan. 
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Table 4o2 
Intensity of intra=regional trade index 
1928 1938 1948 
Westem Europe 1.13 1.14 1.21 
North America 2.59 2.91 2.39 
Asia 2.61 2.83 2.74 
Japan 4.17 4.65 4.29 
Australasia 0.97 0.93 1.08 
Developing Asia 2.66 2.96 3.10 
TOTAL WORLD 1.85 1.92 2.43 
Westem Europe includes Yugoslavia and Turkey 
North America refers to Canada and the United States 
Australasia refers to Australia and New Zealand 
1958 1968 
1.38 1.51 
3.07 3.57 
3.15 2.84 
3.28 3.81 
2.00 2.47 
3.56 3.37 
2.65 2.81 
Developing Asia excludes Japan - incorporates NICs and ASEAN countries. 
Source: Calculated from data in:-
United Nations Yearbook oflntemational Trade Statistics (various years). 
The World Banks World Tables {various years). 
1979 
1.57 
3.63 
2.77 
3.08 
3.32 
3.17 
2.64 
1990 
1.60 
3.50 
2.31 
2.33 
2.47 
2.64 
2.62 
There is another indicator that is useful in addition to Iij. It is claimed by supporters of regional 
integration agreements that such agreements often are accompanied by general trade-policy changes 
which raise a country's trade-to-GDP ratio. Thus the establishment of regional integration agreements 
may result in so much net trade creation that, even though the index of intensity of i's trade with other 
regions falls, there is a rise in its propensity to trade outside its own region because of an increase in 
the value of its trade with other regions as a proportion of i's GDP. To capture the combined effect of 
these two changes - in 'openness' and in extra-regional trade intensity the index of the propensity to 
export extra-regionally is defined as: 
Pij = tij I mj 
= ti * Iij 
where 
* = multiplied by 
tij = i's exports to j divided by i's GDP. 
ti =the ratio of i's total exports to i's GDP. 
and similarly for i's imports from j. The aggregate index of the propensity to trade extra-regionally 
can then be defined as the average of the export and import intensities indexes multiplied by the ratio 
of exports plus imports to GDP (and similarly for the aggregate index of the propensity to trade intra-
regionally). (Drysdale and Gamaut, 1982). 
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With the dramatic growth in the share of their GDP that is traded, the index of the Asian economies 
propensity to trade extra-regionally has doubled in the post-war period in the case of North America, 
and has shown a modest rise for Asia, though still below the 1928 level.. (Table 4.3). 
Table 4.3 
Index of propensity to trade extra=regionally 
1928 1938 1948 1958 1968 1979 
Westem Europe 0.30 0.21 0.31 0.26 0.21 0.28 
North America 0.09 0.06 0.09 0.07 0.07 0.15 
Asia 0.21 0.16 0.18 0.18 0.15 0.19 
Japan 0.14 0.10 0.04 0.13 0.12 0.15 
Australasia 0.37 0.31 0.45 0.29 0.23 0.27 
Developing Asia 0.25 0.21 0.18 0.20 0.22 0.30 
TOTAL WORLD 0.21 0.16 0.19 0.16 0.15 0.23 
Table 4.4 
Index of propensity to trade intra=regionally 
1928 1938 1948 
Westem Europe 0.38 0.27 0.90 
North America 0.27 0.22 0.26 
Asia 0.83 0.76 0.67 
Japan 1.37 1.57 0.28 
Australasia 0.39 0.21 0.43 
Developing Asia 0.82 0.72 0.84 
TOTAL WORLD 0.45 0.37 0.54 
Westem Europe includes Yugoslavia and Turkey 
North America refers to Canada and the United States 
Australasia refers to Australia and New Zealand 
1958 1968 
0.46 0.50 
0.29 0.34 
0.83 0.60 
0.53 0.31 
0.57 0.71 
1.07 1.09 
0.57 0.61 
Developing Asia excludes Japan- incorporates NICs and ASEAN countries. 
Source: Calculated from data in:-
United Nations Yearbook oflntemational Trade Statistics (various years). 
The World Banks World Tables (various years). 
1979 
0.75 
0.70 
0.76 
0.55 
1.03 
1.23 
0.91 
1990 
0.23 
0.14 
0.19 
0.13 
0.28 
0.35 
0.21 
1990 
0.73 
0.67 
0.67 
0.42 
0.89 
1.21 
0.88 
The aggregate effect of these changes has been for Asia's indexes of propensity to trade intra-
regionally and extra-regionally to both fluctuate around a flat trend since 1928, (Tables 4.3 and 4.4). 
But note that Asia's propensity to trade eA1ra-regionally is significantly higher today than it was in the 
1960s, and that this increase has occurred despite the deepening integration within Asia via market 
forces- a phenomenon that has been described as 'open regionalism' (Drysdale and Garnaut, 1993). 
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The trade intensity index, developed by Brown (1949) and Kojima (1964) and synthesized by 
Drysdale and Garnaut (1982), provides a useful analytical tool for guaging the relative importance of 
the bilateral trading relationship between countries. The index measures the share of one country's 
trade with another country (or region) as a proportion of the latter's share of world trade. The formula 
is given below, but also has a counterpart for import trade:-
lij = ( xij I xi) I [ Mj/ ( Mw-Mi) ] 
where:-
xij = Singapore's e"rports to country j 
xi = Singapore's total exports to the world 
Mj = Country j's total imports from the world 
Mw = Total world imports 
Mi = Singapore's total imports from the world. 
Outside the ASEAN region it can be seen from Table 4.5 that Singapore trades most intensively with 
Hong Kong as far as its exports are concerned. Apart from Hong Kong the only other countries to 
exhibit high export trade intensities are other ASEAN members, which is explained in part by their 
small share in international trade. However, export trade intensity with respect to Singapore's trade 
within the ASEAN subregion has been declining. 
Singapore's export trade intensity indices with respect to the Asia-Pacific region as a whole have been 
relatively stable, the only exception being for 1990 where figures increased rapidly for all countries 
bar Japan. The general trend with respect to the European countries has also been relatively stable 
although the figures have declined over tl1e period. 
Table 4.5 
Intensity indices of Singaporean exports by destination 
Country 1970 1974 1978 1982 1986 1990 
Indonesia 
Malaysia 49.60 33.06 21.04 26.41 28.19 22.39 
Philippines 0.05 0.19 26.00 3.43 4.15 4.16 
Thailand 9.33 6.05 6.30 8.86 7.72 7.77 
Hong Kong 4.47 7.84 4.72 6.68 4.00 29.89 
Korea 1.14 1.19 1.02 1.14 0.92 10.84 
Japan 1.25 1.47 1.08 1.50 1.37 1.32 
USA 0.86 1.11 0.76 0.90 1.25 14.88 
UK 0.97 0.61 0.37 0.37 0.42 0.42 
Gennany 0.30 0.35 0.24 0.25 0.33 0.38 
France 0.32 0.29 0.21 0.24 0.24 0.27 
Netherlands 0.36 0.40 0.30 0.50 0.42 0.48 
Belgium- 0.13 0.15 0.08 0.13 0.15 0.24 
Luxembourg 
NB. Indonesia does not report its trade with Singapore. 
Source : Calculated from data in IMF Direction of Trade Statistics (various years). 
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Singapore's import trade intensity indices also suggest that it trades intensively with other ASEAN 
countries, especially Malaysia as before (Table 4.6). However, import trade intensity with respect to 
Singapore's trade within the ASEAN subregion has been declining, with no significant increase in the 
indices for any of the other countries. It must be remembered that Singapore historically played the 
role of an 'entrepot' port, therefore not all of its imports from the region are retained for domestic 
conswnption, since a significant proportion of its primary imports from its neighbours is re-exported. 
Singapore's import trade intensity wiU1 other Asian-Pacific countries is not particularly great although 
the indices with regards to the East Asian NICs are significantly above unity, as is the case for Japan 
and Australia. None of the European countries appear to have any significance apart from the United 
Kingdom 1970, 1974, and it too has played a diminishing role over the period along with the other 
European countries. Thus it can be seen that the Asia-Pacific region as a whole appears to be a region 
from which Singapore imports intensively, although, in terms of both imports and exports Singapore 
does appear to switch its attentions away from the ASEAN region. 
Table 4.6 
Intensity indices of Singaporean imports by source 
Country 1970 1974 1978 1982 1986 1990 
Indonesia 
Malaysia 33.37 25.25 15.80 19.72 19.27 19.05 
Philippines 0.93 0.76 1.32 1.27 3.00 2.35 
Thailand 10.10 8.55 6.00 5.16 6.15 4.64 
Hong Kong 3.04 3.24 1.96 1.79 1.40 1.25 
Korea 1.86 1.29 0.81 0.98 1.33 1.28 
Japan 2.95 2.59 1.77 2.24 1.87 2.21 
Australia 2.79 2.05 1.26 1.76 1.55 1.63 
USA 0.75 1.16 0.80 1.06 1.30 1.30 
UK 1.15 1.03 0.50 0.51 0.63 0.54 
Germany 0.29 0.31 0.24 0.31 0.27 0.31 
France 0.19 0.21 0.18 0.36 0.30 0.30 
Netherlands 0.32 0.33 0.17 0.20 0.23 0.21 
Belgium- 0.13 0.19 0.07 0.14 0.14 0.18 
Luxembourg 
NB. Indonesia does not report its trade with Singapore. 
Source: Calculated from data in IMF Direction of Trade Statistics (various years). 
The high trade intensities observed in some cases may be explained by :- the 'match' between the 
export commodity composition and the corresponding commodity composition of the importing 
country, and; the 'special country bias', that is, the trade intensities for the particular commodities 
traded (Drysdale and Garnaut 1982). The so called 'bias' relates to such factors as relative proximity, 
the importance of historical trade linkages, and ease of communication and commercial contact. Thus, 
the high trade intensities of Singapore in tem1s of both exports and imports in its trade with other 
ASEAN countries, may be attributed largely to what has been termed 'special country bias'. The 
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complementarity of resources and factor endowments probably is less important than is often 
assumed, as the 'match' factor is tarnished by the effects of protectionism and other official resistance 
to trade (Anderson 1983). 
126 
Intxa=Regional Trade 
Analysts have repeatedly stressed that the reason why regional economic cooperation in ASEAN is so 
limited is because apart from Singapore, the ASEAN members export primary products to the 
developed world, and in many cases find that they are in competition with one another in the 
international marketplace. Singapore is the exception and, significantly accounted for 4 7% of all 
intra-ASEAN trade in 1990 (Table 4.7). Paradoxically, however, the differences between the 
economic structures and levels of development of the member states also restrict cooperation. For it 
has proved extremely difficult to design and implement schemes for regional economic cooperation 
that will benefit each country equally, and reaching a consensus has often been impossible. 
Table 4.7 
ASEAN trade flows 1990 
EXPORTS (US$ MILLIONS) 
From Indonesia Malaysia Singapore Thailand Philippines 
To 
Indonesia 280 ? 86 25 
Malaysia 184 5332 473 117 
Singapore 1656 4081 1224 221 
Thailand 151 417 2144 123 
Philippines 87 315 519 59 
Total ASEAN 2082 5149 8409 1863 486 
Total Exports 19376 21125 39322 15992 7034 
IMPORTS (US$ MILLIONS) 
To Indonesia Malaysia Singapore Thailand Philippines 
From 
Indonesia 284 ? 172 161 
Malaysia 300 6431 413 247 
Singapore 896 2186 1505 353 
Thailand 96 504 1186 56 
Philippines 36 135 263 190 
TotalASEAN 1329 3110 7992 2448 852 
Total Exports 13489 16567 43869 16292 8662 
NB. Indonesia does not report its trade with Singapore. 
Source: IMF Directorate of Trade Statistics, (Far East and Australasia). 
Industrial specialisation and complementation in ASEAN must be according to comparative 
advantage. Factor endowments suggest that, 'a priori', Singapore's regional comparative advantage 
lies in relatively skill-intensive and higher technology industries, while the comparative advantage of 
the other ASEAN countries lie, in varying degrees, in resource-oriented basic industries and 
processing industries as well as labour-intensive industries. Differences in the level of industrial 
development and factor endowment between Singapore and the rest of ASEAN has facilitated the 
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regional division of labour. Singapore functions today as a regional pole for development, distributing 
to its neighbours low-priced equipment, products and services and, in addition, transfers of finance 
and know-how which thus multiply intra-regional and extemal interdependence. This division of 
labour, of which the industrialisation of Johore and Batam are good examples, is not mrilateral. 
Owing to its size and limited resources, Singapore has neither the capacity nor the ambition to 
develop on its territory the complete network of modem industry. Its neighbours are not restricted to 
second-rate production. Reciprocally, these cmmtries, which command only limited industrial and 
financial capital, ca1111ot fail to benefit from the presence on their doorstep of a concentration of 
industrial and technical facilities to be used for their own efforts at economic diversification. 
The commodity producers in ASEAN will be exporting increasingly resource-intensive manufactures 
rather than commodities in primary form. Tllis scenario suggests that intra-regional trade in the Asia-
Pacific will be increasingly characterised by intra-industry trade rather than inter-industry trade in the 
twenty first century. 
The process of de-industrialisation in Japan and t11e other developed countries in t11e region, leading 
to a relative decline of manufacturing and an expansion of the services sector, would only serve to 
complement industrial deepening in the developing countries of the region. A major contributor to the 
dynamism of the region would be the youthfulness of the population in the westem corridor of the 
Pacific Basin. 
Chart 4.1, shows the intra regional trade in East Asia and Australasia. The ASEAN members do not, 
in fact, have a compelling reason to put internal trade links before their external interests. More than 
80% of ASEAN exports went to non ASEAN countries in 1990, as the Chart shows. Moreover if 
Singapore, which re-exports many of its imports, is excluded, the share of intra-ASEAN exports in 
total exports falls to just 4.6%, against 61% for the intra-regional trade of EC members, highlighting 
Singapore's importance. 
What is interesting is the small proportion of intra-ASEAN trade, since the ASEAN economies are 
the only ones in Asia which give each other trade preferences. The failure of the preferential trade 
arrangement to generate more intra-ASEAN trade is, however, probably a blessing in disguise. The 
largest of the ASEAN countries (Indonesia, the Philippines and Thailand) have built up sizeable 
industrial sectors much of wllich is sheltered from international competition and not particularly 
efficient. 
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Chart. 4.1 
Int.ra=regional trade in East. Asia and Australasia 
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The traditional Heckscher-Ohlin model can be used to explain why certain countries, such as 
Singapore have a comparative advantage in the provision of services connected with entrepot and re-
export trade. Singapore lies along major sea routes, near great populated areas and has natural 
harbour faci Iities with an abundant supply of labour required for the provision of these services. 
The goods processed in entrepot and re-export trade are not transformed sufficiently to warrant 
statistical reclassification between importation and exportation. Thus intra-industry trade is observed. 
It might be noted though, that many countries present separate statistics on 'normal' trade and 
entrepot and re-export trade. In general, however, these two special trade categories are relatively 
small and collections of international trade statistics by supranational organisations such as the OECD 
or IMF present only consolidated overall trade data. 
A large proportion of tl1e intra-ASEAN trade (about two thirds) is simply bilateral, ie between 
Singapore and Malaysia. Such empirical evidence is often cited by critics to show tltat ASEAN 
economic cooperation lacks substance. It is very wrong to jump to such conclusions on the basis of tl1e 
intra-regional trade figures for two entirely unrelated reasons. For one thing, the official trade 
statistics understate the actual intra-ASEAN trade flows, since they do not include the large vohlllle of 
illegal trade transactions that take place within tl1e region. It is an open secret tllat the illegal trade 
traffic is heavy, especially between Singapore and its neighbouring islands. Sumatra (Indonesia) and 
Mindanao (the Philippines), in particular, have strong and well organised bases for smuggling 
activities. For another, intra-regional trade, no matter how well documented, provides only a partial 
picture of a very complex phenomenon. 
It is not difficult to explain why intra-regional trade within ASEAN has been relatively small. 
ASEAN countries' factor and resource endowments are somewhat similar and they have been 
producing goods, both primary commodities and manufactures, that are very similar, if not identical. 
Put another way, the ASEAN economies find that tl1ey are in competition with one anotl1er in tl1e 
international market place as mentioned earlier. It is the economy of Singapore which seems to 
account for the new ties of complementarity. Tlms the growth in intra-regional trade, at present, is 
largely down to Singapore as it functions as a regional pole for development, distributing to its 
neighbours low-priced equipment, products and services and, in addition, transfers of finance and 
know-how which thus multiply intra-regional and external interdependence. Under these 
circumstances, any attempt to increase intra-regional trade through discriminatory tariff reductions 
would probably result in substantial trade diversion, shifting the sources of imports from the low cost 
third countries to high cost partners. Trade creation effects are likely to be weak, since the cost 
differentials among members presmnably are not large enough to cause a shift from a higher cost 
domestic source to a low cost partner source. ASEAN countries would have been worse off, had they 
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gone all out to increase their intra-regional trade through discriminatory trade measures. It can 
therefore be argued that the low volume of intra-ASEAN trade is not a bad thing after all. 
The interdependencies among various ASEAN partners should be seen as mutually beneficial even 
though it is difficult in practice to ensure absolutely equitable welfare gains. Even if one ASEAN 
country does gain more relative to another, this should not be exploited as a nationalistic, emotive 
issue which may argue for less rather than more trade linkages. As interdependencies increase with 
time, greater coordination of policies will in fact be needed to ensure that the impulses transmitted 
through trade are fully exploited instead of weakened by jealousies and physical and mental blocks. 
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ASEAN Economic Cooperation 
While the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) was founded in response to the threat of 
conuumtist expansion in Indochina, accords on greater economic cooperation have often been spurred 
by political considerations. Advocates of greater economic cooperation stress the dynamic gains that 
would be achieved through greater econontic cooperation, and they have criticised the relatively slow 
pace of intra-regional cooperation without fully understanding the political motivations and 
constraints. Pessimists argue that greater econontic integration is either politically unrealistic or 
undesirable because of the discriminatory nature implied by an 'ASEAN trade bloc'. In any event, as 
the regional political situation stabilises, the policy agenda will increasingly focus on econontic issues. 
In many ways, ASEAN is at a watershed. Indeed a common strategy on domestic econontic policy 
may be a prerequisite to enhancing regional cooperation that will facilitate intra-ASEAN trade and 
investment liberalisation in the future. 
The greater internationalisation of the ASEAN economies has rendered them more sensitive to 
changes in international economic policies and trends. Concerns about rising protectionism in 
developed countries, the increase in bilateral trading blocs and the GATT talks, have important 
implications for the econontic growth prospects of ASEAN. 
'International economic integration' describes both a state of affairs and a process. As a state, it refers 
to a fusion of formerly separate national econonties. More usefully, as a process it signifies the gradual 
eli1nination of econontic frontiers between countries, an 'econonlic frontier' being 'any demarcation 
over which mobilities of goods, services and factors of production are relatively low' (Pelkmans, 
1984). In one sense integration is a global phenomenon, as the network of international trade and 
foreign direct investment intensifies, encouraged by the multilateral agencies like the GATT and 
spearheaded by the activities of multinational corporations (MNCs). In this chapter, however, 
international econontic integration is more narrowly defined as the attempt by the ASEAN country 
governments to link together the econonties of the five countries (Brunei has been excluded as already 
mentioned). 
The theoretical rationale behind regional econontic integration is the notion in trade theory that a 
partial move towards freer trade improves welfare among the member nations. The removal or 
reduction of tariffs among the member countries should improve resource allocation and expand 
markets. Dismantling econ01nic frontiers like tariffs and immigration controls has the general 
econontic aim of raising living standards in the participating countries, but a political purpose of 
fostering peaceful relations among the participants may also be important, especially as in the case of 
ASEAN. In addition, tl1ere is a greater scope for improved efficiency if the countries produce similar 
products. Thus, whether integration is only beginning, such as in the case of a free trade area, or will 
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move along higher fonns, (for example, a customs union, a common market, or an economic union), 
freer trade will be beneficial. 
However, the so called types of economic integration are appropriate only for the textbook exposition 
purposes since they do not represent ant single actual scheme. Even at the simple 'sectoral' level a 
degree of coordination and a tninimum provision of certain institutional arrangements are needed to 
ensure proper and smooth functioning. Also at the 'free trade area' level some administrative 
mechanism has to be incorporated to ensure the proper carrying out of 'rules of origin' in order to 
eliminate trade deflection. Hence cooperation in general and coordination of certain policies in 
particular are not matters strictly confined to 'economic tmions' and higher levels of integration (El-
Agraa, 1982). 
Despite the inability of the theoretical literature to resolve fully whether or not regional integration 
arrangements can be welfare improving, it remains the case that such preferential arrangements have 
been present in the global trading system since GAIT's formation in 1947. Indeed they have a long 
history, being part of tl1e colonial trading systems and the large-power d01ninated trading systems of 
the late nineteenth century that continued through into the first part of the twentieth century. 
The key regional integration arrangements that have entered the global trading system over tl1e post-
war years include the formation of the European Economic Community in 1957, tl1e subsequent 
formation in 1960 of the European Free Trade Association (EFT A), bilateral arrangements between 
tl1e United States and Canada under tl1e Auto Pact of 1965 and tl1e 1988 Canada-US Free Trade 
Agreement, and more recently other initiatives including EC enlargement, an EC/EFT A negotiation 
to form EEA, Canada-US-Mexico negotiations to form NAFT A, and otllers (Anderson and 
Blackhurst, 1993). 
A large number of regional integration arrangements between other countries besides tl1e US and tl1e 
EC have also emerged. They include the Latin America Free Trade Association (LAFT A) of 1960, the 
Central American Common Market (CACM) of 1961, and the East African Common Market 
(EACM) of the same period. More recent examples are the Chile-Mexico Bilateral Trade Agreement 
concluded in 1991, and the 1992 Chile-Venezuela bilateral arrangement. In UNCTAD a negotiation 
on trade preferences among developing countries, the global system of trade preferences (GSTP), 
continues (UNCTAD, 1988; Hudec, 1989). These have attracted less attention than the large-power 
arrangements because the trade covered by them has been relatively small. 
While many (or most) of these smaller-country agreements have subsequently broken down, they 
serve to emphasise the point that, despite the GATT, post-war regional integration arrangements have 
been a central feature in the development and evolution of the global trading system, rather than an 
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exception. Indeed, Japan remains the only major industrialised country that is not currently a 
participant in some form of explicit regional integration arrangement. And even Japan now has an 
informal investment and trade arrangement with the ASEAN countries, and may be poised to move 
further in a regional direction in the 1990s (Anderson and Blackhurst, 1993). 
The global experience of economic integration has clearly demonstrated tl1e case with which negative 
integration can be achieved and the difficulties involved in making progress, if at all, in tenus of 
positive integration. Tlus should not be surprising, however, since the dismantling of tariff barriers 
and import quota restrictions is easy, particularly in a world where these have been gradually reduced 
through multilateral negotiations (GATT and the GSP) whereby certain industrial exports by 
developing nations are granted preferential treatment in certain advanced countries. Positive 
integration, on the other hand, is mainly about non-tariff barriers and here harmonisation is of 
paramount importance. However, harmonisation is a positive act which requires not only concerted 
action but also, in a number of areas, a certain degree of political commitment with implications for 
the sensitive issue of sovereignty as, for example, is the case in fiscal harmonisation, monetary 
integration and t11e coordination of employment policies (El-Agraa, 1982). 
Viner (1950) distinguishes between two effects, one in which trade between partner countries 
expands in accordance with international comparative advantage, and the other in which trade 
between cmmtries expands as a result of the preferential treatment given to imports from within the 
region as compared to those from the rest of the world. The former effect he named 'trade creation', 
the substitution of imports of lower-cost goods produced by a country's partner for its own domestic 
products, and tl1e latter he called 'trade diversion', the slllft in imports from tl1e least-cost exporter to 
tl1e more expensive product from the nation's partners. 
But while this categorisation is a useful description of the effects of customs-liDion formation, it is 
inappropriate as a basis for measuring tl1e welfare effects of a regional integration agreement. From a 
global standpoint, trade diversion represents a shift in the trade pattern counter to comparative 
advantage; but tl1e importing country may benefit from trade diversion as domestic prices of goods 
fall. This may offset any losses in tariff revenues from the switch in the trade pattern. Thus the 
induced changes in t11e pattern of trade are not reliable predictors of the welfare consequences of 
regional free trade from the point of view of individual countries participating in such schemes 
(Greenaway and Winters, 1994). 
An analysis by Kemp and Wan (1976) shows tlmt a new regional integration arrangement will not 
worsen welfare in the rest of the world's economies so long as the volume (not necessarily the share) 
of its trade with the regional integration arrangement countries does not fall, ceteris paribus. But, to 
be welfare improving for tl1e economies witllln the regional integration arrangement, the volume of 
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intra-regional trade must increase following the formation of the regional integration arrangement. 
Thus it is quite conceivable for both trade volumes to rise, improving welfare for those inside and 
those outside the regional integration arrangement, but for the latter vohnne to rise faster than the 
former - in which case the intra-area trade rises and the extra-regional share falls. Despite this insight 
from received economic theory, levels of protection and extra-regional trade shares continue to be 
used to make claims about the welfare effects of regional integration arrangements, pending the 
development of altemative simple-to-calculate indicators. 
It has been claimed that the body of economic integration theory as so far developed has no relevance 
for the Third World. This is due to the fact that the theory suggested that there would be more scope 
for trade creation if the countries concemed were initially very competitive in production but 
potentially very complementary and that a customs union would be more likely to be trade creating if 
the partners conducted most of their foreign trade amongst themselves (see Lipsey, 1960 and Meade, 
1955). These conditions are unlikely to be satisfied in the majority of the developing nations. 
Moreover, most of the effects of integration are initially bound to be trade diverting, particularly since 
most of the Third World seeks to industrialise. 
On the other hand, it was also realised that an important obstacle to the development of industry in 
these countries is the inadequate size of their individual markets (see Brown, 1961; Hazlewood, 197 5 
and Robson, 1980). It is therefore necessary to increase the market size so as to encourage optimum 
plant installations - hence the need for economic integration. This would, however, result in industries 
clustering together in the relatively more advanced of these nations - those that have already 
commenced the process of industrialisation. 
El-Agraa (1979) demonstrated that there is essentially no theoretical difference between economic 
integration in the Advanced World and the Third World but that there is a major difference in terms 
of the type of economic integration that is politically feasible: the need for an equitable distribution of 
the gains from industrialisation and the location of industries is an important issue. This suggests that 
any type of economic integration that is being contemplated must incorporate as an essential element 
a common fiscal authority and some coordination of economic policies. But then one could equally 
well argue that some degree of these elements is necessary in any type of integration. 
It must, however, be remembered that the tenn economic integration does not seem to mean the same 
thing for every type of scheme in existence. In advanced Westem economies integration is about 
resource reallocation as detemtined by the law of comparative advantage defined basically in a static 
sense. For developing countries economic integration is about promoting or enhancing economic 
development and is advanced basically in terms of a dynamic infant-industry argument. In the former 
socialist countries of Eastem Europe, integration was about production planning and plant location 
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also defined in a context of dynamic development. It is probably somewhat muair to suggest that 
advanced Westem economies are preoccupied with the static resource reallocation effects of 
integration since they do in fact recognise the dynamic effects and hope to achieve them. However, 
their predominant behaviour seems to be in contradiction to this recognition. For instance, most of the 
publicised discussion regarding the EC is conducted in terms of possible trade creation which is 
basically about replacing a participating nation's own e::\.'})ensive production by cheaper imports from a 
partner (El-Agraa, 1982). 
Theoretical literature on regional integration agreements has tended to focus on geographically 
discriminatory tariff-based arrangements of the customs union type, rather than the range of 
discriminatory arrangements actually used in regional integration agreements around the world. 
Discussion of the welfare and trade effects of customs unions has been one of the staples of trade 
theorists over the post-war years, from Viner (1950), through Meade (1955) and Lipsey (1957) to 
Wonnacott and Wonnacott (1981), and Wooton (1986). 
In a competitive world, a global Pareto-optimal allocation is achieved when there is a free trade 
between countries. While a move away from a tariff-free world will reduce aggregate world product, 
country welfare will increase for a non-small open economy if it imposes a small tariff. But as 
Scitovsky (1941) and Johnson (1953) showed, such beggar-thy-neighbour policies may induce 
retaliation by the country's trading partners, resulting in a world economy characterised by distortions 
and inefficient production. 
While a multilateral agreement achieving complete trade liberalisation in all countries would restore 
the world economy to a Pareto optimum, it may not be possible to achieve this for a number of 
reasons. The costs of negotiating with other countries may be too high, or an individual country may 
simply be better off in the tariff-ridden equilibrium compared to global free trade. While that country 
may be induced to join a multilateral agreement through transfers from other countries, it is typically 
difficult to reach agreement as to the appropriate level of compensation to be paid and which countries 
should pay it. 
The question then arises as to whether a subset of countries would benefit from an altemative regional 
integration agreement. If there are relatively few countries involved, it may be easier to reach an 
agreement. Because comparisons between second-best situations are involved, in general it is not 
possible to make a policy-ranking across the various potential trade agreements available. Although a 
regional integration agreement is not the first-best for the world, as trade impediments between the 
region and the rest of the world remain, it may still be optimal policy for the countries in the region. 
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For a country to enter a regional integration agreement, it must be the case that the effects of its 
partners removing their trade barriers to its exports are sufficiently large to offset any loss from the 
concessions that it makes to them (W01macott and Wonnacott, 1981; Kowalczyk, 1992). As in 
multilateral trade liberalisation this cannot generally be guaranteed, but, as fewer countries are 
involved in the agreement, it may be easier for them to come to some agreement as to tl1e 
international transfers that are made to ensure that all of tl1e partners in the regional integration 
agreement do indeed benefit. With such a transfer mechanism in place, it is possible for any arbitrary 
grouping of countries to benefit from establishing a regional accord. Thus countries can gain from 
forming preferential trading agreements, and such benefits need not be at the expense of the rest of 
the world. 
A regional integration agreement will benefit its members only if the volume of intra-regional trade 
increases. Thus, if trade with tile rest of the world were held constant (as in the Kemp and Wan case), 
a Pareto-improving regional integration agreement area would involve an increase in intra-regional 
trade relative to inter-regional trade. Consequently, an observation that world trade was becoming 
relatively more 'regional' need not, in itself, indicate any harm (in a welfare sense) to the global 
economy. 
Of more concern is the case when the level of trade between the region and the rest of the world falls. 
Consequently, gains for the region are at the expense of other regions. This may be purely the result of 
liberalisation of intra-regional trade, whereby trade is diverted by the discriminatory nature of tariffs. 
It may also be a reflection of the increased shared market power of tl1e com1tries in the region. These 
terms-of-trade effects are stronger the larger the size and number of countries participating in the 
regional integration agreement. They may choose to e:\.-ploit this monopoly power in trade by 
increasing their external trade barriers relative to those that tl1ey had imposed unilaterally. 
Theory is unable to provide any simple rules as to the suitability on welfare grounds of particular 
cmmtries as partners in a regional integration agreement, as several (sometimes conflicting) 
economic, as well as non-economic, forces apply. An argument can be made for a country joining its 
principal trading partner in a free trade agreement, as this reinforces the pattern of comparative 
advantage and provides a 'safe haven' in the face of a potential tide of protectionism. But cow1tries 
with similar production and export characteristics might also choose a trading agreement in order to 
operate as an international cartel. Yet another possibility is that countries with similar import 
preferences might join forces in order to increase their joint monopsony power with respect to tile rest 
of the world. 
When the member countries of ASEAN are seen in this regard, it is inunediately apparent that the 
countries are not homogeneous economies. Singapore has virtually no agriculture sector to speak of 
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and very limited am01mts of natural resources. Indonesia is a fairly large com1try with a size-able 
domestic market which enables it to reap economies of scale. In te1ms of trade barriers, Singapore has 
lower tariff walls than the other four countries. 
The differing levels and paces of development among the ASEAN countries and the disparities in 
their protective structures and geographic sizes indicate that integration benefits may not accme 
unifonnly across the countries. Differences in their production structures also suggest that the benefits 
and efficiencies that can be captured from greater integration will differ. These problems do not just 
apply to the ASEAN countries, for example the EC countries do not have the advantage of close 
geographical proximity and have also suffered from political problems as well as being of varying 
sizes and at different stages of development. 
What this implies is that under an integration set-up, whereby the ASEAN countries reduce their 
protective walls against each other and at the same time retain their individual protection against the 
rest of the world, the benefits to each member country would not be the same geographically or 
temporally. In particular, com1tries that have a high level of protection in the first place may benefit 
more (or earlier) than those with a lower level of protection for example, Indonesia versus Singapore. 
Furthermore, liberalisation may not be deemed economically efficient in the longer term for infant 
industries that require protection in the initial stages until economies of scale are allowed to operate. 
That is, there is a trade off in the sense that protection can lead to improved efficiency in the long run 
owing to market size. Thus, integration left to itself may not yield a practical and acceptable result. 
However, this does not mean that ASEAN attaches no value to integration. Indeed, schemes were put 
in motion more than a decade ago precisely to begin reducing barriers to intra-ASEAN trade. The 
countries drew up schedules of products whose existing tariff structures would be gradually reduced. 
In addition to these measures, specific economic cooperation agreements were entered into to promote 
economic interaction in ASEAN. 
Of the policies which have f01md to have a significant effect on economic performance, trade policies 
are among the more important. Unfortunately, there is no accurate measure of the restrictiveness of 
trade policies because of the prevalence of non-tariff trade barriers which defy measurement. Tariff 
rates, although an incomplete indicator, both because they constitute an important barrier to trade in 
their own right and because it is often the case that countries with higher than average tariff rates, 
also impose more quantitative restrictions on trade. 
During the 1980s trade was liberalised in most of the Asian economies to some degree. Singapore 
was, of course, already virtually a free trade economy. Of the other ASEAN economies Malaysia has 
been the most open, with lower levels of protection and greater reliance on free-trade zones to 
promote manufactured exports and attract foreign direct investment. Thailand and the Philippines 
138 
have a strong legacy of import-substitution industrialisation, though in recent years both have 
undertaken to liberalise imports and to promote manufactured eli.'])Orts. In 1980 Thailand embarked on 
a course of structural adjustment, combining fiscal retrenchment with vigorous export promotion and 
achieved considerable success. The volume of Thai manufactured exports grew at 25% per annum 
from 1980 to 1988 and rose as a share of total merchandise exports, from 22% in 1980 to 55% in 
1988. Import 1iberalisation, however, has progressed more slowly. The Philippines, on the other hand, 
launched a more ambitious program of trade liberalisation in the 1980s, with a tariff reforn1 in the 
early 1980s and substantial reduction in quantitative restrictions in the mid 1980s. 
Indonesia probably accomplished more trade liberalisation in the 1980s than any of the other ASEAN 
economies, both because its policy objectives were more ambitious and because its initial level of 
protection was higher than in the other economies. In 1985 the government announced across-the-
board reductions in nominal tariffs and introduced a package of measures to provide inputs to 
exporters at international prices. A year later the government announced its intention to remove 
quantitative restrictions altogether. Under this policy the overall value of imports subject to controls 
fell from 43% in mid 1986 to 21% in December 1988. 
The ell.']lerience of ASEAN in economic integration and cooperation has been visible on at least two 
fronts: Firstly in the form of direct governmental arrangements to address specific economic 
problems, and secondly, tlrrough influencing trade direction by altering the tariff structures of 
privately traded goods. ASEAN provides a number of mechanisms for economic cooperation. Thus 
far, economic cooperation among t11e ASEAN governments include a food security reserve system t11at 
provides an emergency rice reserve, joint programs for eradication of foot and mouth disease, and a 
training institute in the area of agriculture. There is an ASEAN Swap Arrangement that provides for 
US$299 million in standby credit for members with balance of payments problems. ASEAN also 
expresses a common stance on international economic issues with regards to t11e multilateral 
negotiations under the auspices of GATT, the European Community (EC), and other international 
commodity agreements. 
In industrial cooperation, ASEAN governments are not short on mechanisms of resource pooling or 
market sharing. Several upstream projects have been agreed upon, and in some cases have already 
begun in the different countries. Examples include a fertiliser project in Indonesia, a rock salt-soda 
ash project in Thailand, and a superphosphate project in the Philippines. However, apart from the 
visible hand of t11e government in the implementation of these projects, several problems were 
encountered. For example, under the program on ASEAN Industrial Complementation (AIC}, the 
development of an automotive industry in ASEAN encountered difficulty in product identification and 
country allocation since government participated in manufacturing location decisions. Consequently, 
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industrial cooperation under these programs were not generally successful in accomplishing the 
program's goals (Far Eastern Economic Review, 1982). 
It is perhaps in the area of trade liberalisation, or in influencing trade direction, that the greatest 
achievements and potential of economic integration in ASEAN can be seen. The major mechanism in 
ASEAN for promoting economic integration is the Preferential Trading Arrangements (PTA). The 
Agreement on ASEAN Preferential Trading Arrangements was signed in Manila on Feb 24, 1977. 
The stated aim of the PTA was to encourage greater intra-regional trade through the use of long tenn 
quantity contracts, preferential terms for financing imports, preferential treatment of imports by 
govenm1ent agencies, preferential tariff rates, and the liberalisation of non-tariff barriers to regional 
trade. The agreement also allowed for temporary suspension of tariff cuts where local industries or 
foreign exchange reserves were seriously affected, and made special supplementary arrangements for 
the inclusion of products arising from industrial complementation schemes (ASEAN Economic 
Bulletin, 1986). 
The main instnunent for trade liberalisation U1at has been applied to date is the granting of tariff 
preferences to ASEAN member countries. In the initial stages of the scheme, tariff preferences were 
granted on a product-by-product basis, with each member country committed to offer a set number of 
tariff preferences each year. Tariff preferences took the fom1 either of not increasing tariff levels for a 
five year period (especially when the existing tariff rate was already zero), or an actual reduction in 
existing tariff rates. At first tariff cuts were of the order of 10% but later, tariff cuts of up to 25% were 
made (Singapore Department of Trade, 1981). 
To ensure that intra-regional trade would benefit ASEAN countries, various rules of origin were 
implemented. These specified that products eligible for inclusion under the PTA have to be either 
products wholly produced or obtained in ASEAN countries; or products whose non-ASEAN content 
did not exceed 50% in value, and whose final stage of manufacture was performed in ASEAN 
countries. There was also a cumulative rule of origin which specified that products which used 
imported inputs which were themselves subject to preferential tariffs must have an aggregate ASEAN 
content of not less than 60% by value. 
The product-by-product approach to tariff reduction was a time consuming exercise as each product 
had to be discussed and examined closely before tariff preferences could be agreed upon. Moreover, 
the conmtitrnent to offer a set number of new tariff preferences each year led to what only can be 
described as 'padding' of the number of items included in the lists of products in the scheme. The end 
result was a proliferation of the number of items which were granted tariff preferences, without much 
prospect of achieving a significant effect on the expansion of intra-regional trade. Many of the items 
included in the scheme were not traded by the member countries. For some product categories, up to 
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two thirds of the items granted preferential tariffs by some countries were not actually traded by them. 
Thus, the frequent mmouncements of an ever increasing list of items included under the PTA gave an 
illusion of progress in the liberalisation of intra-regional trade. What started out as a serious attempt 
to stimulate trade between the ASEAN countries soon began to look more and more like a public 
relations exercise. 
At the same time as the product-by-product approach to tariff reductions was in progress, some 
ASEAN member countries were undertaking bilateral negotiations for across-the-board tariff 
reductions. Early in 1977, Singapore and the Philippines (Thailand was later included) agreed on a 
10% reduction in tariffs on conm1odities traded. By 1980, all ASEAN com1tries had joined in across-
the-board tariff reductions. Initially, a 20% tariff cut was agreed upon for all imports which had a 
value of less than US$50,000 each in 1978. This ceiling was later raised to US$500,000 and then to 
US$1 million (Lutkenhorst, 1984). 
The speed at which across-the-board tariff reductions were embraced by the ASEAN com1tries is a 
reflection of the less tiresome negotiations these involved, compared with the product-by-product 
approach. However, across-the-board tariff reduction had the danger of including items which were 
'sensitive', in the sense that reduced tariffs on these items might adversely affect certain industries in 
member countries. In order to guard against tllis, the scheme allowed for tl1e exclusion of certain 
sensitive items, and provided for the suspension of preferential tariffs where they threaten 'serious 
injury' to domestic industries, or adversely affect the balance of payments. 
All empirical studies on tlle likely impact of tl1e PTA scheme on intra-regional trade confirm that the 
effects of tariff cuts would be minimal. Armas ( 1978) concluded that a I 0% across-tlle-board tariff cut 
on Philippine imports from ASEAN countries was likely to increase Filipino intra-ASEAN imports by 
only 2.5%. Arkasanee and Koomsup (1979), in their estimate of tlle effects of tariff cuts on six Thai 
imports from ASEAN countries in tl1e first batch of items agreed upon under the PTA, concluded that 
tlle effect was 'very small, ranging from 0.06% to 22.2%'. 
In general, past ASEAN experience indicates that ASEAN has failed to capture completely what 
theory argues to be the potential benefits of integration. Several reasons can be offered to explain tlus. 
First, tl1e institution of the PTA, while meaningful, was not systematic in nature. That is, the 
arrangement was set up so that each member government independently decided on tlle list of items to 
be included. Moreover, tl1e extent of the preferences for each individual item was not drawn up jointly 
among all members. Second, there was no clear long term scenario envisioned for tlle ASEAN 
economic front. And third, the explicit economic cooperation efforts were donlinated by government 
intervention a11d did not actively promote private sector contribution and cooperation. Nevertheless, 
tills does not mean there were no real acluevements to speak of. If anything, work among ASEAN 
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economic committees and discussions and exchange between bureaucrats did help to break down the 
barriers. Indeed, this experience paved the way for the introduction of bold initiatives and a more 
dynamic vision for ASEAN. 
The economic proposals that were approved at the ASEAN Summit (Institute of Southeast Asian 
Studies, 1989) were formulated by the countries' economic officials. The proposals were drawn from 
an array of schemes that were suggested by the private sector, ASEAN business groups, and studies 
commissioned by the different ASEAN economic committees. 
The proposals ranged from the formation of a customs union to across-the-board increases in the 
minimum margin of preference for non-agricultural traded products. In the Institute for Southeast 
Asian Studies Colloquium, a hybrid system that recognises the existence of varying tariff structures 
inherent in the ASEAN cow1tries and the differing levels of development among the ASEAN 
members, has been proposed. Under tllis system, a customs union may be formed among the four 
countries of Indonesia, Malaysia, tl1e Philippines and Thailand, and a free trade area would link the 
rnlion with Singapore (and BrUilei). By reducing tariffs among the four countries toward some average 
figure (eg Malaysia), intra-ASEAN trade would be promoted. Since the common tariffs would mean a 
general reduction for the high tariff coWltries {Indonesia, t11e Philippines and Thailand), trade 
diversion can be reduced. On t11e other hand, free trade arrangements witl1 Singapore {and BrUilei) 
would likewise reduce trade diversion in as much as botl1 countries would maintain tl1eir respective 
tariff levels (Crouch, 1984 ). 
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Quantitative Estimation of Integration Effects 
The theory of economic integration has two rather separate strands. On the one hand there is what can 
be described as customs tmion theory developing through the work of Viner (1950), Meade (1955), 
Lipsey (1957), Johnson (1965) and many others while on the other there are the works of Balassa 
(1963) and El-Agraa (1980), developing aspects of integration beyond those purely relating to trade. 
Quantitative studies of integration arrangements have been concerned with measuring the extent to 
which the constituent economies are integrated (eg by comparing the prices of goods or factors across 
countries) and, more extensively, with assessing the effect of integration on such variables as the trade 
patterns of member cmmtries. The purpose of the latter kind of study is to gauge the impact of 
integration on the income and welfare of the member countries, a particularly important consideration 
given the inability of customs union theory to provide generalisations on the welfare consequences of 
union. Much effort has been expended on quantification studies, but it has to be admitted that they 
have thrown only a dim light on to the economic effects of integration. 
Customs muons and free trade areas are usually conceived of as involving merely the progressive 
removal of tariffs between partner countries and, in the former case, the forming of a common 
external tariff with respect to the rest of the world. The removal of quotas and other barriers to trade 
are usually subsumed within the tariff changes for the purpose of estimation. These tariff changes are 
thought to result in a series of relative price changes. The price of imports from partner countries 
falls, for commodities where the tariff is cut, relative to the price of the same commodity produced in 
the domestic country. In tlurd countries which are excluded from the tmion relative prices may change 
for more than one reason. They will change differently if t11e tariff witl1 respect to third countries is 
shifted from its pre-integration level or it may change if producers in tlurd countries have different 
pricing reactions to tl1e change in price competition. Some third country producers may decide to 
absorb rather more of the potential change by reducing profits rather than by increasing prices 
relatively compared with domestic producers. Relative prices are also likely to change witl1 respect to 
different commodities and hence there is a complex set of interrelated income and substitution effects 
to be explained. 
The immediate difficulty is thus the translation of tariff changes and other agreed measures in the 
customs union treaty into changes in prices and other variables which are known to have an impact on 
economic behaviour. Such evidence as t11ere is suggests tl1at there are wide discrepancies among the 
reactions of importers benefiting from tariff cuts and also among competitors adversely affected by 
them (EFT A, 1968) and that reactions of trade to tariff changes are different from tl1ose to price 
changes (Kreinin, 1961). Two routes would appear to be open, one is to estimate the effect of tariff 
changes on prices and then estimate the effects of these derived price changes on trade patterns and 
tl1e other is to operate directly witl1 observed relative price movements. This latter course exemplifies 
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a problem which runs right through the estimation of the effects of economic integration and makes 
the obtaining of generally satisfactory results almost impossible. It is that to measure the effect of 
integration one must decide what would have happened if integration had not occurred. Thus, if in the 
present instance any observed change in relative prices were assumed to be the result of the 
adjustment to tariff changes, all other sources of variation in prices would be ignored, which is clearly 
an exaggeration and could be subject to important biases if other factors were affecting trade at the 
smne time. 
As the barriers to the movement of goods, services and factors between the members of an integration 
scheme are dismantled, theory suggests that there will be an intensification of trade between the 
economies, permitting greater specialisation. In the neo-classical model this should lead to an 
equalisation of prices net of transport costs m1d taxes, and a convergence of wage and interest rates. 
However, even in tl1e EC, the most advanced example of regional integration, the evidence for this is 
weak. 
"A study by Glejser {1972) found, for example, that for a sample of thirty six consumer goods, only 
twenty one showed a narrowing of price differences among the member countries of the original EEC 
between 1958 and 1970 when tariffs and otl1er barriers were being removed. There are, of course, 
great difficulties in comparing prices across countries because of differences in consumption patterns, 
quality etc., and indeed considerable variations in prices occur within countries (Cecchini, 1988). 
Nevertheless, surveys by the European Commission show an impressively wide dispersion of prices 
among member countries, with or without indirect taxes." (Greenaway and Winters, 1994- page 252). 
Given that a country's trading performance depends upon a constellation of influences which are also 
interdependent, measuring the impact of integration on trade flows is a considerable task made more 
difficult by the substantial data requirements. Consequently, much of the earlier work on qum1tifying 
tile trade effects of integration - particularly tile impact of EC formation - has adopted t11e more 
limited approach of concentrating on the relationship between trade and one or a few key variables 
which are supposed to influence its development. As data for the ASEAN countries is limited for the 
period 1967-1985, or in most cases unreliable, a simplified approach of measuring the impact of 
integration has also been adopted in the present study. Residual models have the common 
characteristic that they seek to quantify tl1e hypotl1etical situation {often referred to as tile anti-monde) 
of what would have happened had the trading agreement not been implemented. As with any such 
hypothetical circumstance there is no means of testing its validity other thm1 the plausibility of tl1e 
results and the behaviour of tl1e model in different observable situations. There is a danger that the so-
called integration effect is also picking up the effect of otl1er factors such as multilateral trade 
liberalisation or the removal of exchange controls {Greenaway and Winters, 1994). 
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There is a strong tendency to concentrate on explanatory variables drawn from the importing country 
alone as this considerably reduces the complexity of data collection. The concern here is to establish 
whether the gains from convenience are outweighed by the loss of accuracy. The form of argument 
which is used is that imports would have increased over time without the trading agreement at exactly 
the same rate as they did before tl1e agreement came into effect. Clearly such trend extrapolation will 
have severe drawbacks for a cyclical activity like international trade, so authors such as Walter (1967) 
and Clavaux ( 1969) have asstmled that imports will retain the same linear relation to total 
expenditure, GDP and GNP respectively in t11e anti-monde as they did in the pre-integration period. 
These studies, as pointed out by Williamson and Bottrill (1971), make the thoroughly unlikely 
assumption that the marginal propensity to import remains constant, whereas the evidence points to it 
rising with income. Further, any estimation of the actual marginal propensity to import over previous 
periods will always be clouded by the other changes in trading arrangements which took place then, 
and will not represent an anti-monde where no change takes place. While it is possible to make a 
critical examination of these hypotheses purely on the basis of economic theory and experience 
without any consideration of the numerical values of their results, the relative importance of changes 
in the assun1ptions can only be shown by looking at their quantitative effects. 
The problem can also be approached by considering tl1e relative shares of t11e various suppliers in total 
consumption, rather than the absolute value of imports. Truman (1969) takes the simplest solution 
and assumes that the shares of each supplier will remain constant over time, but it is clearly preferable 
to allow for some change in the ratio over time on the basis of historical change. The EFf A 
Secretariat Studies (1969, 1972) incorporate this by assunling that the linear trend in shares between 
1954 and 1959 would have been maintained by the member countries in the anti-monde. The 
particular trend they estimate is open to objection on the grom1ds, first, that the two years chosen may 
not lie on the actual trend, and second that the form of the trend is too simple. Further estimation by 
say regression is not really profitable given t11e simplicity of the original assumption. 
The projections of trade flows relating solely to the performance of import demand in previous periods 
make too strong assumptions for tl1eir validity to be very great. They assume that past trends will 
continue into the future without considering either the exact nature of the relationship or whether it is 
really likely tlmt events such as multilateral tariff reductions can be expected to continue at the same 
rate in the anti-monde. Furthermore, they tend to assume that many of the determining variables, 
GNP, apparent consumption, etc., would be m1changed in the anti-monde from their actual observed 
values. Since we would expect these variables themselves to be affected by economic integration tltis 
assumption will not be valid. The use of shares rather than absolute values does not avoid the problem 
mlless it can be assumed that income (and to some extent substitution) effects are zero. Yet EFf A 
(1969, 1972) explicitly include an income effect. 
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It is also possible to look at the problem of changes in shares from the opposite direction, and see what 
the actual changes imply for the elasticity of demand for various sorts of imports with respect to 
income. Balassa (1967, 1974) calculated the ex-post income elasticity of demand as the ratio of 
imports from a particular source to that of GNP, and constructed an anti-monde by assuming that the 
pre-integration elasticities would have continued into the post-integration period. By comparing these 
hypothetical elasticities with the observed elasticities he was able to identify an integration effect. 
Balassa interpreted his results as follows: a rise in the income elasticity of demand for intra-area 
imports is evidence of" gross trade creation" (that is, trade creation plus trade diversion); and increase 
in the elasticity of demand for imports from all sources of supply becomes evidence of trade creation 
proper; and a fall in income elasticity of demand for extra-area imports suggests the existence of trade 
diversion. 
In the Balassa study (1967), trade creation and trade diversion effects yield an estimated impact on 
real GDP growth rates of 0.1% per year. The Aitken and Lowry study (1972), investigates the effects 
of two regional integration schemes in Latin America, neither of which is shown to have any 
significant Lrade diverting effects, although some trade creation effects follow from the lowering of 
barriers associated with the liberalised schemes. 
Whether the problem of the anti-monde is approached by Balassa's method, it is clear that the period 
before the formation of the EEC was one of considerable trade liberalisation, and hence the estimation 
of trade relationships during that period will be affected by it. The implicit assmnption of the anti-
monde may in fact be that nothing new occurred, but that liberalisation continued at previous rates. 
Clavaux (1969) estimates that if the existence ofliberalisation is taken into account in the estimation 
period and exclude it from the anti-monde then Balassa's estimates of trade creation by 1966 should 
be more than doubled. It is not clear that the bias that Clavau.x claims is actually so important. In the 
light of the drawbacks it is clear that the elasticities suggest a degree of sophistication which is not 
really present in the model. As Orcutt (1950) points out, if there are no supply equations there is an 
identification problem which biases estimates of price elasticities towards zero. The neglect of supply 
conditions implicitly rests on the strong asslUllption of infinite supply elasticities. Balassa's estimation 
of ex-post income elasticities will take supply constraints into account implicitly, but so will it of 
course for the pre-integration period. 
Balassa's approach is also questioned closely by Sellekaerts (1973) who suggests t11at the estimates 
will be biased unless 'the following ceteris paribus assun1ptions are realistic: no autonomous changes 
in relative prices, no changes in exchange rates, no changes in extra-area trade flows caused by the 
dynamic effects of a custom union'. Clearly any trends in relative prices either before or after the 
formation of tl1e area will bias estimates based on income elasticities of demand alone. The third point 
about dynamic effects merely makes the point that since Balassa is using a 'residual imputation model' 
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all effects, not just the static ones will be included in the residual. Far more important is Sellekaerts' 
clear demonstration that income elasticities vary widely over the pre- and post-integration periods. 
Thus the choice of periods for comparison is crucial. Elasticities will vary with the pressure of 
demand and it is thus important either to compare time periods where activity was in the same sort of 
phase of the economic cycle, or to allow for changes in the economic cycle explicitly in the estimation. 
The aim of the present study is to determine whether or not the formation of ASEAN has been a 
success. There are at least four reasons why neighbouring countries might wish to forge some kind of 
regional association. Each reason has been invoked to some extent in the ASEAN case. The first is the 
argument that it makes some sense to get on well with one's neighbours. Tllis was an important 
consideration in the 1967 Bangkok Declaration in an attempt to rid the region of political turmoil by 
promoting regional peace and stability. The second is the argument that trade creation developing out 
of closer economic ties will confer substantial economic advantages, and that these benefits will 
outweigh the costs of trade diversion, which arise because importers may not be able to buy from the 
cheapest source and exporters to sell at the highest price. The third reason is based on the belief that 
regional liberalisation is politically easier than global liberalisation, and is therefore a necessary step 
towards the latter goal. Finally, there is the argument that, for a range of strategic and commercial 
issues, a regional association - in which member cmmtries are able to subsume individual interests for 
a common good - will be more effective in international negotiations and forums than each country 
acting separately. 
In order to investigate these arguments the Balassa method of estimation was chosen. A general 
deficiency of the methods considered is that they take little or no account of what is happening in tl1e 
exporting countries, being focused largely on conditions in tl1e importing country. As Mayes (1978) 
points out, the neglect of supply conditions implicitly rests on the implausibly strong assumption of 
infitlite supply elasticities. A much more satisfactory means of determining variables from both the 
importing and the exporting countries is the so called 'gravitational' model pioneered by Tinbergen 
(1962) and developed by Pulliainen (1963), Poyhonen (1963) and Linnematm (1966) with a large 
number of applications to the present context. A major advantage is tl1at tl1e model is no longer 
'mechanical' and incorporates explicit economic variables in both countries which makes its 
interpretation much easier. 
The gravitational model suggests that the trade flow between any pair of countries is a multiplicative 
ftmction of their respective national incomes, populations and the distance between them. The model 
is estimated using cross-section data and tl1e effects of any trading arrangements are calculated by the 
unexplained residual in tl1e regression, or, as suggested in Aitken (1973) and Aitken and Lowry 
(1973), by the inclusion of a dummy variable for trade between partner countries. Unfortunately, 
Aitken's (1973) work shows that these two methods can give widely differing results. Moreover, tl1e 
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results vary substantially from year to year, suggesting a need to take account of business cycle 
fluctuations. Verdoom and Schwartz (1972) have developed this approach further by incorporating 
relative prices into a gravity model. Building on earlier work by Waelbroeck (1964), Verdoom and 
Schwartz (1972) have used a gravitational model to explain trade in manufactured goods among pairs 
of countries, with the growth rate of GNP in the importing country, the growth rate of manufacturing 
production in the exporting country, distance, changes in relative prices - including the effects of tariff 
changes - and tariff reductions in intra-area trade as the independent variables. Verdoom and 
Schwartz rationalise the separate introduction of relative price and intra-area tariff variables on the 
grow1ds that the latter variable shows the effects of the abolition of prohibitive tariffs as well as the 
'promotional' effect of integration (Greenaway and Winters, 1994). 
The Balassa method was chosen over other possible methods of estimation as the aim of the present 
study is purely to detemline what would have happened had the trading agreement for ASEAN 
economic cooperation not been implemented (the study only wants to take trade preferences into 
accmmt and not geographical separation as in the gravity models). In other words, it as assumed that 
the establisltn1ent of ASEAN bas been the single largest influence affecting trade flows, and long-run 
influences or special factors would not have appreciably altered the relationships between imports and 
GNP - expressed by the income elasticities of import demand for the period preceding integration -
during the period that has elapsed up to 1984. At the same time, by comparing the relationship of 
intemal and extemal trade to GNP between the pre-integration and the post-integration periods, the 
proposed method abstracts from changes in the growth rate of national income, and provides 
comparable estimates of trade creation and trade diversion. 
The gravity model of trade seeks to e:\.'J)lain trade flows between cow1tries by their incomes, 
populations and other measures of their economic proximity, and can be used as a measure of the 
problem for conventional trade theory. One recent example is Hamilton and Winters (1992), who 
explain seventy percent of the variation in trade flows between seventy six countries in 1984-6 by such 
variables. As a measure of estimation for testing economic integration one may question the validity 
of a method that applies average income elasticities of export supply and import demand, calculated in 
a cross-section analysis of all trading countries, to the countries of ASEAN. In fact, these elasticities 
will be generally higher in the industrial economies, and lower in less developed areas, since 
increased specialisation within the manufacturing sector tends to raise the share of foreign trade in 
GNP in the former group of countries, while industrialisation cum protectionism have the opposite 
effect in the latter (Balassa, 1963, 1974). 
Helpman and Krugman (1985) discuss the empirical implications of the general equilibriun1 model 
with imperfect competition. The main observation is that relative country size has an effect on the 
volume of trade, additional to any effects arising from relative factor endowment differences - see the 
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work in chapter three. Trade may seem intense between similar countries, but that can be explained by 
the fact that they are neighbours and/or members of free trade associations. It has been shown 
elsewhere in the thesis that the ASEAN countries do enjoy the advantage of close geographical 
proximity, which will in itself lead to increased trade flows of both the intra- and inter-industry type. 
However, the vohune of intra-industry trade is greatest between countries of similar size. Tllis 
observation provides a justification for explaining the vohune of trade by a gravity model, and 
Bergstrand (1989) derives a gravity equation from a model that includes factor proportions trade as 
well as intra-industry trade. Balassa and Bauwens (1988) investigate, using European data, the 
explanation of both inter-industry and intra-industry trade and find support for the idea that the 
fonner is explained by factor endowment differences and the latter by characteristics consistent with 
product differentiation being the main e::>..'])lanation of such trade. Thus in the case of the present study 
it would appear that the gravitational model is more suited to testing trade theory rather than testing 
the success of ASEAN econonlic cooperation. 
Prewo (1974) used a general equilibrium approach which linked national input-output models for five 
EC countries to each other and to the rest of the world via a gravity model. This modification is of 
particular importance as it responds to the criticism that earlier efforts at the estimation of trade 
creation and trade diversion have neglected trade in intem1ediate products (Askari 1974). 
Prewo's calculations, like those of the Truman study (1969), are based on the assumption that in the 
absence of integration the import-consumption shares observed in the base year would have remained 
unchanged. In Prewo's case, this assumption had to be made since the only input-output tables 
available for the pre-Common Market period relate to 1959. There is evidence, however, of the 
existence of trends in import-consumption relationships in the EC. 
In an article published in the Econonlic Journal, Kreinin (1969) argued that 'the widely employed 
projections of the 1953-59 trends in the 1960s are hardly warranted, because the intensified 
liberalisation of external imports in the second half of the 1950s would have the effect of increasing 
the projected e::>..1emal imports in the 1960s, and thereby exaggerating trade diversion'. Kreiilin 
suggests using instead the US as 'nonnaliser' or 'control group' on the supposition that it 'can offer at 
least some guidance to what the changes in the EC import-consumption ratio would have in the 
absence of integration. 
As Kreinin notes, various objections can be levied against the use of a foreign country as a nomlaliser. 
In the case of the US, cotton textiles and automobiles do not offer an appropriate basis of comparison; 
the imposition of quota restrictions has reduced textile imports while the US-Canada agreement has 
contributed to the expansion of automobile imports. As expected, the non-nonnalised estimates of 
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trade creation are higher tl1an the normalised results as the fonner make no allowance for the 
l1Uderlying upward trends in trade flows. 
Resnick and Tflllllan (1972) have estimated trade creation and trade diversion for non-food products 
by utilising the price coefficients obtained in a regression model of European trade patterns. Estimates 
of trade creation have been derived from data on average changes in tariffs on intra-area and extra-
area trade and tl1e price elasticity of demand for total imports in the individual member countries. In 
turn, trade diversion has been estimated from data on changes in tariffs on intra-area and extra-area 
imports and tl1e relevant price elasticities. 
A further way of formulating an anti-monde is to analyse the export performance of the members of a 
regional group in markets where they receive no preference. Larnfalussy (1963), for example, assumed 
that el\:porting col1lltries would have increased their share of the EC market in the same proportion 
that tlley have increased tl1eir shares in third markets. These findings were supported by Williamson 
and Bottrill (1971). The method does not, however, enable tlle effect to be broken down into trade 
creation and trade diversion, and the implicit assumption that tllird-col1lltry markets were sufficiently 
l1Uaffected by EC formation to be used as controls is questionable. 
Miller and Spencer (1977) provide tl1e first full, numerical, general equilibrium analysis of regional 
integration arrangements. They use an Armington structure with four regions identified: the UK, the 
EC, Commonwealth col1Utries (primarily Australia and New Zealand), and the United States and the 
rest of the world. They look at the effects of the UK entry into the EC, involving not only lower trade 
barriers witl1 the EC-6 but also the elimination of Commonwealth trade preferences by the UK. 
Interestingly, their results show that the welfare effects associated with entry would be small, but from 
a UK point of view were donlinated by UK contributions to the European budget. 
Large price effects also show up in their model results, particularly a price rise in tl1e UK in 
agricultural products, as might be expected. Associated with this were significant trade effects, 
particularly between the UK and EC, and the UK and the Commonwealth. For instance, in the case 
without transfers through the European budget, the UK increased its exports to, and imports from, the 
EC by 50% in manufactured goods. The UK increased its agricultural imports from the EC by 72% 
but, somewhat surprisingly, decreased its imports from tlle Commonwealth by only 0.8%. 
A later competitive col1llterfactual study by Hanlilton and Whalley (1985) uses a multi-country global 
general equilibrium model, somewhat sinlilar to tllat of Miller and Spencer but with larger 
dimensionality, to look at a variety of potential pair-wise regional integration arrangements between 
tl1e EC and Japan, the OECD com1tries and developing countries. Their results generally show that 
the welfare effects of regional integration arrangements are relatively small but, as in other studies, 
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trade effects are somewhat larger. Their results also show significant terms-of-trade effects associated 
with all these regional integration arrangements. 
Harrison, Rutherford and Wooton (1989) use a somewhat similar structure to look at the effects that 
might be expected if member countries left the EC. The model covers six tradeable goods and eleven 
countries/regions, and uses the Amlington assumption. They show that any cmmtry leaving tlte EC 
would suffer a welfare loss, with the highest loss being for Ireland (8%of GDP) and the lowest for 
France and Italy (0.9% of GDP). 
More recent model-based counterfactual analyses of regional integration anangements incorporate 
non-competitive market structure and scale econonlies. One of the earliest, the Harris and Cox study 
( 1984 ), is an analysis of the effects of Canada-US trade integration, altl10ugh in tlteir trade scenarios 
they also look at multilateral and unilateral free trade, as well as bilateral and sectoral free trade. In 
tl1eir model there is an implicit asstllllption of collusive behaviour by producers around a focal point of 
the world price gross oftl1e tariff in the Canadian market (Shoven and Whalley, 1984). Fixed costs at 
plant level are modelled for Canadian firms, but tltese fixed costs are not sunk costs, and hence a 
significant reduction in the number of domestic firms tends to produce large welfare gains as fixed 
costs are spread over a smaller number of firms (Harris, 1985). Some of the larger welfare and trade 
effects in results from the early versions of the Hanis and Cox model were substantially reduced in 
later versions of the model used by tlte Canadian Department of Finance (1988) in generating tlteir 
own economic assessment of the bilateral agreement between Canada and the US. This was due, in 
part, to a downward revision in tlte trade barrier estimates used earlier by Harris and Cox, and to 
revisions in other parameter values. In some cases, estimated welfare fell by as much as a factor of 
four. Also, because Canada is considerably smaller than the US, global welfare gains and welfare 
effects in the US are considerably smaller as a fraction of world and US GDP, as are the effects on 
corresponding trade flows. 
A later attempt at imperfectly competitive counterfactual <malysis is Snlith and Venables (1988), one 
of a series of papers which look at various scenarios for European integration as part of the '1992' 
exercise undertaken to complete the EC's internal market (see also Haaland and Nom1an, 1992; 
Smith, Venables and Gasiorek, 1992; and Mercenier, 1992). The counterfactual analysis in Smitlt and 
Venables are largely done on partial equilibrium basis, and involve scenarios that do not necessarily 
fully correspond to changes in trade barriers. Their analyses involve an initial assumption of market 
segmentation, and the central counterfactual which tltey analyse is a full market-integration case, 
which does not necessarily correspond to cases where only trade barriers change. Indeed, in some of 
their model analyses where trade barrier changes alone are considered, some of the projected impacts 
are extremely small. 
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A recent paper by Baldwin (1992), using increasing retums also obtains strong effects of trade 
liberalisation. This piece does not explicitly consider regional arrangements, but instead uses the 
estimates of potential static welfare gains from tl1e 1992 EC program due to Cecchini, Catinat and 
Jacquemin (1988), which he tl1en dynamises using a simple inter-temporal model. He shows that if, 
due to scale economies, private and social rates of return on capital differ, then tl1e exploitation of 
tl1ese scale economies can yield additional dynamic gains from trade liberalisation. Using estimates 
from Caballero and Lyons (1989), he demonstrates that these dynamic gains can be large. No trade or 
otl1er impacts are reported; and if tl1ese gains are indeed achievable, they could also be generated by 
otl1er policy interventions (such as tax policy). 
It is difficult to generalise over the results of all the studies because their individual characteristics are 
so varied, as are the results. While some shJdies provide detailed analyses of the trade impacts, their 
analysis of welfare impacts 1nay be more limited. Also, some of tl1e model-based studies, while 
providing analyses of trade and welfare impacts, do not provide results in a form which makes it easy 
to disentangle the various influences on trade and welfare. 
The central problem that emerges from the attempts to quantifY the trade effects of regional 
integration schemes is thus computing a plausible anti-monde. A wide variety of methods have been 
employed to this end, but each has drawbacks that result from tl1e incomplete nahlre of the models 
used. Measuring tl1e effects of integration is a particularly complex undertaking. Not only must one 
attempt to separate the effects of integration from other intervening factors, which is difficult enough 
in itself, and requires a suitable time or country series, but one is inspired by the tl1eory to attempt to 
measure trade creation and trade diversion separately. 
If economic integration could be treated like any otl1er change in exogenous or policy variables in a 
model the correct econometric procedure would be to estimate a model which was large enough to 
reflect all the influences in tl1e economy which were tl10ught to be important. Having estimated the 
model one would then fit it over tl1e data of the period of integration and then rerun inserting the 
values of the appropriate variables as they would have been without integration. The difference 
between tl1e two estimates is then the identifiable effects of integration according to the model of 
behaviour. 
Unfortunately, this is no mean task and can only be approached by use of large models of the 
intemational economy such as tl10se of the IMF (Deppler and Ripley, 1978) or tl1e OECD (1979) or 
perhaps the COMET model of Barten (1976). The main problems are: the size of the model required; 
the constancy of parameters over time. The normal response in practice is to estimate a highly 
simplified model and make a further simple assumption about changes in parameters (Mayes, 1978). 
Furthermore, one of tl1e stages in the argtm1ent is usually left out and instead of comparing what the 
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model predicts without integration authors tend to compare actual behaviour with what would have 
happened without integration attributing all the difference to the effects of integration. Given the 
simplicity of the models and the assumptions about changes in parameters this can result in 
substantial biases in the estimates. 
There are two basic issues over the size of the model: the first is one of aggregation and the second of 
how many relations are necessary to capture the effects of integration throughout the economy and not 
just the initial impact on trade flows. The aggregation issue is well known and occurs, first because 
the direct price and substitution elasticities of demand for imports vary very considerably over 
different commodities, running from direct price elasticities near zero for essential commodities 
which cannot be produced locally to quite substantial values for finished manufactures such as 
consumer durables for which there are many close substitutes (Barker, 1970). It is secondly 
emphasised by the changing cmmnodity composition of trade which tends to result in a downward 
bias in the estimates (Orcutt, 1950; Morgan, 1970). 
If some of the eAlJected effects of integration take place, such as the eAlJloitation of economies of scale 
and the changes in economic efficiency, it will not be just the variables in the model which change 
with integration, but also the parameters. Thus it would not be possible to use a model estimated in a 
period with integration to suggest what would have happened without integration by changing the 
variables alone or vice-versa. Furthermore, if periods are taken such as the formation of EFT A and the 
EC during the 1960s, or the enlargement in the EC in 1973 there is a good argument that general 
economic conditions were not similar in the periods before and after integration. Certainly the years 
after the oil crisis of 1973174 and the period of floating exchange rates are not readily comparable 
with preceding periods. Balassa (1967, 1974) actually uses changes in the income elasticity of demand 
for imports as a means of estimating the effects of the formation of the EC. 
Balassa's quantitative approach in measuring integration is clearly simplistic and although it can be 
improved with the introduction of a number of modifications, still suffers from a variety of drawbacks 
when compared to other models. However, the advantages of simple models are clear as shown in 
Kreinin (1979). Whatever model is adopted it is necessary to be able to explain imports and exports 
disaggregated at the very least by trading area and usually by country as well if estimates of trade 
creation and trade diversion are to be obtained. Therefore, the Balassa model should prove to be 
effective in providing estimates for trade creation and trade diversion in ASEAN given the data 
constraints for the period (1967-75, 1976-84) of the study. Even with a more sophisticated model we 
can only get an idea of an order of magnitude not an accurate single number, hence it is possible to 
use only a relatively limited amount of readily available information to estimate that magnitude much 
more efficient use of the resources can be made by adopting the simple model. Mayes ( 1978) showed 
in a survey of the estimates of trade creation and trade diversion in the EC that the approximate 
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bounds for the likely size of the trade creation were, in the view of the authors surveyed, US$ 8-15 
billion, or to put it another way between approximately 9% and 17% of total EC trade in that year. If 
that degree of accuracy is acceptable then it might be possible, providing appropriate bounds are set by 
varying the assumptions behind the simple model, to adopt a rather simplistic model. 
154 
Trade Creation and Trade Diversion 
'll'be method! rund its Dimitllltions 
The ex-ante and ex-post approach is one of the most popular approaches in measuring the effects of 
integration. It permits the evaluation of the integration framework by comparing an integration 
'parameter' before and after integration. In order to ensure the comparability of estimates of trade 
creation and trade diversion and to abstract from the effects of economic growth on trade flows, 
Balassa suggested in 1963 the application of a method of estimation involving the comparison of ex-
post income elasticities of import demand in intra-area and extra-area trade for periods preceding and 
following integration. Ex-post income elasticities of import demand were defined as the ratio of the 
average annual rate of change of imports to that of GNP, both expressed in constant prices (taken in 
the own currency of each of the ASEAN countries in question from the IMF Direction of Trade 
Statistics). Under the assumption that income elasticities of import demand would have remained 
unchanged in the absence of integration, a rise in income elasticity of demand for intra-area imports 
would indicate gross trade creation, defined as increases in intra-area trade irrespective of whether 
tltis results from substitution for domestic or for foreign sources of supply. In tum, a rise in the 
income elasticity of demand for imports from all sources taken together would give e:li."J)ression of trade 
creation proper, ie. a shift from foreign to partner-country producers, would be indicated by a decline 
in the income elasticity of demand for extra-area imports. 
The basic equation ofBalassa's model is given by:-
Mi = K. yib· e 
Mi = imports of country i 
Yi = GNP of country i 
K =constant 
b =constant 
e =error term 
Linearising t11e model by using log fm1ctions gives:-
ln (MTi) 
ln (Mii) 
ln (MEi) 
MTi = total imports of country i 
= 
= 
= 
Mli = intra-ASEAN imports of country i 
MEi = extra-ASEAN imports of country i 
K 
K 
K 
+ bt 
+ b· 1 
+ be 
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ln (Yi) + et 
ln (Yi) + ei 
ln (Yi) + ee 
The method discussed above can be utilised to estimate the income elasticities of import demand. This 
means that the values ofbt, bi and be can be estimated (Balassa, 1975). The difference between the b 
measures for the two periods is a measure of a change of elasticity of import demand (introducing a 
dmmny variable for the post integration period). 
This method was applied to the five ASEAN countries (excluding Bnmei, as it joined in 1984) to 
examine total trade effects, intra- and extra-area trade effects. A seven commodity breakdown was 
also taken. Before reporting on the results, however, the error possibilities inherent in the method of 
estimation need to be discussed. 
To investigate the trade effects of ASEAN integration we assume the year 1976 as the demarcation 
period of integration. The year 1976 was chosen as the 'benchmark', because only in 1976, after the 
Bali Summit, did economic cooperation begin to take any shape in ASEAN. Thus, by considering the 
period 1967-75 as the pre-integration period and 1976-84 as the post-integration period, we are able 
to formulate the appropriate framework to quantify the necessary trade effects. 
The method is based on the assmnption that income elasticities of import demand would have 
remained m1changed in the absence of integration, ie. that the establishment of ASEAN was the only 
major influence on changes in the pattern of imports as between the pre-integration and the post-
integration periods. This means, first of all, that the effects of price changes other than those brought 
about by integration are disregarded as are the effects of exchange rates changes. Apart from the 
problem of separating autonomous and induced price changes, efforts made to amend the method by 
introducing a price variable (adjusted for exchange rate change) in the calculations relating to total, 
intra-area, and extra-area imports of all commodities have had little success, probably reflecting the 
unreliability ofthe price data (Kreinin, 1969). 
There is further the question if the relationship between imports and incomes in the pre-integration 
period can be considered as 'nonnal'. This assumption has been objected to on the grounds that the 
period in question does not provide an appropriate estimate of the long-term income elasticity of 
import demand (Clavaux, 1969). While rejecting Clavaux's argun1ents, Sellekaerts (1973) sees the 
main difficulty to lie in the selection of the base period. Sellekaerts himself suggests that one should 
chose years in the same stage of the business cycle as benclunarks. There are no business cycle-related 
distortions in the 1967-75 base period as it compares years of average expansion. The extent of trade 
creation will generally be underestimated because the expansion of trade during the base period is 
affected by measures of trade liberalisation. Tariff reductions took place with regard to both intra-area 
and extra-area trade. However, in the case of ASEAN most liberalisation did not take place until 
1977. 
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Next, one should consider tl1e empirical validity of the results derived from growth rates of incomes 
and imports between benchmark years. Following tlle work of Sellekaerts an attempt will be made to 
test tl1e statistical significance of tl1e results by regressing imports on GNP and introducing a dummy 
vmiable for the post integration period. However, one problem often encountered is tl1e lack of 
statistical significance of the results. Tltis is explained by tlle shortness of tlle time-series for tl1e pre-
integration period as well as by tlle substantial fluctuations in imports over the business cycle. The 
former problem is overcome by increasing tlle number of observations by using quarterly as opposed 
to annual data. The latter problem is avoided by taking data for years at a comparable stage of ilie 
business cycle, hence the reason why ilie years 1967-75 were selected for ilie pre-integration period, 
and 1976-84 for tlle post-integration period. 
Analysis of results 
In terms of time-series models, boili ex-post m1d ex-ante forecasts predict values of a dependent 
variable beyond ilie time period in which ilie model is estimated. However in an ex-post forecast tl1e 
forecast period is such tl1at observations on botl1 endogenous variables and the exogenous explanatory 
variables are known wiili certainty. Thus, ex-post forecasts can be checked against existing data and 
provide a means of evaluating a forecasting model. 
The problem is how to evaluate or test ilie goodness of the model. There exists a set of statistical tests 
(R-squared, F-test, t-tests etc) that can be used to judge tlle significance (in a statistical sense) of tl1e 
model and its individual estimated coefficients. Oilier statistics exist (eg the Durbin Watson statistic) 
to test tlle underlying assumptions of the model. A model can have significant t-statistics and a high 
R-squared and still forecast very badly after period. Tltis may result from a structural change (in ilie 
economy) occurring during tl1e forecast period and not explained by tlle model. Good forecasts, on the 
oilier hand, may come from regression models which have relatively low R-squareds and one or more 
insignificant regression coefficients. This may happen because iliere is very little variation in the 
dependent variable, so that although it is not being ex-plained well by the model, it is easy to forecast. 
Even wiili iliese tests, however, tl1e choice of whether to accept or reject the model is not a 
straightforward task. One must decide wheilier the structural specification of ilie model is reasonable 
and wheilier tl1e estimated coefficients make sense. The model's evaluation must also depend on ilie 
purpose for which ilie model was built. 
It must also be remembered that in an ex post simulation it is possible that some of ilie endogenous 
variables will track tlle original data series data closely while otllers will not. Therefore, a correction 
has to be made by reestimating using an autoregressive transformation to correct for tltis serial 
correlation, as more efficient measures would be obtained using the Cochrane-Orcutt metllod. Thus 
tl1e evaluation of tlle model must depend on tl1e purpose for which the model was built. Some models 
157 
are built primarily for forecasting, while others are built primarily for descriptive purposes and 
hypothesis testing. 
Confidence intervals provide us with a simple means of testing the reliability of the regression model. 
When the actual value is obtained, it can be compared with the previously forecasted value. Since the 
error of forecast is normally distributed it is natural to consider the problem of statistical testing. 
Significance tests can be performed on the forecasted value by calculating the normalised error. 
N = Predicted Value- Actual Value 
Standard error of regression 
Since N is normally distributed with mean 0 and standard deviation 1, a 95% confidence interval can 
be determined. If N is less than or equal to + 1. 96 or greater than or equal to -1.96. If the actual 
observed value lies within the 95% confidence interval (-1.96 to +1.96}, it can be assmned that the 
model is perfonning satisfactorily, but if the value lies outside the confidence interval, it may be 
concluded that the model is not petfornting well. 
From table 4.8 it can be seen that the nommlised errors for all the ASEAN countries, and for ASEAN 
as a whole, all lie witltin the 95% confidence interval, except for Indonesia in the case of intra-area 
trade. This problem can be explained by the fact tltat the data is inaccurate in terms of intra-ASEAN 
trade for Indonesia as it does not report its trade with other countries. Therefore, as the values mostly 
lie within tlte 95% confidence interval it must be concluded that tl1e model is performing 
satisfactorily. 
Country 
Singapore 
Malaysia 
Thailand 
Indonesia 
Pltilippines 
A SEAN 
Table 4.8 
Normalised errors for the ASEAN countries 
Total imports futra-area imports lExtra-area imports 
1.15 1.07 0.08 
-0.33 -0.33 0.04 
0.33 0.13 -0.20 
0.13 2.17 0.10 
1.65 0.88 -0.15 
-0.26 0.07 -0.19 
From table 4.9, which shows tlte results from the regression analysis performed on all of tl1e ASEAN 
countries, it can be seen that the R-squareds are all above 99% except for tlte Philippines witl1 respect 
to intra-area imports which remains high at 70%. Correspondingly high t-statistics are also reported, 
all significant at the 10% level all except for Indonesia (total imports: pre-integration) are significant 
at the 5% level. It must also be noted tltat all values for the Durbin Watson statistic are all close to 2, 
the central value in the range of tlte statistic, indicative of no serial correlation, with the standard 
error are small due to the application of tlte Cochrane-Orcutt method. Before reporting on the results 
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of the ex-post income elasticities of demand for imports (in table 4.9), it is necessal}' to look at the 
statistical significance of the results in order to determine whether or not the integration of the 
ASEAN economies has had any real impact on the region. 
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Table 4.9 
Regression analysis results :fox all the ASEAN economies 
Singapore 
Total Period Pre-integration Post -integration Difference Dtmuny 
1fotan limports 
R-squared 0.9953 0.9849 0.9886 
Coefficient 2.11 2.58 3.64 + 
Standard error 0.23 0.34 3.38 
T -statistic 9.35 7.65 2.07 1.11 
Durbin-Watson 2.13 2.12 2.48 
lintra llmports 
R-squared 0.9891 0.9930 0.9364 
Coefficient 2.03 1.55 1.71 + 
Standard error 0.14 0.21 0.39 
T -statistic 14.87 7.33 4.36 1.12 
Durbin-Watson 2.05 2.16 1.99 
lExtJra l!mports 
R-squared 0.9992 0.9959 0.9986 
Coefficient 0.24 2.01 1.09 
Standard error 0.35 0.16 0.71 
T -statistic 6.68 12.27 2.53 1.57 
Durbin-Watson 1.88 1.84 2.06 
* indicates significance at the 5% level 
Malaysia 
Total Period Pre-integration Post -integration Difference Dununy 
1fotaJ l!mports 
R-squared 0.9875 0.9779 0.9686 
Coefficient 0.11 3.33 2.29 
Standard error 0.36 0.35 0.30 
T -statistic 10.29 9.41 7.73 0.22 
Durbin-Watson 1.85 1.71 2.35 
futra l!mports 
R-squared 0.9987 0.9966 0.9941 
Coefficient 0.02 3.72 2.99 
Standard error 0.16 0.83 0.23 
T -statistic 10.12 4.47 12.98 0.79 
Durbin-Watson 1.97 2.02 1.29 
Extra Imports 
R-squared 0.9979 0.9853 0.9928 
Coefficient 0.18 2.67 2.09 
Standard error 0.19 0.45 0.14 
T -statistic 10.94 5.96 14.81 1.19 
Durbin-Watson 1.99 1.98 1.45 
* indicates significance at the 5% level 
Source : Calculated from data in IMF Direction of Trade Statistics (various years). 
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Table 4o9 (continued) 
Thailand 
Total Period Pre-integration Post-integration Difference Dummy 
Total Hmports 
R-squared 0.9921 0.9735 0.9616 
Coefficient 2.65 4.00 1.63 
Standard error 0.33 0.63 0.55 
T -statistic 8.01 6.32 2.96 2.52 * 
Durbin-Watson 1.95 1.89 1.88 
Intra imports 
R-squared 0.9997 0.9963 0.9991 
Coefficient 0.08 2.36 0.34 
Standard error 0.71 0.23 0.87 
T -statistic 10.12 10.46 10.39 0.66 
Durbin-Watson 1.87 1.82 1.92 
Extra Imports 
R-squared 0.9989 0.9973 0.9942 
Coefficient 2.18 2.95 0.16 
Standard error 0.29 0.56 0.80 
T -statistic 7.60 5.29 0.20 0.38 
Durbin-Watson 2.01 2.00 1.97 
* indicates significance at the 5% level 
Indonesia 
Total Period Pre-integration Post -integration Difference Dummy 
Total Imports 
R-squared 0.9756 0.9663 0.8809 
Coefficient 1.01 1.46 0.94 
Standard error 0.30 0.95 0.19 
T -statistic 3.36 1.64 4.91 0.81 
Durbin-Watson 1.91 1.99 1.83 
Intra Imports 
R-squared 0.9987 0.9988 0.9935 
Coefficient 1.52 1.54 1.30 
Standard error 0.10 0.31 0.15 
T -statistic 15.5 4.98 8.33 2.27 * 
Durbin-Watson 1.88 1.98 1.87 
Extra Imports 
R-squared 0.9996 0.9993 0.9967 
Coefficient 0.61 1.59 0.45 
Standard error 0.16 0.06 0.25 
T -statistic 3.69 26.59 2.06 0.83 
Durbin-Watson 1.98 2.25 2.01 
* indicates significance at the 5% level 
Source: Calculated from data in IMF Direction of Trade Statistics (various years). 
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Table 4.9 (continued) 
Philippines 
Total Period Pre-integration Post-integration Difference Dummy 
1rot;d ][mports 
R-squared 0.9828 0.9475 0.9208 
Coefficient 2.88 4.14 3.25 
Standard error 0.33 0.86 1.47 
T -statistic 8.77 4.79 2.21 0.12 
Durbin-Watson 2.09 2.06 1.97 
Intra Imports 
R-squared 0.7071 0.9594 0.0972 
Coefficient 2.36 0.46 2.67 + 
Standard error 0.89 0.85 1.23 
T -statistic 2.65 2.55 2.17 2.12 * 
Durbin-Watson 1.99 2.21 2.00 
Extra Imports 
R-squared 0.9986 0.9932 0.9984 
Coefficient 2.86 3.47 1.78 
Standard error 0.16 1.00 0.41 
T -statistic 17.58 3.46 4.33 0.22 
Durbin-Watson 1.99 2.00 1.98 
* indicates significance at tlte 5% level 
ASEAN 
Total Period Pre-integration Post -integration Difference Dummy 
Total Imports 
R-squared 0.9994 0.9977 0.9983 
Coefficient 2.22 0.81 2.31 + 
Standard error 0.27 1.52 0.27 
T -statistic 8.23 8.53 8.51 1.28 
Durbin-Watson 1.94 1.97 2.01 
Intra Imports 
R-squared 0.9993 0.9950 0.9985 
Coefficient 1.26 4.11 6.72 + 
Standard error 1.74 0.51 1.60 
T -statistic 6.72 8.10 4.20 7.62 * 
Durbin-Watson 1.97 1.94 1.63 
Extra Imports 
R-squared 0.9993 0.9976 0.9983 
Coefficient 2.18 0.89 2.14 + 
Standard error 0.21 1.59 0.31 
T -statistic 10.36 10.56 6.87 0.92 
Durbin-Watson 1.94 1.96 2.05 
* indicates significance at the 5% level 
Source : Calculated from data in IMF Direction of Trade Statistics (various years}. 
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From the test of statistical significance, we are able to test the null hypothesis that there is no change 
in the income elasticities of import demand, between the two periods, against the alternative 
hypothesis that there is a change in the income elasticities of import demand (significant if t > 2.00 
for 60 observations). The results were statistically significant at the 5% level for Thailand (total 
imports), and for Indonesia, the Philippines and ASEAN (intra imports). Therefore, as far as the 
results for Singapore and Malaysia are concerned, there is no reason to reject the null hypothesis that 
there is no significant change in the income elasticities of import demand before and after integration. 
Thailand showed a change in income elasticity of import demand for total imports at the 5% level of 
significance. However, the results for intra and extra imports were insignificant. Indonesia, the 
Philippines and the ASEAN countries as a whole showed a significant change in their income 
elasticities of import demand for intra imports, over the two periods, at the 5% level of significance. 
No other statistically significant results were obtained. Therefore, owing to the lack of statistically 
significant results it can be concluded that over the period of investigation (1967-85), the integration 
of the ASEAN economies has had no real impact on the region. 
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Trade creatnon and trade diversnon 
A consideration of ex-post income elasticities of demand for imports of all commodities, taken 
together, provides evidence of trade creation in the ASEAN market. Table 4.10 presents tl1e 
coefficients for the ex-post income elasticity of import demand (which were all found to be statistically 
significant at least at the 10% level). 
Table 4.10 
Ex=post income elasticity of import demand 
in the ASEAN countries 
Singapore Malaysia Thailand Indonesia Philippines 
Totalllmports 
Pre-integration 2.58 3.33 4.00* 1.46 4.14 
Post -integration 3.64 2.29 1.63 0.94 3.25 
Difference + 
llntra-imports 
Pre-integration 1.55 3.72 2.36 1.54* 0.46* 
Post-integration 1.71 2.99 0.34 1.30 2.67 
Difference + + 
Extra-Imports 
Pre-integration 2.01 2.67 2.95 1.59 3.47 
Post-integration 1.09 2.09 0.16 0.45 1.78 
Difference 
* indicates significance at the 5% level 
Source : Calculated from data in IMF Direction of Trade Statistics (various years). 
A SEAN 
0.81 
2.31 
+ 
4.11 * 
6.72 
+ 
0.89 
2.14 
+ 
Between t11e periods 1967-75 (pre-integration) and 1976-84 (post-integration) the income elasticity of 
demand increased from 4.11 to 6.72 with respect to intra-area imports, from 0.89 to 2.14 with respect 
to extra-area imports, and with respect to total (intra- and extra-area) imports rose from 0.81 to 2.31. 
On examining tl1e ASEAN countries individually it can be seen that, in terms of intra-area imports, 
Singapore and the Philippines provide evidence of trade creation, while Malaysia, Thailand and 
Indonesia provide evidence of trade diversion. The overall estimate for the ASEAN countries as a 
whole is that of trade creation. However, the income elasticity of demand for intra-ASEAN imports 
rose from 4.11 to 6.72 between the two reference periods (this is 'gross trade creation', composed of 
both trade creation plus trade diversion). In the meantime, ASEAN's elasticity of demand for imports 
from third countries (which ought to have shown trade diversion tendencies) actually rose from 0.89 
to 2.14, instead of declining as one would have expected. Finally, ASEAN's elasticity of demand for 
imports from botl1 intra- and extra-area sources rose from 0.81 to 2.31. The only ASEAN country to 
follow the predicted pattern is Singapore. This implies that t11ere would be an increase in the welfare 
of the member nations because it leads to greater specialisation in production based on comparative 
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advantage. Total imports show an overall trade creation effect which could lead to increases in the 
welfare of non member countries because some of the increase in its real income (due to its greater 
specialisation in production) spills over into increased imports from the rest of the world. 
In terms of extra-area imports the overall effect has been that of trade creation. This result is 
surprising, especially since all the com1tries show signs of trade diversion. Of all the ASEAN 
cotmtries, one would expect Thailand to be the only com1try not to show signs of trade diversion. 
Thailand does not show trade diversion because as a country it was never colonised, thus its trade 
links were not influenced as much as the other countries by the colonial powers. At the initial stages 
of development, the member states looked to other countries in the West and Japan rather than their 
neighbours. This trend continued owing to the emphasis on industrialisation, and the need for foreign 
investment and technology from the industrialised countries. However, in the case of the Philippines, 
trade diversion can be e,.,.'plained by the fact that it was heavily influenced by the USA, but has sought 
to break this dominance by shifting its trade towards the other member countries. 
Trade diversion, by itself, reduces welfare because it shifts production from more efficient producers 
outside the member countries to the less efficient producers of the member states. Thus, trade 
diversion worsens the international allocation of resources and shifts production away from 
comparative advantage. 
Trade creation and trade diversion can therefore increase or reduce the welfare of the member states, 
depending on the relative strength of those two opposing forces. The welfare of non members can be 
expected to decline because their economic resources can only be utilised less efficiently t11an before 
trade was diverted away from them. Thus, while a trade creating 'union' leads only to trade creation 
and unequivocally increases the welfare of members and non members, a trade diverting 'mlion' leads 
to both trade creation and trade diversion, and can increase or reduce the welfare of members (and 
will reduce the welfare of the rest oftl1e world). 
The ASEAN countries have used trade diversion as a means of development. The extent of trade 
diversion undertaken by each of the ASEAN countries has varied as each of t11e countries has been 
careful in the calculation of national advantage. Nevertheless, as the overall effect is that of trade 
creation, it would appear that ASEAN has been successful to some extent in increasing welfare. 
In order to offer further explanations for tl1e changes in the income elasticity of import demand, we 
need to examine tl1e results for the major cormnodity categories. Owing to the problems of the 
availability of data (UN data converted to country currency), and given the shortness of the time 
series, satisfactory results were not obtained with regression analysis. Therefore the results obtained in 
table 4.11 have been defined as the ratio of the average annual rate of change of imports to tlmt of 
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GNP. Care of course must be taken, because in the absence of tests of statistical significance, the 
results should be interpreted with caution and taken to be indicative of general trends rather than 
exact magnitudes. 
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Table 4.11 
Ex~post income elasticity of import demand by commodity 
SITC 0+ 1 SITC 2+4 SITC 3 SITC 5 SITC 6+8 SITC 7 SITC9 
Singapore 
Pre-integration 
Post -integration 
Difference 
Malaysia 
Pre-integration 
Post -integration 
Difference 
Thaihmd 
Pre-integration 
Post -integration 
Difference 
Indonesia 
Pre-integration 
Post-integration 
Difference 
Philippines 
Pre-integration 
Post -integration 
Difference 
ASEAN 
Pre-integration 
Post-integration 
Difference 
Food 
beverages 
tobacco 
0.76 
1.04 
+ 
0.99 
0.84 
1.32 
1.81 
+ 
1.44 
1.03 
0.91 
0.99 
+ 
1.08 
1.14 
+ 
Raw Mineral 
materials fuels 
1.75 
1.20 
0.82 
0.86 
+ 
2.74 
1.62 
2.16 
0.91 
0.95 
0.67 
1.68 
1.05 
1.02 
1.48 
+ 
1.19 
1.77 
+ 
2.39 
1.43 
3.29 
3.41 
+ 
1.61 
1.50 
1.90 
1.92 
+ 
Chemicals Basic 
manu-
factures 
1.67 
1.38 
1.33 
0.94 
1.34 
1.28 
1.25 
0.68 
1.20 
0.75 
1.35 
1.01 
1.27 
1.15 
1.54 
1.18 
1.08 
1.38 
+ 
0.78 
0.84 
+ 
0.75 
1.24 
+ 
1.08 
1.15 
+ 
Machinery Other 
manu-
factures 
2.17 
1.43 
2.67 
1.63 
1.10 
1.65 
+ 
1.47 
1.35 
1.12 
0.88 
1.70 
1.38 
1.25 
1.33 
+ 
0.82 
1.38 
+ 
1.11 
1.41 
+ 
1.37 
0.65 
0.79 
1.04 
+ 
1.06 
1.16 
+ 
Source: Calculated from data in United Nations Yearbook oflntemational Trade Statistics (various 
years); IMF Financial Statistics (various years) 
Trade creation can be seen in the following commodity categories:-
SITC 0+ 1 Food, beverages and tobacco 
SITC 3 Mineral fuels 
SITC 6+8 Basic manufactures 
SITC 9 Other manufactures 
Trade diversion can be seen in the following commodity categories:-
SITC 2+4 Raw materials 
SITC 5 Chemicals 
SITC 7 Machinery 
167 
Singapore shows some evidence of trade creation in tern1s of commodity groups. For instance, trade 
creation is exhibited in SITC 0+ 1, SITC 3 and SITC 9, ie. in fuels and other manufactures. This 
pattern emerges because Singapore has traditionally traded with the 'workshops' of ASEAN which are 
exporters of basic foodstuffs and mineral fuels. However, trade diversion can be seen in SITC 2 
because previously Singapore relied on exports of raw materials from other Asian cmmtries and the 
Middle East. 
Trade diversion can also be identified in the remaining categories, SITC 5, SITC 6+8 and SITC 7. 
Singapore has always tended to be outward looking in its policies. The economy has always had a 
history of importing technology and machinery from the industrialised countries (the USA, Japan and 
Western Europe), therefore by diverting its trade towards the other member countries could have 
hindered the growth of the Singaporean economy. 
Malaysia follows a similar pattern to that of Singapore. Trade creation takes place in SITC 2+4, SITC 
3 and SITC 9, whilst trade diversion takes place in SITC 0+1, SITC 5, SITC 6+8 a11d SITC 7. It is not 
surprising that trade creation can be seen in SITC 2 and SITC 3 and trade diversion in SITC 0+1, 
especially since the ASEAN region became increasingly important in terms of Malaysia's imports of 
primruy products, its share rising from 26.9% in 1970 to 38.4% in 1985. Developed countries have 
traditionally been relatively tmimportant as sources of primruy imports, with the notable exception of 
Australia whose share of Malaysia's primary imports increased from 8.5% in 1970 to 10.3% in 1985. 
Trade between Singapore and Malaysia should be able to be measured with a reasonably reliable 
degree of accuracy, in so far as both states have inherited from the period of British colonisation a 
well structured customs administration, which for a long period they shared. The fact that statistics 
are available in these two countries should make it possible to compare and cross-check, but today the 
two states operate different systems of customs classification. Malaysia, whose exports to Japrut are 
routed via Singapore, considers Japan as the final destination of the sales. On the other hand, 
Singapore counts them as imports from Malaysia and as exports (reexports since 1976) to Japan. In 
effect this questions the reliability of the income elasticity of demand for imports data in the case of 
Singapore, (as this problem occurs between a number of Singapore's trading partners) leaving us with 
misleading figures for both trade creation and trade diversion, as Singapore has always played a major 
role in tenus of intermediation. 
Indonesia shows a trade creation effect in SITC 3 and SITC 6+8. This can largely be explained by its 
trade links with Singapore. As Singapore progressed rapidly along its path of development it was able 
to export 'Basic Manufactures' (SITC 6+8) to Indonesia rutd other ASEAN countries such as Thailand 
and the Philippines. This is probably due to changing comparative advantage; as the resource rich 
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countries began to move on from import substitution industrialisation to export oriented 
industrialisation. This point will be examined later. In terms of SITC 3 the trade creation effect can be 
seen to take place because Indonesia, having sent crude petroleum and gas to the refineries in 
Singapore, Singapore in return sold refined petrol and special petroleum derivatives to the other 
ASEAN countries. 
The Philippines shows a trade creation effect in SITC 0+1, SITC 6+8 and SITC 9. Thus food, 
beverages and tobacco, live animals, basic manufachrred items and other manufachlTed goods play a 
dominant role in producing the relevant trade effects in the Philippines. 
In Thailand, trade creation is shown in SITC 0+ 1, SITC 6+8, SITC 7 and SITC 9. Obviously 
commodities such as food items, live animals and manufacturing and related products are the main 
commodities which provide the significant influence on the trade effects in Thailand. 
During the period up to 1980, it was quite clear that the struchlTe of foreign trade of the ASEAN 
countries was determined mainly by the individual country economic structure. The resource rich 
countries of Malaysia and Indonesia exported mainly nahlTal resources and imported manufachlTed 
goods. To a certain ex1ent, the Philippines and Thailand also relied on nahlTal resource exports, 
including agro-based products. Singapore exported manufachlTed goods and also served as a transit 
for exports of primary goods from other ASEAN countries. Thus, ASEAN foreign trade policy up to 
the 1970s was to promote exports of primary products at the best possible terms. 
After 1980 several changes have taken place, which have affected the structure of foreign trade of the 
ASEAN countries. Firstly, the production struchlTe has become more diversified towards 
manufacturing activities, the output of which were increasingly meant for export. Also it should be 
borne in mind that trade in manufachlTed goods is notably difi'erent from trading in primary goods. It 
involves many more niles and regulations which require trade policy measures. 
After a period of decline, there is now a resurgence of interest in regional integration schemes, 
particularly in Europe. Over the last forty years, economic integration has spawned a substantial 
theoretical literahlTe, particularly on customs unions, but much has been misdirected. The central 
finding of orthodox comparative static analysis remains that of Viner, namely that it is not possible to 
generalise about the economic desirability of customs union membership. Beyond this, analysis has 
demonstrated that customs union membership may be superior to non-preferential trade policies in 
some circumstances. The conventional static effects of customs tmions appear, however, to be very 
small and it is clear that the most significant gains may be generated instead from greater competition 
and the fuller exploitation of economies of scale. Empirical work on modelling the effects on 
integration tmder these conditions has been developing very rapidly, particularly in the context of the 
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single European Market and NAFT A. Investigations covering the Asian coWltries and ASEAN 
include (Naya, 1980; Ooi, 1981; Tan, 1982; Devan, 1987; Imada, 1990, 1993). Over the next few 
years computable general equilibrium models promise greater insights into integration effects. 
An aspect that has not been emphasised in tllis approach is why opetling markets to the stimulus of 
greater competition should be pursued regionally rather than multilaterally. One possible explanation 
is that this allows partner coWltries to collaborate in strategic trade policy - a high teclmology project 
for example, will be more credible to rivals if backed by a regional group rather than a single country. 
Also, the adjustment costs associated with increased competition may be more acceptable to powerful 
producer interests if liberalisation is regional rather than global. Within a region, cost differences may 
be relatively small so that integration brings about intra-industry rather than inter-industry 
specialisation and consequently lower adjustment costs (Greenaway and Hine, 1991). 
The removal of barriers to factor mobility in integration schemes is conventionally regarded as raising 
econonlic efficiency since factors can move to where their marginal productivity is higher. Krugman 
(1987), however, argues that the main benefits are likely to come not from net resource transfers 
between coWltries but from the efficiency advantages of more integrated capital and labour markets. 
Tllis involves the two-way flow of resources comparable with intra-industry trade in goods. 
Advantages from tllis such as increased diversification in capital markets have to be offset against 
possible losses, for example from capital moving to avoid tax or to e:ll:p1oit loopholes in regulatory 
frameworks. 
Integration increases the interdependence of econonlies so that witlwut a corresponding increase in 
macroecononlic policy co-ordination, inappropriate policies may ensue. Interdependence may also 
have beneficial effects upon national policies (Krugman, 1987). For example, membership of a 
regional group may act as a buffer against destabilising shocks since the economy of the group is 
likely to be less volatile than is a single national economy. Sinlilarly, integration can help coWltries to 
increase the credibility of their econonlic policies of other group members, and hence achieving t11eir 
objectives at lower cost. Industrial and regional policies also have sinlilar consequences for partner 
countries which are heightened by integration; correspondingly, tl1ere is an argument for co-
ordination. This implies, however, some compronlise of national interests which in turn depends on 
the decision-making system and how far it is influenced by pressure groups. 
The removal of barriers to trade and factor mobility and tl1e co-ordination of econonlic policies 
through regional integration schemes are likely to have substantial effects on the econonlies of the 
member countries during tl1e 1990s; the consequences of regionalism for the world economy and its 
institutional fran1ework may also be considerable. 
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Chapter 5 
Foreign Direct linvestmeERt 
The relationship between either foreign capital inflow in general or foreign direct investment in 
particular and economic growth is rarely established statistically (IMF 1985). There is a general 
belief, however, that they are important as part of - though not a prerequisite for - development. 
Foreign direct investment is seen as both a complement and a stimulus to domestic investment, and 
technology transfer embodied in foreign direct investment is perceived to be critical to development 
(Balasubramanyam, 1980). 
There are several areas where the potential impact of foreign direct investment has been identified as 
important for the developing Asian economies (Ozawa 1980). In view of the increasing emphasis on 
export-based industrialisation, an important area involves the links between foreign direct investment 
and trade. The growth in East Asian exports, particularly manufactured exports, and its significance 
in the development process are well recognised. The role of foreign direct investment has been of 
considerable importance, though that role varies for different types of exports as well as in different 
markets. The importance of multinational corporations in the trade of developing nations should not 
be surprising in view of the intra-trade activities associated with multinational corporations and 
foreign direct investment generally, particularly US-based multinational corporations. Indeed, intra-
firm trade has been identified as growing rapidly in the Asia-Pacific region, though much of this 
growth has been in areas other than manufacturing (Hill and Johns, 1985). 
Singapore has always had a favourable disposition towards foreign investment. Indeed, an important 
feature of the open economy of Singapore has been the large extent of foreign involvement, especially 
in the modem sectors of the economy. The role of the Pacific countries in this respect has been 
particularly conspicuous. 
There appears to exist a close link between trade in manufactures and foreign investment activities in 
the economy. This seems to be the case especially with regards to intra-industry trade flows, for intra-
firm sales apparently constitute the bulk of such flows. Thus, an important explanation of Singapore's 
trade phenomenon lies in the pattern of foreign investment in the country (Balasubramanyam and 
Greenaway, 1992). 
The theory and evidence of international trade have important implications for business. Economic 
agents -firms, labour, owners of capital and land, and consumers - all seek to maximise the returns to 
their scarce resources. Since trade increases overall welfare, unless it is restricted by non-market 
forces, such as government, it will expand as these agents pursue the opportunities that trade presents. 
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Government, in its role as protector of the public interest, also has an incentive to foster trade to 
increase national welfare. If an individual business aligns itself with the process of international trade, 
market forces will work for it and the finn will prosper. If it does not, those same forces will work 
against it; it will decline tmless government intervenes. 
Investment in 'sunrise' industries, in which the nation has a comparative advantage because of its 
factor supplies and costs, has a greater chance of success than investment in comparatively 
disadvantaged ('sunset') industries. Of course, firms and workers in these latter industries have every 
incentive to lobby government to restrict trade. If trade restrictions are imposed, the industries will 
survive for a time. They exist, however, only as long as the dam of government protection can 
withstand the flood of world trade and the national and international protests of those hurt by these 
trade restrictions. 
Three trends in the international trade enviromnent are important for international business: tariff 
barriers are continuing to be reduced {despite neoprotectionism); transportation and communication 
costs as a percent of shipping value are decreasing; and the speed of teclmological diffusion is 
increasing. All three trends facilitate trade by reducing natural and govermnent imposed trade 
barriers. Industries and individual products that were once sheltered from competition from 
international trade are increasingly exposed. This evolving trade environment presents both threats 
and opportunities for managers in all cmmtries. If they respond to threats by obstructing trade, not 
only will national and world welfare be reduced, but their firms will ultimately decline. Only if 
managers respond to the opportunities of trade by investing in plant equipment and research and 
development in industries in which the nation has a comparative advantage, will their businesses 
flourish (Porter, 1989). 
More than far-sighted business decisions are necessary. The burden of adjustment to trade must be 
shared evenly. Such a conclusion is reached on practical grounds. If some groups lose from trade, they 
will lobby government for increased protection and trade will be impeded, to the detriment of 
potential winners and the nation as a whole. Capital and labour will remain tied up in inefficient uses 
and will not flow to more productive ones. The cost of capital and labour will rise in industries with a 
comparative advantage, and their competitiveness on international markets will decrease. Measures 
for retraining workers and employing capital can be expanded. 
It makes no sense to advocate free trade unless funds are available to facilitate adjustment. Political 
pressure from labour and business in declining sectors will ultimately force trade restrictions, to the 
detriment of the nation as a whole, unless the principles of trade theory are fully understood and 
implemented. The manager of a finn involved in international business is, of course, not responsible 
for the implementation of these principles. Tltis is the job of the government. 
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Singapore has no natural resources beyond its port, its location, and its people. Singapore's strategic 
location at the centre of the ASEAN region has contributed to its growth, but without the initiative of 
its government and its people tllis advantage would not have yielded t11e benefits it did. 
The Singapore govenm1ent actively encouraged foreign capital inflow by offering generous 
investment incentives to MNCs. The Singapore case illustrates a situation where the receptivity to 
foreign capital may have been due to the linlited range of options open to a small country. Lack of 
local entrepreneurial skHI and the limited size of the domestic market compelled the Singapore 
Govenm1ent to adopt an export-oriented industrialisation strategy with heavy reliance on foreign 
capital and teclmology. 
The part played by MNCs in the Singapore economy has become increasingly important since the 
1970s. The activities of MNCs penetrate into all branches of manufacturing as well as tl1e commercial 
and financial sectors. While it is generally believed that MNCs will raise the level of technology in the 
host countries by taking up more than proportionately the production and transfer of teclmology, it is 
also commonly argued that the teclmology introduced by MNCs is not 'appropriate' for developing 
countries. The most common argument is that MNC teclmology is capital-intensive and therefore 
tends to reduce the employment generation capacity of t11e host countries. On the otl1er hand, MNCs 
are also e}.'}Jected to play an important role in employment generation through their participation in 
the manufactured exports from developing countries (Lim, 1988). 
It is necessary to define what exactly MNCs are. Despite the fact that MNCs are said to exist 
everywhere, that their study has been taken up by researchers from various disciplines, and they are 
constantly referred to by the govenm1ent, the mass media and the general public alike, there is still no 
general consensus on the exact definition ofMNCs; nor is there a general consensus on the use of the 
term MNCs. The other popular names for MNCs are Multinational Enterprises (MNEs), 
Transnational Corporations (TNCs) and International Corporations. The United Nations organisation 
now prefers to use TNCs in lieu of MNCs and MNEs. The tem1 TNC has the advantage tl1at it has a 
more general com1otation of referring to activities taking place across national boundaries. 
In tllis study the term MNC will be used. MNCs being defined as tl10se finns wllich have a parent 
fim1 in a home country and subsidiaries in one or more host countries. In the subsidiary, some 
production processes take place in the sense that it is not just a sales office or sometlling sinlilar 
(Caves, 1982). 
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llllata constraints 
There are no comprehensive data on FDI stocks and flows in each of the ASEAN countries. FDI data 
are generally from the balance of payments statistics and from the investment boards. The various 
national data differ with respect to definition, coverage and time period and cannot are aggregated to 
produce an accurate ASEAN total and have li1nitations when making intercmmtry comparisons. The 
published balance of payments data on FDI flows do not represent total FDI in each country or foreign 
ownership of productive assets and do not show sectoral breakdowns or country sources as these are 
usually available only from data compiled by national investment boards. However, such data usually 
refer to FDI approved rather than implemented. 
Reliable and comprehensive data relating to foreign investments in Singapore are hard to come by. In 
Singapore, FDI statistics are derived from the EDB. They exclude investment outside the promoted 
sectors and ignore reinvestments by the existing units. The data is often too aggregated, as it is 
intended merely to show capital outflows as registered by the central banks. Data on capital exports, 
sufficiently disaggregated to shed light on t11e sectoral distiibution of capital outflows, are not readily 
available. One other caveat is that capital exports are sometimes channelled through particular 
countries for certain tax reasons, thus camouflaging the actual destination of capital transfers 
(Wagner, 1989). 
FDI data provided by multilateral organisations like the IMF are not helpful either, as such data are 
available only at a highly aggregated level. Moreover, international comparisons are hampered by 
dissimilar standards of compilation of data between countries and differences in accounting 
procedures and depreciation rules. Furthermore, there is no standard international classification for 
investinent, unlike trade (SITC) and industry (ISIC). 
These data problems have to be borne with when foreign investment stocks are analysed. Needless to 
say, the scope of the analysis in the following chapters is affected by data constraints of one kind or 
another. Accordingly, the conclusions based on the analysis will have to be treated with caution. 
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The theory of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) 
Foreign direct investment is a distinct form of capital movement because investors have direct control 
over management and production in their overseas operations. Early attempts to analyse foreign direct 
investment (FDJ) as a fom1 of international capital movement within the framework of the theory of 
international trade proved to be inadequate because they simply failed to match the empirical 
evidence. 
Within modem writings on the theory of FDI, three prominent approaches are represented by: 
Western economists interested in the behaviour of large multinational fim1s, especially those of 
American origin; Japanese economists who are concerned to explain the motivation of Japanese direct 
investment during the mid-1960s and 1970s, and writers from host countries who are concerned about 
the benefits and costs ofFDI to the host economy and society. 
Western approaches 
Traditional trade U1eory treated FDI as a form of international movement of capital (Ohlin 1933). 
Differences in the relative factor endowment ratios of capital and labour among countries caused 
differences in the rate of return to capital as represented in the level of interest rates. This led to flows 
of capital from capital-rich to capital-poor countries. This view of FDI as capital movement proved to 
be inadequate in explaining foreign investment by developed countries. Empirically it was found that 
the majority of FDI was not directed towards countries which were poorly endowed with financial 
capital, but rather towards developed countries, and a large percentage of the capital expenditure of 
foreign subsidiaries was financed from local sources. 
Noting that the key agent of recent (post World War II) Western foreign investment was the 
multinational fim1, a number of Western economists in the 1960s and 1970s analysed foreign 
investment by applying industrial organisation theory to the actions of the multinational fim1. Their 
investigations began from the assumption that a multinational operating in a foreign country was 
faced with certain costs which local firms did not face. These costs arose from cultural differences, 
difficulties in understanding local language and markets, problems with bureaucracy and so on. To 
compensate for these disadvantages, multinational firms investing overseas had to have some 
countervailing advantages which enabled them to compete successfully against local rivals. The 
attention was thus turned on the specific advantages of the investing firms and the ways in which 
these advantages affected their strategy for corporate growth. 
A pioneer among this group was Hymer, who was the first to demonstrate that the central motive for 
direct investment was the finn's desire to control foreign operations. Tllis direct control was necessary 
in order to obtain the full returns on advantages of skills and abilities which that finn possessed over 
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local and foreign competitors (Hymer 1976). These advantages could be of various kinds: access to 
cheap capital or raw materials; access to larger markets which led to economies of scale; exclusive 
possession of intangible assets such as managerial skills and superior teclmology; or the inforn1ation, 
Research and Development (R&D) and other infrastructure available in the multinational network. Of 
all these, Hymer concluded that lmowledge or technological advantage over local firms was the most 
important. 
However Hymer recognised that possession of technological advantage might not be a necessary 
condition for FDI, and other economists elaborated the argument further, arguing that imperfections 
in the markets were important additional factors which ensured that firms could exploit their specific 
advantages through discriminatory pricing (Kindleberger 1969; Caves 1971; Horst 1978). Caves and 
Horst argued that firms were induced to invest directly overseas when they possessed well established 
brand names and other forms of product differentiation which created monopolistic advantages over 
local and other foreign finns. The marketing advantages of oligopolistic firms with differentiated 
products offset disadvantages inherent in investing and operating overseas, and could explain why 
these firnlS invested abroad. Caves also argued that large firms were in a better position to fund the 
large initial outlays involved in overseas operations, and thus he associated FDI with large 
oligopolistic firms. 
The product cycle theory proposed by Raymond Vernon was a variant of the industrial organisation 
approach to foreign investment (Vernon 1966, 1981; Wells 1972). It attempted to integrate tl1e firm-
specific advantages theory with the tlleory of international trade. It regarded technological innovation 
as the main detenninant of the structtue of world trade and of tl1e distribution of production among 
different countries. Technological innovations were finn-specific advantages and the differentials in 
these assets gave rise to comparative advantage among firms in different locations. These comparative 
advantages explained patterns of trade and investment. 
The product cycle model comprised three stages. In tl1e first stage a firm in an advanced country 
innovated a new product. As long as the technology for producing tl1e product was not yet 
standardised, the production was located in the country of origin where there was a good supply of 
suitably skilled labour and easy access to the major market, and tl1e originating firn1 enjoyed a 
monopolistic position in the market. In the second stage the production technology became more 
standardised, more firms entered the market, demand became more price elastic, and the firms 
competed with one another to improve productivity and gain economies of scale. With standardised 
technology, firn1s could mass-produce for export, or even relocate the production to countries with 
lower unskilled labour costs. In the final stage, firms were virtually obliged to relocate production to 
low cost countries and import finished products back to the originating country, or face the prospect 
that competitors would relocate and steal tl1e market. Thus according to the product cycle theory the 
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move overseas was prompted initially by a desire to pre-empt other competitors from shating the 
markets. 
For the industrial organisation theorists, the key determinants of foreign investment were thus firm-
specific advantages and the imperfections in the markets. More recent works attempted to give a more 
precise definition of these firm-specific advantages. Hennart argued that the key advantages arose 
from i1movations in legal forms, organisational structure, management techniques and international 
communications. Firms which possessed these advantages found they could obtain better profits by 
direct investment rather than by licensing ventures (Hennart 1982). Buckley and Casson (1976) added 
that there were certain advantages inherent in the multinationalism of the multinational firm. 
Through transfer pricing, vertical integration of production, and similar techniques, multinational 
firms could generate economies of scale which raised the profitability of direct investment versus 
licensing or similar arrangements. 
Subsequently Casson identified the key advantage of the multinational firn1 as its ability to internalise 
the transaction costs associated with the development ofR&D and the accumulation of knowledge and 
R&D at low transaction costs, the greater would be the benefit it could gain from directly marketing 
the resulting products ratl1er than simply selling technology. In tl1ese circtmlstances, firn1s would 
choose to license technology only if host governments refused to allow direct investment (Casson 
1987). 
More recently, economists became interested in new forn1s of overseas involvement which differed 
from the conventional style of direct investment (Oman 1984 ). These forms included technology 
contracts, management contracts, franchise arrangements, turnkey projects and production sharing. 
These have been labelled as 'new fonns of investment'. Oman categorised these new fonns of 
operation into two main types. In the first, the foreign-held equity was usually less than 50%. In the 
second, the foreign firm contributed no equity at all, but provided technology, e:-..'Jlertise or brand name 
franchise in return for some management control and some long-term arrangement for compensation. 
This arrangement could be a long-term contract or grant of a minority equity share. 
The new forms of investment involved some tmbundling of the 'package' of traditional FDI, which 
usually included equity or financial capital along with embodied or disembodied technology, 
management and even access to world markets. According to the industrial organisation approach to 
overseas investment, these new fonns appeared because multinational firms found tl1em a profitable 
way to optimise the return from their innovations and from their accumulated skills and knowledge in 
management and marketing compared to traditional equity participation (Chee 1989). Small and 
medium sized firms which accumulated firm-specific advantages in small-scale production, unique 
technology or organisation know-how might prefer the new form of investment as a means to get an 
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optimal return to their specific advantages because they had limited financial and managerial 
resources (Chee 1989). 
The 'eclectic paradigm theory' of foreign direct investment (J. D. Dunning), though itself not another 
theory, is intended to provide an overall analytical framework for empirical investigations, by 
establishing the common ground between theories. According to this theory, there are three sets of 
determinants of FDI, each relating to an advantage of direct investment over alternative modes of 
serving the firm's customers at home and abroad. The first necessary condition for FDI is that foreign 
firms have an ownership advantage over their rivals or potential rivals in the host country. The 
ownership advantage is necessary to out weigh the disadvantage of being foreign. It may take the form 
of either a monopoly over a product or brand name, a patent on a production process or technology, or 
a superior knowledge of the market and of marketing techniques. 
The second requirement for FD I is that the host country must have some locational advantage in 
terms of serving the market of the host country or as an export base. The locational advantage may 
derive from a fundan1ental comparative advantage, such as a11 abundance of high quality, low wage 
labour, from relatively low transportation costs, or from policy-determined costs arising from trade 
restrictions, labour legislation, pollution controls and direct incentives to or restrictions on direct 
investment. In the absence of a locational advantage, the fim1 would chose exporting over direct 
investment as the way to exploit its ownership advantage in foreign markets. 
Finally, even when there is an ownership advantage and a locational advantage there must be an 
internalisation advantage that induces the firm to chose direct investment over other arn1s-length 
arrangements, such as production licensing. In many developing countries there is an expressed desire 
to unbundle FDI so as to obtain the technology that comes with foreign investment without yielding 
control over production to foreigners. However, except in the natural resource field where service 
contracts, production-sharing agreements and technical assistance agreements are not uncommon, 
foreign investors have generally resisted unbundling the direct investment package. Often it has 
proved difficult to define the component to be sold, such as technology and to agree upon a price. 
It is useful to consider how tltis theory applies to t11e three broad forms ofFDI in developing com1tries: 
i) natural resource investment; ii) investment to serve the host country market; iii) export-oriented 
investment. In the case of natural resource investment, tlte locational advantage is obvious. The 
ownership advantage of fim1s from developed countries derives from the high capital intensity and 
technology intensity of natural resource extraction. This advantage has not, however, always proved 
enduring, as evidenced by the nationalisation of foreign firms in the natural resource sector of 
developing countries. The intemalisation advantage for natural resource investment is also not as 
strong as in other sectors. 
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The first wave of post-war direct investment in developing countries aimed at serving the host-country 
market occurred in the 1950s and 1960s in response to the adoption of the import substitution 
industrialisation strategy by many developing countries. That producers in developed countries 
possessed some ownership advantage over domestic firms in developing countries was apparent from 
the fact that they dominated the market for manufactured goods in developing countries. The premise 
of the infant industry argmnent on which the import substitution strategy was founded was that 
manufacturers in developing countries could acquire the ownership advantage if only given time. 
However, import barriers themselves provided the missing locational advantage to direct invesunent 
in developing countries, and thus direct investment became a means of circumventing trade 
restrictions. In recent years foreign invesUnent aimed at the domestic market has been concentrated in 
the service sector, in such branches as banking, insurance and tourism. In this sector the locational 
advantage derives not so much from government policies as from the nature of the services 
themselves, which often require a local presence in order to provide the service. 
The third form of FDI is the expmt-oriented investment, which acquired special importance in East 
Asia in the 1970s and 1980s. The locational advantage of export oriented investment derives 
primarily from comparative advantage, in particular from a relative abundance of low wage labour 
and foreign policy-induced advantages, such as the establishment of export processing zones within 
which foreign firms could operate under essentially free trade conditions. The ownership advantages 
consisted of foreign firms' inside knowledge of the market for labour intensive products in developed 
countries, and in the case of manufactured components, from the foreign investors' ability to identifY 
labour-intensive processes within the vertically integrated production structure of the multinational 
finn which could be relocated to developing countries. One important consequence of ex']>ort-oriented 
direct investment was in inducing local firms to emulate the export-oriented foreign firms, with the 
result that indigenous firms have acquired an ownership advantage that allowed them to become 
foreign investors themselves. 
The theory of FDI pertains to intra-regional investment flows in the same way that trade theory 
pertains to intra-regional trade. Where there are ownership, locational and inter-nationalisation 
advantages to FDI among the Asian countries, investment should follow, provided barriers are not 
placed in its way. Furthermore, to the extent that direct investment flows are motivated by 
comparative advantage considerations, as in the case of natural resource investment and export-
oriented investment, a complementary relationship should be observed between direct investment 
flows and trade flows. Even import substituting direct investment may complement trade, since 
foreign firms operating in sheltered markets often make heavy use of imported capital goods and 
intermediates from the home country. The expectation is, therefore, that where conditions favour 
intra-Asian trade they will also favour complementary flows ofFDI between the Asian economies. 
179 
Japanese approaches 
The 'organisation', 'transaction' and 'product cycle' approaches to the analysis of foreign investment 
were all developed to help explain the behaviour of MNCs, and in particular American MNCs. In the 
1960s, these MNCs were the major agents for overseas investment. From 1969 onwards, foreign 
investment began to flow out of Japan at an ever increasing rate until by 1980 Japan overtook the 
United States in terms of net annual outflow of investment. By the late 1970s, the analysis of foreign 
investment had become a topic of major importance for Japanese economists. 
Their approaches to the theory of foreign investment diverged sharply from the micro-economic 
concerns of Western theory. Among the Japanese approaches, the most remarkable was that of 
Kojima, not least because of his aggressive departure from Western theory. 
Kojima argued that the product cycle theory and other approaches from micro-economic theory tended 
to explain the motivation to invest overseas in tenns of the defence of monopolistic or oligopolistic 
advantages (Kojima 1973, 1978). He was concerned that tllis approach encouraged host countries to 
view foreign investment as exploitive and often directly antagonistic to the better interests of host 
country firms and the host economy as a whole. To counter this tendency, Kojima did not argue that 
the theory of monopolistic advantage was wrong, but rather that it was only one of a range of 
motivations for foreign investment. He went on to draw a contrast between American investment 
overseas, which often could be explained in terms of the defence of monopolistic or oligopolistic 
advantage, and Japanese investments which he claimed were differently motivated and more benignly 
complementary to tl1e host economy. To achieve tllis contrast, Kojima switched the approach away 
from the micro-economic perspective of organisation t11eory, and back to the macro-economic 
framework of comparative advantage and the international division of labour. 
Kojima (1978) elaborated his t11eoretical exposition, based on tl1e well known Heckscher-Ohlin 
theorem, in his book 'The Theories of Foreign Investment'. He divided direct investment into four 
major types: resource-oriented, labour-oriented, market-oriented, and oligopolistic, and argued that 
each type had a different motivation, and a different impact on trade and on the host country 
economy. 
Resource-oriented investment was undertaken to increase the production of natural resource products 
which the home country lacked. This type of investment generated trade, because it resulted from the 
home country's lack of comparative advantage and its desire to secure a supply of natural resource 
products from t11e host country. The investment thus increased exports of primary products from the 
host country to home and third countries. But where production and marketing were integrated witllin 
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the same foreign multinational firm, host countries might receive small benefits in tem1s of returns 
because of the monopolistic position ofthe foreign multinational firm. 
Labour~oriented investment was tmdertaken in labour-intensive industries (such as textiles, shoes, 
toys) for which home countries had lost comparative advantage, usually because of rising labour costs. 
Such investment complemented less developed cmmtries which have scarcity of capital but abundant 
labour. It assisted in the reorganisation of the international division of labour and promoted trade 
between labour-scarce and labour-abundant countries. It increased the import of capital goods from 
developed to developing countries. And, as this type of investment aimed to establish an export base 
rather than import substitution, it increased export of labour-intensive products from developing 
countries back to the home country or to third cmmtries. 
Market-oriented investment in Kojima's scheme was direct investment induced by trade barriers in the 
host country. Often developing countries imposed differential tariffs, heavier on final consumer goods 
but lower on intermediate and capital goods. This cascading tariff structure induced foreign firms to 
import components and parts and assemble them into consumer goods for sale in the domestic market 
of the host country. This type of investment was trade-creating, but often one sided. It increased 
export of components, parts and capital goods from the home to the host country. But since the 
original purpose of protection was to encourage import substitution industries, foreign investment 
induced by this kind of protection enabled the firm to produce and sell above the world market price. 
In the short term the lop-sided trade impact was likely to weigh the host cmmtry's balance of trade. 
But, if the import substitution industry grew successfully towards export orientation, then direct 
foreign investment of this type could tum out to be labour-oriented investment and could generate 
trade from the host cow1try. 
Kojima's fourth type of direct investment was labelled 'oligopolistic direct foreign investment'. It was 
a variant of the market-oriented type, essentially similar to the direct investment described by Hymer 
and Vernon with respect to the United States, namely direct investment in products which 
commanded oligopolistic positions in the market because of product differentiation and other firm 
specific advantages. This type of investment, according to Kojima, was anti trade creating in two 
different ways. First, from the point of view of the home country, the transfer of production to a 
foreign location reduced exports and might eventually increase imports as products were imported 
back from the overseas subsidiary to the home country. In his words, "Both the loss offoreign markets 
and increase in imports then result in balance of payments difficulties and the export of ~ob 
opportunities"' (Kojima 1978 page 89). Second, from the point of view of the host cow1try, the 
demand for inputs (foreign exchange, labour, skill) in the newly located industries tended to restrict 
the availability of such inputs for traditional industries in which the host country had a comparative 
advantage in world trade. As such it diminished the host country's capacity for export growth. 
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Kojima argued that American foreign investment was mainly of the fourth type. It had occurred 
mostly in products which involved high expenditure in R&D and advertising by large firms, and 
which as a result commanded highly oligopolistic positions in the market. By contrast, Kojima 
contended, Japanese foreign investment consisted mainly of the first three types. He argued that 
Japanese investment in Southeast Asia in the 1960s and 1970s was concentrated in product areas such 
as textiles, iron and steel and agriculture. And he pointed out that these were traditional, price 
competitive goods in which Japan and other developed countries had been losing their comparative 
advantage, largely on account of rising labour costs. Japanese investments were thus complementary 
to the factor endowments of developing countries, and tended to encourage trade, promote the 
international division of labour, and aid the industrialisation of the host countries. 
In Kojima's analysis, foreign investment was usually induced by changes in comparative advantage 
within the framework of a competitive market. Yet he admitted that there would be specific situations 
in which foreign investment was induced by imperfections in the market. These imperfections might 
be created by the oligopolistic advantages of firms, or by the p1ice distortions of tariff policies. Yet 
Kojima placed more emphasis on the framework of comparative advantage because of its relevance to 
the bulk of Japanese overseas investment in the late 1960s and 1970s. His main contribution to the 
theory of FDI was to focus attention on the international division of labour resulting from changes in 
comparative advantage. 
Several writers argued that Kojima's sharp distinction between the motivations of Japanese and 
American investment was misleading. Sekiguchi and Krause pointed out that the Japanese pattern of 
FDI in the 1960s and 1970s reflected merely the stages of economic development of Japan and Asian 
countries at that particular period (Sekiguchi and Krause 1980). As Japan moves up the teclmological 
scale and becomes more like the United States, they suggested, Japan would invest more in im1ovative 
products, and the pattern of Japanese direct investment would become more like that of the United 
States. In other words, the distinction which Kojima drew between 'Japanese' and 'American' 
motivations for overseas investment was really a distinction between countries in the early and later 
phases of industrial maturity. And as a result, it was likely to change over time. 
In a study comparing Japanese and American direct investment in South Korea, Lee (1984) confirmed 
tllis analysis. In the period 1962 to 1972, Japanese investment did tend to be a little more labour-
intensive than American. But there was a change in pattern over the ne;>,.i six years, when both 
American and Japanese direct investment in South Korea became concentrated in skill-intensive, 
high-technology industries. 
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Building on this analysis, Lee argued that Kojima had underestimated the importance of micro-
economic factors in his theory of foreign investment. Lee accepted that foreign investment took place 
within an overall framework of comparative advantage in which resource constraints and govermnent 
policies (both home and host) played an important role. But Lee added that decisions to invest were 
taken at the individual firm level. Even when confronted by resource constraints and changes in 
comparative advantage, Japanese firms faced a range of options. They could switch product lines, 
concentrate on the home market, or even stop production and convert their capital to stocks. An 
adequate theory needed to explain why firms would choose to invest overseas. In Lee's opinion, this 
theory would need to return to the organisation approach of Caves and Vernon. 
Several writers suggested that Japanese investment in ASEAN in the 1980s had many similarities to 
the American style described by the organisation theorists, and which Kojima had disavowed. As 
Japanese firms faced strong competition from the Asian NICs particularly in markets such as 
consumer electronics, Japanese investment in ASEAN displayed many of the oligopolistic 
characteristics of American firms. And Japanese firms became as adept as any American 
multinational at developing brand names and other fom1s of product differentiation in order to reap 
oligopolistic advantages. 
Ho!l1 country approaches 
Economists from ASEAN host countries tended to see no substantial difference between the 
motivations of American and Japanese firms. In their view, both were monopolistic. Both were 
concerned to conserve and exploit their specific advantages, hence the low level of technological 
transfer. Several studies from host countries showed that Japanese firms were more restrictive than 
American or European firms in transferring technology and skills. 
All of these approaches concentrated on the supply side. They analysed the motivations of the 
investing firms or the comparative advantages of the investing countries. They considered the host 
countries in tern1s of the investment climate, the state of political stability, and certain specific 
policies such as tariffs and investment promotion. 
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Foreign Direct Investment = The World Economy 
The term "Globalisation" can happily accommodate all manner of things: expanding international 
trade, the growth of multinational businesses, the rise in international joint ventures and increasing 
interdependence through capital flows - to name but a few. Trade related aspects of globalisation raise 
controversial questions of policy: witness the stalemate in the Uruguay round of trade talks. But in one 
respect this sort of globalisation is easy enough to grasp: anybody who is either a consumer or a 
producer knows what trade in goods and services means. On closer examination, part of the mystery 
can be e":plained, some of the threat dispelled. In broad terms, the evolution of global finance in the 
past decade is readily understood. Banks and other financial firms saw new opportmtities, responded 
to competition, tried to increase their shares of markets to raise their profits just as companies in other 
industries do. It was the pace of change that took everybody by surprise (The Econontist, 19th-25th 
September 1992). 
Acting separately, innovation, technology and deregulation would each have spurred rapid financial 
change during the 1980s. But they came together, intercOimected, each multiplying the effects of the 
others. As a result, there has been little time for the capital market, or the governments that regulate 
it, to learn. Both have made big mistakes and will continue to do so. If for no other reason, the 
transition to the new world of finance is likely to be hazardous. So for some time yet, the mystery and 
the threat will remain. 
In all sorts of ways, foreign direct investment (FDI) is a special case, in tenus of global finance and 
global business. FDI increased sharply during the 1980s. Almost all of this increase, until recently, 
has been in flows of FDI among rich, industrial countries (see tables 5.1 and 5.2). A look at the 
geographical pattern of industrial-country flows makes it clear tl1at macroeconontic policies -
especially as they affect exchange rates - had a decisive influence. 
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Table 5.1 
Foreign direct investment inflows 
into the larger industrial countries (annual averages) 
1975-79 1980-84 1985-89 1990 1991 
Total inflows, $bn 
% distribution 18 34 96 156 84 
United States 33 53 51 29 14 
Larger EC cmmtries 57 38 37 57 66 
-of which 
Belgium 6 3 3 6 na 
France 10 7 6 8 18 
Germany 7 2 2 2 3 
Italy 3 3 3 4 3 
Holland 4 3 4 7 5 
Spain 4 5 5 9 12 
Britain 23 15 14 21 25 
Australia 6 6 5 4 5 
Canada 2 -1 1 5 5 
Japan 0.5 0.8 0.4 1 2 
Sweden 0.3 0.5 1 1 8 
Switzerland 0 0.8 2 3 na 
Table 5.2 
Foreign direct investment outflows 
from the larger industrial countries (annual averages) 
1975-79 1980-84 1985-89 1990 1991 
Total outflows, $bn 
% distribution 34 40 126 214 157 
United States 47 24 19 15 17 
Larger EC countries 40 53 48 50 55 
-of which 
Belgium 1 0.3 2 3 na 
France 5 8 7 16 15 
Germany 9 9 8 11 14 
Italy 1 4 3 4 5 
Holland 6 7 6 7 7 
Spain 0.4 0.8 0.6 1 2 
Britain 18 24 21 8 12 
Australia 0.8 2 3 0.9 0.2 
Canada 4 7 4 0.2 3 
Japan 6 11 17 22 20 
Sweden 2 2 4 7 5 
Switzerland 0 0.8 4 3 na 
Totals may not add up to 100 due to rounding 
Source: IMF International Financial Statistics Yearbook (various years). 
For 30 years, to the end of the 1970s, American outflows of FDI to other rich countries amounted to 
roughly half the global total. In 1980-84, as recession and high interest rates reduced the financing 
capacity of American companies, the share fell to 24%. However, American multinationals began 
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raising capital from off-shore affiliates, which in tum could borrow from foreigners without exposing 
them to America's withholding tax on interest. Balance of payments figures record such borrowing 
from foreign affiliates as a fall in outflows ofFDI. 
In 1985-89, as the dollar fell in value, flows of FDI from America were reduced to just 19% of 
worldwide flows. Suddenly control of American companies was available to foreigners at bargain 
basement prices. Hence, investors piled in. In 1989 Britain's FDI outflows were 17% of global flows 
(about the same as America's). Most of that capital flowed into America. Japan's share of the 
worldwide total increased to 24%- much of it, again, to America. 
Though most of the increase in FD I during the 1980s was investment to and from industrial countries, 
this may be about to change. Between 1989 and 1990, the most recent year for which figures are 
available, inflows ofFDI to industrial countries fell from $165 billion to $152 billion- mainly because 
of slowing economic growth in America. But inflows to developing countries went up slightly, from 
$30 billion to $32 billion (The Economist, 19th-25tll September 1992). 
FDI in developing cotmtries is unevenly distributed. The economics of East Asia take the major share. 
Between 1986 and 1990 the developing countries altogether received, on average, $26 billion ofFDI a 
year. Of that, East and South-East Asia's share was $14 billion, Latin America's $9 billion and 
Africa's $3 billion. Relative economic performance, it might seem, would account for that distribution. 
But again, causality can run both ways. Many of Asia's economies have long sought FDI, not so much 
for the capital as for the contacts, knowledge and technology that come with it. Many developing 
countries in other regions have traditionally been hostile to it - not because they did not need the cash, 
but because they did not want foreigners owning and running their businesses. 
Tllis is changing fast. Govemment policies towards FDI are being liberalised worldwide. According to 
the United Nations' World Investment Report 1992 on transnational corporations, tltis trend 
accelerated in 1990 and 1991. In a tally for 1991, the report counts 34 countries, rich and poor alike, 
that made, in all, 82 big changes to their FDI laws. Eighty of tltose changes made the rules less 
restrictive. This matters because the market for corporate control is much easier to damage witl1 
regulation than the market for footloose capital. Unlike in the market for pure capital, deregulation of 
the market for FDI was probably a necessary condition for faster growth of flows to poor countries. 
Another powerful spur to FDI in poor countries has been privatisation. As many developing countries 
have recently turned to what tl1e World Bank calls "market-friendly" policies, privatisation and a 
more welcoming attitude to inward FDI have often gone hand in hand. In this way another trend in 
domestic policy during tl1e 1980s - or is it merely 'deregulation' in another guise? - has contributed to 
the growth of global finance. More than 70 countries are reckoned to have embarked on major 
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privatisation programmes during the past ten years. In 1985-90 roughly 130 state-owned enterprises 
were sold every year. And by the end of the 1980s, on one estimate, global privatisation proceeds 
added up to nearly $200 billion (United Nations- World Investment Report, 1992). 
Over the coming years, this new acceptance of FDI in developing countries is likely to make a big 
difference to their growth prospects. There is no question that barriers to the international flow of 
capital are coming down - either because governments saw them crumbling <md had no choice but to 
dismantle them, or else because (as in the case ofFDI) they chose to demolish t11e barriers regardless. 
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Foreign Direct Investment in ASEAN 
In the 1980s the ASEAN region has become one of the most attractive investment locations in the 
developing world and attracted a disproportionately large amount of FDI, particularly in the 1987-91 
period. Its success stands in sharp contrast to that of other developing countries, which have 
experienced a falling share of global FDI flows. However, in the coming years, ASEAN may expect 
keener competition for FDI (United Nations- World Investment Report, 1991). 
Until the 1980s most developing countries were reluctant to depend much on FDI as an instrument of 
economic development and industrialisation because of perceptions of high costs and uncertain 
benefits. Dependence on FDI is seen to increase a country's economic, political and social 
vulnerability, undermine its national sovereignty, and expose its society to undesirable foreign 
influences. Where the development emphasis is on social justice and the eradication of poverty, 
agricultural and rural development, and import-substituting industrialisation, FDI is perceived to have 
a limited role. However, with the need to accelerate economic growth and to achieve a more dynamic 
and internationally competitive industrial sector, FDI is increasingly perceived to be useful. FDI 
makes possible not only access to larger volmnes of capital resources and foreign exchange but also 
access to technology, managerial expertise, marketing skills, and sourcing and marketing networks 
which facilitate the entry into e:\."J)Ort markets and upgrade local enterprise. 
The experiences of ASEAN economies, particularly Singapore, with FDI are largely positive. 
Differences in FDI experience among host developing countries may be partly owing to industry-
specific and firm-specific factors, but the benefits from FDI also depend largely on the institutional 
and policy environment of the host countries. 
First, where trade, industrial and competition policy regimes result in a distorted incentive structure, 
as is usually the case with import substitution, and where government bureaucracies are incompetent 
and corrupt, foreign MNCs are more prone to inefficiency and rent-seeking activities. In general, 
countries which pursue market-oriented and export-oriented policies have better experiences with 
FDI. Second, com1tries which impose highly restrictive performance requirements on equity 
ownership, localisation of persmmel, local sourcing of inputs, and transfer of teclmology without 
parallel measures to improve domestic supplies and human resource development will be unable to 
maximise the benefits from FDI. 
Traditionally, FDI in the region has been mainly from non-regional developed countries. Later on, 
Japanese investment became important. In the period from the 1950s to the early 1980s, most ASEAN 
governments, with the notable exception of Singapore, had been lukewann towards foreign 
investment for two main reasons. First, they expanded state capital significantly in tl1e 1950s and 
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1960s and tended to view foreign capital as a potential competitor of state capital. Second, they feared 
that foreign capital would strengthen sections of domestic capital which the government did not 
favour. However, by the early 1980s, the importance of these two factors had generally diminished. 
State capital had failed to have a dynamic effect on economic development and was in retreat in most 
states. And ASEAN governments felt more confident of their abilities to manage the politico-
economic impact of foreign capital inflow. At the same time, the recession of the early 1980s made 
foreign capital an attractive option for alleviating the debt burden and regenerating economic growth. 
As a result of these forces, after 1985 the ASEAN govermnents were prepared to revise rules and 
promotional incentives to encourage investment inflow (Robison, 1986; Krause, Koh and Lee 1988). 
The attitude of domestic capital towards foreign investment was also favourably affected by the 
recession of the early 1980s. Many of the avenues of opportunity open to domestic capital in the 1970s 
appeared to be closing off. First, as state capital retreated, so too did the opportunities for government 
contracts and joint public-private ventures. Second, the recession in Western markets blunted export 
possibilities. And third, opportunities for import substitution investment seemed to be exhausted. In 
many cmmtries major business interests, particularly those with experience of cooperation with 
foreign capital in earlier distribution and import substitution ventures, were keen to expand into more 
complex manufacturing ventures, often with an export orientation, in conjunction with foreign 
technology and perhaps also equity participation. 
Four main factors lay behind the increase of Japanese investment into ASEAN in the late 1980s. First, 
structural changes in the Japanese economy dramatically altered the pattern of comparative advantage 
and forced many production processes to relocate outside Japan. Second, Japanese firms increasingly 
commanded specific advantages in terms of technology, management skills, organisational assets and 
marketing properties, that enabled them to realise profits through investment in a variety of overseas 
markets. Third, against a background of recession and exhaustion of import -substitution growth, large 
scale domestic capital in ASEAN perceived that Japanese capital and technology would deliver 
advantages both directly through joint-venture operations and indirectly through a general stimulus to 
the domestic economy. Fourth, ASEAN governments perceived that Japanese capital inflow would 
help relieve the debt burden and regenerate economic growth without seriously disturbing delicate 
politico-economic balances which sustained tl1ese governments in power. 
The ASEAN member countries differ markedly from each other in their economic philosophy and 
policies. These differences are also reflected in t11eir policy orientation towards FDI. At one extreme is 
Singapore, which has pursued a virtually open-door policy toward FDI, often discriminating against 
local industries in its investment incentives in the interests of growth efficiency (UN 1982). At the 
other extreme is Indonesia, which has pursued an inward-looking strategy of development and has 
experienced substantial amounts of protection induced FDI. Malaysia and the Philippines fall in the 
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intermediate category of countries which have attempted to attract FDI towards export-oriented 
industries. Both com1tries have established export processing zones in their bid to attract export-
oriented FDI. Thailand, which has a low level of FDI relative to the other com1tries, appears to have 
followed a laissez-faire policy towards FDI, allowing market forces to dictate the distribution of 
investments between locally owned <rnd foreign owned firms. This largely non-interventionist policy 
appears to have applied to Japan, the principal investor in the country. With the exception of 
Singapore, all of the member countries stipulate local content requirements and require MNCs to 
promote exports. In doing so the MNCs appear to have reacted to individual country policies towards 
FDI rather than adopt investments among the five countries. Thus, in the absence of a unified policy 
towards FDI on the part of ASEAN, no other outcome could be expected. 
The importance of foreign direct investment in the export of manufactured products varies between 
the different countries of the region. In Singapore, foreign firms, both Japanese and United States 
based MNCs in particular, are dominant in exporting manufactured products, including those 
'traditional' products that are still being manufactured. In the case of Malaysia, one of the key 
contributions of FDI has been associated with U1e growU1 of exports generally, including 
manufactured exports, in which the marketing role of MNCs has been particularly dominant 
(Hoffman and Tan, 1980). 
Although economic ftmdamentals are crucial, a favourable foreign investment policy improves the 
overall investment climate for FDI. Variations in policy stances among countries, as well as within a 
country over time, reflect different and changing perceptions of the benefits and costs of FDI, the 
development alternatives and options available, and the constraints and pressures. Compared with 
other developing regions, the ASEAN countries have always maintained a favourable stance towards 
FDI. However, until recent years, there were wide diversities in policies and attitudes among them. 
Singapore has always maintained a highly open economy and a friendly foreign investment regime, 
and FDI has always played a crucial role in the economy. Singapore welcomed FDI without 
reservation at a time when the FDI role was hotly debated in developing countries, including some in 
ASEAN, and the arguments of the 'dependency school' had found many adherents. Factors which 
have shaped Singapore's pro-FDI stance include its long history of openness to foreign trade and 
immigration, a not tulhappy colonial experience and smooth transfer of political power and the 
economic philosophy of the political leadership which has been in power since 1959. Furthermore, its 
small physical and economic size necessitated dependence on multinational corporations, witl1 their 
production know-how and established quality standards and marketing networks. The government 
rationalised tl1at MNCs would enable Singapore to industrialise quickly and efficiently without the 
necessity of protecting the small domestic market, and it would be too slow and uncertain to depend 
on traditional local capital to attract export-oriented MNCs (Lim 1988). 
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Unlike other ASEAN countries, no foreign investment laws were enacted in Singapore. In the 1960s 
FDI inflows helped to close the saving-investment gap, financed net imports and created employment. 
Additionally, when the city-state's viability as a nation state was in doubt in the immediate post-
independence years, the foreign investor presence helped to establish Singapore's economic security 
and gave confidence to local private capital. By the 1980s the economic situation in Singapore had 
changed markedly, with high rates of savings, balance of payments surpluses and full employment. 
Yet the dependence on FDI did not diminish. Singapore continues to rely on FDI for 
entrepreneurship, technology and markets. The promotion of inward FDI increasingly focuses on high 
technology and high value-added industries and services. At the same time, worsening land and 
labour constraints and the growing financial resources of public and domestic enterprises have led to a 
new emphasis on outward investments. Outward direct investments are particularly encouraged in the 
ASEAN region and China (Yue, 1983). 
The past decade has seen a growing perception in the other four ASEAN countries that FDI benefits 
far outweigh costs as FDI can contribute significantly to economic dynamism and restructuring and 
export performance. Particularly in t11e post-1985 period, the ASEAN-4 have revamped and modified 
their foreign investment policies. As a result, tl1ere has been a convergence of FDI policies, with 
respect to both the level and range of investment incentives offered and tlle relaxation of performance 
requirements and otl1er restrictive regulations. Foreign investment inflows have surged. 
Indonesia enacted the Foreign Investment Law in 1967 to promote and regulate FDI inflows. Its 
approach towards FDI remained cautious until recent years. The commodities and oil boom has 
encouraged a strategy of self-sufficiency, including import substitution in manufach1ring and a 
restrictive FDI policy. Falling oil and commodity prices in the mid-1980s, the heavy fiscal burden of 
non-performing state owned enterprises, and possibly the demonstration effect of the successful 
export-oriented Asian NICs caused a shift in development strategy towards a more open economy, 
emphasis on developing non-oil sectors, especially manufacmring, and bigger roles for the private 
sector and for FDI. The new FDI policy has more incentives and less restrictive mles for projects 
which are export-oriented, upgrade the teclmology and marketing know-how of existing firms, 
improve intemational competitiveness of mmmfacmred exports, encourage joint venhlres, and 
promote tl1e development ofless developed areas (United Nations- World Investment Report, 1992). 
Malaysia first introduced tax incentives to attract FDI into the manufachlring sector in the late 1950s. 
Foreign investments in manufacturing were increasingly cham1elled into export processing zones. As 
in Indonesia, the decline of oil and commodity prices in the first half of the 1980s, a rising fiscal 
burden, and slower economic growth led to a change in policy stance, with an enhanced role for FDI. 
The New Economic Policy for the 1990s emphasises the role of private enterprise rather than 
govemment intervention to narrow the etl1nic economic and social gaps. The new investment 
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incentives are aimed at broadening and upgrading Malaysia's industrial stmcture and giving greater 
emphasis to high-technology industries and to the linkage between small and medium industries and 
the larger industries (Yue, 1983). 
The Philippines' Basic Investment Law of 1960 provided tax incentives for the importation of 
machinery and spare parts for basic industries, followed by incentives for textiles, mining etc. The 
1967 Investment Incentives Act established the Board of Investment and granted a range of incentives 
for investments in priority industries. In 1970 the Export Incentive Act granted incentives to 
investments in export-oriented industries. The Board of Investment published annual Investment 
Priorities and Export Priorities plans, listing industries given special incentives. More laws 
proliferated in the 1970s including those establishing industrial estates and export processing zones. 
In 1981 the various pieces of legislation were consolidated under the 01m1ibus Investment Act. The 
political crisis in 1983 and the subsequent political instability had a negative impact on economic 
performance and on FDI inflows. FDI declined precipitously from $344 million in 1982 to only $72 
million in 1988. In an attempt to reverse the downtrend, the 1987 Omnibus Investment Code 
consolidated various investment laws and incentive schemes. Tltis was followed by the 1991 Foreign 
Investment Act which liberalised the m1es regulations on foreign ownership (United Nations - World 
Investment Report, 1992). 
Thailand's basic legislative framework for foreign investment dates back to the 1950s and has 
remained virtually tmchanged. However, there have been substantive changes in the perceived role of 
the private sector and of FDI, and this is reflected in the more flexible implementation of policy, 
particularly after 1984 (Yue, 1983). 
In Indonesia both US and Japanese FDI are domestic-market oriented, especially so in the 
manufacturing sector. It is also arguable whether Japanese investments in comparable industries are 
any more labour-intensive than US investments. Both countries appear to have reacted to the 
protectionist trade policies of Indonesia in the market orientation of their investments. Again, in 
recent years Singapore's exports are increasingly veering towards human and physical capital-
intensive exports. In Malaysia and the Philippines, both US and Japanese investments are oriented 
towards labour-intensive exports, especially so in the e:\:port processing zones. Arguably, a uniform 
policy towards FDI on the part of ASEAN may have promoted export oriented FDI based on labour-
intensive manufactures in all five countries. However, it is the policy orientation of the countries and 
not the source of FDI that appears to have influenced the market orientation of investments. 
Singapore has recently emerged as a significant investor in other developing countries in the region, 
including the ASEAN countries; such investments are in relatively labour-intensive industries. One 
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major reason for such FDI intensive in the use of cheap labour is the rising costs of labour in 
Singapore. 
Notwithstanding the problems of data comparability, the general picture that emerges from the 
different data sources is that the ASEAN countries have received a sizable share of the FDI that 
flowed to the developing world. The ASEAN countries accounted for 63.4% of the FDI flows to 
developing countries in the Asian and Pacific region in 1977-83, (UN Economic and Social 
Commission for Asia and the Pacific, 1986). Three ASEAN countries were among the ten largest 
recipient developing countries in the 1980s. Singapore was the leading host country, with $19.5 
billion ofFDI inflows, accmmting for 11.2% of the developing countries' total. Malaysia ranked sixth, 
with $9.8 billion and 5.6% share, while Thailand ranked ninth, with $5.1 billion and a 2.9% share. 
Table 5.3 shows ASEAN- net FDI inflows, (1961-90). Statistics for 1961-90 show that among the 
ASEAN countries, the largest private FDI flows have gone to Singapore, with 42.7% of the ASEAN 
total, followed by Malaysia with 27.6%, Thailand 13.7%. Indonesia 10.5% and the Philippines 5.5%. 
The level of FDI inflows in ASEAN in the 1980s was 4.3 times that received in the 1970s. For the 
industrial countries, the growth has been fastest for Thailand (7.9 times), followed by Singapore, 
Philippines, Malaysia and Indonesia (2.0 times). The growth of FDI has been especially marked 
during the 1988-90 period. 
Table 5.3 
ASEAN - net foreign direct investment inflows, 1961-1991 
Singapore Thailand Malaysia Philippines Indonesia ASEAN 
$Million 
1961-80 3,728 1,186 4,453 452 2,163 11,982 
1981-90 21,468 6,875 11,850 2,777 4,047 47,017 
1988-90 11,162 5,045 5,523 2,029 2,222 25,981 
1961-90 25,196 K,061 16,303 3,229 6,210 5K,999 
% Distribution 
1961-80 31.3 9.9 37.2 3.8 18.1 100.0 
1981-90 45.7 14.6 25.2 5.9 8.6 100.0 
1988-90 43.0 19.4 21.3 7.8 8.6 100.0 
1961-90 42.7 13.7 27.6 5.5 10.5 100.0 
Source : IMF - International Financial Statistics Yearbook, 1991. 
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Foreign Investment in Singapore 
While Singapore has pursued, since the 1970s, a policy of mobilising foreign and local investment in 
the sector of advanced technology and services, it has become a magnet for investment to the region as 
a whole, being in the leading ranks of 'developing countries'. This situation can be explained in 
Southeast Asia by a 'chain' process of industrialisation, with Singapore as an intennediate link for 
MNCs eager to move into the markets of the neighbouring countries. The emergence of a 
manufacturing sector in the region coincided with a wish on the part of Singapore to transfer certain 
classes of production outside the island and so circumvent local protectionism by means of direct 
investment. Preoccupied with the effects of the international recession on the island's economy, the 
government sought new guarantees for the viability of the emporium: in 1981 it set up the 
Government of Singapore Investment Corporation (GIC), and used part of the surpluses of public 
enterprises and of the state's foreign currency reserves to invest in the ASEAN cmmtries and increase 
its financial assets and deposits overseas (Wells, 1983). 
Before looking at the sectors which Singapore developed, we should investigate the character of the 
investment from outside which has enabled it to meet the challenges resulting from 1965, and to pull 
itself up to its present position of economic influence. Foreign investment has moved into Singapore 
on a massive scale because of its especially favourable socio-economic system. In fact, the success of 
Singapore in drawing in tlJ.is investment appears to be not only vital to itself in terms of economic 
growth, but also for the development of the region as a whole. 
The manufacturing sector has grown 21 times in real tenns since 1960, increasing from a 17.6% 
share of the economy to 26.9% in 1990. In the 1960s the emphasis was on labour-intensive industries 
such as textiles and consumer electronics to employ the thousands of workers who had been left 
redundant by the withdrawal of the British. But as skills levels and infrastructure improved in the 
1970s and 1980s, higher value-added industries such as petroleum refining and precision engineering 
were attracted to Singapore. Now that Singapore has virtually full employment, it has begun to move 
beyond production stage manufacturing and attract foreign investment in research and development 
and high technology industries such as aircraft assembly, material sciences, bio-technology and 
information technology (Accountancy, February 1983). 
With its 'growtl1 triangle' project t11e government is actively encouraging the more labour-intensive 
industries to move their production facilities into Malaysia or Thailand, where labour is cheaper and 
more abundant, but maintain head office functions in Singapore, where communication and 
distributive networks are more efficient and treasury/fund management facilities more sophisticated. 
"Singapore is not competing with these countries but promoting all ASEAN cmmtries so that the 
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region as a whole can offer the full range of resources and become a global economic power", (Lee 
Kuan Yew, quoted in- Accountancy, February 1993, page 47). 
Statnsticaa data on foreign innvestment 
Table 5.4 shows the percentage of foreign owned gross fixed assets by country of origin. Table 5.5 
shows the investment commitments in manufacturing by country of origin. 
Table 5.4 
Percentage of foreign owned gross fixed assets 
by country of origin 
Country 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 
USA 34% 33% 35% 38% 42% 
Japan 7% 13% 10% 22% 28% 
Europe 45% 37% 26% 17% 18% 
EC 42% 34% 20% 15% 16% 
UK 20% 14% 9% 6% 4% 
Netherlands 18% 14% 1% 6% 3% 
Gem1any 1% 3% 5% 2% 6% 
France 1% 1% 1% 1% 2% 
Italy 1% 1% 3% 
OtherEC 1% 1% 1% 1% 
Switzerland 1% 1% 2% 1% 1% 
Sweden 1% 1% 4% 1% 1% 
Other Europe 1% 1% 
Others 14% 17% 29% 23% 12% 
Source: Economic Development Board Yearbook (various years), Singapore. 
Since 1970 the US has remained the dominant investor except during the period 1986-1989 (as seen 
from Table 5.5) when Japan was dominant. Both of these economies account for the greatest share of 
investment, and this share has gradually risen over time. By 1990 the USA accounted for 42% of 
foreign owned gross fixed assets, with Japan accounting for 28%, a considerable increase from only 
7% in 1970. 
Although FDI from the UK continued to rise in real terms, its share of FDI declined continuously 
from 20% of foreign owned gross fixed assets in 1970 to 4% in 1990. This trend has also been 
followed by other EC members and European countries, except for Germany which showed an 
increase from 1% in 1970 to 6% in 1990. The share of FDI from the Netherlands was high prior to 
1980, being largely represented by one large petroleum refinery. Some of the figures are distorted, 
because of the recession which affected the economy in 1985. 
The figures for regional investment in Singapore are divided into several separate portions. At the 
beginning of the 1980s, seventy-two major investments in manufacturing were listed as originating 
from the ASEAN countries (Malaysia: 61, Thailand: 6, Indonesia: 5), eighty from Hong Kong and 
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seventeen from Taiwan. Totalling on average less than US$ 1.5 million and creating at most 50-100 
jobs, these inflows went to several specific sectors - te.:>..iiles, clothing, woodwork and furniture, paper 
and printing. But the sources of official statistics remain silent on the subject of the multiple minority 
shareholdings from ASEAN countries in foreign companies and above all companies owned by 
Singapore's Chinese diaspora: these are in the form of long-tem1 investment in services, real estate 
and the hotel industry, and include inflows which have been cham1elled via Hong Kong or Taiwan 
with the sole object of changing their identity before they come to be invested in Singapore (Ng, 
1986). 
The initiative for these investments springs from several quite distinct motives. First, the climate for 
doing business in the country of origin may be unfavourable for socio-political as much as for 
economic reasons: limited banking facilities, the exclusion of private capital from certain sectors, the 
ever present state bureaucracy and interventionism, inadequate infrastructures and low productivity. 
The endemic fear of political instability and of communalist movements forces overseas Chinese 
business circles throughout the region to regard Singapore as a refuge for their assets. 
Secondly, the expansion - both economically and in quality - of the services Singapore offers is 
attractive to investors from the neighbouring countries, who are fascinated by this beacon of material 
success. Thirdly, along with Hong Kong and Taiwan, the city state is one of the main pillars of the 
Chinese disapora with links of kinship, business and clientelism extending throughout and even 
beyond the region. Fourthly, the internal markets of the ASEAN countries - including that of 
Indonesia, which is by far the biggest but also the least developed - offer only limited outlets for 
sophisticated products, and present some difficult problems, such as high production costs, lack of 
skilled labour and customs dues that penalise exports. Finally, obtaining an interest in the industrial 
and tertiary fabric of Singapore has allowed the neighbouring countries to have access to efficient 
services, various modem techniques and a more direct acquaintance with the demands of international 
markets (Ng, 1986). 
The question that needs to be asked is whether or not the tendency will be for ASEAN investment in 
Singapore to diminish? There is no sure answer, but Singapore's policy of discouraging local 
concentrations of labour-intensive industries and of encouraging investment in the ASEAN countries 
suggests that the answer may tum out to be positive. The high cost of setting-up in Singapore and the 
loss of income to tl1e countries of the region from sales of energy and raw materials show a similar 
tendency. On the other hand, the uncertain economic and/or political outlook for its regional 
neighbours gives Singapore a piivileged status in the eyes of the business circles in those cmmtries, as 
a safe haven for capital and a hub of services and technologies capable of responding appropriately to 
their ambitions as tl1ey themselves are seeking to diversify the bases of their economies (Lim, 1988). 
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Table 5.5 
Investment commitments in manufacturing 
by country of origin 
Gross fixed assets (nearest S$ million) 
Country 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 
(1) (2) 
USA 505 674 533 571 805 427 443 543 586 520 1054 
Japan 135 212 73 166 166 244 493 601 691 541 708 
Europe 360 228 421 394 325 201 218 285 358 544 435 
EC 269 166 386 338 318 180 204 241 345 525 395 
-of which 
UK 129 83 283 207 186 69 93 42 56 174 89 
Netherlands 1 62 99 70 75 57 70 82 174 72 
Gem1any 69 11 31 12 14 20 16 90 46 26 165 
France 18 1 1 6 15 27 15 86 106 60 
Italy 45 62 2 5 44 5 22 68 32 
OtherEC 6 6 5 7 2 1 4 0.2 4 11 6 
Switzerland 35 17 22 15 2 4 7 27 10 1 32 
Sweden 53 38 11 12 0.3 14 5 8 7 
Other 1 7 1 27 3 0.5 1 8 2 18 
European 
Others 187 106 133 137 37 15 34 17 21 19 19 
FOREIGN 1189 1221 1162 1269 1334 888 1190 1448 1657 1625 2127 
LOCAL 224 641 542 506 493 232 259 295 349 333 266 
TOTAL 1413 1862 1704 1775 1828 1120 1450 1743 2007 1958 2484 
NB. Data Excludes 
1) $800 million investment cotmnitments in the Petrochemical Complex 
2) $790 million investment commitments in the Petrochemical Complex 
Source: Economic Development Board Yearbook, 1990/1991, Singapore. 
Investment commitments in the manufacturing sector hit a record high of $2.4 billion in terms of 
fixed asset investment. When fully operational, these investments would generate a gross value added 
of over $3 billion. Of the total commitments, 85% came from abroad with the US contributing over 
$!billion while Japan and Europe accounted for $708 million and $435 million respectively. Local 
investment commitments amounted to $266 million. 
Investment commitments from the US were for both expansion and new projects. Expansion projects 
were mainly in the electronics industry while new projects were in the chemicals industry. In the case 
of Japan commitments were concentrated in the electronics and machinery industries for new and 
expansion projects. 
European investment commitments for 1990 came mainly from the Netherlands, UK, France, Italy 
and Germany. They were mostly in e)\,:pansion projects in the electronics industry to produce audio-
video consumer products. The phannaceutical industry attracted the bulk of new investment 
commitments for the production of active ingredients for medical products. 
197 
Local investment cmmnitments were concentrated mostly in expansion projects in the electronics, 
machinery and printing industries. New projects were recorded in the plastics, machinery and the 
electronics industries. The Local Enterprise Finance Scheme and Small Industry Technical Assistance 
Scheme provided financial assistance to local companies to invest in automation equipment and 
engage consultancy services to improve operational efficiency. 
Although Japanese FDI in the manufacturing sector increased rapidly in t11e 1970s, it did not play as 
dominant a role in Singapore as it did in tlle ASEAN cow1tries, despite the Japanese view tllat 
Singapore has been tlle most attractive country for Japan as an investment market among the five 
ASEAN nations; and the 'exceptionally magnanimous' attitude towards Japanese FDI by the 
government. One possible explanation for tl1is seeming paradox lies in the differences in the 
motivation for FDI between Japanese and American MNCs in tl1e ASEAN region. During the 1960s 
and early 1970s, Singapore's relatively cheap, unskilled, and disciplined labour force and low import 
tariffs were very attractive to export-oriented US-based MNCs. Conversely, Singapore's small internal 
market and general absence of tariff barriers made Singapore relatively less attractive to Japanese 
MNCs since they could supply the market by exports. Prior to 1970, t11e largest Japanese investments 
in Singapore were in the assembly of motor vehicles, printing, tyres, and cement, all industries tllat 
had some protection by tariff and non-tariff baniers to trade. In 1980, when the government reduced 
the level of protection, some Japanese MNCs withdrew t11eir investments. Japanese MNCs, however, 
have also invested heavily in export-oriented industries such as textiles and electronics (Allen, 1973; 
Nakakita, 1988). 
Singapore has one of the most liberal policies towards FD I of any country in the world. Essentially tlle 
government makes no distinction between foreign-owned and locally-owned finns. Controls are 
minimal or non-existent on foreign exchange and licensing, tlle extent of foreign equity positions, 
industry (except for public utilities and telecmmnunications services tllat are reserved for t11e 
government), imports of machinery and raw materials, local content requirements, employment of 
foreign personnel, ownership of real estate, and acquisitions or takeovers. The government, however, 
has encouraged (but has not required) local equity participation and the use of locally-produced 
inputs. There are no anti-trust or other laws regulating competition and no laws on monopolies or 
market dominance. The government believes t11at free trade and the market system minimise possible 
anti-competitive practices by MNCs and their harmful effects. If anytlting, Singapore's policies 
towards FDI have become more liberal over time as it has implemented the second phase of its 
industrialisation strategy. 
The policy of encouraging FDI has caused mild protests from some local businessmen who have 
claimed that tlle government has discriminated against them in its incentive progr3ll1111es. The 
programmes as such essentially did not discriminate between foreign- and locally-owned firms, but 
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often only foreign-owned firms have had the necessary capital, teclmology, and access to export 
markets necessary to qualifY for the incentives (Bmch, 1980; Tambunlertchai and Loohawenchit, 
1981). This situation offered scant consolation to local entrepreneurs. MNCs have also sometimes 
been charged with being isolated with few linkages to the economy (importing most of their raw 
material and component inputs, machinery and equipment and exporting their output), pre-empting 
local entrepreneurs and stunting their growtl1, absorbing the highest skilled workers and managers, 
employing foreign managers (over 20% of all managers, engineers and technicians in Singapore are 
foreign), and increasing Singapore's reliance on unstable export markets and on decisions made at 
corporate headquarters abroad. 
In light of these problems, in the late 1970s, the government began to encourage foreign investors, 
especially those from high income countries, to fonn joint ventures with local entrepreneurs, increase 
the ratio of local value added to output, and de-package their investments. Table 5.6 shows the 
principal statistics of manufacturing by capital structure for 1990. Singaporean businessmen who 
entered joint ventures with foreign partners had a lower failure rate (6% over the last 25 years) than 
those who had no foreign partners (38%). The prime minister of Singapore, Mr Lee Kuan Yew, 
stated: 'The bigger and more established an MNC is in his field, the higher his success rate and the 
bigger his contribution to jobs and GNP ..... The less experienced the industrialist and the less 
advanced his technology, the higher the failure rate.' Not surprisingly, government policy in the early 
1980s was to attract large, experienced, technology-intensive MNCs as Singapore moved from labour-
intensive to capital- and technology-intensive manufacturing. This policy was successful in attracting 
major MNCs from the USA, Europe, and Japan in such industries as microchips, disc drives, software 
cartridges, electronics, compressors, engineering services, and instmments (Asia Research Bulletin, 
January 1980). 
Foreign firms, usually operating via joint ventures, have been identified as playing an important role 
in the exports of petrochemicals, electric and electronic machinery and textiles industries (Westphal, 
1981; Bohn-Young Koo, 1982). Japanese based fim1s have been dominated in foreign investment in 
exporting appears to be proportionately more important than its role in the economy overall: the 
proportion of total conunodity exports directly accounted for by foreign firms increased from 6.2% in 
1971 to 17.6% in1975 (Westpahl, 1981). 
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Table 5.6 shows the increasing dominance of foreign enterprises in the manufacturing sector, and 
their large size relative to local enterprises. 
Table 5.6 
Principal statistics of manufacturing by capital 
structure in Singapore dollars (millions>v 1980=90 
1980 
Legal status of Number of Number of Output Value-added Capital 
establishment establishments workers expenditure 
Total 3,355 285,250 31,657.9 8,521.9 1,861.9 
Wholly local 2,153 80,262 4,943.6 1,624.2 264.3 
Majority local 368 38,329 3,385.1 1,154.1 208.9 
Minority local 318 52,861 4,736.8 1,133.2 246.8 
Wholly foreign 516 13,798 18,592.8 4,610.3 1,141.8 
1990 
Legal status of Number of Number of Output Value-added Capital 
establislunent establishments workers expenditure 
Total 3,703 351,674 71,333.2 21,606.8 4,184.3 
Wholly local 2,508 102,084 10,769.0 3,535.1 744.9 
Majority local 329 42,310 6,446.5 2,361.3 481.6 
Minority local 245 35,433 9,853.8 2,010.7 450.6 
Wholly foreign 621 171,847 44,263.8 13,699.5 2,507.0 
Source : Department of Statistics :Report on the Census of Industrial Production, Singapore 1990. 
Singapore's economy is built by private enterprise, both indigenous and foreign. Since the colonial era 
there has been a dualistic industrial structure, comprising large foreign corporate enterprises on the 
one hand, and a large munber of small, highly competitive local enterprises on the other. Both were 
involved largely in commercial and service activities, with manufacturing becoming important only 
from the late 1960s (Lim, 1988). 
The foreign business community, originally dominated by British commercial enterprises, has since 
independence become increasingly diversified by nationality and by business activity. It now includes 
significant numbers of other Europeans, citizens of the United States and Japan, and other Asians, the 
latter mainly Chinese from countries such as Hong Kong, Malaysia and Indonesia. While the 
Europeans, Americans and Japanese are concentrated largely but not exclusively in large enterprises, 
especially subsidiaries of MNCs, the other Asians operate on a smaller scale, frequently in joint 
ventures with indigenous entrepreneurs, who are also mainly etlmic Chinese (Lim and Fang, 1986). 
Local entrepreneurship is abtmdantly available from diverse sources. Some local entrepreneurs have 
branched into manufacturing from traditional family businesses in the commercial sector, often in 
response to the profit opportunities provided by a tariff-protected domestic market. Others have set up 
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their own businesses after acquiring some technical or marketing experience as employees, often in 
large foreign firms. 
In his speech at the Singapore Business Awards dilmer on January 8th 1993, Lee Kuan Yew 
emmciated the need for Singapore to develop an external wing to its economy: 
" In the last four-five years, Korean, Taiwanese and Hong Kong entrepreneurs have moved abroad in 
a big way mainly because of pressure from their own high labour costs and attraction of new high 
growth markets abroad. They have invested in Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia, Vietnam and more 
massively in China. In 10-20 years these investments will give their GNP a tremendous boost. Unless 
we do the same, Singapore will not have this external boost. 
All successful mature economies have this external dimension which broadens their domestic 
operations and helps to upgrade their economy ..... 
Our track record makes me confident that we have the men and the resources to meet tllis challenge. 
We can change our orientation. We can alter our social climate to become more encouraging and 
supportive of enterprise and innovation. We can enthuse a younger generation witl1 the thrill and the 
rewards of building an external dimension to Singapore. We can and we will spread our wings into 
the region and then to the wider world." (Lee, 1994). 
It is perhaps because of this growing overseas investment that the Singapore :finns account for the 
largest mUllber of establishments, workers and capital expenditure, and rarlk second in terms of output 
and value-added. The majority of these firms, though they are small and tend to be labour intensive 
and oriented towards the domestic market are able to surpass, the larger, export oriented firms from 
Japan, Hong Kong and West Germany in tenns of value-added. Finns from the United States rank 
first in terms of output and value-added as they play a dominant role in the electronics field, the 
largest contributor witllin the manufacturing sector in terms of output, value-added and employment. 
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Table 5.7 
Principal statistics of manufacturing by major source of 
capital, in Singapore dollars (millions), 1990 
Major source 
of capital 
Total 
Singapore 
Australia 
Hong Kong 
Japan 
Malaysia 
Switzerland 
Taiwan 
United Kingdom 
United States 
West Germany 
Other European 
Others 
Number of 
establishments 
3,703 
2,846 
37 
50 
294 
55 
20 
20 
75 
170 
28 
72 
36 
Number of 
workers 
351,674 
145,034 
2,349 
6,979 
68,956 
2,568 
2,844 
1,858 
8,145 
81,131 
7,768 
21,233 
2,809 
Output 
71,333.2 
17,303.7 
463.5 
450.9 
14,454.3 
601.2 
334.9 
276.4 
2,679.5 
24,192.3 
1,122.9 
9,139.7 
313.3 
Value-added 
21,606.8 
5,929.9 
170.4 
174.9 
4,191.1 
123.6 
145.9 
87.0 
1,416.2 
7,116.3 
400.7 
1,761.3 
88.9 
Capital 
expenditure 
4,184.3 
1,233.6 
24.7 
26.8 
1,046.0 
22.2 
22.2 
30.9 
97.5 
1,126.6 
70.9 
428.9 
53.5 
Source : Department of Statistics : Report on the Census of Industrial Production, Singapore 1990. 
Table 5.7 shows the relative weight of investors of different nationalities in the manufacturing sector. 
Japanese firms follow in importance after the firms from Singapore and the United States. Among 
firms of other nationalities, those from West Germany and the United Kingdom rank next in 
importance. The considerably lower levels of output and value-added are simply a reflection of their 
concentration in the labour intensive electronics and instrument manufacturing industries. Other 
European countries also offer some significant results. This, however, probably reflects the heavy 
investment by the other European nationalities, especially the Dutch, in the large scale, capital 
intensive, high value-added petroleum refining and electronics industries. 
The manufacturing sector in Singapore is clearly dualistic. It is dominated by large, highly export-
oriented, more capital-intensive foreign enterprises, particularly from the United States and Westem 
Europe, and in the petroleum and electronics industries. But there are also many small, more labour-
intensive local enterprises that support these large firms. They complement rather than compete with 
the larger foreign owned enterprises. Whereas the foreign firms, with the exception of the Malaysians, 
are largely export-oriented, the local firms produce mainly for the domestic market. Their output 
includes not only consumer goods but also intermediate inputs and subcontracted items for foreign 
owned firms (Lim and Fong, 1986). 
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Sectors of development in Singapore 
Government policies towards domestic savings and investment and foreign direct investment have 
played a crucial role in Singapore's development. Following the advice of a UN mission, the 
promotion of foreign direct investment was initially undertaken to increase employment. With 
unemployment of 46,000 in 1958 and expected increases in the working age population of 53,000 
over a five year period, the 1961-63 Development Plan concluded that eliminating unemployment 
necessitated attracting FDI. 
Until the Second World War, Singapore's economic destiny depended largely on entrepot trade. As 
entrepot trade and the related service sectors did not provide sufficient employment opportunities, 
unemployment rose to a considerable extent. By 1958, 13.5% of the working age population was 
unemployed. New avenues of economic expansion had to be found to provide employment and to 
ensure increases in living standards. 
Gob Keng Swee, the mastermind of econ01nic policy at the time, described the situation: 
" Taking an overall view of Singapore's econ01nic policy, we can see how radically it differed from the 
laissez-faire policies of the colonial era. These had led Singapore to a dead end, with little economic 
growth, massive unemployment, wretched housing, and inadequate education. We had to try a more 
activist and interventionist approach. Democratic socialist economic policies ranged from direct 
participation in industry to the supply of infrastructure facilities by statutory authorities, and to laying 
down clear guide-lines to the private sector as to what they could and should do." (Gob, 1976). 
The solution was industrialisation. This meant transforming Singapore's small manufacturing sector 
which had provided employment for only 29,000 people in 1959. Manufacturing had been 
concentrated in the processing of primary commodities for export and the production of food, 
beverages, clothing and some other consumer goods for the small domestic market. 
Industrialisation was the central issue in the 1959 electoral manifesto of the People's Action Party 
(PAP), which has held power ever since. The manifesto listed four advantages and four weaknesses 
for industrialisation in Singapore. The advantages were said to be a hard-working, resourceful and 
enterprising people; a favourable geographical position and good sea communications; a large amount 
of capital accumulated by local enterprise and public authorities; and markets available in the region. 
The weaknesses were listed as free-port status, which was considered to be disadvantageous to 
industrialisation; lack of free access to the market of Malaya; relatively small numbers of managers, 
technicians and skilled workers; and the predilection of entrepreneurs for trading rather than for 
manufacturing. 
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To bring about industrialisation, the manifesto emphasised the desirability of establishing a conm1on 
market with Malaya, upgrading the technological level of industry, encouraging foreign business, and 
protecting selected industries by tariffs and quotas. Upon coming to power, the PAP-dominated 
parliament enacted the Pioneer Industries Ordinance, the Industrial Expansion Ordinance and the 
Control of Manufacturing Ordinance, followed by the establishment of the Economic Development 
Board (EDB) to promote industrial development. Table 5.8 outlines the tax incentives available to 
foreign investors in Singapore. 
Table 5.8 
Tax incentives available to foreign investors in 
Singapore 
1. Pioneer status for approved manufacturing and service activities - exemption of tax on 
profits; tax relief period of five to ten years. 
2. Expansion incentive for approved manufacturing and service activities - exemption of tax on 
profits in excess of preexpansion level; tax relief period of up to five years. 
3. Approved foreign loan scheme for manufacturing and service activities - exemption of 
wifuholding tax on interest. 
4. Tax concessions for approved manufacturing and se1vice activities - half or 1\tll exemption 
of witllholding tax on royalties 
5. Export incentive for approved export activities - 90% tax concession on approved export 
profits. 
6. Double tax deduction for expenses on export promotion and development. 
7. Double tax deduction for expenses on research and development. 
8. Accelerated depreciation allowance. 
9. Investment allowance for approved manufacturing and service activities, approved research 
and development activities, approved construction operations, and approved projects for 
reducing consumption of potable water. 
10. Post pioneer incentive for approved companies enjoying pioneer status or export incentive as 
a follow up to pioneer incentive - corporate tax rate of not less than 10% for up to five years 
upon expiry of pioneer or export incentive. 
11. 10% concessionary tax on income of Asian Currency Units, off-shore income of insurance 
companies and income from off-shore gold transactions. 
12. Tax exemption on income from approved syndicated loans and syndicated credit facilities. 
13. Tax exemption on income of Singapore-registered ships. 
14. 50% tax concession on export income of approved warehousing, technical, or engineering 
services. 
15. 50% tax concession on export income of approved consultancy services. 
16. 50% tax concession on export income of approved international trading companies. 
17. Concessionary 10% tax on income from approved headquarter operations. 
18. Venture capital incentive for investment by eligible companies and individuals in approved 
new technology projects - losses incurred from the sale of shares, up to 100% of equity 
invested, can be set off against in the investors' other taxable income. 
Source: Lim Chong-Yah (1988), Policy Options for the Singapore Economy, McGraw Hill. 1988. 
The Industrial Expansion Ordinance of 1959 granted tax relief to existing enterprises that were 
increasing the production of approved products. Tax relief was provided for a period of five years on a 
sliding scale, depending on the amount of new capital invested. It ranged from 11% to 15% of profits. 
The Control of Manufacturing Ordinance of 1959 tried to prevent excessive competition in domestic 
markets. This was to be done by limiting the number of firms that manufactured certain products 
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designated by the Ministry of Finance. In 1961, the government established the EDB. The EDB 
provided factory sites to investors for rental or purchase within industrial estates established for this 
purpose, of which Jurong Industrial Estates was the largest. EDB also extended medium- and long-
term loans as well as equity financing to industrial enterprises, gave technical assistance to industry, 
and set up industrial training schemes. 
Technical assistance included feasibility and market studies, industrial research, the setting of 
standards and some help with product development and industrial design. EDB also provided 
technical and managerial training and established training schemes in collaboration with industry. 
Govenm1ent departments were instructed to buy from domestic producers whenever their prices did 
not exceed the prices of comparable imports by more than 10% (Wawn, 1982). 
It was soon understood that import substitution in Singapore's small domestic market held little 
promise. Correspondingly, the munber of products subject to import quotas was reduced to 26 in 1968 
and to 3 in 1973. In turn, after increases in 1968 and 1969, the number of items subject to tariffs was 
reduced again, reaching 91 in 1973. Protection rates were never high in Singapore, however. Thus in 
1967 the average rate of nominal protection (indicating the joint effects of tariff and quota protection) 
on domestic sales was 5% and the average rate of effective protection 91%. And, in the same year, 
export subsidies were introduced that provided incentives to export industries similar to those granted 
to import-substituting industries, on the average. 
Export incentives were granted tmder the Economic E'-1>ansion Incentives Act of 1967 which reduced 
the company tax rates on profits earned from exports by approved manufacturing enterprises from 
40% to 4% for a period of 15 years. The same act lowered the tax on royalties, licenses, teclmical 
assistance fees, and contributions to R&D costs payable to overseas enterprises to 20%. The resulting 
export expansion contributed to rapid increases in employment. As a result, by 1973 the 
unemployment rate declined to 4.5%, representing largely frictional unemployment. With the easing 
of unemployment, the policy changed from the attraction of labour -intensive industries to that of high-
technology industries. Also, the educational system was reformed and technical training schemes were 
instituted (SICC, 1981). 
In 1972, the government established three training schemes. Under the Joint Industry-Government 
Training Scheme, the government contributes 50% to the cost of training provided by MNCs and 
local firms; tmder the Overseas Training Scheme, finns are supported in sending trainees to industrial 
countries; under the Industrial Training Grant Scheme, firn1s with approved in-house training 
facilities are given subsidies. 
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By 1986 there was a total of 608 government-linked companies ranging from department stores to 
shipping yards. In some areas, such as airlines and shipping, govemment remained the sole owner 
until recently. In others, govenunent is a major shareholder. The Development Bank of Singapore, for 
instance, is 48% govemment owned. In joint -venture businesses the government has been active in 
steel, sugar, and department stores and has taken an equity share in a wide variety of other 
enterprises. The govenunent also invests overseas tluough the Govenunent of Singapore Investment 
Corporation (Rodan, 1986). 
In 1978 the government l<nmched a program, termed a 'Second Industrial Revolution', to change the 
economic, social, and political face of Singapore (Rodan, 1987). The economic experiment involved 
restructuring and upgrading into higher-value activities, particularly in the manufactming sector. 
There was for tluee years a corrective wage policy to spur labour productivity. This purpose was to be 
served by the expansion of educational and training facilities through a corrective wage policy to spur 
labour productivity, by incentives for investment in R&D, and by the policy of raising wages. The 
rationale for this strategy is detailed in Singapore's indicative development plan for the 1980s, which 
set a GDP growth target of 8-10% a year, and identifies manufacturing, trade, tourism, transport and 
communication, and 'brain' services (including financial, medical and architectural services) as the 
five pillars of growth. 
Both internal and extemal factors prompted the restmcturing strategy. The govenunent plarmed that 
incentives for these industries would not only increase GDP per capita, but would also allow 
Singapore to decrease its reliance on exports of products such as textiles and consumer electronics that 
faced increased protection in the long nm in many of Singapore's export markets and increased 
competition from countries with lower wages. Internally, the economy was experiencing widespread 
labour shortages which were likely to become more severe because of the absolutely diminishing pool 
of new labour entrants. Politically, a strategy of relying on labour intensive activities could not satisfY 
the rising expectations of workers for better pay which was only possible with t11e creation of more 
skilled jobs. Externally, Singapore was beginning to lose its competitive advantage in producing 
labour-intensive manufactures to ot11er developing countries, and faced the ever-present threat of 
protectionism in developed country markets. Singapore has combated increased trade barriers for 
some of its products in high-income countries by diversifYing its exports of manufactured products to 
non-traditional markets in both high and middle income countries and by increasing the range of the 
products it produces and exports. Moreover the industrial countries continued to grow slowly in the 
1980s and Singapore had to find new markets for its exports. 
To encourage firms to upgrade and mechanise, the govenunent adopted three sets of policies, of 
which only one is really new in the history of industrial development in Singapore. These policies 
were a wage correction policy designed to raise labour costs to promote efficient use of scarce labour, 
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additional investment incentives for desired industries, and e:o.:pansion of training and educational 
facilities for new labour force entrants and workers in industry. 
Wage correction policy 
Prior to 1972 market forces determined wages in Singapore. To ensure orderly wage changes the 
government set up in 1972 a tripartite National Wages Council. Since then, wage guide-lines, though 
vohmtary, have strongly influenced wage increases in botl1 the private and public sectors. During and 
in the few years immediately after the world recession of the mid 1970s, tl1e Cmmcil recommended 
modest wage increases to ensure tl1e competitiveness of the labour intensive export industries. These 
guide-lines, while helping to keep exports competitive, did not encourage firms to use labour 
efficiently or to upgrade their operations quickly. As a result, labour shortages intensified and 
manufacturing productivity suffered, growing by an average of only 2% to 3 %a year until 1979. In 
1979 t11e Council began a three year wage correction policy; i.e recommended high wage bill 
increases averaging nearly 20% a year, to restore wages to market levels. Workers, however, enjoyed 
average wage increases of about 14% a year because part of the increase in employer wage bills was 
chmmelled into increased Central Provident Fund contributions and into a Skills Development Fund 
to train and upgrade workers affected by the restructuring strategy. Thus the inflationary 
consequences of the wage correction policy were minimised. In 1980 the Council introduced the idea 
of a second-tier payment to reward above-average workers. Because of implementation problems, this 
idea did not find much favour with employers who dropped it the following year. The government 
indicated that in future wage increases will be closely tied to productivity gains. The Council's guide-
lines will be more flexible to reflect, more fully than in the past, the diversity of productivity gains 
among firms (Lim, 1982). 
The Council's success in minimising industrial conflicts and ensuring wage changes has ironically 
also produced conditions that might undermine its influence in the future. By strongly guiding wage 
developments the Council has inllibited the growtl1 of close ties between workers and employers at the 
company level. Workers increasingly tllink the NWC, whose policies reflect government priorities, is 
the body that gives t11em wage increases. The government's primary role in the NWC also made 
employers dependent on the Council to assure industrial peace. In consequence, they did not pay 
enough attention to ways to gain worker loyalty. 
Equally important, the NWC eroded flexibility in wage negotiations. Both unions m1d employers 
became essentially implementers of NWC decisions. Differences in productivity and profitability 
among employers were not fully reflected in wage changes, resulting in labour misallocation. 
The government recognises that a bigger role for market forces in wage developments is necessmy to 
strengthen worker-employer relations and to improve labour market efficiency. It also recognises that 
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the NWC still has a role to play in helping the economy to make the transition from a guided wage 
system to a freer labour market (Lim, 1984). 
The wage correction policy has apparently met some success. Employment creation in the economy, 
especially in the manufachtring sector, has slowed down. National productivity gains doubled to 
about 5% a year in 1980-81 before slipping to 2% in 1982 largely because of weakening external 
demand for Singapore's manufachtring exports. In the late 1970s and early 1980s, tmemployment 
continued to fall, wages rose, there was increased competition from other industrialising countries 
witl1 far lower wage rates, and protectionism increased against some labour-intensive products in 
Singapore's markets abroad. In response to these trends, tl1e government instiruted policies to 
accelerate the shift of the manufacturing sector away from labour-intensive industries witl1 low value 
added per worker towards capital- and skill-intensive industries with higher value added per worker. 
Labour was shifted out of textiles, sawn timber, and food processing into electronics, professional and 
scientific instruments, and into service industries such as ship and aircraft repair, and services for the 
off-shore oil industry. 
The government encouraged these shifts by investment and tax incentives, training programmes, tariff 
reductions, government investment and, from 1979 to 1981, mandatory rapid increases in wages and 
increased payments by firms and workers into the government run pension plan, the Central Provident 
Fund. The emphasis changed from increasing output and employment to increasing value added per 
worker and value added per unit of output in Singapore. In its efforts to increase the value added per 
unit of output of goods produced in Singapore, the government also encouraged forward and 
backward integration by producers and increased use of locally-produced inputs and capital 
equipment. In 1983, in line with improved economic performance, productivity growth again rose to 
nearly 4% and has since maintained an average growth rate of 4.8% 
Industrial imrestment incentives 
Despite the extensive network of stable capital in the economic life of Singapore, the government 
adopted a most positive policy stand towards foreign capital. From the beginning the government 
welcomed foreign capital almost unconditionally. The government actively identified foreign firms 
which were likely to find Singapore attractive, and invited their executives to Singapore to display the 
facilities available and to indicate the government's willingness to receive tl1eir investment. It imposed 
no restrictions on foreign equity participation except in certain industries like banking, newspapers 
and residential properties; no restrictions on remittances of earnings, or repatriation of capital; and 
relatively minor restrictions on the employment of suitably qualified foreign professionals and skilled 
workers. 
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The reasons behind the adoption of such a policy lay in the relative weakness of Singapore's domestic 
capital. As an entrepot centre, Singapore possessed a business community more oriented towards trade 
and service activities rather than manufacturing. As a creation of colonial rule, Singapore had few 
sizeable businesses which were domestically owned. To promote industiialisation the government 
reasoned it would be quicker and more efficient to invite foreign participation, rather than nurture 
local capital out of its underdeveloped situation. 
Singapore was in a great hurry to industrialise, to restmcture the economy away from the stagnating 
entrepot trade and to combat large scale tmemployment. But it did not have the wherewithal to 
unbundle the FDI package and to obtain the capital, technology and managerial and marketing 
expertise independently and efficiently. For such an infant industrial economy anxious to leap into 
international markets, a heavy dependence on MNCs with their well established marketing network 
was unavoidable (Lim, 1988). 
Singapore's economic growtl1 had depended very much on the prosperity of Malaysia and Indonesia, 
for which it acted as a service centre. By inviting MNCs to use Singapore as an off-shore production 
platform, Singapore lessened its dependence on its two neighbours. Besides, the economic ties with 
powerful nations gave Singapore a greater sense of security (Y oshihara, 1976). 
To stimulate investment in desired high-value activities, the government has modified old fiscal 
incentives and introduced new ones. The basic tax incentive was, and still is, pioneer status which 
exempts from tax company profits for a period of five to ten years, depending on such factors as the 
level of investment, its capital and skill intensity, research and development spending, and so on. 
Pioneer status can be granted to deserving projects even if the investment is less than S$ 1 million. 
The period of exemption from company tax can be longer than ten years for projects involving 
advanced technology and long gestation periods (SICC, 1981). 
A second important incentive, first introduced in 1967 and liberalised since then, encourages exports 
by taxing approved export profits at 4% rather than at the usual rate of 40%. The normal incentive 
period is five years, but it can be as long as fifteen years for projects with fixed capital expenditure of 
over S$150 million, provided Singapore permanent residents own at least 50% oftl1e paid up capital. 
Firms that do not qualifY for pioneer status or export incentives can obtain an investment allowance 
which allows an approved manufacturing or technical servicing project a tax credit of up to 50% of 
new fixed investment in plant, machinery, and factory buildings. The credit can be set off against 
profits of the company for the year in which the capital spending takes place. 
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In addition to pioneer status, ell:port incentive and investment allowance schemes, the government has 
a variety of other incentives to encourage plant expansion, automation, computerisation and research 
and development spending. Capital equipment can be completely written off in five to ten years, plant 
and machinery for research and development can be completely depreciated in three years, and the 
purchase of computers in one year. Double deduction of Research and Development spending is 
pennitted, lump-sum payments for manufacturing licenses can be capitalised and written off in five 
years, and an investment allowance of up to 50% of the capital investment in research and 
development is available (Wawn, 1982). 
A capital assistance scheme was set up in 1975 with a budget of S$100 million to provide equity 
and/or loan capital to industrial investors with specialised projects that will benefit Singapore 
economically and technologically. The Economic Development Board (EDB), which administers the 
scheme, also has a small industries finance scheme to help small finns to upgrade their operations and 
diversifY their product lines. Local finns are also eligible for small development grants U1lder a 
product development scheme administered by the Board. 
In legislation, all the incentive schemes except those aimed specifically at small or local finns are 
available to both local and foreign enterprises. In practice, however, foreign enterprises which 
dominate the manufacturing sector in terms of value-added and exports have benefited more than 
local firms because of their larger investments and higher technology levels (Lim and Fong, 1986). 
Compared with the 1960s and 1970s investment incentives are now more selectively awarded. 
Favoured projects are those that are technologically sophisticated and also capital and skill intensive. 
The EDB has drawn up a list of industries for priority development. The list included industries 
making such products as computers, instnunentation and industrial controls, teleconununication 
equipment, advanced electronic components, solar cells and optical fibres, precision machine tools, 
photographic and optical instruments, medical instruments and devices, office equipment, industrial 
machinery including robotics, oil-field equipment, aircraft components, ship machinery, diesel 
engines, tnining equipment, speciality industrial chemicals, pharmaceuticals and engineering plastics. 
Besides planning to attract investment in priority industries to broaden Singapore's industrial base, the 
government is encouraging local manufacturers who cannot pay market wages to relocate to other 
countries. The relocation of such firms, it believes, will not only help neighbouring economies but 
also give industries in Singapore ready access to key inputs. It will also encourage with loans and 
incentives the expansion of supporting industries to link-up with high value-added industries. In 
short, the Singapore government is clear about the industries it wants and the adjustment that both 
local and foreign fimts must make to remain viable in Singapore in the future. 
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JE:x:JI}~msion of training and educational facilities 
A third vital component of the restmcturing strategy is the accelerated expansion of educational and 
training opportunities not only for new labour force entrants but also for workers already in industry. 
With the emphasis on skill and technology upgrading, post-secondary technical and professional 
training has become a high priority of government policy. 
Singapore's educational transformation has been extremely impressive. During the mid 1950s only 
one in two children had even primary education. Despite the fact that today nearly 90% of children 
have to start their school careers by learning English, the English-based 0-Level success rate is 
claimed to be a quarter higher than Britain's. Dr Tay Eng Soon, minister of state for education, 
admits that the education system is highly competitive and meritocratic - 'but no more so than the UK' 
(Wawn, 1982). 
The demand for graduates still exceeds the expanding supply - particularly in computer science - and 
the fastest growing investment in further education is in sub-graduate technical training. There are 
three youth training centres in computerised manufacturing technology, with courses ranging from 
design to robotics, plus technical institutes sponsored by French, German and Japanese firnlS. 
Although Britain is now only second to America in its investment in Singapore, the only fom1al 
British involvement in that training is a computer institute established in 1983 through collaboration 
between the British Council and the British computer company ICL. 
Apart from expanding training institutions that prepare new entrants for the job market, the 
government is actively encouraging the expansion of training opportunities for workers already in 
industry, especially the half million workers with little or no education. It has developed a Basic 
Education for Skills Training (BEST), which was introduced to raise t11e literacy and numeracy levels 
of unskilled and semi-skilled workers, so that they could than be retrained to operate computer-related 
equipment. That produced a 92% success rate from the first year's 22,600 students. Companies that 
mn retraining programmes of their own are encouraged by both grants and tax relief. Equally, firms 
that do no training are penalised (Lim and Fong, 1986). 
Government training and educational progranlilles are not restricted to Singaporeans only. Because 
of the declining number of qualified Singaporeans the government has increased the intake of foreign 
students into post-secondary and tertiary institutions. At the same time, it is encouraging foreign 
skilled and professional workers to settle in Singapore, and encouraging highly educated women to 
marry and have more than two children. It has also instituted policies such as flexible working hours, 
part-day work etc to induce more women to join the work force. The long-term aim is to expand the 
locally available supply of skills needed for a modern industrial economy, and not to become 
dependant on unskilled foreign labour. High dependence on unskilled foreign workers, the 
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govenm1ent believes, not only retards industiial restructuring but also creates problems of integration, 
especially if the foreign labour is imported from countries whose populations have different social and 
cultural characteristics from that of Singapore. 
Summary 
The balanced nature of Singapore's economy and its past development allowed the govellilllent to take 
what it realised was a calculated risk of decreased growth in the manufacturing sector in the short run 
in order to shift the economy onto a path it hoped would lead to sustained long-term growth. The 
sectoral balance and stability that have accompanied Singapore's rapid growth augur well for its 
growth prospects in the future since Singapore is not dependent on only one sector to drive its growth. 
As a consequence, Singapore was able to be more daring and innovative in its sectoral development 
strategies since problems in one sector could (potentially) be offset by successes in others. Moreover, 
since development will largely come in the future, as it has in the past, from intra- rather than inter-
sectoral reallocation of resources, growth can be accomplished with less disruption, fewer adjustinent 
costs, and a lower risk of misallocation of resources. 
In general, the govemment of Singapore implemented its overall development strategy through the 
private-enterprise market system and devoted its efforts to influencing the macro-economic 
envirmrment - tariffs and non-tariff barriers to trade, the exchange rate, taxation, savings, the 
investment climate, finance, labour relations and wages, human resources and infrastructure 
development - so that private enterprises would be attracted to investinent in industries in which 
Singapore had a comparative advantage and the private sector could successfully fulfil the central role 
it had been given. The govellilllent, however, has also invested as a sole owner <md joint-ventme 
parlier in areas in which private investinent was not forthcoming to the desired exient - steel, 
petrochemicals, shipyards - in industries that were nah1ralmonopolies - utilities, water, transportation 
and port services - and in infrastruchue development - the port, roads, and industiial and housing 
estates. 
Some of these enterprises competed directly witl1 privately owned firms, but in general they were not 
seen as a tlueat to tl1e private sector, although occasionally there were complaints of unfair 
competition. Once a govellilllent owned enterprise has become economically viable, often part of its 
equity has been sold to the public. Despite this direct involvement at the micro-economic level, t11e 
govemment has remained firmly committed to fostering private enterprise and to the competitive 
market system as the means to achieve economic growth and resource allocation. 
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Chapter 6 
Muitinatimunll CorporatioXll§ in §ingapo~re 
The effects of MNCs on host countries have been widely studied in recent years. It is often believed 
that MNCs tend to produce and transfer more teclmologies than local firms, and in consequence play 
a more important role in the process of technological change and development. At the same time, it is 
also argued that MNCs tend to produce and transfer inappropriate technologies to the host developing 
countries and thus hinder development. Therefore, the relationships between MNCs in the 
manufacturing sector and domestic enterprises should be examined as well as industrial structures in 
host developing countries. There are two broad sets of relationships involved, both of which are of 
significance for understanding the effects of MNCs on host economies and to the formulation of 
policy. The 'direct' relationships that MNCs strike up with local suppliers or purchases (backward and 
forward linkages in the Hirsclm1an sense) can constitute powerful mechanisms for stimulating, or 
retarding, economic, and particularly industrial, growth in developing countries. The 'indirect' effects 
that the entry and operations of MNCs may have on local industrial structure, conduct and 
performance may be equally important: MNCs may change the nature and evolution of concentration; 
they may affect the profitability and growth of indigenous finns; they may alter financing, marketing, 
technological, or managerial practices of the sectors that they enter; they may, by predatory conduct, 
drive domestic firms out of business; and so on (Dunning, 1985). 
The continuing debate on the costs and benefits of MNCs for host countries has touched upon several 
of these issues, but the outcome has, in the absence of sufficient empirical work of real value or 
relevance, remained unclear. Policy malting has continued to rely on generalisations drawn from 
scanty evidence, or, more commonly, on a priori beliefs about the behaviour and impact of the MNCs. 
This section exatnines the role ofMNCs in Singapore and the extent to which they have contributed to 
the economic development. 
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Industrial structure, conduct and performance 
Before considering the empirical evidence of the impact of MNCs on the economy of Singapore a 
brief examination should be given of the approaches to study the effects of foreign investment on host 
couutries. Economic theory provides us with two approaches to study the effects of foreign investment 
on host countries. One is rooted in the standard theory of international trade and dates back to 
MacDougall (1960). This is a partial equilibrium, comparative-static approach to show how the gain 
from marginal increments in foreign investment would be distributed. MacDougall's main findings 
can be smnmarised as follows: an inflow of foreign capital increases total real wages of labour. Most 
of the labour's gain, however, is merely a redistribution from domestic owners of capital, since the 
profit on total capital falls as a result of the capital inflow. In relation to the profits accruing to the 
foreign capital the host country's gain from the capital inflow is relatively small. According to 
MacDougall, however, there are other, possibly important benefits that may be obtained by the host 
country. "The most important direct gains ..... from more rather than less private investment from 
abroad seem likely to come through higher tax revenue from foreign profits (at least if the higher 
investment is not induced by lower tax rates), through economies of scale and through external 
economies generally, especially where domestic firms acquire 'know-how' or are forced by foreign 
competition to adopt more efficient methods" (MacDougalll960, p 33). 
The other approach departs from the theory of industrial organisation. This approach was pioneered 
by Hymer (1960) and has since been developed by Caves, Dunning, K.indleberger and Vernon among 
others. The starting point here is the question why firms, on the whole, undertake investment abroad 
to produce the same goods as they produce at home. The answer has been formulated as follows: "For 
direct investment to thrive there must be some imperfection in markets for goods or factors, including 
among the latter technology, or some interference in competition by government or by firms, which 
separates markets" (Kindleberger 1969, pl3). To be able to invest in production in foreign markets a 
firm must thus possess some asset in the fonn of knowledge of a public-goods character - product and 
process technology or management. 
A firm investing abroad therefore represents a distinctive kind of enterprise and, according to the 
industrial organisation approach, these distinctive characteristics are pivotal when analysing the 
foreign investment's impact on host countries. MNC entry represents something more than a simple 
export of capital into a host cmmtry, which is generally the case in models rooted in trade theory. 
Particularly for underdeveloped economies this consideration is of importance, since such economies 
have a very different structure from the capital exporting ones. In many uuderdeveloped economies 
the domestic enterprises are relatively small, weak and technologically backward. These countries also 
differ fTom the developed ones in such aspects as market size, degree of protection and availability of 
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skills. The entry of MNC subsidiaries into tmderdeveloped countries may therefore have effects, both 
positive and negative, which are substantially different from the effects that entry into a developed 
country gives rise to, since the latter is assumed to be more similar to the capital exporting country. 
Although the trade theory approach and the industrial organisation approach are not mutually 
exclusive, they emphasise different effects. Trade theorists are mainly interested in direct effects of 
foreign investment while scholars following the industrial organisation approach put more emphasis 
on the indirect effects or externalities. The latter's analyses of costs and benefits from foreign 
investment generally deal with issues which can only be resolved on empirical grounds. Some are 
interested in what technological benefits the host country might gain from foreign investment while 
others emphasise export markets. 
The trade theory approach does not take into account significantly enough the differences between 
foreign direct investment and other types of capital inflows from abroad. Foreign investment, rather 
than provide the recipient country with a capital inflow only, "represents entry into a national industry 
by a finn established in a foreign market" (Caves 1971, page 1). Foreign entry may therefore 
influence both the structure of the host economy, as well as the conduct and perfonnance of host 
country firms. Furthenuore, international investment is dominated by large MNCs that, in many 
respects, are distinguished from the 'ordinary' firms used in pure competitive trade models. These 
models therefore sometimes miss the core of the problem. Work has been done combining the 
analytical tools of trade theory and industrial organisation (Helpman 1983 and Markusen 1982). 
Finally, the comparative static approach, as such, has limited value for studies of the externalities that 
are relevant in a development process. 
The industrial organisation approach is also unsatisfactory in many respects. The most important 
shortcoming arises from the lack oftl1eoretical analysis. The empirical school has predominated in tl1e 
studies of costs and benefits from foreign investment. In many areas tl1ere is, in fact, no a priori way 
of knowing whether MNCs contribution will be positive or negative. 
The autl10rities in Singapore took advantage of foreign investment in restructuring Singapore's 
manufacturing sector and overall development from a low wage and low productivity economy to a 
relatively high wage and high added value economy. The authorities did not hesitate to abandon 
whole low wage sectors of the economy to outward FDI of their own, in order to allow for higher 
added value productions at home. Thereby the govenunent made use of certain political 
authoritarianism and of wage controls. But it did not regulate specifically inward or outward FDI, but 
rather the macroeconomic environment. This is a rather unique precedent in the developing world 
(Financial Times, 29tll March 1993). 
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The indirect effects of MNCs on host countries can be conveniently reviewed under the standard 
industrial economics format of stmcture, conduct and performance. While there exists a multitude of 
issues of interest here, only those which have aroused concern in the literature will be mentioned here. 
The objective of this study is to analyse various aspects of foreign investment by exanlining the 
statistical relationship between a nmnber of stmctural variables and the sectoral distribution within 
the manufacturing industry. Using Dunning's adaption of the 'industrial organisation approach' 
(1973), it will be possible to show that the ownersllip advantages of multinational corporations have 
assisted Singapore's economic restmcturing towards higher allocative and technical efficiency; and 
that multinational corporations have adjusted to changing locational advantages of Singapore's 
resource endowments rather more positively than national firms. 
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Structure 
There have been few systematic studies comparing the industrial structures of developing countries or 
analysing the structures of particular developing countries. Tllis is because it is notoriously difficult to 
trace the exact causal relationsllips between industrial stmcture, the conduct of finns, and their 
performance, all of which seem to interact in complex ways. Given the nature of data in developing 
com1tries, moreover, it may be expected that studies of the impact of MNCs on the structures of host 
countries would face severe infonnational and methodological problems. The literature on MNCs in 
developed countries is not clear on the nature of their effect on industrial structures: i1litially the entry 
of foreign competition may reduce the existing level of concentration, but in the longer run the 
oligopolistic nature and larger size of the MNCs may well increase it. The facts are that industrial 
concentration has tended to increase in developed countries, and that the growth of MNCs has taken 
place mainly in sectors in which they are active. However, it is not clear to what extent MNCs have 
contributed independently to concentration (by, say, unwarranted takeovers or predatory behaviour 
based on advantages conferred by size or financial power), as distinct from simply embodying or 
transnlitting changes caused by technological, marketing, financial, or organisational developments. 
Thus, efficient production and trade may, in some industries, require larger finns and increased 
competition over time; financial or econonlic factors may cause takeovers or mergers independently of 
the nationality of firms; marketing and R&D economies may compel larger size; and so on - tl1ese 
factors must be disentangled from MNC presence before tl1eir separate effect is apparent. 
Newfarmer and Mueller (1975) used data from a sample of 197 US MNCs to analyse the degree of 
denationalisation in 1972 in Mexico. They fotmd that of the 100 largest firms, 61 were foreign (of 
which 39 were US); of the 300 largest firms, 150 were foreign (97 US). Newfarmer and Mueller also 
provide data on Brasil, where the US accounts for 36% of foreign capital stock, and where of the 500 
largest non-financial corporations in 1972 MNCs number 158 (US firms 59). Some data on Argentina 
was given by Sourrouille (1976), who found that foreign firms contributed some 30% of total 
manufacturing output in 1970, far more than 20 years previously. The data for Singapore in 1990, on 
the 1000 largest corporations, shows that 618 were foreign owned, 244 of wllich were Japanese 
owned, 116 were US owned, with 31joint ventures. 
The general upshot of the work done seems to confirm a priori expectations, that MNCs are a 
significant and growing force in the manufacturing sectors of most developing countries, that tl1ey are 
present in industries with degrees of concentration, and that they are generally larger than domestic 
private firms. MNCs flourish in sectors that are marked by high levels of oligopoly, but the causes of 
oligopolisation may well lie elsewhere, in scale econonlies of production, R&D, marketing, finance, or 
some such factor: to the extent that several modern industries are inherently oligopolistic, tl1e 
presence of MNCs may not as such cause higher concentration. However, it is quite plausible that in 
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developing countries their entry does speed up the natural process of concentration, and that the 
weakness of local competitors, with the exception of enterprises fostered by the state, enables them to 
achieve a much higher degree of market dominance, in sectors in which they are active, than would be 
the case in developed economies. 
Alllloutive nmpact 
Under the assumptions of neo-classical trade theory, a country's economic welfare will be optimal 
when it allocates its resources in a way which best exploits its comparative advantage; that is where its 
international competitiveness - as revealed, for example, by its share of world exports or e"-'J)Ort-
import balance - is most favourable. In exchange for the exports so generated, the resources of other 
countries are used to provide the importing country with the goods it is relatively least suited to 
produce. The examination of comparative advantage as 'revealed' by international trade data, even 
from a dynamic viewpoint, is not in itself sufficient to suggest the appropriate economic structure for a 
given country. The availability of factor endowments and their possible upgrading also needs to be 
taken into accmmt. 
From the viewpoint ofMNCs foreign production is likely to be favoured (i) the greater the ownership 
advantages such firms perceive they possess over their competitors, (ii) the greater the incentive to use 
these advantages with immobile resources located in a foreign country, and (iii) the more imperfect 
the markets for channelling intermediate products generated or used by MNCs across national 
boundaries. 
From the perspective of countries wishing to maximise the benefits of international economic 
involvement, inward direct investment should be directed to those sectors which use the kind of 
mobile specific advantages with which non-resident firms are favoured, but which need to be used in 
conjunction with immobile resources with which the recipient country, is comparatively well 
endowed. 
The first hypothesis states that foreign owned MNCs will set up production in those sectors of the 
economy which are the most internationally competitive. Several authors try to relate the impact of 
MNCs to various measures of competitiveness. The most widespread used, in one form or another, is 
Bela Balassa's revealed comparative advantage, (RCA). All country studies agree that foreign 
affiliates, relative to indigenous firms, tend to concentrate their activities in sectors in which the RCA 
ratio is greater than one and increasing over time. Some studies, notably those of Belgium (Van Den 
Bulcke, 1985), the UK (Dunning, 1985) and Japan (Ozawa, 1979), examine the extent to which MNC 
activity concentrates in high value sectors. Although the evidence is by no means conclusive, it is 
highly suggestive, and especially so in the three countries mentioned as well as in the results of the 
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present study. Therefore, it is expected that foreign affiliates tend to concentrate their activities in 
sectors in which the RCA ratio is greater than one and is increasing over time. 
The second hypothesis relates to the ex1ent to which MNCs are, in some sense, better allocators of 
resources between sectors than national firms. Here, much depends in which sectors the MNCs 
perceive they have an ownership advantage over their foreign competitors and whether the 
productivity advantages originate from the possession or use of mobile or immobile resource 
endowments. Two measures of allocative efficiency are taken, productivity and profitability. The 
index of productivity used is gross value added, though ideally one would have preferred a total 
productivity index. Profitability was defined as a profit/gross sales ratio. Thus it is hypothesised that 
foreign owned .MNCs will produce in those sectors which are of above average productivity or 
profitability. 
Problems in evaluating or predicting the impact of MNCs on economic structure arise due to market 
failure in the product market which may be government or market induced. MNCs respond both to 
government signals and to market structures, and influence resource allocation accordingly. These 
may not always operate as neo-classical theory would suggest. It is possible that import controls may 
lead to investment being inefficiently directed, while .MNCs operating in an oligopolistic market 
framework may operate less than optimal strategies. 
Technical impact 
The second way in which MNCs may impinge upon economic stmcture is by affecting the efficiency 
of sectors in which they participate. MNCs will invest in those sectors in which they perceive they 
have the most technological and other advantages. It may therefore be reasonable to hypothesize that 
these advantages may result in higher productivity ratios - particularly labour productivity ratios - as 
many of the advantages are capital or teclmology intensive and labour saving. Value added per worker 
was used as the measure of productivity. 
Adjustment impact 
Finally, MNCs may impinge on economic structure according to whether they assist or inhibit the 
reallocation of resources in response to changes in demand or supply conditions. Inward FDI, for 
example, might aid stmctural adjustment if it was directed to those sectors producing goods for which 
the domestic market and international demand was growing the fastest. Structural adjustment in most 
developed industrial economies has taken the form of reallocation of resources towards teclmology 
and/or human capital and information intensive sectors, that is, higher value-added activities; such a 
reallocation has occurred both within manufacturing and service sectors and between these sectors. 
Four contributing factors can be pin-pointed to such changes - three on the supply side and one on the 
demand side. The first is the emergence of the NICs. Here, theory would suggest a resource 
219 
reallocation away from labour intensive and low skill sectors into technology intensive and high skill 
sectors, and/or to promote labour saving ilmovations in the fonner sectors. The second change is 
teclmological advance, particularly in the area of infonnation technology and changing factor cost 
ratios which is prompting a similar pattern of resource reallocation. The third change, allied to the 
previous two, has been the pressure to reduce inefficiency and to encourage rationalisation of sectors. 
The fourth factor has been the shifts in consmner demand towards higher income goods, in so far as 
the direction of MNC investment is often from higher to lower income countries. 
The hypothesis to be tested is that the ownership advantages of MNCs enable them to be better 
choosers of growth sectors or to create growth, and/or allow them to redirect their attention to those 
sectors which are becoming more productive and or internationally competitive. 
The next hypothesis examines the extent to which MNCs adapt to changes in economic structure. 
MNCs will produce in sectors in which the RCA ratio has most improved, and productivity has most 
increased. Value added per worker was used as the measure of productivity. Total factor productivity 
is the correct measure, but it cannot be calculated as the data is not available to estimate the 
production functions of each industry. 
There is one other structural aspect of MNCs which requires consideration. Tllis concerns the role of 
MNCs as coordinators of separate economic activities across national botmdaries, and the effect this 
has on econonlic structure. While it is an inherent feature of MNCs that they internalise international 
intermediate product markets, they may also impinge on such markets witllin a country and on final 
goods traded between cmmtries. Tllis market replacing effect is inadequately captured in the statistics 
but may have far reaching implications both on the type of economic activity carried out and on its 
determinants. Theory would suggest that MNCs will tend to concentrate in sectors in which tl1ere are 
most opportmlities for minimising transaction costs. Data on such market replacing activities are 
exiremely limited. However, it might be reasonably argued that the greater the degree of product or 
process diversification witl1in MNCs, and the more they practise product or process specialisation 
between countries, tl1e more likely the structural impact ofMNCs will be of concern to tl10se countries 
that do not wish to identify themselves with the resulting international division of labour. This may be 
illustrated from just two aspects of internalisation: (i) vertical integration in Singapore, and (ii) 
international product or process specialisation between different parts of the same MNC in different 
countries. Therefore, it is hypothesised that MNCs will tend to concentrate in sectors in which tl1ey 
are vertically integrated, or which offer oppommities for intra-industry trade. 
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Analysis of results 
llllata availability 
The empirical investigations to be conducted in tllis section are based on data from the Singapore 
manufacturing industry. Singapore is both fairly industrialised and influenced by MNCs, In this 
industrialisation process, foreign capital has played an important role. The foreign influence on the 
Singapore economy is considerable, and more than half of the industrial output is produced by MNCs. 
It was hoped that a direct comparison between locally owned industries and foreign owned MNCs 
operating in Singapore could have been made, but proved impossible due to a lack of available data. 
An attempt to gather the information from a questionaire survey sent out to a number of Singaporean 
firms was undertaken, however the response was inadequate for the investigation in question. The 
Economic Development Board was able to provide the comprehensive statistics on the activities of the 
MNCs for this study. The data used covered the entire manufacturing industry divided into twenty 
broad industry groups, at the three-digit ISIC level. 
The commodity classifications used were:-
311 Food 
3 13 Beverage 
321 Textiles & Textile Manufactures 
322 Wearing Apparel Except Footwear 
323 Leather & Leather Products 
331 Sawn Timber & Other Wood Products 
341 Paper & Paper Products 
342 Printing & Publishing 
3 51 Industrial Chemicals & Gases 
352 Paints, Pharmaceutical & Other Chemical Products 
353 Petroleum Refineries & Petrolemn Products 
357 Plastic Products 
369 Non-Metallic Mineral Products 
381 Fabricated Metal Products, Except Machinery & Equipment 
382 Machinery Except Electrical & Electronic 
383 Electrical Machinery, Apparatus, Appliances & Supplies 
384 Electronic Products & Components 
385 Transport Equipment 
386 Instrmnentation Equipment, Photographic & Optical Goods 
3 90 Other Manufacturing Industries 
The empirical investigations conducted were based on data from the manufacturing industry of 
Singapore for the year 1990, and the period 1970 to 1990. Table 6.1 presents the results of the 
statistical relationship between FDI and a number of structural variables. The structural variables 
were selected in order to show that the foreign owned MNCs are a significant and growing force in 
the manufacturing sectors of Singapore and that they are present in industries with degrees of 
concentration. Data for this study, at the three-digit ISIC level, was obtained from the Research and 
Statistics Unit of the Economic Development Board in order to test the hypotheses by applying a 
correlation technique - bivariate nom1al distribution. A correlation technique was adopted as there is a 
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problem of causality with a number of the variables. The R -squared is usually of value in analysing a 
regression model in which a causal relationship between the dependent variable Y and the 
independent variable X has been specified. Thus, R-squared is interpreted as more than a measure of 
correlation. Regression and correlation techniques differ in that correlation techniques do not involve 
an implicit assumption of causality, while regression techniques do. The dependent variable is the 
variable to be explained or predicted, while the independent variable is the moving force or causal 
variable. The least squares method would have been a more appropriate technique, but in this case can 
not be used as it is impossible to detennine the causal structure of the model before examining the 
data. 
The notion of causality (and also of causal relations and causal ordering) is essentially a philosophical 
rather than an empirical matter. Philosphers do not agree on their understanding and definition of a 
cause and outcome. Theories vary from an extreme 'everything causes everything' (Democrit) to 
denying the existence of any causation whatsoever (Hume, Berkley) (Charernza and Deadman, 1992). 
At first sight it appears that the simple question 'does X cause Y or does Y cause X?' should have a 
simple answer; in fact questions of causality are very difficult and no universally acceptable definition 
of causality has yet been developed. Mere correlations between variables are insufficient to establish 
causation since correlation isn't a symmetric measure, and unidirectional causality is a symmetric 
concept. 
Furthennore, a more temporal ordering is not sufficient either to establish or dismiss causality: that A 
occurred before B is insufficient to establish that A caused B, and is insufficient to dismiss the 
possibility that B caused A. The latter possibility could be rationalised as follows: if B is predicted to 
occur, so that B is expected with a high probability, this may induce the event A now. 
It may be argued that concerning temporal causality, a cause cannot occur after the effect; indeed, it is 
frequently assumed tlmt causes predate effects, but these views are not uncontentious. Moreover, 
causal variables are not synonymous with controlled variables: it might be argued that a controlled 
variable can only be a cause, not an effect, but in the case of policy instruments tl1e policy makers may 
use feedback rules so that the instruments react both to the present economic environment and 
currently held expectations of tl1e future enviromnent. This is closely related to tl1e concepts of 
exogeneity and endogeneity: a classical exogeneous variable may be both a cause and an effect. 
Causality questions are not confined to time-series data and also arise in cross-section analyses, but 
formal tests of causality have received little attention and thus are unable to shed light on the present 
cross-sectional study (Darnell, 1994). 
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Table 6.1 
Analysis of results: 
the foreign influence on the Singapore economy 
Dependent Variable Independent Variable Correlation T -statistic Level of 
significance 
Foreign direct investment Revealed comparative 0.63 3.42 1% 
advantage 
Foreign direct investment Export/import ratio 0.55 2.76 5% 
Foreign direct investment Gross Value Added 0.96 14.66 1% 
Foreign direct investment Sales 0.55 17.02 1% 
Foreign direct investment Productivity 0.92 3.77 1% 
Foreign direct investment Industry Growth 0.87 7.38 1% 
Change in foreign direct Change in export/import 0.54 2.70 5% 
investment ratio 
Increase in foreign direct Increase in industry 0.63 3.38 1% 
investment growth 
Change in foreign direct Change in revealed 0.69 2.62 5% 
investment comparative advantage 
Increase in foreign direct Increase in productivity 0.20 0.84 
investment 
Foreign direct investment Value added ratio 0.34 1.51 
Foreign direct investment Intra-industry trade 0.34 1.21 
Change in foreign direct Change in intra-industry 0.58 1.89 10% 
investment trade 
Allocative impact 
The correlation between the level of FDI and RCA was 0.63, significant at the 1% level, and the 
correlation between the level ofFDI and the export/import ratio was 0.55, significant at the 5% level. 
Tllis supports the hypothesis that foreign owned MNCs will produce in those sectors of the economy 
wllich are the most internationally competitive. 
The Singapore govermnent believes that the causality works in both directions. We accept, of course, 
that the causal relationship between both variables is difficult to establish; in fact if FDI was primarily 
oriented towards industries with growing RCAs, it should be underlined that, in several cases, such a 
trend was itself fostered by the inflow ofFDI. 
Singapore's small physical and economic size necessitated dependence on MNCs, with their 
production know-how and established quality standards and marketing networks. The govermnent 
rationalised that MNCs would enable Singapore to industrialise quickly and efficiently witl1out tl1e 
necessity of protecting the small domestic market, and it would be too slow and uncertain to depend 
on traditional local capital (Lim, 1988). 
In the nlid-1960s the govermnent instituted a strategy of growth through labour-intensive 
industrialisation. In order to reduce the high unemployment rate the govemment reduced tariffs and 
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non-tariff barriers to trade and encouraged labour-intensive manufacturing industries: textiles and 
garments, and later electrical assembly and parts and shipbuilding (Lee, 1973). This policy faced 
several problems. Although wages in Singapore were far below those in high-income countries, they 
were significantly above those in the NICs, which had larger internal markets, yet were engaged in a 
strategy of export led growth. In order to attract the substantial FDI that this economic strategy 
required, Singapore offered generous investment incentives to MNCs (Lee, 1977). The government 
also recognised that stability, especially political stability and a motivated yet passive labour force, 
would increase the attractiveness of Singapore as a site for FDI. To achieve this situation, the 
government severely limited the rights of workers to strike and bargain for wage increases and the 
rights of citizens to engage in radical political dissent (Lim, 1975). 
Table 6.2 
Foreign Direct Investment inflows into 
ASEAN, (US$ millions) 
Singapore ASEAN 
Year 
1970 93 352 
1971 116 400 
1972 141 509 
1973 327 645 
1974 230 945 
1975 254 1,199 
1976 186 1,116 
1977 206 1,164 
1978 186 1,116 
1979 669 1,526 
1980 1,138 2,333 
1981 1,645 3,503 
1982 1,298 3,125 
1983 1,085 3,091 
1984 1,210 2,638 
1985 809 1,988 
1986 1,529 2,664 
1987 2,630 3,927 
1988 3,493 6,805 
1989 3,915 8,555 
1990 4,489 11,121 
Source : World Bank, World Tables 1992-1994. 
Singapore and 
% FDI inflow into 
Singapore 
26.4 
29.0 
27.7 
50.7 
24.3 
21.2 
16.6 
17.7 
16.6 
43.8 
48.7 
46.9 
41.5 
35.1 
45.8 
40.6 
57.4 
66.9 
51.3 
45.7 
40.3 
Initially it was the generous investment incentives which led to an inflow of FDI into Singapore. 
Table 6.2 shows that FDI inflows into Singapore increased from US$ 93 million in 1970 to US$ 329 
in 1973. The world recession in 1974/75 led to a dramatic fall in FDI into Singapore which continued 
tmtil 1979. Singapore was no longer receiving the largest inflow of FDI throughout this period. By 
1978 Singapore only accounted for 16% of all investment inflows into the region. In 1979 the 
Singapore Govenm1ent set about attracting investment into the economy through 'the second 
industrial revolution'. This strategy of export-led growth headed by exports of MNCs and sectoral 
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change led by FDI in the manufacturing sector was highly successful in terms of economic growth, if 
at some cost in terms of worker's rights and civil liberties. The economy boomed, and as it developed 
a comparative advantage in a number of products, this in tum led to the further increase in FDI both 
through the e"'])ausion of existing MNC activities as well as investment from new sources. 
As the economy developed a comparative advantage in a number of commodities this attracted further 
investment from the MNCs, implying the and increase in the RCA led to an increase in FDI. 
However, the investment incentives still played a major role in attracting FDI inflows into Singapore, 
which accounted for over 40% of total ASEAN inflows from 1979 onwards. The only major decline in 
FDI inflows into Singapore since 1979 was in 1985 - a period of recession when FDI generally 
declined - falling to US$ 809 million, with Singapore still accounting for 40% of all investment 
inflows into the ASEAN region. Since 1987 the ASEAN region has become one of the most attractive 
investment locations in the developing world and has attracted a disproportionately large amount of 
FDI US$ 11,621 million in 1990, 40% of which went to Singapore declining from 66% in 1987 as the 
other ASEAN countries implemented policies to attract FDI. 
The correlation between the level ofFDI and gross value added was 0.96, significant at the 1% level, 
and the correlation between the level of FDI and sales was 0.55, also significant at the 1% level. The 
e"ient to which MNC activity concentrates in high-value sectors is highly suggestive, but is by no 
means conclusive. Much seems to depend on the type of FDI undertaken. Where MNCs allocate their 
investment to high-value sectors the host community does not always benefit as much as it might, 
since the rent earned on these activities is appropriated by the parent company. 
l'echnical impact 
The correlation between the level ofFDI and productivity was 0.92, significant at the 1% level. MNCs 
may help to raise technical or sectoral efficiency in two ways: by themselves being more efficient than 
their indigenous competitors, and through linkages, example, and competitive stimulus, upgrading the 
productivity of their suppliers, customers, and competitors. Foreign affiliates generally record higher 
productivity ratios than their indigenous competitors. The spillover effects, through example and 
competition, partly depend on the existing market structure; in the economies and sectors where there 
has been a strong indigenous presence it has generally been beneficial. In Singapore the local markets 
are often too small to allow economies of plant size to be fully exploited and for there to be other than 
a monopolistic or oligopolistic market situation; indeed in some sectors, such as pharmaceutical 
chemicals, there is evidence that MNCs have squeezed out local firms. 
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Adjustment impact 
The correlation between the level of FDI and industry growth was 0.87, significant at the 1% level. 
The industries in which FDI increased fastest had a higher increase of export/import ratio than did 
industries in which the FDI did not increase as quickly. The correlation between change in FDI and 
change in the export/import ratio was 0.54, significant at the 5% level. There is of course a problem of 
causality here. Does the observed relationship rw1 from the export/import ratio of an industry in 
Singapore to FDI, or vice versa: that is, did foreign firms invest in nahtrally export-oriented industries 
or did the foreign investment cause these industries to be export oriented? As described in the 
previous section, the Singapore government has believed that the causality works in both directions. It 
has fonnulated policies to attract FDI to industries in which it has identified an export potential. The 
FDI was positively related to industry growth within the manufacmring sector. The correlation was 
0.87. Moreover increases in the FDI stake were positively correlated (0.63, and significant at the 1% 
level) with industry growth. As with exports, however, there is a causality problem here since FDI 
comp1ised such a large percentage of total manufachlring investment. 
The correlation between the change in the level of FDI <md the change in RCA was 0.69, significant 
at the 5% level, and the correlation between the increase in the level of FDI and the increase in 
productivity was 0.20, which was not significant even at the 10% level. There is also a problem of 
causality here between change in FDI and change in RCA. As previously stated the Singapore 
government has believed that the causality works in both directions. It has formulated policies to 
attract FDI to industries in which it has identified a potential comparative advantage. 
This supports the hypothesis that MNCs will produce in sectors in which the RCA ratio has most 
improved, but fails to support the hypothesis that MNCs will produce in sectors in which productivity 
has most increased. The Singapore government constantly aims to stimulate inward direct investment 
into the more technology-intensive sectors. It must be remembered that if MNCs are to play a positive 
and helpful role, the government must create the right economic climate - including the removal of 
obstacles to redeployment. 
~arketstructure 
There is no evidence to support the fact that the affiliates of foreign based MNCs are more likely to 
concentrate in sectors which are vertically integrated. The correlation between FDI and the value 
added ratio (V AR- defined as gross value added divided by gross output) was 0.34 and insignificant. 
Similarly the FDI v liT hypothesis suggests that there is a positive but insignificant association 
between intra-industry trade and the foreign participation ratio, witl1 a coefficient of 0.34. 
Regrettably, intra-industry data are rarely presented in sufficient detail to allow tlte separation of 
vertical and horizontal transactions. However it can be seen that foreign affiliates of MNCs are 
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strongly concentrated in sectors in which the intra-industry trade ratio rose the sharpest. Examples of 
categories highlighting this trend include:- paper products and printing, industrial chemicals, 
machinery except electrical, electrical machinery, and electronic products. These sectors happen to be 
those in which MNCs are more likely to adopt a global strategy. The correlation between the change 
in FDI and the change in liT was 0.58, significant at the 10% level. 
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Conduct 
While there is a vast literature on the theory and experience of firms' conduct in expanding or 
entering new markets, especially on takeover and merger behaviour, relatively little work in tllis area 
has been done on developing countries. Several host governments in developing countries have, 
however, el'\rpressed concern about takeovers of local firn1s by MNCs; it has been generally felt that 
MNCs have, in their immense financial and other resources, and unfair advantage over local 
competitors, and can, therefore, buy them out at a price wllich understates their true value. 
Furtl1ern1ore, MNCs may, by predatory market conduct, stifle local competition, or so emasculate it 
that local firms are forced to sell out to tl1em, tlms speeding up the process of 'denationalisation' and 
increasing dependence on foreigners. Such fears are not just confined to developing countries; they 
have been voiced in European countries, and the control of acquisitions by large firms, mostly 
multinational, remains the major concern of anti-monopoly policy. 
The US Tariff Commission's (1973) study of US MNCs noted their preference for entering new 
markets by mergers or takeovers, and gave various reasons for tl1is preference: immediate access to 
markets and brand names; control over proprietary teclmology; access to operating plant and 
personnel; and valuation at less than true worth. In developing com1tries the second and third reasons 
may not be important, but the ot11ers may be significant enough to explain Vernon's product life cycle 
(1979). It was found that by the end of the 1960s almost 65% of 2,904 subsidiaries of 396 US and 
other MNCs in developing countries had been set up by acquisitions rat11er than by new investments. 
Sinlilar data is not available for Singapore, but it does seem likely that where takeovers by MNCs are 
permitted, they have been actively used as a method of entry into sectors where successful local firms 
offered distinct benefits to new entrants, like the established market networks, efficient plant, or a 
skilled labour force. These factors apply witl1 much less force to lligh-teclmology industries, where 
MNCs would gain little from acquiring local enterprises. If this is indeed tme, it would appear that 
MNC takeovers, generally adding little by the way of technology, may not have been beneficial to host 
developing countries. 
A great deal of the literature on MNCs suggests that they use their strong financial position to gear 
tl1emselves exceptionally highly in developing countries, thus raising t11e profitability of their equity 
investment, and depriving local enterprises of domestic savings, and reducing t11eir exposure to 
exchange risk. While general presumptions of this sort are too numerous to list, empirical support for 
them has usually been provided by showing figures on the sources of financing (parent firm, retained 
profits, local equity, and local/foreign debt) of MNC subsidiaries: in the absence of comparisons witl1 
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patterns of financing of the MNCs in their home cmmtries, and of local firms in the host cmmtry, 
however, such figures may be quite misleading. 
An aspect of MNC behaviour which has received a great deal of attention is transfer pricing. Transfer 
prices are the prices that are charged on tl1e transactions that take place within the MNC. The prices 
that are charged on these intra-corporate transfers can clearly deviate from market prices because 
trade within the MNC may be transacted outside tl1e sphere of market forces. 
For a variety of reasons tlle host counlly government may wish to control the external transfer of 
funds by MNC subsidiaries located within its borders. The MNC, on tl1e other hand, may wish to 
evade or avoid such restrictions and tl1e parent can ensure the transfer of funds out of a country by 
raising the price of the inputs that it sells to its subsidiary in that cmmtry and lowering price of what it 
buys from its subsidiary. Such manipulation of transfer prices - that is, the deviation of transfer prices 
from arms-lengtll prices - may have a number of objectives, (Lall 1973), including reduction of 
corporate tax liability. 
The scope and effectiveness of transfer price manipulation by MNCs vary widely from industry to 
industry and from one firm to another. Three sets of factors account for this 1meven incidence. (Lall 
1979). 1) inter-industry variations in tl1e trade component of MNC production; 2) variations in the 
extent of intra-firm trade as a proportion of total trade by MNCs; 3) variations in the possibilities for 
manipulating transfer prices. 
Point one is self explanatory. Witll respect to point two, Lall (1979) argued that intra-firm trade was 
likely to be larger in those industries that are of a 'high' technology (including large R&D 
requirements, high level of skills, and firm-specific products, designs, etc), have specific marketing 
requirements and where there is risk and uncertainty attached to open market transactions. Examples 
of such industries include office machines, plastics, computers, instrunlents and transport equipment. 
With respect to point three, Lall argued that the more advanced the firm-specific was the level of 
technology embodied in a product, and the more discontinuous its supply, tl1e greater was the scope 
for transfer pricing. Pharmaceuticals provide a major example of transfer price manipulation. 
The manipulation of transfer prices in a ma1111er detrimental to the interests of host countries may be 
extremely difficult to identifY and control. It is safe to assume that MNCs will not willingly cooperate 
in supplying information to the host com1try govenm1ents investigating their affairs. Developing 
com1tries will probably not have the personnel with the abilities to deal with these problems, although 
this will change over time, given the possibility of increased international cooperation in these 
matters. 
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Clearly transfer pricing is a problem for all host nations, both developed and developing. Its 
magnitude should not be underestimated but, on the other hand, it is something that host economies, 
both individually and in cooperation with one another, can attempt to do something about, and in the 
longer run it may well be a problem of declining imp01tance. 
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Performance 
There are several issues which may be considered under 'performance', but only the ones which have 
attracted attention in the context of MNCs will be examined, and which fall within the general scope 
of industrial economics: profitability, productivity, and the choice of teclmology. Other issues such as 
employment creation, part of which comes under the choice of technology, exports or management 
efficiency are deliberately excluded from this survey. 
Size 
In terms of size, MNC subsidiaries seem to be much larger than domestic firms. 'Multinational 
corporations .. .. .. are among the most powerful economic institutions yet produced by the capitalist 
system', (Dunning 1981, page 3), and this power is partly a consequence of size. Although size is an 
important criterion for distinguishing multinationals from other enterprises, one should differentiate 
between absolute and relative size. Certainly the largest fim1s account for a very significant proportion 
of the world's stock of foreign investment and they wield substantial economic and political power, 
with the total sales of many corporations singly exceeding the Gross National Products of many nation 
states (Linge and Hamilton, 1981). Yet a far wider range of enterprises have become significant as 
MNCs because of their relative size, in their dominance of particular segments of international 
markets for specialised products or services. 
The USA and the UK have traditionally enjoyed a dominating position as far as FDI and international 
production are concerned. However, by the late 1970s that position had been eroded by the increased 
share in the stock of global FDI accounted for by Germany and Japan, and to a lesser extent 
Switzerland and Holland. 
A unique feature of MNCs is their ability to view the world as a single economic mlit and 
consequently to plan, manage and orga1lise their activities on a global scale. MNCs are both products 
of and contributors to technological developments that have reduced the problems posed by 
geographical distance. It is the parent company that determines global strategy, decides on the 
location of new investment, allocates export markets and research and development (R&D) 
progranunes to various parts of the corporation and determines the prices that are charged on intra-
corporate transactions. 
There are various measures - sales, value-added, capital, employment - wllich could be used to 
compare size. Each of them suffers from limitations when used on its own, and ideally a combination 
of several measures should be used. For reasons of convenience sales and assets have also been chosen 
as two measures to indicate comparative sizes in this study. The figures must be used with a great deal 
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of caution as declared company accom1ts are never a completely reliable guide to the real 
'perfom1ance' of firms, and much less so when, as with MNCs, some of the important costs are 
determined directly by the firms concerned. Such uncertainty is not solely owing to financial 
manipulations on the part of the MNCs. Items such as tl1e amount of depreciation each year, are 
inherently subject to arbitrary valuation within a fairly wide range, while inflation, which normally is 
not taken into account, further distorts the value of fixed assets. Other items are liable to 'doctoring' by 
local, just as much as by foreign, enterprises. These are basic conceptual problems about how such 
items as 'capital employed' should be defined, to which convention provides a workable but not 
completely satisfactory answer, (Sen, 1975). And finally, tllere are the difficulties of comparison and 
interpretation entailed in using data from a short period. There is little that can be done to resolve 
such problems, which pervade all studies of tltis type, and should be clearly borne in mind. 
Sales figures have been taken for the year 1990-91. The main drawback of using sales for a 
comparison of size is that sales in any particular year may be misleading, because of differing rates of 
capital utilisation. Unfortunately, sufficiently detailed knowledge of rates of capacity utilisation are 
unavailable for individual firms in a year to supplement the comparisons of sales dat:1, so it must be 
assumed, perhaps unjustifiably, tllat these were similar for different industries. 
We have already indicated some of tlle problems inherent in comparing figures for assets. The value 
of net fixed assets as stated in tlle balance sheets is not a very good indicator of tlleir real value, 
because the depreciation metllods used by accountants are based on arbitrary conventions and are 
dictated by the tax system, and because inflation is not fully (if at all) taken into accom1t. The value of 
current assets may vary from firm to finn according to peculiar and changing market conditions, 
which could affect the value and quantity of stocks and the volume of trade credit receivable. It may, 
on tile oilier hand, be argued that such distortions do not greatly affect a comparison of finns in 
roughly similar conditions, and that an averaging process may cancel out most individual aberrations. 
In terms of the sales by Singapore companies, Singapore Airlines, the national carrier, dropped from 
its dominating role in tl1e number one spot to number three. The blame for this rests squarely on the 
Gulf crisis and subsequent war wreaking havoc on turnover and profit figures in various industries. 
Abnorn1ally high and volatile crude oil and product prices following the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 
August 1990 helped revenues at many oil trading houses to soar, with seven petroleum based 
companies occupying places in the top ten, compared witll six in 1991. The others are Singapore 
Airlines and electronics groups Sony and Matsushita. Singapore Airlines, however, is the only 
company in the top ten which suffered a drop in both sales and net profits. Singapore's top company 
in terms of sales in 1992 was Caltex Trading, which was tltird in 1991. Sales jumped more than five 
times to S$13 .69 billion. One of the two newcomers to the top ten list was Nissho Iwai Petroleum, a 
subsidiary of tile giant Japanese trading house, which was the second largest company witl1 revenues 
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of S$7.7 billion. The other is Nippon Oil which entered at tenth position, having dropped out of the 
top ten in 1991. In all, ten of the first fourteen companies ranked are either oil companies or oil 
trading houses, underlying the importance of this industry, the second largest industry after 
electronics, to the Singapore economy. The top eight in 1991's list have retained their places, while oil 
trader Idemitsu fell from nineth to fourteenth place and Thomson Consumer Electronics slipped from 
tenth to twelfth place. Table 6.3 shows the top companies and their rankings for the years 1991 and 
1992. 
Table 6.3 
Top companies 0 ranked by sales 0 
Rank 1991 Rank 1992 Company name 90/91 89/90 
S$'000 S$'000 
3 1 Caltex Trading 13,688024 2,540,165 
2 Nissho Iwai Petroleum Company 7,698,855 4,438,773 
1 3 Singapore Airlines 4,948,100 5,093,100 
7 4 Cosmo Oil International 3,946,938 1,727,317 
5 5 Sony International (S) 3,493,607 1,807,520 
2 6 Asia Matsushita Electric (S) 3,353,766 1,807,520 
6 7 C Itoh International Petroleum Co 2,605,429 1,730,782 
4 8 Mobil Oil Singapore 2,348,190 1,877,783 
8 9 Marubeni International Petroleum (S) 2,194,567 1,475,879 
13 10 Nippon Oil Asia 1,982,120 1,374,010 
Source : Regis!IT of Comganies, Singanore 1992. 
Seven of the top ten companies were Japanese owned, up from six in 1991, while Caltex and Mobil 
are American. BP is the highest ranked British company in eleventh position. Total sales by the top 
ten companies more than doubled between 1991 and 1992, mainly because of a strong performance by 
the oil based firms, to S$46.2 billion in 1992 from S$21.9 billion the year before. However, net profits 
of the top ten shrank slightly by 3% to S$1.36 billion, due to Singapore Airlines' 24% phmge from 
S$1.2 billion to S$0.91 billion. 
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Table 6.4 shows the top companies with the largest asset base, with Singapore Airlines convincingly 
managing to retain its number one spot in tltis category. Keppel and Glaxochem are again second and 
tltird respectively while United Industrial Corporation in fourth place is the only newcomer to the list, 
with its subsidiary Singapore Land in fifth place. 
Table 6.4 
Top companies ranked by total assets 
Rank 1991 Rank 1992 Company name 90/91 89/90 
S$'000 S$'000 
1 Singapore Airlines 9,058,500 8,235,800 
3 2 Keppel Corporation 4,877,554 3,432,316 
2 3 Glaxochem 4,211,849 1,306,359 
14 4 United Industrial Corporation 4,211,849 1,306,359 
4 5 Singapore Land 3,237,407 2,561,793 
8 6 DBS Land 2,919,574 1,684,531 
6 7 Neptune Orient Lines 2,916,082 2,494,837 
5 8 City Developments 2,855,531 2,536,013 
9 9 Glaxo Far East 2,383,321 1,655,258 
10 10 Fraser & Neave 2,160,639 1,549,626 
Source : Registry of Companies. Singapore 1992. 
Table 6.5 
Top twenty public listed companies 
Rank 1991 Rank 1992 Public Listed Companies Sales 
90/91 S$'000 
1 1 Singapore Airlines Ltd 4,948,100 
2 Singapore Petroleum Co Ltd 1,571,379 
4 3 Keppel Corporation Ltd 1,400,306 
2 4 Neptune Orient Lines Ltd 1,333,157 
3 5 Fraser & Neave Ltd 1,327,687 
9 6 Weame Brothers Ltd 835,538 
5 7 Inchcape Berhad 829,462 
17 8 Cycle & Carriage Ltd 827,663 
6 9 Intraco Ltd 776,180 
7 10 Asia-Pacific Breweries Ltd 766,293 
13 11 Natsteel Ltd 748,310 
8 12 Amcol Holdings Ltd 718,503 
10 13 Times Publislting Ltd 618,762 
11 14 Haw Par Brothers International Ltd 582,229 
14 15 Singapore Press Holdings Ltd 531,609 
16 16 Sime Singapore Ltd 483,739 
19 17 Sembawang Shipyard Ltd 435,767 
18 City Developments Ltd 431,626 
15 18 Cold Storage Holdings Ltd 424,619 
20 20 Singapore Bus Service (1978) Ltd 397,449 
Source : Registry of Companies, Singapore 1992. 
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Table 6.5 shows the top twenty leading public listed companies. Only five of the public listed 
companies, all local, made it to the top twenty sales rankings. This is one more than in 1991. The only 
newcomer was the homegrown Singapore Petroleum Company, the second highest ranlced listed 
corporation, occupying thirteenth place. The others were Keppel (16th), Neptune Orient Lines (18th), 
and Fraser & Neave (19th). 
The general picture conveyed by the asset figures strongly confinns that conveyed by the sales figures: 
on average, the foreign multinational corporations are substantially larger than the locally owned 
corporations. 
Profitability 
While some scattered data are available on the profitability of MNCs in developing countries, (Lall 
and Streeten, 1977), there are relatively few studies which try to statistically analyse and explain the 
relative profitability of MNCs and other firms. The aggregate data indicate that MNCs are fairly 
profitable in developing countries, and on average perform better than local firms. While this accords 
with the general theoretical consideration that MNCs possess certain oligopolistic advantages that 
give them an element of market power - and thus superior profitability - not possessed by other firms, 
it may be misleading if the average profitability of MNCs reflects, not their superior performance, but 
the fact that they happen to be concentrated in industries with higher profits due to higher risk, 
greater barriers to entry, better capacity utilisation or higher rates of growth, or that they are larger if 
size is associated with profitability. If the e:-.:planation lies in industrial composition or size, local 
finns of comparable size and specialisation may show equally high profitability - the fact that they are 
multinational may not add to eaming capacity. 
The main problem in studying the profitability of MNCs is the potential for undeclared profits 
remitted abroad by transfer pricing, which by its nature is practically impossible to detect and allow 
for. All studies for developing countries mention this, and must be bome in mind when interpreting 
the results. 
As in 1991, Singapore Airlines and Mobil were the only two companies in the top ten on both the 
sales ;md profitability lists. Table 6.6 shows the leading profit makers. Singapore Airlines' profit 
dropped due to the high oil prices during the Gulf crisis, and industry competition has pushed it down 
to second place in terms of net profits. Switching places with it is the previous runner-up British 
pharmaceutical group Glaxochem, which is followed by its sister company in third place, with the 
unique distinction of having profits twice as large as sales in 1991. Singapore Press Holdings and 
Keppel Corporation in seventh and eighth places respectively are the two newcomers to the list, 
replacing Hewlett-Packard and Sundstrand Pacific. 
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Table 6.6 
Top companies . in terms of profits . 
Rank 1991 Rank 1992 Company name 90/91 89/90 
S$'000 S$'000 
2 Glaxochem 980,061 1,059,740 
1 2 Singapore Airlines 912,800 1,200,600 
3 3 Glaxo Far East 495,671 545,204 
7 4 Compaq Asia 221,096 136,967 
4 5 Petrochemical Corporation of (S) 171,243 278,675 
9 6 Mobil Oil Singapore 153,899 115,627 
11 7 Singapore Press Holdings 133,374 95,282 
15 8 Keppel Corporation 118,202 82,761 
8 9 Apple Computer Singapore 114,930 119,171 
6 10 GM Singapore 109,948 171,404 
Source : Regis!!Y of Comganies, Singagore 1992. 
MNCs will also, as far as possible, attempt to minimise the amount of tax that they pay and will also 
wish to minimise the risks that they face, although clearly such objectives may be mutually exclusive 
in many instances. It is not always possible, however, to explain or predict the behaviour of individual 
affiliates along these lines. Given that the interests of any one part of the MNC are subordinate to the 
interests of the MNC as a whole, different affiliates may pursue various objectives, all of which may 
well be consistent, in the long nm, with global profit maximisation. 
To achieve U1e objective of global profit maximisation, MNCs have divised a variety of financial 
strategies and policies. Examples include a heavy reliance on local borrowing and the reinvestment of 
profits to finance affiliate operations; U1e takeover of existing operations in the developing com1tries, 
rather than the establishment of new ones; and the manipulation of transfer prices. Transfer prices are 
the prices that are charged on transactions that take place witl1in the corporation (intra-corporate 
transactions); given that such prices are determined by the MNC itself and not by market forces, they 
can deviate to a considerable extent from so called 'arms-length' market prices. 
Pa·oductivity 
In the field of development economics there is an ex1ensive literature comparing different 
perfonnance measures of foreign and domestic firms in underdeveloped countries. In his survey of 
this literature, Lall (1978) finds that generally these studies tell us that finns operating under domestic 
ownership are unable to compete with MNCs. It is also frequently contended that foreign finns 
display greater efficiency because they enjoy better management and possess a technological 
advantage in superior technique of production. 
There is little doubt that foreign and domestic finns in general do perfonn differently, but it may be 
questioned whether this is due to ownership advantages as such. All the studies referred to by Lall 
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show, for instance, that the MNCs are more efficient in their use of capital and labour than domestic 
firms. However, none of these studies are able to ascertain whether this is owing to ownership or to 
other factors such as industrial distribution, size, technology and market conditions. 
The measurement and comparison of inter-firm productivity is fraught with difficulties. It is not clear 
how inputs, especially different kinds of labour and capital, and outputs should be measured nor how 
their relationships should be interpreted. Productivity varies widely with the nature of the industry, the 
technique of production used, scale economies, managerial efficiency, capacity utilisation, labour-
force skills, market power, and so on. (see Bhalla, 1975 and Lim, 1976). Since the purpose of such 
productivity comparisons, in this case of MNCs with local finns, is presumably to gain an insight into 
how efficiently firms use labour and capital, ideally one should separate out ex1raneous factors not 
related to individual firms' efficiency. There are problems of methodology which need careful 
handling: simply to compare local and foreign firms, of different sizes, in different industries, facing 
different market conditions, or using vastly different technologies in the same industry, may be 
misleading if these factors are not explicitly accounted for. 
In recent years, a great deal has been written about the choice of technology in developing countries. 
In the particular context of the study of MNCs, the debate has, revolved around the introduction of 
'inappropriate' - excessively capital-intensive - techniques by foreign firms and the way in which this 
distorts tl1e choice of technology in the developing economies. The data in the current study cannot 
even begin to deal with the fundamental problem of whether teclmologies used by the firms in the 
study have been 'inappropriate' with reference to social optimum, since it is impossible to postulate 
what such an optimum would be in concrete terms or whether suitable alternative technologies are 
actually available in the conditions being dealt witl1. Nor is it possible to investigate the extent to 
which MNCs have adapted techniques developed in rich countries to conditions in poor ones. 
However, it is possible to tllrow some light on the relative use of capital by the various firms in the 
survey. 
The empirical investigation to be conducted is based on the manufacturing industry of Singapore for 
the year 1990, using data obtained from the Registry of Companies in Singapore (1992). Capital 
employed in relation to net sales (the capital-output ratio), has been chosen as an indicator of capital 
use. Table 6. 7 shows the ratios of assets to sales, which have been calculated by applying a correlation 
technique- bivariate nom1al distribution - in order to detennine the significance of the results by use 
of at-test. 
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Table 6o7 
Capital=output ratio 
Category IR:ntio IRannk 
Food & beverage 91.3 4 
Te,.'tiles 38.8 8 
Paper products & printing 97.4 3 
Chemicals/petroleum 45.4 7 
Metal products 68.7 6 
Machinery 82.2 5 
Electrical/electronics 157.9 2 
Transport equipment 176.3 1 
FOREIGN 54.3 
LOCAL 97.8 
Source : Data from the Registry of Companies, Singapore 1992. 
From table 6. 7 it can be seen that the ratio of total assets to sales is highest for transport equipment 
and electricaVelectronics. The commodity categories with the lowest ratios are textiles and 
chemicals/petroleum. Thus of the two largest industrial sectors in Singapore - chemicals/petroleum 
and electricaVelectronics it would appear that the former uses relatively less capital in relation to 
output. In the case of a country like Singapore which encourages inward FDI, capital does not appear 
to be a scarce resource. Therefore, there is no problem in having industries which require a large 
amomlt of capital. However, as Singapore is such an open economy, it is almost impossible in some 
cases to determine the origins of the capital. The capital required for industry may be raised locally, 
but it could equally be raised externally. 
In terms of country of capital ownership, when looking at the difference between the total asset to 
sales ratio for foreign versus local industries, it can be seen that the foreign owned corporations have a 
much lower ratio than their local com1terparts. The data was found to be significant at the 5% level. 
This may have one or both of two explanations: first, that foreign MNCs are as efficient as other firms 
in terms of utilising their capital for production, but are using techniques which need less capital per 
unit of output; and, second, that they use the same techniques but are more efficient in achieving 
higher turnovers on capital employed ('efficiency' in this sense may also be taken to include economies 
of scale). The kind of information necessary to test the first hypothesis is not available, though it is 
possible to examine the choice of technique in the context of capital-labour ratios. 
To some extent, the possibility that foreign corporations use less capital per unit of output than other 
firms is contrary to expectations. Foreign corporations do tmdoubtedly lead in the use of new 
technology, which usually, but not always, tends to increase the use of capital per unit of output; they 
are relatively predominant in capital-intensive industries; and there is little evidence that they adapt 
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their 'core' technologies to different environments. The possibility that they are more efficient seems 
more plausible: they are clearly larger than the locally owned corporations, and so may reap 
economies of scale, and their management techniques may be superior to those of other firms. 
Table 6o8 
Capital=labour ratio 
Category !Ratio JRank 
Food & beverage 88.4 2 
Tex1.iles 22.1 8 
Paper products & printing 54.5 4 
Chemicals/petroleum 133.1 1 
Metal products 47.0 5 
Machinery 46.8 6 
Electrical/electronics 63.6 3 
Transport equipment 45.3 7 
FOREIGN 54.3 
LOCAL 97.7 
Source: Data from 1he Registry of Companies, Singapore 1992. 
The relationship between capital and labour is shown in table 6.8, defined as total assets (book value) 
to total number of employees. The comparison of foreign corporations and locally owned corporations 
is more interesting: as with the capital-output measures, the ratios seem to indicate that capital 
intensity is lower for foreign corporations than for other firms. In other words, foreign corporations 
appear to be generally less capital-intensive, in both meanings of the term (capital-output and capital-
labour ratios), than locally owned corporations. As with the capital-output ratios, the statistical tests 
for the various ratios of capital-labour show that they are significant, but tltis time at tl1e 1% level 
(using the same correlation technique as before). This assumes that wage rates for given kinds of 
labour in the two groups are similar. Little information is available on tltis, but impressionistic 
evidence suggests tltat foreign corporations may pay somewhat higher rates; whether or not this is 
sufficient to account for the overall difference, it is impossible to say. 
The nature of the data precludes a much more refined analysis, but it would appear justifiable to 
conclude that, once industrial influences are accounted for, there is no decisive difference in 
technology arising from the origin of investment. This is hardly surprising, as local firms are almost 
entirely dependent on foreign technology; furthermore, this general statement is not incompatible with 
the possibility that foreign MNCs have more modern technology, or influence local firms' choice of 
teclmology, neither of wltich propositions can be tested by the data at hand. 
The data does, however, show that foreign MNCs do tend to be more efficient than their local 
counterparts. Industrial factors seem to be quite important, but several otlters which have not been 
tested may equally well be sigttificant in detenuining tl1ese pattems. If better data were available and 
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greater resources, it might be possible to uncover some interesting tendencies; but as matters are, we 
must remain agnostic. 
Choice of teclrunology 
One of the areas of great interest and controversy in the study of MNCs in developing countries has 
been that of the 'appropriateness' of technology. There are several works reviewing the general 
literature on the choice of technology and employment creation in developing countries, (Bhalla, 
1975; Gaude, 1975; Morawetz, 1974; Stewart, 1974; White 1976). 
The transfer of technology is usually seen as a major factor in development. Yet it is generally 
accepted that, first and foremost, MNCs, at least in manufacturing, transfer older technologies to host 
cOtmtries. Not only does this maximise their profits from R&D but it also ensures greater 'in house' 
control of the process of technology diffusion. Too much competition might result and too quickly, 
limiting profits to sustain R&D, if up-to-date technology were transferred and copied. Many US 
corporations now regret having sold teclmology licences to Japanese fim1s in the 1950s and 1960s. 
Second, frequently MNCs prohibit exports by NICs or developing COlmtries, and even some advanced 
countries, using the technology transferred: there is much UN documentation on such 'restrictive 
practices'. While t11ird, a large proportion of equipment transferred to t11e NICs and developing 
countries is often considered to be inappropriate on the grounds that it is capital-intensive, causing 
insufficient job creation in countries mostly with a labour surplus, and usually produces goods suitable 
for, or capable of, consumption only by the elite classes. This is hardly relevant for Singapore, 
however, as labour is in short supply, and overall rates of remuneration are high by Asian standards. 
Balance of payments 
The initial act of direct investment will usually, but not always, involve a capital inflow, which will 
appear as a credit item in the capital account of the balance of payments. Exports by the MNC will 
appear as a credit item in the current account. Offsetting these credit items will be a number of items. 
The activities that the MNC engages in may be import intensive, that is, require the import of capital 
goods, and raw materials and intermediate goods. The MNC subsidiary is also likely to make a variety 
of payments to the parent company, including payments for technology, royalties, technical and 
managerial fees, and contributions to headquarters' overhead expenditure and research and 
development expenditure. In addition, if it is profitable, the MNC subsidiary, will of course, wish to 
remit all or part of its after tax profits to the parent or some other part of the corporation. 
It is also relevant to note that much MNC FDI involves the takeover of already existing, domestically 
owned enterprises. MNC FDI is likely to be import intensive, although the extent of import intensity 
depends, in part at least, on the degree of linkage creation in the host country. In some cases the local 
economy may not be capable of supplying the required inputs, in that it may not have the technical 
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resources to produce the input at all or it may be tmable to reach the technical or quality standards 
demanded by the MNC subsidiary. In other cases, tie-in clauses impose a legal obligation on the 
subsidiary to buy from the parent or some other part of the corporation (Vaitsos, 1974). 
Overall, therefore, it is impossible to quantify with any degree of accuracy or reliability the direct and 
indirect effects of the operations ofMNCs on the balance of payments of host economies. Even ifthere 
is a large positive effect, as in the case of mineral extraction and export, other aspects of the MNCs' 
operations may be undesirable - for example, the rate of exploitation of a non-renewable resource may 
be too high, tax payments to the developing country too low, insufficient employment may be created 
and so on, although it must be remembered that all these various aspects of the operation ofMNCs are 
open to negotiation. Tie-in clauses increase the import sensitivity of the economy already exacerbated 
by the process of import substitution industrialisation, and export restrictions prevent the development 
of new overseas markets and the earning of additional foreign exchange (Hood and Y mmg, 197 4). 
The developing country government may attempt to alleviate the burden imposed on the balance of 
payments by profit repatriation encouraging MNCs to reinvest a greater proportion of their profits 
locally. But if the rate of return on foreign capital, after tax depreciation, is greater than the rate of 
growth of national income and assuming that these profits are reinvested locally, then foreign capital 
ownership grows at a faster rate than national income. Assuming a constant capital-output ratio, 
foreign capital grows at a faster rate than domestic capital, an ever increasing proportion of the 
domestic capital stock will be owned by foreigners. This process is not likely to be politically 
acceptable and must in any case end when all capital is foreign owned (Streeten, 1972). 
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Direct linkages 
MNCs can exert a significant influence on both the rate and characteristics of the process of growth 
and development through the creation of fonvard and backward linkages with the host economy. 
Forward linkages refer to the scale of the output of the MNC to domestic firms for use as inputs into 
their productive process, and backward linkages refer to purchases by MNCs from domestic supplier 
finns. 
It is usually argued that MNCs will establish few linkages with domestic firms. The highly centralised 
global structure of the MNC and the integrated nature of its global operations, its use of capital-
intensive technologies and the nature of the final product, taken together lead many economists to 
argue that MNCs create a virtual 'enclave' in the host economy, integrating the 'modern', MNC 
dominated sectors of the host economy with the international economy (Colman and Nixson, 1986). 
It is not only ownership as such that detennines linkage possibilities in developing countries, but also, 
and perhaps more importantly, the nature of the teclmology utilised and the characteristics of the final 
product. The e:>..ient of linkages created in particular countries depends upon tl1e stage of development 
of indigenous industry, the availability of local skills and technology, institutions and government 
policies, changes in demand and technology in world markets and their political attractiveness to 
MNCs. The main benefits of such investment are generally supposed to be employment creation, 
export promotion, skill and teclmology transfer, and the stimulation of local linkages. The main costs 
are the generous fiscal and infrastructural incentives that developing countries have to offer, the socio-
political constraints of having to ensure a docile and low-cost labour force, the danger of losing 
'footloose' behaviour does not seem to have been realised; fiscal concessions certainly have been 
generous; MNCs have clearly shown a marked preference for stable regimes witl1 little or no 
problems; the incidence of 'squeezing' local finns needs further investigation; and export market 
instability is not a particular feature of MNC exports. On the whole, the benefits seem to have 
outweighed the costs witl1 developing countries, and many of them are now seeking to attract MNCs 
or foreign buying groups (Lall, 1978). 
Besides tlle general studies, a nmnber of com1try studies have discussed export-orientated foreign 
investment (and subcontracting) for Mexico, Hong Kong, Singapore, the Caribbean, and Taiwan. 
Nearly all of them have come to favourable conclusions about the net benefits of such activity to host 
developing countries, but tl1eir discussion of linkages as such has remained desultory and 
tmsatisfactory (see Lall, 1978). 
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Lim and Pang (1976), who surveyed the electronic industry in Singapore, noted that European fim1s 
buy a fair amount of their inputs ( 40% to 50%) locally, while US (under 10%), and Japanese (about 
20%) buy much less. This is owing to the fact that US fim1s were specialised in the semiconductor 
sector and Japanese firms in high-technology components, beyond the technological capabilities of 
domestic firms at the time, wllile European firms manufactured mainly consumer electronics where 
the scope for local purchase was much higher. However, local products tended to be rather costly, and 
were purchased chiefly in order to qualifY for GSP privileges in selling to Europe. Local firms faced 
the usual problems of quality, technology, high costs, and so on, and are sometimes assisted by the 
local MNCs from whom they subcontracted by free technology transfers. Firms wllich subcontracted 
to foreign buying groups seemed to face greater problems; their wage costs were higher than Hong 
Kong or Taiwan so that they were constantly threatened with losing their markets; they complained of 
little assistance from the government; and they were short of finance and new technology. 
UNCTAD (1975) reviewed tl1e electronics industry in developing countries generally, and reached 
optinlistic conclusions about the effects and prospects for subcontracting. It found tlmt several finished 
electronic products could be successfully manufactured by local enterprises in South East Asia, and 
subcontracting has led to 'a whole network of small manufacturers t11at were set up as a result of the 
backward linkages created'. 
Clearly much more evidence is needed on the experience of different industries in different developing 
coUfltries before it would be possible to generalise about the impact of MNC linkages in ell..-port-based 
industries. It is obvious that substantial linkages have been created, and that in some sectors such as 
electrotlics, they have been beneficial to host cotlfltries; however, it is possible that in some other 
industries, like textiles, linkages have been weakening and have had undesirable effects on 
distribution and welfare. 
MNCs are extraordinarily responsive to competitive pressures on product price and quality. Product 
market and industry factors, and not host country policies, are the major deternlinants of tl1e 
production technology they use. The production technology in tum deternlines the level and pattern of 
direct and indirect employment created by MNCs. A host country can only influence MNC production 
teclmology by providing incentives and the infrastmcture support to attract tl1e MNCs it wants. But 
once the MNCs establish themselves, they will respond primarily to market and industry factors. 
The host country should concentrate on developing infrastructure support and finding ways to 
improve the efficiency of its institutions. Institutional efficiency and good infrastructure reduce costs 
and uncertainty and encourage MNCs to take a long-term perspective. Because of market and industry 
factors, MNCs may initially adopt technologies inappropriate to a country's resource endowments. But 
as they grow, their employment impact will increase too, even though tl1ey may become more capital-
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intensive, because the increase in production and scale of operation will likely overwhelm the 
employment effect of rising capital intensity. Tlris suggests that a host country should take a fairly 
long-term view of the contribution that MNCs can make to its development. Attempts to maximise the 
short-nut contribution of MNCs by requiring them, for example, to buy locally from protected 
suppliers, can be counter productive. They would possibly encourage MNCs to take a short-term view 
and reduce their commitment to the country. 
Though local suppliers are initially inefficient compared with foreign producers, MNCs must try to 
assist them in various ways. Their commitment to local purchases is important for the development of 
an adequate supporting industry, and to the creation of indirect employment. The Singapore 
experience suggests that a well-developed local supporting industry can help diversify supply sources 
forMNCs. 
Labour mnrket impacts 
Singapore's wage costs are many times those of its neighbours, but they are still much lower than 
those in Europe, the USA and Japan. Despite rapidly rising wages, MNCs continue to set themselves 
up in Singapore wlrile others already in Singapore continue to upgrade their operations. This is 
because Singapore's competitive advantage - the product of its many attractions including excellent 
infrastructure, social and political stability, institutional efficiency - has increased rather than 
decreased with development. A host country need not fear that rising wages alone will retard 
employment growth or erode its competitive position. However, it must ensure that the general 
environment supports MNC expectations that profit opportunities will continue to be available 
(Financial Times, 29th March 1993). 
Even in labour-intensive industries, labour costs form but a small proportion (10%-20%) of total 
costs. Other costs - materials costs, freight and fuel costs, utilities, housing for expatriates - are much 
greater. A country's exchange rate also heavily influences both the prices of imported inputs and 
exports of its MNCs. The host country must pay attention to factors that influence non-wage costs of 
production if it wants to maintain a competitive advantage in attracting MNCs 
The strategy of industrialisation selected may affect the extent of MNC employment creation. Export-
led industrialisation may well utilise relatively labour-intensive techniques and thus create more jobs 
than 'inward-looking' import substituting industrialisation. However, it is also likely to be the case 
that export oriented MNCs create fewer linkages with the host economy and thus indirect employment 
creation is likely to be limited (Colman and Nixson, 1986). 
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Locally Owned Firms 
Although data on Singapore's outward FDI do not lend themselves to statistical analysis, they can give 
impressionistic support to several of Dunning's propositions. Outward FDI by Singapore-owned firms 
in the manufacturing sector has largely concentrated in industries in which the FDI share in 
Singapore was relatively low: textiles and garments, food and beverages, leather products, wood 
products, mbber products, bricks and tiles and clay products. This is hardly surprising. If virtually no 
locally-owned finns operate in an industry, the amount of outward FDI by these locally-owned firms 
would not be expected to be significant. Quite the opposite: given the very high FDI share in the 
manufacturing sector, it is surprising that Singapore's recorded outward FDI was so large relative to 
that from other low- and middle-income countries. These outward investors have developed fiml-
specific advantages in product and process technology, management, and access inputs and output 
markets that have allowed them to invest abroad in competition with other MNCs and locally-owned 
firms in the host country. 
Locally owned firms in Singapore have developed ownership-specific advantages in several areas. 
Their production bas been more oriented towards the domestic market than has that of foreign firms 
in their industries. Locally owned firms (and to a lesser extent joint ventures) have developed products 
which are appropriate both to the income level and to the consumer demand segments in Singapore. 
These product characteristics have often been overlooked by MNCs producing in Singapore for both 
the local and international market. Such products from Singapore's finns have often been e"-"}JOrted to 
neighbouring countries whose demand patterns are more similar to those in Singapore than to those in 
the home cmmtries of other MNCs. Rising wages in Singapore and trade protection and other 
government industrial policies in neighbouring countries have given these locally-owned firms in 
Singapore the incentive to invest abroad. Singapore's relatively well-developed capital market has 
facilitated raising capital for the investments. The labour-intensive technology used by the locally 
owned finns is often more appropriate for the wage levels and capital costs of neighbouring com1tries 
than was the production technology of other MNCs. As rising wages and rising foreign investment put 
pressure on locally owned finns, they were unable to use their advantage in product and process 
technology to produce abroad in such industries as textiles and garments, machinery, fabricated metal 
products, earthenware, glass and non-metallic mineral products, plastics, and paper and printing. 
Locally owned firms in Singapore have also acquired ownership-specific advantages in upgrading, 
processing and packaging agricultural and forest and natural resource products as traders and 
processors of the raw material, both from neighbouring countries for sale in high-income markets and 
from the USA, Canada, and Australia for sale in neighbouring com1tries. Govennnent policies in 
neighbouring countries to upgrade natural resources prior to export and to process imported natural 
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resources prior to sale have pushed firms in Singapore to invest abroad in these cmmtries. These firms 
have been able to utilise their firm-specific advantages in product and process technology and their 
sourcing and marketing systems to compete in these markets. 
There has also been considerable disinvestment by some foreign-owned firms in Singapore, especially 
since the late 1970s. Two factors can be identified to account for this outflow. Firstly, in the early 
stages of Singapore's industrialisation some firms were attracted to Singapore by its relatively low 
wages compared to industrialised countries. Rising wages in Singapore and the formation of export 
processing zones in neighbouring cmmtries witl1 lower wages have led some of these firms to pull up 
stakes and move to countries with lower wages. These forces have also led some locally-owned, 
export-oriented firms to invest abroad. Secondly, Singapore went through a mild import-substitution 
phase in the 1960s during which time some FDI was attracted to Singapore to serve its domestic 
market. Tariff reductions in tl1e late 1970s and early 1980s largely removed this tariff protection and 
some ofthese import-substituters have witl1drawn their investments. 
One of tl1e most common problems faced in investing overseas was tl1e quality and availability of 
production and management staff. At tl1e production level, many were of the view tl1at worker 
productivity was a problem as workers possessed little industrial experience. Training had therefore to 
be provided as a means to increase labour productivity. Typically, Singapore-based managers and 
engineers would be sent to oversee the startup operations in tl1e overseas plant. Local managers would 
then be hired at a subsequent stage. Depending on location and the existence of trained managers, an 
overseas plant, for example, in Johor, could be entirely managed by local staff. The problem 
encountered was tl1e difficulty of sending Singapore-based key managerial staff to oversee the 
overseas plant, particularly at the initial stages. This included the difficulty involved in persuading 
Singaporeans to be located abroad, as well as the problems of sparing tl1em in the already tightly 
stretched Singapore operations (Lee, 1994). 
A second set of problems was dealing with tl1e bureaucracy, documentation, building selection and 
construction. For companies used to moving into factories ready-built by Jurong Town Corporation in 
Singapore, tllis laborious and time-consuming process was costly, especially if the company had to 
start from scratch. The seriousness of tllese problems depended on the host country. Those who had 
investments in China invariably cited this as a problem, whereas tllose who invested in Perai, Penang, 
were able to commence operations within six months, and for Johor, tllree months. These points may 
be best illustrated by use of an example of a locally-owned firm: 'Amtek Engineering Ltd.'. 
Amtek Engineering Ltd is one of the leading local companies in Singapore manufacturing precision 
metal parts. Principal clients include MNCs such as Philips, Hitachi, IVP Thomson, Compaq and 
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General Motors. Its overseas investments, mainly in the same industry, also derive their business 
mainly from MNCs. 
Amtek's subsidiary in Malaysia, KRIS Components Sdn Bhd, was established rather early, in 1975. 
Another subsidiary, AE Technology, was set up in March 1989. It is only in the last three years that 
these companies have seen rapid growth. This has been attributed to the influx of MNCs into 
Malaysia, partly because of the change in government policy resulting in the relaxation of foreign 
investment regulations. The Malaysian subsidiaries achieved a 40% increase in tmnover in 1991/92 to 
reach S$30 million and now have a total of 460 employees. The majority of the clients are Japanese 
MNCs as there are proportionately more Japanese MNCs in Selangor than in Singapore. There is also 
a branch office and manufactming facilities located in Parit Btmtar in northern Perak to cater to the 
MNCs located in northwest Malaysia. The factory was located in Perak rather than Penang as the 
latter was considered to be too expensive and crowded. A second branch will be set up in Johor to 
cater to the MNCs in southern Malaysia. All three factories produce entirely for the Malaysian 
market. Metal parts are bulky, as a result of which transportation and handling costs form a 
substantial component of total cost. That is one main reason why, although wages are lower in 
Malaysia, it is not cost effective to export the products to Singapore (Lee, 1994). 
There was a large inflow of foreign investment into Thailand about two to three years before Malaysia 
liberalised its foreign investment policy. At that time, there were very few quality suppliers of metal 
stamping parts in Thailand, apart from one or two Japanese, as the Thais had not yet acquired the 
technology to do so. The company, incorporated in March 1987, is 40% owned by Amtek (S$1 
million investment), 40% by the Thai partrter and 20% by a venture capital company. It employs 
about 150 workers and has a tmnover of S$4-5 million. 
Amtek has faced a number of difficulties with the workforce in Malaysia at both the production and 
management levels. There is currently a labour shortage in Malaysia; many of the most able workers 
are overseas; and what is left are people with little industrial experience. There are also limited 
opportunities for training in Malaysia, and the quality of supervisors is also not as good as tl1at found 
in Singapore. Similar labour problems are faced in Thailand. Consequently a munber of measures 
have been adopted, in both countries, to cope witll these problems (Lee, 1994). 
Overseas direct investments by Singapore manufacturing companies is not a new phenomenon. It 
dates back to the 1980s, particularly in the second half, when labour cost and availability, land costs, 
and the real appreciation of the Singapore dollar caused domestic business costs to rise to a relatively 
higher level than that in other countries in the region. At the same time, tl1is increase in costs 
coincided witl1 the foreign investment liberalisation policies of Malaysia, Thailand and Indonesia, and 
the consequent inflow of foreign investment to these countries. 
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The second wave of overseas investments by Singapore companies, superimposed on the first wave, is 
now occurring. While the same cost push factors apply, the opening up of the transitional economies -
China, Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia - is attracting investors to these new markets which also offer 
low-cost and plentiful supply of labour. It is anticipated that this outflow of investments will increase 
in the future, in both absolute terms and relative to GDP, both because of the constraints to e:-..'J)ansion 
in Singapore as well as the business opportunities available in other rapidly growing Asian 
economies. 
The macro statistics indicate that private overseas direct investments from Singapore have risen in 
magnitude. The stock of direct investments abroad increased from S$ 1.6 billion in 1980 to S$ 7.5 
billion in 1990 alone (Table 6.9). Wholly- and majority-owned local companies accounted for over 
40% of direct investments abroad in both 1989 and 1990, with a slight increase in the percentage 
share from 42.4% in 1989 to 45.8% in 1990 (Table 6.10). Manufacturing companies were the second 
largest direct investors, accounting for about 19% of direct investments abroad at the end of 1989 and 
1990, compared with 50% at the end of 1990 for companies in the financial sector. 
Table 6.9 
Singapore's investment abroad (1976~90) 
Year Direct investment 
S$ million 
1976 1051.1 
1977 1120.0 
1978 1291.0 
1979 1506.8 
1980 1615.9 
1981 1677.7 
1982 2986.9 
1983 2233.1 
1984 2399.3 
1985 2257.2 
1986 2597.6 
1987 2961.5 
1988 2993.9 
1989 5288.7 
1990 7473.8 
Source: Department of Statistics, Singapore Investment Board, Singapore National Printers Ltd 1990. 
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Table 6.10 
Investment abroad by type of investment and type of 
companies 1989 and 1990 
1989 
S$ million 
Total direct 
investment 
5288.7 
(100%) 
1990 
S$ million 
Total direct 
investment 
7473.8 
(100%) 
Wholly-local 
owned 
666.7 
(12.6%) 
Wholly-local 
owned 
1545.8 
(20.7%) 
Majority-local 
owned 
1575.1 
(29.8%) 
Majority-local 
owned 
1968.4 
(26.3%) 
Wholly-foreign 
owned 
2395.4 
(45.3%) 
Wholly-foreign 
owned 
3126.7 
(41.8%) 
Majority-foreign 
owned 
651.5 
(12.3%) 
Majority-foreign 
owned 
923.9 
(12.4%) 
Source: Department of Statistics. Singapore Investment Board, Singapore National Printers Ltd 1990. 
However, although direct investments have been increasing in magnitude particularly in recent years, 
they are still not large enough to have a significant impact on the Singapore economy. Direct 
investments comprised only 26.9% of total investments abroad at the end of 1990, with portfolio 
investment, transactions with overseas companies and other foreign assets constituting the lion's share 
of total investments abroad (Table 6.11). Similarly, income from direct investments comprised 21.7% 
of income from total investments in 1990, and 5% of factor receipts of Singaporeans from the rest of 
the world in the balance of payments (Table 6.12). 
Direct investment 
Portfolio investment 
Table 6.11 
Singapore's investment abroad, 
1989 and 1990 (as at year end) 
1989 Share 1990 
S$ million % S$ million 
5288.7 23.3 7473.8 
5535.9 24.4 7639.3 
Transactions with overseas 
companies 3790.9 16.7 5391.2 
Other foreign assets 8098.5 35.7 7330.1 
TOTAL 22714.0 100.0 27834.3 
Share 
% 
26.9 
27.4 
19.4 
26.3 
100.0 
Source : Department of Statistics. Singapore Investment Board. Singapore National Printers Ltd 1990. 
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Table 6.12 
Income from Singapore's investment abroad, 1989 and 1990 
1989 Share 1990 Share 
S$ million % S$ million % 
Direct investment 393.8 25.9 467.7 21.7 
Portfolio investment 405.1 26.9 578.3 26.8 
Transactions with overseas 
companies 118.5 7.8 165.8 7.7 
Other foreign assets 629.9 41.4 677.6 31.4 
Gain/loss from sales of assets -24.6 -1.6 270.6 12.5 
TOTAL 1522.7 100.0 2159.9 100.0 
Factor receipts of Singaporeans 
from rest of the world 7190.0 100.0 9381.0 100.0 
Total income from Singaporean's 
investment abroad 393.8 5.5 467.7 5.0 
Source : Department of Statistics, Singapore Investment Board. Singapore National Printers Ltd 1990. 
Similarly, there is hardly any noticeable effect of overseas direct investments on the manufacturing 
sector. One would expect that the relocation of manufacturing activities overseas would result in a 
reduction in the manufacturing workforce in Singapore, and a shift in the sectoral composition of 
GDP away from manufacturing towards services. However, the manufacturing sector's share of GDP 
has remained relatively constant at 26%-28% of GDP since 1987, as has its share of employment, at 
27%-29% (Lee, 1994). 
It could be that overseas investments from Singapore have still not reached a sufficient magnitude for 
its impact on the economy to be noticeable at the macro level. If in the 1990s there is an acceleration 
of such overseas investments, then this could be translated into a noticeable macro level effect on the 
Singapore economy. 
When companies establish overseas manufacturing plants, a restructuring of company activities 
occurs. In particular, the Singapore operations become the corporate headquarters for the group. 
Typical headquarter activities for manufacturing companies comprise: management and control; 
finance and legal administration; logistics, procurement of supplies and marketing; engineering and 
technical support; and research and development. A typical pattem of restructuring is that the more 
manual lines are shifted out, while the more technically sophisticated, newer product lines are 
retained. The Singapore plant would also carry out the prototyping, process design and R&D, but once 
the project is secured, mass production is carried out off-shore. 
For the company, the benefits of overseas investments are obvious. It enables company expansion to 
occur, with consequent increases in tumover and profits. It enables them to overcome the constraints 
of Singapore's smallness, and yet to leverage Singapore's skill, finance and infrastructure capabilities 
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to advantage. There does not appear to be any downside element in this from the company's point of 
view, except that managerial resources are tightly stretched. 
The benefits from overseas investments are most likely to be gained from the location of corporate 
headquarter activities in Singapore. First, corporate headquarter activity will generate demand for 
professional, administrative, marketing and procurement, engineering and R&D staff. This is a high 
value-added activity, and desirable from tl1e national perspective. In macro terms, it is likely to lead to 
a reduction in tl1e absolute employment in manufacturing, but an increase in the average skill level of 
tl1e manufacturing workforce. The manufacturing sector will, over time, tend to become more 
producer service oriented, and the distinction between manufacturing and services is likely to become 
more blurred. 
Second, the location of management control matters. If decisions are made in Singapore, then it is 
more likely that there would be business spin-o:ffs for other Singapore companies because of the 
network and local knowledge. Business opportunities would tl1erefore be more likely to be channelled 
to Singapore companies. What matters is tl1e benefits of employment and value added to a country 
regardless of whether the company is Japanese or American. However, it could be that ownership does 
matter in Asia because of cultural differences between the East and the West. In Asia, personal 
relationships based on trust and knowledge appear to be relatively more important than in the West. 
When tl1ese are factored into profit calculations, then the location of management and ownership 
would detemline the likely network of business contacts, and hence the possible spin-o:ffs from 
business relationsllips. Tllis argun1ent strengtllens tl1e importance of developing strong local 
enterprises which can compete overseas, as these are more likely to retain their corporate headquarters 
in Singapore than the MNCs (Reich, 1980; 1991). 
The broader issue is that, when private local companies regionalise, a possible loss of control results. 
First, it is politically and economically dangerous to have a concentration of overseas investments in 
any one country. An economic downturn, or worse, political turmoil, and in tl1e extreme case, 
expropriation, could mean significant losses and would have adverse repercussions for the Singapore 
economy. It is for tllis reason that there is a deliberate strategy to balance the home country 
composition of foreign investment inflows into Singapore. But it would be difficult to implement a 
balanced country portfolio for outward investments because of its decentralised nature. Second, any 
strong sense of dissatisfaction with living conditions in Singapore could tip tile scales and cause 
emigration and relocation of corporate headquarters to what are perceived of as more friendly 
environments. Pessinlism regarding Singapore's future could also have tl1e same effect, especially in 
the context of a vibrant regional economy. Third, it could be that investing overseas carries witll it a 
higher risk than investing in Singapore. Fourth, overseas investments cause greater econonlic 
interdependency between Singapore and other countries in the region. While tllis is inevitable, it may 
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have social and political consequences which need to be carefully managed. All said and done there is 
no alternative for Singapore but to expand overseas. In other words, the issue is not so much whether 
they should invest, but how it should be done so as to derive the maximum net benefits for Singapore 
(Lee, 1994). 
As in the manufacturing sectors, FDI in the service sector was concentrated in those sectors in which 
MNCs had finn-specific advantages and Singapore had location-specific advantages. The relative 
growth rates of Singapore's broad economic sectors do not seem to have been related to FDI share. 
FDI share was high in the manufacturing sector and its growth was high; FDI share was low in 
transportation and communications and financial services, but their growth was high. FDI share was 
low in trade and commerce utilities and their growth rates were relatively low. Within these broad 
sectors, however, FDI share and inflows ofFDI tended to be concentrated in fast growing industries or 
industry segments. 
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Policy Implications 
The analysis of the determinants and effects of FDI in Singapore shows a clear pattem. Inward FDI 
has been in response to the location-specific advantages arising from Singapore's wage levels (and 
capital costs), location, govenunent incentives and infrastructure development, and the firm-specific 
advantages ofMNCs in capital, management, technology, and access to export markets. Outward FDI 
has responded to similar factors as Singapore's location-specific advantages (often in industries in 
which Singapore was losing its comparative advantage) declined relative to those in neighbouring 
countries and locally-owned finns developed firm-specific advantages of their own which they could 
utilise through production abroad in countries which had developed location-specific advantages for 
Singapore based MNCs. 
FDI has played a major role in restructuring Singapore's manufacturing sector and its overall rapid 
development. The high stake of FDI in Singapore's economy and its importance in future 
development, however, have imposed certain costs. "Reliance on foreign investment has not been 
without cost, although often the price which has been paid goes unnoticed in the euphoria of success, 
the profits of a foreign subsidiary ultimately belong to foreigners, and not to the domestic population. 
The foreign share of Singapore's GDP must be one of the highest in the world, rising from 10% in 
1966-67 to a high of28% in 1979-80. In other words, only about three quarters of Singapore's GDP is 
what the official publications call 'indigenous GDP'. Unlike the other Asian NICs, this is a major 
price to pay for development". (Lim, 1988). 
Singapore has been highly dependent on continuing inflows ofFDI for its growth in the past and this 
dependence will continue in the future. One of Singapore's most attractive locational advantages is the 
stability of its govermnent and its labour force. This stability has come at a cost of a certain degree of 
political authoritarianism and govemment control over wages, working conditions, and labour-
management relations. Singapore is no longer a low income, low wage cotmtry; its GNP per capita 
exceeds that of Hong Kong, Israel, Ireland, Greece, Portugal and Spain. Other countries with far 
lower wages have embarked on e}l:port-led industrial policies so that Singapore's labour-intensive 
exports have come under increasing competitive pressure. In order to compete with exports from these 
countries Singapore can either restrain wages or increase the hUillan and physical capital intensity of 
its manufacturing sector. Yet its past reliance on MNCs to provide a package of technology, capital, 
management and access to markets may have stunted the development of both its own R&D 
capabilities and its ability to acquire technology at am1's length. 
The goveTIU11ent of Singapore has recognised that FDI by MNCs has had an important and distinctive 
role to play in Singapore's economic development. Singapore's industrial policy has been to attract 
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investment by MNCs on the one hand and to influence their behaviour so that Singapore receives the 
greatest possible benefits from their investment on the other. Singapore has implemented this policy 
not by overt regulation of the operations of MNCs, but rather by regulating the macro-economic 
environment in which they operated: exchange rates, savings rates, wage rates, and infrastructure 
development. This policy and the way it was implemented has been successful up to a point. 
Singapore's economy has grown and restructured rapidly and it is well placed to achieve rapid growth 
and further structural change in the future. However, the costs in establishing this haven for MNCs 
must also be examined. 
In their plan to upgrade Singapore from a centre of entrepot trade to an industrial metropolis, Prime 
Minister Lee Kuan Yew and the leadership of the People's Action Party (PAP) had envisioned the 
Federation with Malaysia as the protected market for Singapore's industrial goods. With the loss of 
this market, PAP technocrats dumped the accompanying strategy of import-substitution 
industrialisation and in desperation adopted the new approach of export-oriented industrialisation. 
The world became a substitute market for Malaysia, and the motor of the new strategy became not 
local entrepreneurs but an alliance between the PAP state elite and foreign capital. When it opted for a 
strategy of making multinationals the engine of growth, the PAP technocratic elite envisioned a 
situation in which the foreign corporations would stimulate the growth of the local industries that 
would service them. Tltis has clearly not been the case. At least of the mid-1980s, subcontracting was 
not substantial, with foreign firms sourcing no more than 25% of their input from local 
establishments. When multinationals did establish complementary relations with local entrepreneurs, 
it often ended up with the former dontinating and eventually buying up the latter (Lim, 1988). 
Indeed, the MNCs not only failed to serve as a locomotive for growth of local businesses but they 
competed with domestic entrepreneurs for the small Singapore market, being able to enjoy advantages 
of brand name and access to the parent companies' resources in the areas of technology, finance, 
management and marketing expertise. Koh and Lee put it "the successful local entrepreneur is a 
scarce and precious resource in Singapore today." The blame was laid squarely at the doorstep of 
government policy (Miitistry of Trade and Industry, pl29. Singapore 1986). "Singaporeans have been 
traditionally entrepreneurial. But an econontic policy which stresses the role of foreign investment in 
manufacturing inevitably forces the local entrepreneur into a lesser role." Local businesses resent not 
only the lack of protection in their home market but also the fact that government incentives have 
actively discriminated in favour of the MNCs. For instance, the requirement that pioneer enterprises 
have investments of over US$1 million to be entitled to tax breaks automatically cuts out most local 
finns since only a handful can reach that level of capitalisation. More broadly, policies supportive of 
foreign investors were enacted well before policies supportive of small businesses: foreign investment 
policy was enacted in the early 1960s, wltile measures directed at assisting small local firms, like tl1e 
Small Industries Finance Plan, were adopted ten to fifteen years later (Krause, Koh and Lee, 1988). 
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In explaining the marginal character of the local business community, the PAP elite has resorted to all 
e>.rplanations except the obvious. One government favourite has been the alleged 'absence of the 
entrepreneurial spirit' among Singaporeans. As local entrepreneurs note, this is a strange charge since 
the Singaporean Chinese helped build Singapore as a trading entrepot. The PAP's riposte is that 'the 
entrepreneurship required in an entrepot economy is not the same required in modem, industrialised, 
and diversified economy'. But tllis is a difficult proposition to defend since Chinese merchants made 
the transition from commerce to industry in places like the Philippines, Thailand, Taiwan and Hong 
Kong. Clearly, the crowding out of the domestic entrepreneurs by the MNCs is the main reason for 
the lack of dynamism of local business. 
For a long time, the PAP state-multinational capital relationship was viewed as a partnership of 
equals. Yet in reality foreign capital was the tmdisputed senior partner in the alliance, as underlined 
by the dismal results of the PAP state's ambitious effort to upgrade Singapore's industrial structure 
from labour-intensive to high technology manufacturing in the 1980-85 period. 
This Second Industrial Revolution was intended as a optimal response to the same forces tl1at pushed 
the Taiwanese and Koreans to emphasise technological upgrading of their production processes: the 
loss of cheap-labour advantage. Beginning in 1979 the PAP government adopted a series of policies 
designed to transform the island into a base of higher value-added, high technology industries. 
Central to the strategy was a wage correction policy, consisting of raising wages for local workers 
while at the same time phasing out cheap foreign labour. This strategy, which raised unit labour costs 
by 40% over six years, was designed to move Singapore out of direct competition with ot11er countries 
that could offer lower wage rates in labour-intensive industries and enhance the productivity of higher 
paid labour through capital and skill-intensive production processes (Lim, 1988). 
The Second Industrial Revolution was the supreme attempt at technocratic manipulation. But the 
MNCs did not follow the script laid out by PAP economists. The teclmological upgrading of 
production processes hardly took place, as indicated by the fact that wages accounted for 50% of 
value-added in manufacturing by 1984. Instead of upgrading t11eir investments, the Japanese, for 
instance, substantially reduced their investment commitments, with the 1980 figure falling by 56% of 
the previous year's. For a time Japan redirected much of its low value-added investment to Hong Kong 
without significant increases in higher value-added production in Singapore (Ministry of Trade and 
Industry, Singapore 1986). 
The crisis that followed the wage correction policy forced government teclmocrats to confront the fact 
that because cheap labour continued to be Singapore's main asset in the eyes of the MNCs, it could be 
altered only at great risk. The EDB planners explained that they had misunderstood why companies 
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had come to Singapore. Good infrastructure was important, but it was not the main driver. Cheap 
wages were. MNCs faced with the decree, did not see the point in giving US$2 an hour wages to 
unskilled Singaporeans when Malaysian, Thai or even Mexican workers could do the same jobs for 
under US$1. On top of that, all those countries had begun offering their own incentives to lure 
industry. So the Singapore shortcut was backfiring as companies began going elsewhere. Some 
stopped investing, whilst a few got ready to pull out. The combination of a 40% decline in investment 
and weakening international demand for key manufactures brought about Singapore's most serious 
recession in twenty years in 1985, as GDP declined (Lim, 1984). 
The downturn underlined, among other things, the muortunate consequences of a policy of not 
extending preferential treatment to local entrepreneurs and not protecting the domestic market. Had a 
differential wage correction policy been applied, local entrepreneurs could have moved into labour-
intensive areas being vacated by the MNCs. And had they enjoyed a protected domestic market, local 
producers could have prospered by responding to the increased demand brought about by higher 
wages in the MNC sector. In other words, the international recession and decline in foreign 
investments in the export sector could have been counteracted by a booming domestic economy. 
Instead of creative Keynesian policies, the government instituted a series of draconian measures to get 
the economy out of the recession, including a freeze on wages in 1986 and 1987, a 15% reduction in 
the employers' contribution to the Central Provident Fund (a system of forced savings), and lowering 
of corporate taxes from 40% to 30%. By February 1986 the government appeared to have reversed the 
earlier policy of stressing high-technology investment in favour of 'all fonns of investment which can 
make profits'. Hard labour instead of high productivity became, for a time, the government's rhetorical 
response to the crisis. As Minister of Trade and Industry Lee Hsien Loong asserted in 1986 that 
Singapore could become competitive by getting workers to work 44 hours a week, where others will 
only work 38 .... to do third shifts and keep plants open 24 hours a day. Instead of being phased out, as 
originally intended, cheap foreign workers were brought in at a record rate of 2,000 to 3,000 a month, 
raising the foreign labour force from 100,000 in 1985 to 150,000 in 1988 (Ministry of Trade and 
Industry, p51-53. Singapore 1986). 
Among those attracted again to Singapore by the prospects of cheap labour were Japanese companies, 
who were being pushed out of Japan by the higher production costs brought about by the rapid 
appreciation of the yen. It was Japanese investment, totalling close to $1 billion between 1986 and 
1988, that enabled Singapore to come out of the recession. Clearly cheap labour for low value-added, 
labour-intensive production was the magnet that attracted capital back. Despite the wave of 
investments from Japan, Singapore's technocrats realised that its MNC dependent export-oriented 
economy was more than ever in a precarious position (Straits Times, 3rd December 1988). 
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With the failure of the Second Industrial Revolution to attract R&D facilities and other high 
technology investments, the PAP technocrats worried that the window of opportunity for high-tech 
migration might be closing. Like the other NICs, Singapore was undergoing a stmctural squeeze, 
threatened at one end by lower cost labour in other third world countries but tmable to make the 
transition to high-tech production. Facing this dilemma, Singapore's technocrats began to talk less 
about making the island a centre of high-tech manufacturing and more about plans to develop it as 
Southeast Asia's financial and service centre. This meant displacing Hong Kong as the regional 
banking centre and stock market, and doubling efforts to get corporations to make Singapore their 
regional headquarters, or the staging area for their manufacturing and marketing forays into the other 
countries of ASEAN (Ministry of Trade and Industry, p61. Singapore 1986). 
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Cllllallpteir 7 
RegimmaR K~rntegralltimm Agreeme~rnt§: An lEa§1t A§ ian 1fradling Bloc 
There are few who would quarrel with the proposition that more rapid growth of an open, 
international economy will lead to more rapid growth for the developing countries, given their trade 
and payments regimes. Moreover, for developing countries as a group, an open multilateral system is 
essential if those countries basing their growth strategies on an outward-oriented set of trade policies 
are to be able to achieve anything like the same degree of success attained by the outward-oriented 
countries in the 1960s and 1970s. An even stronger statement can be made: in the unlikely event that 
the industrial countries were to restrict the rate of growth of real exports from the developing 
countries to, say, the rate of growth of real GNP in the industrial countries, that would severely 
dampen the growth prospects of the developing countries as a group (Pearson and Riedel, 1990). 
To be sure, developing countries with outward-oriented trade policies will generally have better 
economic performance than those with highly restrictive import-substitution regimes. (Krueger, 
1984). There can be little doubt that the developing countries now have a strong stake in the GATT 
system. And, as indicated by their increasing share in world trade, they would have an increasingly 
strong voice and should participate more fully in GATT activities. Historically, however, the 
developing countries insisted upon 'special and differential' treatment within the GATT (Wolf, 1987). 
This insistence was based upon the ideology of export pessimism, and the belief that manufacturing 
industries of developing cmmtries could not compete with established industries in developed 
countries. In the 1950s and 1960s, the stance of the developing countries was consistent with their 
policies toward trade and payments regimes. 
A few of the advanced NICs, especially Singapore, have indicated a greater interest in the Uruguay 
Round of trade negotiations, and have recognised the importance of a successful outcome to them. 
GATT negotiations result in reciprocal reductions of trade barriers. These reciprocal reductions are 
then mutually 'bound', to assure trading partners of the permanence of the cuts. Developing countries, 
by staying aloof from the major GATT negotiations and by retaining special and differential treatment 
and simultaneously citing the balance of payments exception to justify their continued protection, have 
been unable to negotiate for reciprocal benefits. Their trend toward increasing liberalisation has been 
unilateral (Wolf, 1987). 
Thus, despite the very significant trend toward increased liberalisation of trading regimes by 
developing cow1tries, little has been gained by way of negotiated liberalisation on the part of the 
developed countries. During the 1960s and 1970s, failure to negotiate reciprocal concessions was 
probably not important, due both to the small amount of trade carried on by the developing countries 
and the fact that the industrial countries were in any event undertaking major liberalisation of their 
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trade and payments regimes. In the 1980s and 1990s, however, the failure of developing cmmtries 
actively to negotiate could be far more costly: protectionist pressures in the developed countries are 
probably stronger than they were in earlier decades, and the larger share of the developing countries 
makes them vulnerable to protectionist pressure. 
The debate on tl1e merits of regionalism is not new. More than forty years ago, Jacob Viner (1950) 
showed tl1at extending a preferential concession to a partner may well involve replacing imports 
purchased from the cheapest source with imports from the partner cmmtry, in which case trade 
diversion, rather tl1an trade creation occurs, resulting in a loss of welfare. 
But one issue that was never debated during the 1950s and 1960s was the possibility of the world 
dividing up into a few trading blocs. This simply was not a realistic prospect, given t11e long history of 
the United States as a staunch supporter of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and 
of the multilateral approach. In recent years, however, t11e United States has also supported a regional 
approach - in part, out of frustration witl1 the delays in completing the GATT talks. And although 
Japan has resisted leading the way toward a defensive bloc in East Asia because of its large stake in 
the US market, it could well change its stance. 
Four decades ago, boosted by the creation of the European Conmmnity (EC), - now the European 
Union (EU) - a wave of regionalism spread across the world. Then after laying dormant for most of 
the 1970s, it took off again in the mid-1980s. All the major players in t11e world are involved. Canada, 
Mexico, and the United States have initiated the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFT A). In 
Europe, the EC has set about to create a single intemal market, while t11e queue of countries desiring 
to join the EC com1tries continues to lengthen. There is a growing concem that a trading bloc is 
forming in East Asia under t11e leadership of Japan. And since 1985, six substantive regional 
agreements and innumerable proclamations of intent to integrate have been signed (Melo and 
Panagariya, 1992). 
The East Asian markets have accelerated their growth, and promise to maintain that momentum in 
the future, thereby raising the expected retum to the pursuit of 'open' regional integration. For 
exan1ple, Soutl1east Asia and China have emerged with new industrial dynamism as a second tier of 
Asian NICs. China's new dynamism became evident soon after tl1e country's adoption of its open-door 
policy in 1978. The Southeast Asian economies also began to grow and industrialise rapidly from the 
mid-1980s. An important measure which helped these economies to take off was their opening up to 
foreign direct investment. The subsequent inflow of investment, especially from Japan and the Asian 
NICs, has expanded substantially the stocks of capital and technology with which to industrialise. 
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Having identified the two challenges of the new regionalism, competitiveness and protectionism, the 
question needs to be asked concerning what the East Asian economies can do to respond to these 
challenges? In order to cope with the former, it would be helpful for the East Asian economies to 
promote regional integration. To cope with the latter, the East Asian economies should strengthen 
their efforts to defend and improve the multilateral trading system. The East Asian economies should 
pursue these two objectives at the same time. It is important to note that the two need not conflict with 
each other, for there can be two types of regionalism - closed and open - and the conflict with the 
multilateral system does not arise in the second case. 
Regional integration can be promoted in a number of ways, such as preferential trade liberalisation, 
harmonisation of policies, and infrastructural investments. ASEAN must proceed cautiously with the 
idea of regional trade liberalisation. It cannot afford to become part of a confrontational bloc. ASEAN 
officials have made it clear that they do not want the gradual movement toward closer Pacific Basin 
cooperation to result in a closed bloc or regional institution that could undermine ASEAN strength 
and unity. These officials are also concerned that a regional bloc could involve serious welfare 
reducing trade diversion and more critically, it works against the multilateral trading system (ASEAN 
Economic Bulletin, 1991). 
In 1967, five East Asian countries made the first (and only) attempt at regional integration, (Brunei 
joined in 1984) forming ASEAN. The goal of the six countries was to promote intra-regional trade 
through preferential trading arrangements among member countries. But the results have been less 
than spectacular: intra-regional trade as a proportion of total trade among the ASEAN-4 (Singapore 
excluded) grew from 3.2% in 1980 to just 4% in 1990. Of this small amotmt of intra-regional trade, 
not even 5% was covered by preferential trading agreements (Panagariya, 1994). 
Recently NAFT A, the continuous widening and deepening of the European Union and the protracted 
negotiations at t11e Uruguay Round have rekindled interest in regional groupings in East Asia. On 
January 28th 1992, tl1e ASEAN countries signed a framework agreement to create the ASEAN Free 
Trade Area (AFT A) by 2006. The endorsement of the AFT A vision is a very positive development. 
Large benefits can accrue to member nations from the pooling of resources and sharing of markets, 
witl1 dynamic effects reinforcing such benefits (Naya, 1992). 
Both internal and external factors have led to tl1e creation of AFT A. First, internal economic 
conditions are more appropriate now for tl1e implementation of a free trade area than they were 
previously. In the past, the economic structures of the ASEAN countries were weak with most 
countries following inward looking economic policies. Tariff levels were relatively high in Indonesia, 
the Philippines and Thailand and ranged widely within each country. Malaysia, on the other hand, 
had relatively low levels of protection and Singapore has been virtually a free port since the 1960s. 
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The recent unilateral liberalisation that has been occurring has harmonised tariff structures to a 
considerable degree. Consequently, tl1e disparities of tariff structures have been reduced, facilitating 
further regional integration efforts. Manufactures comprised only a small share of total intra-ASEAN 
exports until recently, with Singapore playing a dominant role in the largely primary product and 
entrepot trade of tlle region. The rapid industrialisation, which took place in the 1980s and 1990s in 
all of the cmmtries, has caused tlle percentage of manufactured e"-'}JOrts to rise dramatically. This rapid 
industrialisation has given rise to a large increase in intra-industry trade in manufactured products in 
tlle region, making trade more complementary tllan competitive between the ASEAN nations. To 
realise the potential for intra-regional trade creation, it is essential to develop trade patterns based on 
intra-industry specialisation, similar to trade between developed countries such as witltin tlle EC 
(Naya, Imada and Montes, 1991). 
There is also increasing external pressure on ASEAN to come togetller economically. Developing 
countries in oilier regions are undertaking economic reforms and opening tl1eir economies to trade 
and investment witll great success. For example, Latin American countries have recovered from the so 
called "lost decade" of tl1e 1980s; economic reforms have spurred economic growtl1 and tl1ese 
countries are now beginning to attract export-oriented investment. Similar developments in Eastern 
Europe and Soutl1 Asia accentuate the trend. Competition from these other developing areas make it 
critical tllat ASEAN's attractiveness to investors be enlmnced. One way of doing so is to create a large 
single regional market through AFTA (Naya, 1992). 
Botll economics and politics are against a discriminatory trading bloc in East Asia. Historically, East 
Asia has benefited greatly from an open world trading system. Despite a redirection of trade toward 
itself in recent years, tlle region still ships two tltirds of its exports to tlle rest of tlle world. 
Given tlle importance of open markets to tl1e region's economic growth, the case for an East Asian 
bloc should be evaluated primarily in terms of tlle impact such a bloc would have on tlle world trading 
system. The region's future interests will be best served by a strategy tl1at promotes an open world 
trading system. A discriminatory trading bloc does not fit tl1at bill. 
An approach tl1at encourages regionwide trade liberalisation on a nondiscriminatory basis may still 
hold some promise. In the long run, this approach could serve as a stepping stone for Japan and China 
to assume a leadership role in promoting global free trade similar to tlmt played by England in tl1e 
19th century and the United States in the post-war era. Unfortunately, such liberalisation is unlikely, 
because of short-term adverse effects on the region's tenus of trade. 
The economic desirability of an East Asian trading bloc depends on two factors. First, an East Asian 
bloc may serve as a deterrent to the fom1ation of closed trading blocs arom1d tl1e world. According to 
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this argument, the world is already dividing into blocs. To ensure that they do not become overly 
protective of and limit access to their own markets, East Asia should be united and in a position to 
retaliate. Unilateral actions such as those taken by the United States under its super 301 provisions, 
for instance, would be harder to implement with a united East Asia. Second, the fonnation of regional 
blocs could facilitate future rounds of the GATT. The Uruguay Round was protracted in part because 
of the large number of participants and the 'free rider' problem such a number generates. One reason 
for the success of past GATT rounds was that the United States could deal with the EC as a single 
unit. This fact has led many to conclude that a small number of blocs could make future GATT 
negotiations more manageable. Such blocs would also assume responsibility for many intra-regional 
trade issues, so that the GATT process could be used primarily to resolve problems between regional 
trade areas, and to bring down barriers, swiftly and efficiently (Panagariya, 1994). 
Both of these arguments have merit but are highly contentious. Critics note that blocs enjoy more 
market power than individual countries, so tl1at, in principle, nothing prevents blocs from raising 
rather than lowering trade barriers. As a deterrent, then, blocs function only as long as they do not 
carry out the threat to raise barriers. Once the tlrreat is canied tlrrough and a trade war breaks out, 
retaliatory actions are likely to be more severe than they would be without blocs. In addition, critics 
note that small numbers do not necessarily mean faster progress in trade talks. The EC process tl1at 
began in 1957 is still working toward a single market. In tl1e meantime, the region's nontariffbarriers 
have proliferated, with the coverage of these trade restrictions e.li.1Janding fivefold between 1966 and 
1986 (Panagariya, 1994). 
Internally, there are at least three interrelated factors working against a regionwide free trade area. 
First, the major players in the region have historically been political rivals. Through time, trade and 
intra-regional investments have gone a long way toward bringing these fanner enemies closer. 
Second, the East Asian cow1tries have very different levels of protection and are at very different 
stages of development, suggesting that the distribution gains from a free trade area would be uneven. 
Third, East Asia comprises a large number of countries, making negotiations for a free trade area a 
daunting task. It has been difficult for the ASEAN countries to make progress with just six members. 
For twenty five years, despite many efforts, success in promoting trading was minimal (Naya, 1989). 
In the early years of ASEAN's existence, there was virtually no progress towards any fonn of 
substantive cooperation. There was nothing more than the laying of the foundation stone for the 
member countries to conduct periodic consultations and to nuture consensus. It has been successful in 
promoting peace and stability in the region, cultural development and better personal interrelations, 
and, to a more limited extent, economic growth of its member states. Although the peace and stability 
that ASEAN cooperation brought about have had an important influence on the rapid economic 
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growth of individual countries, ASEAN member states have not been able to internalise as a group 
ASEAN economic cooperation for growth (Broinowski, 1982). 
To outside observers, the idea of close economic cooperation, let alone integration, among five 
countries as disparate in size, industrial development and political and cultural orientation as the five 
ASEAN countries has seemed incongruous, until they remembered that there were not insignificant 
differences in size betvveen Gennany and Luxembourg, in industrial development between Britain and 
Demnark and in cultural and political orientation between Italy and the Netherlands. The case for 
regional economic cooperation, specialisation and trade liberalisation is in no way weakened by these 
differences, though they inevitably make for slow progress. 
Indeed, it can be argued that these causes of slow progress are an advantage rather than a 
disadvantage for ASEAN. The economic costs of over-enthusiastic promotion of regional trade, 
through the diversion of trade to high cost sources, are well known. The cautious eye to national 
advantage that has been evident in each member country's approach to ASEAN cooperation is an 
important constraint on tendencies towards trade diverting approaches to regional cooperation. 
Similarly, the greater ease with which the five countries have agreed on approaches to external 
economic partners has helped to preserve a healthy, outward-looking orientation. 
It is some achievement that ASEAN over the years has been able to demonstrate regional political 
solidarity, has to its credit a few small economic gains, and has avoided the mistakes of trade 
diversion that have marred some attempts to accelerate economic development through regional 
integration elsewhere in the world. Given the importance of the maintenance of the post-war liberal 
international economic order to the long term growth prospects of the ASEAN countries, the 
emphasis so far on access to OECD markets is well placed. 
If we focus our attention to the period of 1967 to 1976, generally there was no real progress for 
ASEAN. There was only some forn1 of political hannonisation, particularly within the framework of 
foreign policy. Attempts in the integration efforts of ASEAN were geared more towards peace and 
stability. Admittedly, the strength of its solidarity in tltis sense, derives from the fall of Saigon. It was 
undoubtedly a right track for the protection of the region's security. Following this argument, ASEAN 
is indeed quite a successful form of political organisation (Broinowski, 1982). 
On the other hand, if we look from the angle of economic integration, during this period, ASEAN's 
integration is a complete failure. Though the main aim oftl1e ASEAN establishment (as can be found 
in the Bangkok Declaration) is to promote 'active collaboration' and mutual assistance on matters of 
common interest in the economic, social, cultural, technical, scientific and administrative fields, there 
was not much collaboration in economic or other fields during t11at period. 
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Obviously the slowness in pace towards economic integration in ASEAN, makes it a unique 
cooperation scheme in developing countries. Unlike other integration schemes where ambitious 
programmes were launched shortly within the first year of their existence, the ASEAN process of 
integration was entirely open minded and highly unstructured. In fact, the word integration itself has 
all along been avoided. Thus, even if we evaluate ASEAN integration by comparing it to other 
integration schemes and find out that its beginning was a complete failure, we realise that the first 
nine years of ASEAN was actually spent in building their 'sense of community' an10ng the members. 
Although the early existence of ASEAN may not bring meaningful benefits to the integrating 
countries, the trust that the countries have gathered in creating the 'sense of conunmtity' and solidarity 
should be considered as praiseworthy. 
From the experiences that have been reviewed, the only factor that slows the momentunl of the 
integration of ASEAN from 1976 to the present is in fact the 'integration machinery' itself. The top 
hierarchy in the organisation structure of ASEAN is composed of ministers who are, of course, 
politicians. The process of integration gives rise to lengthy negotiations and repeated consultations 
which result in the low implementation rates of most of the ASEAN projects. When integration 
progran1mes are brought to the drawing board, they are often turned into a political exercise involving 
political juggling so that the end result can be far removed from the concept of equitable distribution 
of cost and benefits of the integration. This is quite different to that of EFT A where the Council of 
Ministers makes swift decisions on matters concerning economic integration ie they are strictly 
following 'business means business' approach. It is tlterefore not surprising that there is a shortfall 
between objectives and results in the case of ASEAN (Jorgensen-Dahl, 1982; Crouch, 1984). 
It seems that the methods by which old projects are supplanted by new ones, reflect the learning 
through mistakes approach. However there is a lesson to be learned by tl1e proponents of the ASEAN 
integration. We view that the success of the integration efforts in ASEAN lies only in 'lubricating' the 
machinery of tlte organisation. This means that all future projects or progranlllles should have been 
carefully assessed (tluough poor feasibility studies) before they are implemented. It is also felt that the 
Advisory Committee should play a more vital role in tl1e decision making process of ASEAN. 
ASEAN offers some wortltwhile opportunities for tlte acceleration of economic growtl1 in its member 
countries. It also offers some seductive paths into dead-end, inward-looking patterns of development. 
ASEAN over the years has made some limited use of the former, while, for tl1e present at least, 
resisting the temptations of the latter. 
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ASEAN and the Regional Environment 
As Heinz Arndt and Ross Gamaut succinctly put it:- "ASEAN has looked inward to the promotion of 
intra-regional trade, and outward to the improvements of the terms of trade upon which its members 
relate to third countries." (Arndt and Gamaut 1979). Promotion of intra-regional trade is essential 
both to capture tl1e advantages of specialisation based on comparative advantage and also tl1e benefits 
of economies of scale. Indeed, this was tl1e rationale for ASEAN enunciated by the UN team of 
experts in 1969. 
The objectives were to be attained through regional cooperation in matters relating to trade and 
allocation of manufacturing industries between the member countries. The mode of regional 
cooperation or 'integration' was through regulation. The 1976 declaration of ASEAN concord 
provided instruments designed to promote integration. 
lfnadequacies of PTA 
An agreement was finally signed in 1977 and named the 'Preferential Trading Agreement' (PTA) 
(Tan, 1982). At first, seventy one concessions were covered, but by 1987 negotiations held at regular 
intervals had raised this number to 20,000 and were leading to a limited multilateralisation. In April 
1980, a general reduction of 20% was adopted for any national import flow of any one product of 
ASEAN origin not exceeding a total atmual value of US$ 50,000; in 1984 tllis ceiling was raised to 
US$ 10 nlillion, atld virtually automatic concessions were applied to certain categories of products. As 
regards tl1e origin of goods, there were rules defining the applicability of the PTA: tl1ese distinguished 
goods produced and exported directly by ASEAN from those in wllich the element of foreign 
processing did not exceed 40-50% oftl1e final value (Jackson, 1986). 
The agreement on the PTA did not compensate for the stalling of tl1e project for a free trade zone, and 
Singapore did regret that regional cooperation had to evolve at the pace of nlinimum concessions from 
the least developed member states. The Singaporean director-general for ASEAN affairs declared in 
August 1977: "Altl10ugh we would be prepared to accept any compronlise, we also have the feeling 
that because of the pace at which ASEAN is disposed to evolve, we would rather rely on our own 
arrangement." (Yue, 1978). For Singapore tlle tlleory ofthe beneficial effects oftlle PTA- tl1at it will 
create new flows of trade between member states and provide substitutes for some imports from 
outside - has hardly been proved in view of the extremely modest scale of the arrangement. 
The concessions exchanged remain insignificant despite their large number. For political more often 
than econonlic reasons, the obligation on the governments to present several hundred concession 
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offers each year leads them to choose tariff reductions on products which are of only very minor 
importance in their foreign trade, or which have never been traded before with their ASEAN partners. 
- Except for the respective national lists of unilateral concessions of Malaysia and the Philippines, and 
of Malaysia and Singapore, there are too few similarities between the national lists generally, thus 
making it impossible to promote intra-regional trade more effectively. 
-A reduction of 10-20% in import taxes turned out to be of only limited effect, because the tariffs in 
question were prohibitive. In the hypothetical case of existing tariffs being dropped altogether by the 
Philippines on all imports with an annual value below US$ 500,000, it was calculated in 1984 that the 
total increase in import purchases would have increased by only 2% (Lutkenhorst, 1984). 
- In Singapore and even in Malaysia, numerous concessions have included goods which were already 
free of duty; of 147 offers made voluntarily by Singapore in 1981, fifty three were already in this 
situation. Inversely, some other ASEAN countries have presented goods also bearing low tariffs but 
they have excluded 'sensitive' products which could foster import creation to their disadvantage 
(Singapore Department of Trade, 1981). 
- Negotiations on the basis of unilateral concessions, product by product, are long and subject to 
lobbying from pressure groups, especially those very closely linked to the govermnents of the three 
most protectionist ASEAN countries. Manufactured goods, which are precisely the major productions 
of Singapore and Malaysia, are also a constant source of conflict and disagreement among member 
states. 
- Various products eli..'])Orted by Singapore are not eligible according to the PTA rules of origin, 
concerning re-exports and manufactured goods containing too large a proportion of foreign 
components. 
No one should expect from the PTA a substantial increase in intra-ASEAN trade. Even if PTA marks 
a first step, it plays down the comparative advantage of some member states for manufactured exports, 
and of others for exports of raw materials or se1ni-processed goods. Facing considerable political 
resistance within ASEAN, PTA gives little benefit to either Singapore or Malaysia. Singapore is 
afraid that the PTA will favour and protect ASEAN's least efficient entrepreneurs but also contribute 
to the decline in competitiveness of certain branches of regional or national economic activity because 
of excessive isolation from world markets. 
The establishment of a free trade area is what the city state aspires to. A customs union would oblige a 
free trading economy such as Singapore to raise its customs protection in conformity with a conunon 
ASEAN external tariff. It would not only stimulate the growth of its industry and services, but it 
would also enable products from the outside world to enter the ASEAN market via Singapore on a 
massive scale, at the risk of obstructing or delaying the industrial take-off of A SEAN's most backward 
countries. This solution is not viable politically: Indonesia and indeed other countries are not willing 
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to sacrifice their own development for the benefit of Singapore and Malaysia, or to enable a process of 
regional industrialisation with little benefit or spillover effect for themselves (Rieger, 1988). 
Statistical analysis of the impact of PTA on regional trade suggests that it is the narrow range of 
products included in the PTA and the relatively low tariff cuts it affords that are responsible for the 
slow growth in intra-regional trade. Inorganic and organic chemicals and machinery constitute the 
m;Uor groups in which PTA preferences are concentrated. In terms of production capabilities of the 
ASEAN com1tries, the machinery group is relatively more important. Much of the existing trade of 
ASEAN in this group, however, is with the developed countries. A deeper cut in tariffs is likely to 
divert some of this trade towards the ASEAN member countries. The potential for such trade is likely 
to be much more important for Indonesia, Thailand and the Philippines because the share of the 
A SEAN countries in the total imports of machinery into these countries is low. Their imports of 
machinery products from Singapore and Malaysia, the two countries which possess production 
capabilities, is likely to grow. It is unlikely, though, that Indonesia, Thailand and the Philippines 
would concede further reductions in tariffs not only because of their strong protectionist sentiments 
but also because such reductions would result in a loss of tariff revenues (Axline, 1977). 
Thus, the slow growth in intra-ASEAN trade is to be attributed not so much to the similarity of 
industrial structures of the members as to their reluctance to engage in a broadly based tariff reduction 
exercise. Indeed, the lack of cooperation and not the similarity of industrial structures can be 
emphasised as the reasons for slow growth in intra-ASEAN trade. Cooperation has been slow to 
materialise because the member countries with similar industrial structures appear to be reluctant to 
expose their industries to competition. 
It can be seen that the economies of the five com1tries are structurally linked to those of the developed 
countries in the sense that they export raw materials and primary products and labour intensive 
manufactures to these countries and import capital intensive manufactures and machinery and 
transport equipment. Since four of the five member countries are heavily dependent on primary 
products for their exports, it is unlikely that an elimination or drastic reduction of tariffs on intra-
regional trade would promote such trade. In any case, the trade that is likely to occur as a result of 
such an across-the-board drastic cut in tariff levels would be more in the nature of trade diversion 
rather than trade creation. It is debatable if such trade diversion would be in the interests of the 
member countries. 
It could, however, be argued that the integration would promote increased specialisation and trade 
between the member countries in manufactures. Over the years the composition of exports of the NICs 
has changed from labour intensive goods to human and physical capital intensive goods. This 
development is largely owing to the continued process of capital accumulation, increased foreign 
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investment in the production of these goods, and a favourable policy environment prevailing in these 
countries. Mirroring this development is the gradual increase in e:\.l>Orts of labour intensive goods and 
hmnan and physical capital intensive goods from the other Asian countries, including Malaysia, the 
Philippines, Thailand and to a lesser extent Indonesia. Apparently these cotmtries are occupying the 
niche in exports of goods vacated by the NICs. As seen in chapter two, the RCA analysis suggests 
that, broadly speaking, e:\.l>Ort growth has been in accord with the regions changing factor 
endowments as stipulated in the conventional trade theory. At the present time much of tl1e trade of 
the NICs and that of the ASEAN cotmtries (excluding Singapore) is with the developed countries. The 
formation of a free trade area or a customs union may promote increased intra-regional trade. The 
experience of the NICs in the importation, adaptation and spread of new technology will be invaluable 
to the ASEAN economies as they strive to capture export markets vacated by the NICs. Undoubtedly, 
the NICs have played a major role in placing Asia at the forefront of the development process. 
However, the prospects for sustaining this position and for providing the growth momentum within 
Asia will require increasing economic cooperation between the Asian economies. 
The increased intra-ASEAN intra-industry trade flows may partly be because of official interventions 
such as the Preferential Trading Arrangements (PTA). Their intra-industry trade witl1 each other is 
higher t11an with tl1e rest of the world, and the trade diversion in the integration schemes probably 
accotmts for this. But given the costs of trade diversion, the higher intra-industry trade in ASEAN 
may not be beneficial. Certainly tl1e fact tlmt intra-ASEAN intra-industry trade indices have increased 
significantly since the 1970s is indicative of growing intra-industry specialisation in the region, as 
highlighted by tl1e evidence provided in chapter three which complements the relev<mt tl1eoretical 
literature. 
The dynamic benefits from integration that result in rising per capita incomes will tl1en lead to an 
increased demand for variety, which in turn implies that the scope for intra-industry trade can be 
expected to rise. This e:\.l>ected positive association between economic integration and intra-industry 
trade may be reinforced by any liberalisation of capital flows concomitant on integration, which 
encourages vertical specialisation by, for instance, multinational corporations. 
Though the method of estimation for trade creation and trade diversion proved to be of limited use in 
detennining the effects of ASEAN cooperation, it can be seen that generally, there were increasing 
trade interdependencies among the ASEAN econmnies. The work in chapter four showed that the 
economy of Singapore offers a nUI11ber of positive spillover effects for the other ASEAN countries. 
From this it would appear that the economic destiny of the ASEAN countries is increasingly tied to 
their relations with one anotl1er. It does appear that if regionalism were to become fashionable, 
ASEAN would, as a group, become more cohesive and tmited for trade negotiation purposes, and rely 
more on the internal ASEAN dynamo to promote growth for all. 
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Opening up of ASJEAN to foreign investors 
Foreign direct investment (FDI) drives international trade flows. Trade in goods from one part of a 
company to another accom1ts for perhaps 40% of all merchandise trade, totalling US$ 3. 7 trillion in 
1992. Slow economic growth has curtailed the boom in FDI in rich countries, but, investment is still 
rising in the developed world (The Economist 18th-24th 1993, p95). The recent GATT talks laid 
down general principles for MNCs who wanted a way of locking in improvements in investment rules 
to prevent backsliding. These require national treatment and forbid certain restrictions on subsidiaries' 
operations, such as local-content requirements. But developing cotmtries managed to thwart ambitious 
plans put forward by richer ones compelling governments to allow in foreign capital. They may be 
more an1enable now. Since 1986, when the Uruguay Round was launched, third world governments 
have liberalised trade and invited in foreign investors to boost their economies. 
Each national policy regulating foreign investment has developed a kind of competitive convergence 
among ASEAN member states, with each country seeking to obtain the maximmn of foreign 
investment flows into the region. In the case of Singapore, foreign investment has been closely 
associated with the concept of economic viability of the island, and to the priority guarantee of its 
permanent existence as a political entity and sovereign state. In the other ASEAN countries the 
ammal an10unt of foreign investment is also very important but not so closely related to national 
survival: these states are cushioned by large rural societies and by a diversity of natural resources; the 
role of foreign investment in these economies is tnainly to bring about the speedy realisation of certain 
development projects in the fields of infrastructure or industry. ASEAN has never been hostile to 
MNCs, mllike some other regional groupings such as the Andean Pact; it has adopted, and only in the 
fonn of a resolution, a code of conduct for MNCs (Yue, 1983). The welcome given to foreign 
investment is more or less determined by the degree of economic and cultural nationalism and the 
level of development of each member state. Since the 1987 smnmit in Manila, the member states have 
been engaged in promoting intra-ASEAN investment and the harmonisation of their national systems 
of guarantees offered to foreign investors. 
Singapore constantly works its hardest to damp down the potential jealousy of its neighbours looking 
at the considerable flow of foreign investments that pour in every year. This area of potential tension 
has eased somewhat over recent years with increasing investment flows into the other ASEAN 
com1tries. Singapore is able to emphasise the diversity of services it can offer for the benefit of its 
neighbouring economies, and its investment in Indonesia and Malaysia, including tl1e relocation of 
industries in accordance with changing comparative advantage, which has become higllly significant 
since the 1980s. 
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Developing com1tries are becoming big foreign investors in their own right. Figures issued for 1992 
by the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development show Hong Kong, Taiwan, Singapore 
and Thailand among the top ten investors in China, where FDI in 1992 totalled US$ 11 billion. Total 
FDI from developing coillltries more than quadrupled to US$ 9 billion a year between 1986 and 1990. 
That gives both rich and not-so-rich nations cause to write some rules for fair play (The Economist 
18th-24th 1993 p95). 
A customs union between the ASEAN countries, although attractive in theory, poses immense 
practical problems. Singapore, a free market oriented economy, is illllikely to agree to the erection of a 
common tariff on third coillltries at a level acceptable to the other coillltries, especially one that would 
be acceptable to Indonesia. Moreover, a genuine customs union would also require coordination of 
domestic policies with regard to the intra-regional movement of labour and capital and in the area of 
domestic tax policies. It is mllikely that the five coillltries subscribing to different economic 
philosophies would consent to such a radical change in economic policy. Therefore, although a 
customs union between the ASEAN members is possible in theory, it is improbable in practice. 
Singapore's view of economic integration 
Singapore's position within ASEAN reflects its national economic and political structures; the city-
state mainly pleads for the adoption of the same kind of instmments as those that have governed the 
efficient development of its own society and its remarkable economic success (Crouch, 1984). This is 
highlighted in Singapore's particular position with regard to intra-ASEAN trade in the industrial 
sphere. As the only economy showing a true complementarity with its partrlers, it instinctively 
distrusts regional industrial cooperation attempts that result from pure inter-govenunental 
negotiations. Based, most often, on superficial economic analyses, such initiatives result from political 
motives without enough prior consideration for the rigid economic interests of each ASEAN coillltry 
involved. As the promoter of a fabric of effective intra-regional ties which derive from the play of 
market forces and the direct involvement of local and international business circles, Singapore sees no 
valid argillllent that could support an administrative and institutional approach to cooperation between 
ASEAN industries. For these industrial branches which can only attain viability through vast 
economies of scale, a highly unified ASEAN market would not even bring enough economic 
incentive: the regional market would remain too small considering the current level of development of 
the ASEAN economies. 
Initiated in haste because of the climate of political revival prevailing at the Bali Sllllll1it of 1976, the 
six ASEAN industrial projects (AlP) did not owe their inspiration to any coherent feasibility study and 
were immediately criticised by Singapore for their gigantic scale. Each project was estimated to cost 
around US$ 250 million, and a 40% fmancial participation by the member states was programmed 
without knowing the possible source of the remaining 60%, which in principle was to be the 
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responsibility of the country receiving the project; nobody could tell either if the regional market could 
absorb the future production. Nonetheless, Japan offered a US$ 1 billion line of credit. 
The plaruting of two industrial complexes for production of urea-based fertilisers (each with a capacity 
of 500,000 toru1es), to be built in Indonesia and Malaysia, envisaged output in excess of the most 
optimistic forecasts of regional demand. Only one of the two was finally completed, in northem 
Sumatra: officially inaugurated in 1984, it is mainly an Indonesian plant serving national interests. 
Thailand was also to build a soda ash factory, but its competitiveness by world price standards was 
nullified by the fact that unrefined salt had to be transported over a distance of 430km from the north 
of the country to the coast. The Philippines presented a project for exploiting copper, then phosphate-
based fertilisers, and then timber, \vithout ever choosing one project which was econontically feasible 
(Broinowski, 1982). 
The objective of these ASEAN agreements was to implement a division of labour among member 
states for some sophisticated manufacturing productions which were well beyond the individual 
capacity of any one of the countries on its own. Singapore immediately expressed its opposition to any 
attempt at regional industrial planning imposed by ASEAN govemments and to any exclusivity clause 
binding member states to buy the final products resulting from such agreements. In 1979, however, 
certain national chambers of commerce latmched the idea of a first complementarity agreement in the 
automobile industry, with each country specialising in the supply of particular components and 
agreeing to sell the ASEAN cars on its domestic market with a 50% tariff exemption. Jakarta and 
Kuala LUlllpur also proposed that any production resulting from a complementarity agreement should 
be at least 51% controlled by ASEAN investors (Far Eastem Econontic Review, 27th July 1979). The 
principle of a general agreement on intra-ASEAN industrial complementarity was signed much later 
in October 1986. 
Singapore disapproved of the possible development of protected industrial monopolies, which would 
kill free competition in the region and favour many inefficient fim1s. Therefore, it further reduced its 
import taxes, increased those on components and parts, and declared that it would not implement the 
proposed complementarity arrangements. Finally, no ASEAN govemment wished to see Singapore 
isolate itself as it did from the ASEAN industrial projects of 1977. A comprontise was found, which 
almost entirely elintinated the initial plans for state intervention: no ASEAN production of a sintilar 
nature would be discriminated against by another member state specialising in any type of component; 
the commercial preferences granted to the goods as the result of complementarity agreements would 
be left to the discretion of each country; and they would not be allowed to exceed the concession rate 
granted in the framework of the ASEAN PTA. 
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Conceived as a more flexible instmment, better adapted to the demands and needs of the private 
sector, the basic agreement on ASEAN industrial joint ventures (AlN), signed in December 1982, 
stipulated that if two or more ASEAN entrepreneurs of different nationalities decide to collaborate, 
their financial production would benefit from a reciprocal tariff concession of 50% in their respective 
countries. In addition, eighteen sectors were initially identified - like ferrous alloys, mini-tractors, 
special paper, textile machinery and chemicals (Far Eastern Econmnic Review, 8th December 1983). 
Singapore reacted positively as the one member state which has already invested most through joint 
ventures in the region, and well before any regional agreement of that kind existed. The city-state 
judged the basic agreement to be incomplete, and made it clear that it would not participate if it did 
not obtain satisfaction. Clarification was forthcoming in 1984 on the two following points (Indorf, 
1984). First, the preferential treatment applied between the countries of the participating 
entrepreneurs was to be extended, after a lapse of four years, to other ASEAN member states 
according to the trade agreements already in force (and not by the application of a 50% tariff 
exemption as stipulated by the 1982 agreement). Secondly, a foreign company established in one of 
the member countries could control up to 49% of the joint venture or of some of the companies 
involved in the deal -a principle which certain ASEAN delegates had rejected in 1982. The first of 
these two points was adopted at the Manila Summit in December 1987, and indeed without such a 
provision the actual impact of the ASEAN industrial joint venture could not be gauged. 
During the recession of the mid-1980s, contrasting with the rapid growth of the previous decade, the 
member states all denmmced, to varying degrees, the failure or lack of adaptability of the existing 
instmments of regional cooperation and the absence of any firm cmrunitment to genuine economic 
cooperation. Meanwhile, the report of the 'twelve', published after the fifteenth meeting of ASEAN 
foreign ministers in order to diagnose ASEAN's inadequacies and what reforms should be introduced, 
produced no significant reaction. 
Criticisms and new proposals, like a multi-tier ASEAN grouping have proliferated, especially from 
Singapore since the beginning of the 1980s, a situation directly related to the economic recession of 
1984-86 which prompted the island's aut110rities to give renewed attention to making the most of the 
regional market. Certainly, Singapore does not have the power to initiate political moves in the 
region, but t11e neighbouring capitals have encouraged step-by-step, economic liberalisation measures 
at home, and a regional cooperation that is more business and market oriented tl1an before. This was 
probably owing to the international economic recession of the mid-1980s and its aftermath. The 
example of Singapore, where the business community circles and the governmental administration are 
two separate entities even if working in close collaboration, has an influence on otl1er ASEAN states 
whose domestic economies were often suffocated by bureaucratic and/or very cormpt public 
interventionism (Behrman, 1980). For the first time since 1967, the private sector in ASEAN is 
exerting increasing pressure on the six governments to make appreciable progress in mobilising the 
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real forces of the regional market. Singapore is much less isolated than before, and probably even 
better integrated in the ASEAN fomm. 
ASEAN unity and cooperation have already moderated some intra-ASEAN conflicts. The ASEAN 
spirit of cooperation has been exrpressed in the dialogue with other countries and regions outside the 
Pacific, such as the European Community. ASEAN has also been supportive of the GATT rounds. 
This not only indicates a preference for settling disputes but also a basic understanding of the wisdom 
of openness and dialogue with all parties. This attitude would militate against ASEAN support for an 
exclusive Pacific Basin organisation to confront Europe. This wisdom also recognises the benefits of 
diversifYing markets in an interdependent world, where political or protectionist shocks could be 
damaging if ASEAN depended too much on any one market (ASEAN Economic Bulletin, 1991). 
ASEAN representatives have also made clear that ASEAN recognises that it is also engaged in fierce 
economic competition. It clearly sees that ASEAN has a greater say in the world economy when it 
speaks with one voice. Therefore, it will not enter into any agreements or cooperative ventures that 
could weaken or divide ASEAN. This fundamental tension - between regional Pacific goals and 
ASEAN domestic goals - is likely to endure. It is exacerbated by conflicts between the goals of 
individual member states of ASEAN and larger Pacific regional goals. ASEAN works by consensus, 
and if one member state has strong objections to Pacific Basin regional cooperation, the other member 
states will not break ASEAN unity and proceed without it. Tltis makes for a slow process toward new 
initiatives, but is balanced by ASEAN's basic policy of openness and consultation in its relations with 
other countries (Hardt and Kim, 1990). 
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ASEAN and Pacific Economic Cooperation 
Conditions for economic growth 
The ASEAN economies meet the conditions for continued strong economic growth - with one key 
exception. They have the raw materials, the educated workforce, and the economic leadership, but 
they do not have the markets. ASEAN is not only vulnerable to blatant protectionism or economic 
recession in developed com1tries but could also experience problems if it fails to attract investment 
and technology transfer or if the heavy hand of government continues to restrain the fi.Ill energies of 
the private sector. In other words, ASEAN is in as much danger from its own protectionists and 
defenders of the status quo as is the United States or the European Commmlity (EC). If ASEAN is to 
continue its successful economic performance, it must continue to increase its involvement in the 
world economy by opening its markets to new teclmology and business services that will increase its 
competitiveness. It must also recognise its environmental problems and be willing to take greater 
leadership in international forums. Economic issues should be given equal priority with political 
issues at the annual ministerial meetings. While ASEAN may not be able to participate directly in the 
seven-nation Economic Summit, it should make its views known to all the pcuticipants in advance 
rat11er than relying on Japan to represent its interests, as seems to have been the case in the past. 
Given the lllailY important factors t11at contribute to economic growth, ASEAN cailllot go it alone. 
Because of the deep and pervasive interdependence of the world economy cu1d ASEAN's need for 
markets, ASEAN cam10t not afford to tum over its destiny to a Pacific economic bloc competing with 
other economic blocs. Competing in an open world economy is one thing; competing witl1 Japan, 
Korea, and Taiwan in a closed bloc would be quite anot11er. One ASEAN leader, the Malaysicu1 Prime 
Minister, Dr Mahathir put it this way: "Recent experience thus teaches us that national policies alone 
are incapable of solving our domestic economic problems. The reality has changed: the world 
economy drives us, not tl1e other way rmmd." (Hardt and Kim, 1990). 
The need for regional economic cooperation 
For ASEAN, with its commitments to world markets and an open international economic system in 
which it can prosper, regional macroeconomic cooperation must be approached cautiously. Macro 
policy is dominated by Japan on the financial side and by tlle United States in trade. ASEAN needs 
t11e EC and other markets too much to adopt a narrow or confrontational regional position. In the past, 
Japan has consulted with ASEAN and then suggested tllat it was representing ASEAN interests at tl1e 
Summit (Hardt and Kim, 1990). It would be prudent for ASEAN to communicate its views directly to 
the oilier players, especially the United States. The critical issue in any regional discussion of 
macroeconomic policy issues is whetl1er they can be dealt witl1 effectively without t11e participation of 
the Europeans. The ASEAN countries have long-standing ties witl1 Europe and active trade and 
investment relations. As the world economy becomes more and more competitive and interdependent, 
ASEAN must seek new market niches (Seah, 1975). 
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Asia lP'acific Economic Cooperation (AlP'EC) 
APEC was initially conceived as an informal forum of officials from Asia-Pacific countries in 
response to the rise in economic regionalism, notably the EC and NAFf A. Largely because of this, 
Australia the plans initiator, excluded the US and Canada in early 1989 when it first proposed the 
grouping that became APEC. The US reacted angrily to its exclusion from an economic group they 
felt would be dominated by Japan. 
When APEC ministers first met in Canberra in 1989, the grouping had 12 members: the ASEAN six 
and ASEAN's six dialogue partners in the Pacific, the United States, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, 
Japan and South Korea. The EC, also a dialogue partner, was not included. APEC was then intended 
to be an informal consultative forum. But two years later in Seoul, APEC began to spell out the 
members' commitment to free trade and economic collaboration through 'open regionalism'. After 
initially objecting to Taiwan and Hong Kong's participation, China agreed to their joining as 
'economies' rather than countries. APEC's fifteen member countries now account for about 50% of the 
world's production and 40% of global trade and will account for more by the year 2000. Furthermore, 
intra-regional trade among APEC economies in 1992 reached an amazing 65%, (see table 7.1) 
surpassing that within the EC and despite the absence of measures that discriminate against outsiders. 
(Far Eastern Economic Review, 18th November 1993). 
Table 7.1 
APEC's exports and imports (US$ billion,l988=1992) 
APEC's exports 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 
To member countries 712.1 784.3 839.9 914.6 1,002.6 
To outside APEC 367.3 395.7 436.8 480.6 515.4 
Total exports 1,079.4 1,180.0 1,276.7 1,395.2 1,518.0 
% of intra-APEC exports 66.0 66.5 65.8 65.6 66.0 
APEC's imports 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 
From member countries 737.5 814.9 862.3 934.8 1,020.9 
From outside APEC 384.6 425.7 480.0 468.9 498.5 
Total imports 1,221.1 1,240.6 1,342.3 1,403.7 1,519.4 
%of intra-APEC imports 65.7 65.7 64.2 66.6 67.2 
Source: Australian Government, figures cited in (Far Eastern Economic Review, 18th November 
1993). 
At the outset, ASEAN has understandably been cautious about APEC. In view of the vast disparities 
in income, teclmology and skill levels among the APEC economies, there was genuine concern that 
discrepancies in national capacities to benefit from joint regional development and cooperation could 
lead to asymmetrical dependence, heightened tension and North-South polarisation within APEC. 
However, the reality of rising economic interdependence between ASEAN and the other Asia-Pacific 
economies, particularly after the active pursuit of an outward oriented strategy by ASEAN since the 
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mid 1980s, have persuaded ASEAN to recognise the need to participate in a wider forum to enhance 
economic cooperation among the Asia-Pacific economies. 
Consequently, despite earlier ASEAN fears of dilution in a wider regional organisation, t11e concern 
of being dominated and overshadowed by the much larger economies in APEC and t11e insistence on 
the informal arrangement and non-institutionalisation of APEC, ASEAN had expressed the view that 
it was prepared to participate in APEC and to contribute constructively to the consultative process. 
This is a pragmatic posture as, with less than two percent of the world GDP, it is unrealistic for 
ASEAN to hold back APEC. Propelled by powerful market forces and tmder the onslaught of direct 
foreign investment from the larger Asia-Pacific economies in linking their industrial stmcture, 
ASEAN economies will continue to be drawn deeper and deeper into the complex web of division of 
labour fast emerging in the Asia-Pacific region. A hesitant rather than an active approach towards 
APEC would still lead to ASEAN being subsumed as part of the global production and sourcing 
network of Japanese firms and the firms of the NICs, without any chall11el or fomm for effective 
representation of collective ASEAN interests (ASEAN Economic Bulletin, 1992). 
The eventual active participation of ASEAN in APEC represented a fundamental rise in confidence as 
a result of the success of their outward oriented development strategy since the mid 1980s. It is 
noteworthy that ASEAN could collectively use APEC for greater influence, somewhat analogous to 
the occasional disproportionate impact of smaller states within the EC. More significantly, ASEAN is 
at tl1e stage of pending take-off in tl1eir industrialisation process and the next ten to fifteen years of a 
conducive free trading multilateral system would be crucial. To achieve this, ASEAN needs to ensure 
a stable, free and open trading and investment system, preferably globally and if not, at least in the 
Asia-Pacific region. APEC could be an effective forum for promoting this critical ASEAN interest. In 
particular, APEC could be an effective counter-balance to the potential inward looking tendency of the 
EC. In addition, ASEAN could use APEC to chall11el Japan and the NICs' capital flows to develop the 
region rather than allow them to be diverted to Eastern Europe. 
In 1990, the Malaysian Prime Minister, Dr Mahathir, charged that the fomm was a grouping designed 
to ensure US domination, and proposed the creation of the exclusively Asian EAEG (East Asian 
Economic Group). Mahathir maintained then that Asian nations needed a collective voice in tl1e face 
of a unified Europe and the prospect of NAFf A. The US strongly opposed the idea and the proposal 
was later altered to make the group into the East Asian Economic Caucus within APEC (Far Eastern 
Economic Review, 18th November 1993). 
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East Asian Economic Group (EAEG) 
The EAEG concept was to embrace ASEAN, Hong Kong, China, South Korea, Taiwan, Japan and 
other countries in the Indochina region though there was no firm list of countries made out. The 
rationale is that cooperation and speaking with one voice was necessary among the Asia-Pacific 
countries. While it was appreciated that some countries, particularly Japan, would come under 
pressure to reject Malaysia's proposal, the membership of Japan is considered crucial to the success of 
the EAEG. Malaysia may particularly want to anchor Japan to East Asia, arguing that East Asia 
should be Japan's natural constituency rather than have it uproot industries away to Europe or the 
United States. The steps toward such a group, which would a priori exclude no country in East Asia, 
would take two stages. First, a fonnation of like-minded countries which have or share common 
interests in specific areas of trade vis-a-vis GATT and the new international trade organisation. The 
second stage envisages a formalisation of trade and economic links which would spur trade and 
investment in the East Asian region. Any formal arrangements, however, would be based on GATT 
principles, not creating unnecessary barriers to third countries' imports, not diverting trade but trade 
and investment enhancing (ASEAN Economic Bulletin, 1992). 
When ASEAN trade ministers met in Kuala Lumpur in October 1991, the EAEG was supported as an 
ASEAN initiative after Indonesia was successful in getting the name changed to East Asian Economic 
Caucus (EAEC). This was to defuse allegations that it was intended as a trading bloc. It is somewhat 
unfortunate that the EAEG concept, in excluding key Asia-Pacific players like the United States, 
Canada and Australia at its inception, has faced significant opposition from them. Their opposition 
further resulted in the cautious attitude of Japan and some ASEAN countries towards the idea 
(ASEAN Economic Bulletin, 1992). 
The share of intra-regional trade within the total EAEG trade was, in fact, a relatively low 38.8% in 
1990. But growing economic ties within East Asia and the emergence of fledgling market economies, 
are increasing the proportion of intra-Asian trade. Foreign investment and market structures in 
Guangdong and Fujian in southern China have caused China's exports to more than double since 
1982, of which 60% go to other East Asian countries. China, Taiwan and Hong Kong have all 
recently joined APEC, while Vietnam and Laos are queing to join ASEAN. Adding in Australasia, 
China and the remaining East Asian countries to the EAEG increases the proportion of intra-regional 
trade to 44.2%, higher than the 41.5% of total US, Canadian and Mexican exports that were traded 
within the proposed NAFTA in 1990 (Financial Times, 3rd February 1992). 
That both NAFT A and the largest possible East Asian free-trade zone still rely on e>..1ernal trade for 
more than half their total trade suggests that neither has an interest in undermining the multilateral 
trading system. But APEC could offer an alternative route to trade dynamism if Europe becomes 
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overtly protectionist or simply loses interest in global free trade. Combining the 23 NAFr A, East 
Asian and Australasian cotmtries into one Asia-Pacific bloc boosts their intra-regional trade ratio to 
69.4% in 1990, exceeding that of the EC and EITA combined (Financial Times, 3rd February 1992). 
Numerous factors are behind the rapid growth in intra-Asian trade since 1986, though it is impossible 
to determine their relative importance. Certainly, the currency realigrunents which took place in 1985 
and 1986 were of prime importance. From 1980 to 1985 the US dollar appreciated in real tenus by 
some 40%, making the United States a relatively attractive market to Asian exporters. However, after 
the Plaza Accord the US dollar fell steadily, thereby reducing the relative profitability of expmting to 
the United States in favour of Japan, Germany and other members of the European Monetary System. 
In addition, the increasing threat of protectionism in the United States and Europe, occurring at the 
same time most Asian cotmtries were tmilaterally liberalising trade, no doubt gave impetus to intra-
Asian trade. And, of course, with income growing more rapidly in Asia than elsewhere, one would 
expect intra-regional trade to be relatively strong. 
It is clear that in the corning decade, ASEAN needs to work within a larger context or group in order 
to realise the benefits of economies of scale and division of labour as well as collectively helping to 
promote the free multilateral trading system. In such a context, it is better for ASEAN to take an 
active rather than a passive role in the evolving groupings such as APEC. It would be better for 
ASEAN to be prepared with the right institutions and policies to interact with other groupings in the 
maimer that it has selected, and better if by its own tenus as a group. 
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Cllnm jpl~tell' ~ 
Cmn~llun§Ji.onn 
There are some fundamental changes in the determinants of economic strength. In the 19th and early 
20th century, comparative advantage in land, people and natural resources plus teclmology, were the 
key factors in determining the economic power and success of nations. Mining teclmology was new. 
There was limited production of coal and steel. Those nations with the technology to extract coal and 
produce steel were the first to be industrialised. They had a tremendous advantage over other nations. 
The poorer backward countries were easily defeated and conquered because of the technical inferiority 
of their armaments and economy. 
Countries achieved greater economic power by conquering more territories and people to get more 
raw materials and larger markets. Great Britain became the most powerful country in the world. 
Through its technological advantage it gained control over more territories adding to resources and 
markets. 
Today, people can gain access to most technology and resources. So the ownership of natural 
resources or commodities is of no great economic advantage. Nor is the possession of technology, 
unless it is very advanced and reverse engineering is not easy. In this age, technology is widely and 
rapidly available to those with the capacity to absorb the knowledge. And if they have this capacity, 
they can take the advances further on their own. Of course not all sophisticated teclmology is easily 
and widely accessible. 
The open trading system under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GAIT) has provided an 
alternative route to wealth creation based on trade, investments and transfer of technology and know-
how. Those countries that have plugged themselves into this system have prospered. Outward 
orientation has paid off very handsomely for Singapore. Trade policies have not, of course, been the 
only or perhaps even the primary reason for the success of the ASEAN countries. Appropriate trade 
policies require suitable domestic economic policies. The economic 'openness' of the five countries 
varies considerably, both in tenns of the share of the international trade sector in GDP and in terms of 
the general policy orientation. But by international standards the five economies are relatively open 
and the fact that they are able to respond to ch;mging international circumstances, is undoubtedly one 
explanation of their generally good economic performance. 
Just as countries may distort the allocation of resources through import substitution, so it is possible to 
'overdo' export promotion policies, although the effects of these policies are likely to be more visible 
than in the former case. Nor is 'export-led' growth a term which appropriately characterises the 
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ASEAN industrialisation experience since the 1960s, notwithstanding its relevance to one or two of 
the countries. E:\.']JOrt-oriented industrialisation would seem to be a more suitable description of the 
recent record: it reflects the greatly increased importance of manufactured exports to the region, and it 
is indicative of major policy changes in the last three decades. Moreover, it is indicative of changing 
trade and industrialisation strategies, and particularly of the fact tl1at developing countries no longer 
necessarily experience an import substitution phase before embarking on the export drive. 
The Asian NICs embarked on tl1eir export-oriented drive at a particularly favourable period. This was 
during the sustained post-war economic boom when developed country markets grew rapidly, and 
protectionism generally declined. Such fortuitous circumstances are unlikely to be repeated in the 
immediate future. Nevertheless, even during an era of slow growth, the international economy is still 
expanding. The economies of the developed countries have more tl1an doubled in size since the mid 
1960s. However, all evidence suggests that ASEAN manufactured exports and import penetration 
have grown since the 1970s, including during periods when economic growth rates declined. Thus, 
the international economy, and the ability of the world market to absorb increased ASEAN exports, is 
the critical external factor. 
Japan began to vacate the more labour-intensive activities in the late 1960s. This provided an 
important stimulus for Singapore's exports, initially as a major competitor began to withdraw from the 
market, and subsequently as a new export market emerged. Singapore was ideally placed to take 
advantage of the transfonnation of the Japanese economy, with some spill-over to the otl1er ASEAN 
cmmtries. Just as Singapore benefited from the changes in the Japanese economy, the ASEAN 
economies have benefited from tile continuing transfonnation, expanding their manufactured exports, 
including those to the NICs and Japan. There are of course, many otlwr 'near NICs' outside ASEAN, 
but they do not enjoy the advantage of geographical proximity and close commercial contact. Foreign 
investment by the NICs in ASEAN has been an additional means of relocating industrial activity 
rendered uncompetitive in the fom1er. 
Singapore remains important as a demonstration effect for the rest of ASEAN. Just as Singapore's 
initial export drive in the 1960s prompted a re-think and eventual policy reorientation among the 
ASEAN governments, so the maintenance of continued outward-looking policies in Singapore, even 
in the face of an international recession, provides a powerful antidote to those advocating a return to 
more inward-looking policies. 
Classical economic theory emphasises tl1e importance of natural resources and cost factors in 
determining comparative advantage. Singapore is an example of a country where this theory does not 
hold. It does not have any natural resources or raw materials. Singapore has always been different 
from the rest. Since it has no natural resources of its own, the rest of ASEAN had served as its 
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hinterland long before ASEAN was formed. Singapore is also more industrialised than any other 
ASEAN country. Thus, the Singapore economy has always played a complementary role in the South 
East Asia region, which also explains why Singapore has had stronger intra-regional trade linkages 
than any other ASEAN country. 
Important structural changes are taking place in the ASEAN economies. These changes may effect the 
production and trade matrices of ASEAN significantly in t11e foreseeable future. Malaysia and 
Thailand are quickly climbing the ladder in terms of manufacturing, as highlighted by Akamatsu 
(1962) in what is characterised as the 'flying geese pattern'. Indonesia is successfully reorienting its 
manufacturing sector towards the global market furough bold liberalisation measures. The Philippine 
economy has bounced back to growth. Singapore is moving away from manufacturing into technology 
and skill-intensive services, while Malaysia is losing its comparative advantage in labour-intensive 
manufacturing operations. 
The Singapore experience accords well witl1 the theory. Indeed, because of its more advanced 
industrial structure and poorer resource endowment, it has progressed further along the 'stages' 
approach forwarded by Balassa. The share (RCA) of unskilled labour intensive manufactures began to 
decrease about the mid 1970s, when rising real wages and human capital intensive manufactures 
began to erode tl1e economy's comparative advantage in these products. Correspondingly, the share of 
technology and hwnan capital intensive manufactures began to increase gradually. As would be 
expected, the share of these two groups in Singapore's manufactured exports is by far the highest in 
ASEAN, even allowing for the absence of resource based exports. The importance of 'policy' can also 
be seen to have played a role, both facilitating the industrial transformation and in determining tl1e 
extent to which Singapore is able to reap the benefits of changing comparative advantage. 
The RCA analysis in chapter two suggests that, broadly speaking, export growtl1 has been in accord 
with the region's changing factor endowments. Singapore is a rapidly growing and industrially 
advanced cow1try witl1 a very poor resource endowment. The last few years have witnessed a major 
transformation in the structure of industrial production and exports. It has shed its labour intensive 
industries as its comparative disadvantage in these activities has developed. Increasingly its industrial 
structure has evolved towards more skill and capital intensive activities. Its extremely open economy 
and the nature of the government intervention has facilitated the industrial upgrading process. 
All these factors will no doubt alter the character of ASEAN economic cooperation in the 1990s and 
beyond. There is a trend towards increased complementarity with ASEAN, which will have a 
favourable impact on intra-ASEAN trade flows, especially in terms of intra-industry trade, in tl1e 
years ahead. 
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Every competitive strength Singapore has today has been consciously created and developed through 
deliberate policies. They have always realised that the only way to make a decent living for their 
people was to make themselves relevant to the needs of the region and the world. So, as the region 
needed a place to buy and sell, Singapore becan1e an entrepot. As multinational corporations, first 
American, then Japanese and Emopean, needed a low-cost production site to maintain 
competitiveness, they provided the infrastmcture, the tax incentives and the trained workforce to 
encourage them to set up in Singapore. 
Nothing remains the san1e, therefore as things change so must Singapore in order to remain relevant 
to the people with whom they do business with. In terms of global developments, there are two trends 
that are of particular importance and relevance to Singapore. The first is the globalisation of 
businesses. Multinational companies today have become truly global in their business perspective. 
They spread out their business activities across the world according to the competitive advantage of 
each country. Their markets are becoming increasingly integrated. 
The second significant trend is the growth potential in the Asia region. Asia is e:-.-pected to be the 
growth dynamo in the world economy in the 1990s. Its economic perfonnance is dominated by Japan 
and the four NICs - Singapore, Hong Kong, South Korea and Taiwan. Their share of world GNP has 
more than doubled over the last twenty years. Their share of world exports has more than trebled. If 
they maintain these growth rates, their combined GNP would exceed that of the European Community 
by early next century and the United States by the year 2015. Parallel to this growth, intra-Asian trade 
has been expanding at a rapid rate. In the past, Asia was viewed primarily as a low cost supplier. It is 
now emerging as a major market in its own right. (EDB, 1990, Dept of Trade and Industry.) 
Michael Porter of Harvard undertook a four year study on the competitive advantage of nations. 
(Porter, 1990). He concluded that national prosperity is created, not inherited. It does not grow out of 
a country's national endowments such as resources and raw materials as claimed in classical 
economics. Rather, competitive advantage has been created by several nations to overcome 
disadvantages in natural resources. Resource-poor countries such as Japan, South Korea, Hong Kong 
and Singapore bear testimony to tltis thesis. These countries have generated their own competitive 
advantage by creating new strengths such as highly skilled and dedicated workers or top class 
infrastructure. Porter concluded that ultimately nations gained competitive advantage in particular 
industries because their environment was the most forward looking, dynamic and challenging. 
Growth in Asia over the last twenty years has been led by Japan and the Asian NICs. Their histories 
have given them cultural ballast to adjust and adapt themselves to tl1e needs of a modem industrial 
society. Their govemments have invested heavily in human resource development. Their ambition and 
drive will carry them at high rates of growth into the next century. 
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They have compensated for their lack of natural resources by creating their own advantages. For 
example, the shortage of labour in Japan spurred innovations by Japanese companies in automation 
technology. Another example is Singapore's trauma when she was abmptly separated from Malaysia 
in 1965. Markets, raw materials and resources available in Malaysia, long taken for granted, were 
suddenly lost. Singapore has become what it is today, because the people and the government set out 
to make up for t11eir deficiencies. Circumstances forced Singaporeans to compensate by building up 
superior infrastructure, and creating the most favourable conditions including good labour-
management relations so tl1at international business can flourish, and tluough them, Singaporeans 
can plug into tl1e global economy. 
One of the main policy objectives of tl1e developing countries is the expansion and diversification of 
their exports of manufactmes and semi-manufactures. Success in achieving this objective in Singapore 
has been associated with the attailllllent of a higher proportion of intra-industry trade. The evidence 
suggests that the trend towards greater intra-industry trade may contribute to the attailllllent of the 
trading objectives of the developing countries of the region, since tl1e higher rate of trade expansion 
with which it is associated is mostly attributable to trade creation, not to trade diversion. 
The results presented in the present study are not directly comparable to those obtained by other 
authors who also analysed the determinants of intra-industry trade among developed and developing 
countries. However, tl1e work undertaken in chapter tluee has set out to explain intercountry 
differences in the e~1ent of intra-industry trade in manufactured goods by reference to hypotheses 
derived from contributions to the tl1eory of intra-industry trade. The results proved to be significant as 
all tl1e hypotl1eses put forward have been confirn1ed by the results and the explanatory power of the 
regressions was high, that is apart from the effects of economic integration on intra-industry 
specialisation. The extent of intra-industry specialisation increases with tl1e level of economic 
development, geographical proximity and Singapore's role as an entrepot. The size of domestic 
markets and the existence of trading partners with common borders also contribute to intra-industry 
trade, and it increases the extent of such trade in Singapore. 
In providing evidence on the determinants of intra-industry trade the findings in chapter tluee support 
the work carried out by Balassa and complement the relevant theoretical literature. As noted by 
Balassa nearly thirty years ago, the existence of intra-industry trade has important policy implications 
(Balassa 1966). Given that intra-industry specialisation is likely to generate just as large a welfare 
gain to com1tries as inter-industry specialisation - given also t11at t11e income distribution effect is 
likely to be less serious and tl1e adjustment problem more manageable - it may seem preferable for 
countries to encomage more intra-industry specialisation. Certainly intra-industry specialisation will 
meet witl1 less domestic resistance than inter-industry specialisation. This was tl1e experience of the 
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western industrialised countries over much of the post -war period. It was for tlli.s reason that GATT 
was relatively successful in lowering trade barriers on manufactures in the first twenty five years after 
the war. Most trade took the forn1 of trade in manufactures and this took place between mature 
industrialised economies possessing similar factor endowments. Intra-indusuy specialisation was tlle 
predominant type of international specialisation. It was only in later decades that frictions began to 
develop, first with the admission of Japan to GATT and, later, with the growth of developing cmmtry 
exports of manufactures. The NICs possessed relatively different factor endowments to the advanced 
industrialised countries and so their trade with the latter tended to take the forn1 of inter-industry 
specialisation. The result has been considerable friction between the NICs and the advanced 
industrialised countries. 
As the economies of tl1e NICs and the ASEAN countries mature, more of their trade will take the 
fonn of intra-industry specialisation. Rising wage costs have already begun to reduce the traditional 
comparative cost advantage in labour-intensive manufactures in the ASEAN countries. However, this 
will benefit tlle western industrialised economies, and Japan, if they adopt policies that encourage 
more intra-industry specialisation. 
Of tl1e trade that the ASEAN countries do with each other a sizeable part (about 40% in the second 
period, 1976-84) is in the fonn of intra-industry trade or 'competitive' trade. This is lower than for 
trade among industrial countries, as it has been shown elsewhere that intra-industry trade varies with 
tlle degree of development. These findings are broadly in conformity witl1 tl1eory: unlike inter-industry 
trade which depends basically on tlle pattern of factor endowments, as stipulated by tlle Heckscher-
Ohlin model. This is not surprising as Singapore, tlle most advanced of all t11e ASEAN cotmtries, 
accounts for the bulk of ASEAN's intra-industry trade with tlle developed countries. Nor is it 
surprising to find that the intra-industry trade indices among the ASEAN countries are higher tl1an 
those with third cmmtries, but for a few exceptions. The increased intra-ASEAN intra-industry flows 
may partly be due to official interventions such as the Preferential Trading Arrangements (PTA). 
Their intra-industry trade wit11 each other is higher tllan with the rest of the world, and t11e trade 
diversion in the integration schemes probably accounts for tlli.s. But given the costs of trade diversion, 
the higher intra-industry trade in ASEAN may not be beneficial. Certainly the fact that intra-ASEAN 
intra-industry trade indices have increased significantly since the 1970s is indicative of growing intra-
industry specialisation in the region. 
While t11e level of industrialisation has been mentioned as being associated witl1 the level of intra-
industry trade, it seems likely that the nature of the foreign trade regimes may also be important. 
Indeed, overall trade policies or strategies may be more important t11an specific devices for stimulating 
intra-industry specialisation and trade. Superficially, it would appear from the case of ASEAN that 
the more open economies and export-oriented countries such as Singapore l1ave higher intra-industry 
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trade ratios. If research can establish the importance of the nature of the regime relative to other 
factors and if it can be shown that there are net long-term gains, then snch findings would lend 
support to the choice of export orientation as a superior industrialisation strategy, although tllis is a 
very complex question. Certainly, it would seem desirable that any conscious move towards the 
promotion of intra-industry specialisation should be part of a consistent and comprehensive trade and 
industrialisation strategy. On the other hand, the direction of a country's policies and its priorities may 
change. In tltis contel\.'1, specific devices such as export subsidies or export processing zones may be 
useful in encouraging the transition to a more open trading regime, in promoting certain social 
objectives or decentralisation, or even in offsetting external disecononlies or itlitial costs. As a general 
guide, the costs of such schemes, whetl1er used in isolation or as part of a more general strategy, 
should not exceed the expected flow of future benefits, including any e"-iernalities. Evidence shows 
that positive action by governments can promote intra-industry trade, but, before a comprehensive and 
internally consistent policy package can be put together, further information is needed about the 
experience of individual countries and regions and about the econonlies of production at t11e process 
level in specific industries. 
A finding of considerable importance, as seen in chapter three, is that intra-industry trade is on the 
increase. This is particularly pronounced in the case of Singapore's trade with industrialised and 
newly industrialising econonlies. And t11ere are reasons to believe that the bulk of the intra-industry 
trade consists of intra-firm sales. The latter is intimately related to foreign investments in Singapore's 
manufacturing sector in general and export-oriented industries in particular. More specifically, the 
role of multinationals and the presence of transfer pricing in intra-firm sales have rendered the 
structure of trade in manufactures so complex that it cannot be analysed within the simple framework 
of traditional theory. In other words, comparative advantage cannot be adequately explained in terms 
of factor and resource endowments. Therefore, it appears that Singapore has little choice in tl1e 
direction of its external trade in manufactures, given the structure of foreign direct investments in t11e 
country. It would then follow that Singapore's trade policy is heavily influenced by, or dependent on, 
its foreign investment policy and not the ot11er way around. In other words, Singapore can bring about 
changes in its trade structure only via changes in the structure of foreign investments in the country. 
The application of Balassa's method of estimation, for trade creation and trade diversion, involving 
the comparison of ex-post income elasticities of import demand in intra-area and extra-area trade for 
periods preceding and following integration in chapter four, proved to be of linlited use in 
detemlitling the effects of ASEAN econonlic cooperation. The indices imply that the ASEAN 
countries have used trade diversion as a means of development, although t11e extent of trade diversion 
undertaken by each of the ASEAN countries has varied as each country has been careful in the 
calculation of national advantage. Nevertheless, as tl1e overall effect, in the study, is that of trade 
creation, it would appear tl1at ASEAN has been successful to some extent in increasing welfare. 
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However care must be taken, because in the absence of statistically significant results, the observations 
should be interpreted with caution and taken to be indicative of general trends rather than exact 
magnitudes. From the test of st:'ltistical significance there was no reason to reject the null hypothesis 
that there was no significant change in the income elasticities of import demand before and after 
integration. TI1erefore, owing to the lack of statistically significant results, it must be concluded that 
over the period of investigation (1967-85), the integration of the ASEAN economies has had no real 
impact on the region. 
In the endless debate on competition versus complementarity between the countries of the region and 
Singapore, complementarities clearly outweigh competition flows if one looks closely at the external 
trade and industrial fabric of the city-state in a regional perspective. 
The competitiveness of Singapore's manufacturing industry working to the detriment of the other 
ASEAN countries can only be seen in a few rare instances (oil refining, plywood, textiles) which have 
been flourishing at the very time when they are being delocalised or converted to more modem 
teclutiques. In Indonesia and Malaysia, the lack of industrial competitiveness in these countries 
(especially Indonesia) during the 1960s and 1970s had its origin more in their unadapted socio-
economic structures than in competition from Singapore. International circlllllstances make it ltighly 
unlikely for the time being that the ASEAN countries would succeed in launching themselves into 
advanced manufacturing on a serious scale, which would face Singapore and other newly 
industrialised countries either with bitter competition or a structural recession. 
However, potential NICs like Malaysia and Thailand and even relative newcomers like Indonesia, 
have benefited from the new international division of labour since the second oil crisis of 1979. Large 
amounts of foreign investment have been poured into ASEAN labour-intensive manufacturing, 
especially from 1986 to 90, pushing these economies upwards, even in highly specialised production 
like automobiles (Malaysia) or aeronautics (Indonesia). Such changes in the region have reinforced 
Singapore's strategy of rapid industrial delocalisation to its neighbours, and the fhture niches of the 
city-state will be concentrated more and more in services rather than pure manufacturing. 
New ties of complementarity are to be found everywhere in the primary and secondary sectors, as in 
the service sector. Singapore functions today as a regional pole for development, distributing to its 
neighbours low-priced equipment, products and services and, in addition, transfers of finance and 
know-how which thus multiply intra-regional and external interdependence. This division of labour, 
of which the industrialisation of Johore and Batam are good examples, is not unilateral. Owing to its 
size and limited resources, Singapore has neither the capacity nor the ambition to develop on its 
territory the complete network of modem industry. Its neighbours are not restricted to second-rate 
production. Reciprocally, these countries, which conunand only liinited industrial and financial 
286 
capital, cannot fail to benefit from the presence on their doorstep of a concentration of industrial and 
teclmical facilities to be used for their own efforts at economic diversification. 
The interdependencies among various ASEAN partners should be seen as mutually beneficial even 
though it is difficult in practice to ensure absolutely equitable welfare gains. Even if one ASEAN 
country does gain more relative to another, this should not be eA'Ploited as a nationalistic, emotive 
issue which may argue for less rather than more trade linkages. As interdependencies increase with 
time, greater coordination of policies will in fact be needed to ensure that the impulses transmitted 
through trade are fully exploited instead of weakened by jealousies and physical and mental blocks. 
ASEAN has had little success in promoting its stated objectives. The type of regional cooperation in 
trade and industrialisation that it has attempted to promote can be best described as integration 
through regulation. Such a scheme necessarily involves conscious policy coordination and an effort of 
will to succeed on the part of the member countries. It requires individual member cmmtries to 
sacrifice short-term national objectives in the interests of long-term objectives for the group. The 
member countries of ASEAN, though aware of these prerequisites for success, appear to have been 
reluctant to abide by them. The main stumbling block in the way of progress appears to be the marked 
differences in the development strategy and economic philosophy of the principal member countries. 
The Association, though, appears to have had some success in negotiations with the developed 
countries on trade-related issues of significance to individual member countries. ASEAN has had little 
impact on either the magnitude or the pattern of FDI in the region. The impressive growth 
perfonnance of the member countries in recent years is to be attributed to their resource endowments, 
fiscal discipline and the outward-looking strategy of development pursued by two of the five member 
countries. 
It is likely that the classical mode of integration would have served the member countries better than 
the mode of integration through regulation which they have attempted. But given the differences in 
economic philosophy among the member countries, the likelihood of the five countries embarking on 
a customs union appears to be remote. Indeed, given the strong trade and investment links they have 
forged with the developed countries and the prevailing pattern of their resource endowments, it is 
arguable whether a customs union would fare any better than the loosely knit organisation in place. It 
is worth noting that the record of ASEAN is none too encouraging for those championing the so-
called 'Pacific Concept' - a wider grouping of both the developed and developing countries in the 
region. The concept is likely to remain a theoretical possibility, much talked about, but with little in 
the way of concrete measures to promote it. The concept is faced not only with the problems 
associated with economic nationalism on the part of the developing countries, but also with deep-
seated suspicions concerning the political motives of the developed countries in mooting the idea of a 
Pacific c01muunity. 
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The high economic growth of Japan and the Asian NICs has now spread to the ASEAN countries. 
Over the last few years all these countries have deregulated and liberalised their economies. They now 
set out to get foreign investments and participation in their economic development. Fundamental 
changes are also taking place in the pattern and structure of FDI in Singapore. The bulk of FDI has 
flowed into the manufacturing sector with a noticeable shift in the origins of foreign capital. As in the 
case of trade there has been a shift from the Atlantic to the Pacific, with the EC becoming 
progressively less important than Japan and tl1e East Asian NICs emerging as significant sources for 
capital. 
It is important to note tl1at tl1e changes in the direction of trade and investment flows are by no means 
peculiar to Singapore, as such trends are readily observable in other ASEAN countries as well. What 
Singapore has been experiencing in its trade and investment relations with the outside world is simply 
a reflection of the fundamental shifts taking place at tl1e global level. There is no doubt that Singapore 
is benefiting from all this, as the country's recent impressive perfonnance, in terms of GDP growth, 
export growth and other economic indicators can be largely attributed to U1e Pacific phenomenon. 
The work in chapters five and six has shown tl1at the MNCs operating in Singapore have had a 
significant effect on the structure of the economy. It is abundantly clear that MNCs or their affiliates, 
posses a number of distinctive features. Their range and structure of output is different, they generally 
record a higher productivity and/or profitability, they are prone to engage in more international 
transactions and they are likely to be more vertically or horizontally integrated. The case of Singapore 
emphasises that, in the absence of MNCs, the structure of domestic activity would be very different 
from what it is. In Singapore where economic signals are especially favourable to foreign MNCs, 
inward investment has helped upgrade the quality of indigenous resources. But since most of these 
subsidiaries are export-oriented and closely integrated into the global or regional strategy of tl1eir 
parent companies, their impact is likely to be very different from that of their indigenous competitors. 
MNCs have a munber of distinguishing features. The first is that MNCs posses certain so called 
ownership advantages over their non-MNC competitors. While some of these advantages are country 
of origin specific, others arise from their ability to capture the economies of integration of producing 
or marketing activities, undertaken in more tlmn one, and usually several, countries. 
The second reason is tlmt MNCsjudge resource usage and allocation in any one oftheir affiliates from 
what is good for tl1e enterprise as a whole rather tllan from tlle viewpoint of an individual production 
unit. It follows that whenever there are benefits or costs resulting from operation of the affiliate which 
are external to it, but internal to the MNC of which it is part, tllen the interests of the two will diverge. 
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In such cases, their conduct and behaviour will be different from what would happen if the separate 
affiliates were under independent ownership, as will their response to changes in exogenous variables. 
The size of the recipient economy may also be an important enviromnental variable. In Singapore 
MNCs dominate many industrial sectors; hence their distinguishing features stand out. It is also clear 
that the fastest growth in MNC activity - at least within the manufacturing sector - is occurring in 
sectors in which rationalised investment is taking place where MNCs seek to take advantage of the 
different characteristics of the countries in which they produce. There is also evidence of a growing 
amount of intra-industry trade between the affiliates. This form of dependence on the division of 
labour fashioned by MNCs has a number of special characteristics which are particularly felt by small 
economies, such as Singapore, which are part of customs unions or free trade areas. 
MNCs impinge on the economic structure of countries both by their choice of economic activity, and 
by their conduct and performance in the sectors in which they produce. While the former impact may 
be related to OLI characteristics of the sectors and the existing market structure, once established, the 
conduct and performance of MNC affiliates affects their share of industry output, and with it, of 
market structure; in turn changes in the market structure may cause MNCs to reappraise strategy and 
hence lead to further reallocation of resources. 
There is a widespread belief that the high-value activities of MNCs tend to be concentrated in the 
home countries while their overseas satellites engage in low-value activities. It would seem that as 
firms become more multinational and less etlmocentric in their outlook they direct a higher proportion 
of t11eir R&D to their affiliates; but, except in a very few cases, the great bulk of fundamental research 
continues to be undertaken in the home country, while t11e control of what type of R&D is done and 
where it is located is still very much a centralised decision and viewed from the perspective of the 
long-term goals of the MNCs as a whole, rather than those of its individual affiliates. Again, a conflict 
of interest may arise between the international division of labour of R&D activities from a corporate 
objective compared witl1 that of a particular home or host country. 
In other areas, being part of an international network of activities might enable the foreign firm to 
create more linkages with local firms than an indigenous competitor would. However, where the R&D 
is done by tl1e parent company, the host economy may be deprived of an important part of its 
opportunities for 'growing up'; this is particularly likely to be the case where the market structure and 
technology of the industry cannot economically support more than two domestic products. Yet even 
where some local R&D is undertaken by the foreign affiliate, its parent company still retains control 
over its type and usage, and there is no guarantee tl1at it will be profitable to use such teclmological 
capacity in a way consistent with the long term industrial or development goals of host countries. 
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Just as trade links an economy to an international division of labour, so does international production. 
MNCs promote different patterns of the international allocation of economic activity than would 
otherwise exist. The question of interest and concern to both host and home countries is the extent to 
which the resulting disposition of output accords with their own interests. Partly, of course, tllis 
relates to political values and goals though these are not independent of likely econonlic outcomes. 
These outcomes relate to the extent the which there is an adequate control mechanism (including that 
imposed on the market) on the actions of MNCs, ensuring that they have to be efficient and that tile 
econonlic rent tl1ey earn is nlininlised. In industries dominated by MNCs this is not easy to see. Not 
only may oligopolistic behaviom result in sub-optimal efficiency, excessive discretionary expenditure, 
wasteful advertising, and so on; policies towards the redeployment of tl1eir activities to help sponsor 
changes in international resource allocation are likely to be cautionary. In countries in which they are 
faced with no effective competition, this may slow down or stifle the development of an indigenous 
technological capacity. 
Of the fact that MNCs do introduce an element of openness, and hence vulnerability, into economies 
such as Singapore and its ASEAN partners, there can be little question. Their activities in any one 
country reflect response to changes in the world econonlic environment in the other countries in 
wllich they operate. For good or bad, they are conduits of change, and countries wllich wish to 
insulate themselves against such change may well be concerned about their structmal impact. At the 
same time, there is little evidence that the adverse consequences of change can be laid at tl1eir door. 
Their recent record on employment in both developed and developing countries, compared with that 
of national firms, is a creditable one, even though their reactions to econonlic signals may be rather 
speedier and more evenly distributed than host countries would like. 
MNCs are also an integrating force in the world economy. Again, whetl1er the kind of integration they 
promote, the way t11ey bring it about, and the distribution of the resulting benefits is acceptable to 
participating nations is another matter. But inevitably, increasing corporate internalisation and the 
growth of cross-border, intra-industry, intra-finn trade leads to a change in the stmcture and location 
of econonlic activity. But how far corporate integration is consistent with regional integration again 
rests on the policies of governments, the international market structure in which MNCs operate, and 
their individual strategies. 
Up till 1980, Singapore's attraction for business was mainly due to a low-cost business environment. 
Tllis is no longer the case. Other countries, both in the region and elsewhere, can offer lower costs 
than Singapore. To sustain the growth, Singapore has to move into higher value activities, which 
require higher skills and technology, and which can justify Singapore's higher cost stmcture. Today, 
Singapore faces increasingly stiff competition from countries up and down the development ladder -
the already developed countries, the NICs, as well as t11e developing countries. Singapore is no longer 
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competing on the basis of low cost. It must look for new factors for success. It is for tllis reason that a 
Strategic Economic Plan has been developed in order to identify what specific strategies aie needed to 
be implemented to meet the needs of the developed country activities which they are trying to attract. 
Economic positioning goes beyond competitive positimling. It involves the mle Singapore can play in 
tl1e international economy and in t11e global strategies of companies. In the 1960s Singapore was a 
low-cost supplier of products and resources. In the 1970s and 1980s, as its capabilities developed, 
Singapore became involved in higher-value activities such as product development, industrial design 
and fund management. For the 1990s, as the Asia-Pacific region grows in strategic importance to 
companies and as Singapore builds on its capabilities, the aim is to play the role of a stiategic partner 
in compatlies' global operations. 
The growth potential of the Asia region provides new opportunities for strategic partnership between 
Singapore and international companies. In the early stages of economic development, Singapore had 
concentrated on 'outer-globalisation' - establishing linkages with the rest of tl1e world as they had the 
markets and technology. In the 1990s, t11e aim is 'inner globalisation', as Asia itself offers new 
opportunities for growth (Econonlic Development Board, 1990- Global strategies conference). 
Singapore is well positioned at the hub of this fast growing region. Companies can use Singapore as a 
springboard into the region. One of the strategic strengths that Singapore offers companies is its 
linkages and ties to the region. As a nation of nligrants from t11e region, Singapore has an 
understanding of the cultures and business traditions of the region. This, coupled with their 
cosmopolitan environment and infrastructural strengtl1s, makes Singapore an effective interface for 
MNCs expanding into the region. 
The survival and viability of the emporium can only be guarnteed by means of a judicious choice 
between several areas of specialisation wllich - as has often been said - do not imply superiority, a 
leading position or even segregation from the neighbouring countries. It is a question of defining 
those areas in the necessary process of constant adaptation to international market conditions, and to 
the foreseeable evolution of the regional environment in the next two to three decades. Constant 
adaptation has to be the major preoccupation of Singapore. 
Without the cooperation of the other member states of ASEAN, it is doubtful whether the growth of 
the Singapore economy would have been as rapid. The fact that Singapore was at a higher level of 
development in the integrated region implies that with a head start in industrialisation it was able to 
strengtl1en its position and increase its lead as a result of integration. It will not necessarily be in 
Singapore's interest to forge a closely knit subregional integration through discrinlinatory 
arrangements, as the trade diversion effects arising from it are likely to far exceed the trade creation 
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effects, given the resource and factor endowments of the ASEAN region. Much of the increase in 
intra-ASEAN trade in recent years is attributable to the bold liberalisation measures taken by 
individual countries in unilateral fashion outside the ASEAN framework. To say the least, the 
ASEAN market is no substitute for the global market. Nevertheless, ASEAN can play a 
supplementary role that is mutually beneficial to all its members. 
It is also important for the city-state never to forget that every break in relations with the regional 
environment, whether brought about by its own action or by one of its neighbours, could spoil the 
geopolitical conditions which have governed its brilliant development, based at one and the same time 
on regional and worldwide links. The damage, however, would probably not be fatal because of the 
close ties it has established with the industrial cow1tries. 
In short, looking at Singapore's difficulties with a rising tide of protectionism penalising its exports, 
and at the sometimes uncertain mobilisation of the foreign investments which are indispensable for 
the successful realisation of its technological ambitions, the industrial and financial expansion of 
Singapore outside its frontiers (in ASEAN and its periphery, South Asia, China, Australia and the 
West coast of the US) represents a third possible way forward, giving offence to none and allowing it 
to transcend the narrowness of its geographical and human limitations. 
The ASEAN region in particular is positioned to benefit from the business opportunities arising from 
the dynamism of the Asia region. The 1980s saw a change in the economic strategy of most of the 
ASEAN governments, from import substitution and self sufficiency to market oriented economic 
development. Interest from foreign investors has been rekindled. This provides a unique opportunity 
for business development and collaboration specifically between three ASEAN countries - Singapore, 
Malaysia (especially the state of Johor), and Indonesia (in particular, the Riau Islands). 
International companies today distribute their business activities to take advantages of the competitive 
strengths of each country. R&D, industrial design, engineering and software development are 
undertaken in countries where such skills are available. Marketing and corporate support services are 
undertaken in countries where infrastructure is well developed. Labour-intensive activities are 
undertaken where inexpensive labour is readily available. 
Companies from the OECD countries have had to distribute their activities to far flung corners of the 
world. Modern telecommunications technology has reduced the problems of coordinating these 
activities. Nevertheless, significant economies of scale can be achieved if these activities can be 
located near one another. In practise this is hard to achieve as no one country can offer both a 
plentiful supply of labour and land at competitive prices, as well as a sophisticated level of 
infrastructure and other support facilities. 
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In Asia, Singapore, Johor and the Riau Islands provide this unique combination. The Riau islands 
have ample land, and workers are freely available from other parts of Indonesia. Johor has a more 
developed infrastructure and higher skilled workers. Singapore, with a long history of 
industrialisation, has the sophisticated infrastructure and the specialised skills and support facilities. 
Because of the different stages of development the three countries complement one another nicely. 
In recent years an increasing degree of horizontal industrial cooperation has been witnessed in the 
Asia-Pacific region, particularly through the shifting of industries among Asian NICs, ASEAN 
countries and Japan. For further economic development and peace in Asia, it is important for Japan to 
continue to improve its market access, to promote its direct investment and technical transfer in this 
region, and to reinforce its industrial cooperation with ASEAN countries in a mutually 
complementary mrumer. 
As the industries develop in the Asian countries, it will become vital for Singapore to continue to 
enhance its industrial structure, and to contribute to further economic growth of its neighbouring 
countries, as they proceed. To this end, Singapore and Japan should expand the dimension and depth 
of cooperative relationship between them not only in terms of trade but also in investment and 
technical exchange. In particular, the utilisation of the vitality of the private sector is essential. 
ASEAN nations are expected to continue their vigorous economic growth, by building up their export 
capability, while increasing their interdependency among them and in the region of Asia-Pacific 
regions. This will drive Singapore, as the centre of the ASEAN economy, to advance its industrial and 
servicing structure to a higher level. 
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